1. The decision makers from NASA and Morton Thiokol were under a litany of outside pressures to proceed with the launch. This particular launch had been delayed for over six months and rescheduled a handful of times. There was significant pressure placed upon the team by the U.S. government in order to compete with the space programs of rival nations. The longer the project was delayed the more expensive it became for the both the government and the private companies, resulting in intense economic pressure. Morton Thiokol was under pressure to deliver their product on time and without faults and wanted to maintain a successful relationship with NASA for financial purposes. The general public and the masses were all monitoring the situation and took notice when major national programs are substantially delayed, creating societal pressure. In 1986 the Cold War was still active, albeit in its later stages, and the pressure to “save face” and project dominance against Russia was very real. All of these forces and more made the decision to cancel the launch bigger than a simple mechanical issue. It’s easy to say with hindsight that the decision makers should have stayed in a vacuum and prioritized safety and nothing else, but a combination of the 100% success rate and outward pressure to launch created an atmosphere more akin to “the show must go on” than safety first. I think its safe to say that type of atmosphere vanished for good shortly thereafter. 2. Roger Boisjoly was a booster seal expert for Morton Thiokol. Roger was also assigned to the to the SRM Seal Problem Task Team, whose job it was to analyze the faults associated with the O-ring design as well as determine the best course of action to combat the problem. During the teleconference on January 27th, Roger vehemently argued that the reliability of the O-ring design and its function under the colder weather conditions would be questionable at best. At colder temperatures the O-ring materials would stiffen up and their ability to effectively seal would be reduced. This would allow for both increased erosion of the O-ring as well as dangerous blow-by, in which gaseous material bypasses the seal entirely, to take place. Roger and Arnie co-led the presentation given on the teleconference, their conclusion was to scrub the mission and wait for optimal weather conditions of 53 degrees or warmer. Roger first pointed to flight 15 data, the coldest recorded launch, and the increased damage found on the boosters from O-ring blow-by. However, the Team’s points were countered because of the resounding lack of specific evidence required to prove their point. Undeterred, Roger tried arguing his point on a more basic level, citing the observed damage levels from the two flights of question, 15 and 2, and that the damage “simply looked worse” (Group Process, B, pg. 3). Again, his arguments were quelled by a lack of evidence and the overall atmosphere surrounding the O-ring investigation. Given the seriousness surrounding a failed flight, Roger was correct to advise against the launch despite the lack of evidence surrounding his claim. He understood the problem better than anyone else and fought to defend his opinion even though it meant being exposed to ridicule from NASA officials. Roger defended his decision to delay the launch until the weather improved, despite a lack of evidence, because he knew there were unanswerable questions about the impact of the weather and that the downside was large. Despite his persistence, there were other actions Roger could have undertaken to try and persuade NASA to call off the launch. Chiefly among these would have been to gather more data ahead of time. Despite knowing of the problems existence for over a year, Roger was relatively unprepared to back up his opinions with scientific evidence. Ultimately, it was the lack of specific evidence that led to the dismissal of his warnings. Roger could have pushed for the O-ring task force to become “official” and be given more authority to demand information and request testing given the seriousness of the problem. This would have allowed for testing to take place prior to the Challenger flight. Finally, Roger should have presented this problem to the NASA flight officials prior to the day before the launch. This left little to no time for the appropriate gathering of facts that would have warranted an effective decision. 