Amtrak’s Sunset Limited and M/V Mauvilla – Corporate Social Responsibility 1 It has been called the worst train disaster in U.S. history. The wreckage of the Sunset Limited on September 22, 1993 took 47 lives. There are many circumstances surrounding this wreck that affect the many stakeholders involved. Certainly, CSX Transportation, Inc., Amtrak and Warrior and Gulf Navigation Company (WGN) and their employees, the passengers on the train and barge, the surrounding community, the train and barge industries, the governing body of the Big Bayou Canot bridge, environment, and stockholders are all stakeholders. Adding possibly to that list, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), US Army Corps of Engineers and the Coast Guard might be stakeholders as well. The Mauvilla, while being steered by Pilot Odom, and not Captain Stabler, in dense fog conditions could be viewed as negligent. Additionally, Odom admittedly was not adequately trained in the use of the towboat’s radar system. At the time of the accident, Amtrak’s conductor and assistant conductor were not in the wheelhouse of Amtrak’s engine Number 819 and the train, being guided by engineers, was traveling at a speed above authorization. Again, given the weather conditions, this could be viewed as negligent. Certainly, these two examples might not be illegal; however, the outcome of the incident “precipitated the filing of over one hundred personal injury and wrongful death suits against WGN, the pilot and captain of the Mauvilla, CSX and Amtrak.” (1999. Case Research Journal, H. Richard Eisenbeis, Sue Hanks, Bruce Barnett). Neither action alone caused the accident, but compounding those with the fog and the conscience decision of CSX to not install the sensors that detect bridge damage made them unethical decisions. Amtrak’s Sunset Limited and M/V Mauvilla – Corporate Social Responsibility 2 CSX’s decision to not install the recommended equipment represents a breakdown of its economic and ethical CSR, and may have also crossed the legal line. The equipment would have increased the cost of building the bridge, so NTSB’s recommendations were ignored.
Not having this equipment installed leaves them wide open for multiple lawsuits. Prior to the incident of Amtrak’s Sunset Limited railcar, it is unknown the various positions of philanthropic CSR Amtrak and CSX might have had. Certainly after the accident, their commitments to the community must have increased by 100 fold. This, for Jeremy Bentham, would be ethical. If Amtrak and CSX took the position and gave back to the community post accident, and the good outweighed the bad, then they would be acting ethically. Amtrak’s economic position most likely went (for a period of time) from being well positioned in the market to a very competitive place with the other modes of public transportation – busses and airline. They were well positioned in that they could offer a much faster means of travel than a bus and provide on-board fine dining, and could offer a much less expensive travel than an airplane which does not include a meal of any kind. Amtrak surely suffered public pressures. In turn, this incident should have spurred beyond-compliance behavior necessary to satisfy the economic definition of CSR. (http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jel.50.1.51, page 75). An example would be to enhance train travel. This would satisfy their fiduciary duty to maximize profits for shareholders and offer a benefit to the consumer. Amtrak and CSX had the legal and ethical CSR to take strides to prevent another incident like the wreck of the Sunset Limited. Education and training of the conductor, assistant conductor and pilot of the barge that includes extensive focus on their emergency action plans. Amtrak’s Sunset Limited and M/V Mauvilla – Corporate Social Responsiblity 3
Legally, they should be held accountable for the health and welfare of the employees and passengers on board.

REFERENCES: http://www.tmba.tv/trial-graphics/maritime-investigations/sunset-limited/ http://www.nber.org/papers/w13989.pdf?new_window=1
http://www.aabri.com/manuscripts/10499.pdf