3. Bob Lund was the Vice President of Engineering for Morton Thiokol. Despite very limited vocal contribution during the teleconference, Bob is arguably the most crucial individual in the entire case. As VP of engineering, Bob aggregates all of the information from the engineers below him and then makes a recommendation to Jerry Mason, the Senior VP, as to what the engineering department, as a whole, should do. Initially, Bob agrees with Roger and faxes over his, and thus Morton Thiokol’s, opinion that NASA scrub the launch until the temperature is at least 53 degrees. However, he is silent almost the entire teleconference, allowing Roger and Larry debate back and forth. I state he is potentially the most important character because the Morton Thiokol Caucus ends with him being told to make a decision. The next piece of information we are provided is when Morton Thiokol reconnects to the teleconference and advices NASA that the issue has been resolved and that they now officially advise that the flight proceed as originally planned. Thus, it can be inferred that Bob allowed others to speak, gathered all of the information available to him, and then came to the decision that they should continue the launch. Bob shouldn’t have allowed his decision to become a management decision. There was ample evidence that a problem could easily arise and had he thought critically he would have arrived at the correct engineering decision and requested more time to test the materials and ensure safety. Similarly, had Bob reclassified his “decision” as a problem of information and opted to wait until he had the necessary inputs to make a quality decision we might have avoided the whole situation altogether. 4. Larry Mulloy was the solid rocket booster manager at MSFC. Larry was present for the teleconference and the most vocal opponent of Roger’s warnings. Larry argued Roger’s conclusions from the very beginning. His main objections were centered on Roger’s lack of specific evidence pertaining to how the cold, specifically temperatures around 30 degrees effects the O-ring and its ability to seal. Although he does make attempts at understanding the core concept behind Roger’s argument, you get the sense that he was looking for ways to discredit the argument instead of truly evaluating it for what it was. As if he already had made up his mind about whether or not they should launch and was looking for any reason to validate it. In his defense, there was a lot of pressure riding on this decision, pressure from multiple sources, and he was looking for an argument based on quantifiable numbers, not speculation. This was not given to him, and instead of accepting Roger’s opinions as grounds to delay the flight he dismissed them as not being able to be proven and fell into the groupthink trap that had permeated NASA culture. After 19 successful flights, appropriate attention to the minor details was not allotted and the atmosphere surrounding safety was too relaxed. As chief opponent to Roger, Larry played a critical role in influencing the ultimate decision, which was to proceed with the launch. In hindsight, Larry should have recognized that enough uncertainty surrounded the O-ring in question existed and that no amount of criticism, media or elsewhere, should impact their duty to make the best safety decision possible. Despite being correct about the lack of evidence Roger presented, he should have opted to delay the launch until the proper data had been attained and analyzed. At that point, Roger had brought up enough of an argument that the classic escalation of commitment scenario began to arise pitting safety concerns against managerial and deadline concerns. Finally, Larry shouldn’t have been so initially critical. Had he been more open to receiving the problem and viewed as a serious issue instead of finding any attempt at dismissing it, the Challenger might never of launched under those conditions. 5. Broken into its most simplistic elements, the decision-making in the Challenger case can be traced back to the basic concepts introduced in class. The launch date had already been delayed numerous times, there was mounting pressure from the space programs of foreign countries (Russia), and every space shuttle launched so far had also successfully returned. All of this contributed to an atmosphere of over confidence that permeated not only NASA, but members of Morton Thiokol as well. Because of this, key officials that would otherwise be focused solely on the success of each singular mission began to drift their attention towards simply making sure the next one happens. This type of groupthink allowed a serious design flaw to continue unchecked despite specialists saying there was a high potential for error. The simplest solution to this mentality going forward is to scrub any launch when an expert has expressed concerns, until those concerns can be properly vetted. Beyond that, had more members of that teleconference thought critically about the issue raised and had the courage to voice those opinions the launch might have been delayed again. Along similar lines of thinking, the same scenario also begins to intrude on the concept of escalation of commitments. Due to the success of the shuttle program and relaxed safety atmosphere, NASA officials allowed themselves to be caught up in the ramifications for continuing to delay the launch, instead of analyzing whether each trip was fully safe to launch. The Challenger case only boarders on this concept however due to the ambiguity surrounding the issue. There was a lack of evidence as to the effects of the lower temperature and no one was sure that it would fail. It was a combination of this doubt and the atmosphere that lead all parties to recommend proceeding with the launch and ultimately one of the largest disasters in our history.