ARMY AVIATION OPERATIONS IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

Introduction

“Foot slogging” by infantrymen has been most important and fundamental to address an insurgency; however, there are limitations to their mobility. To increase their versatility, the Portuguese introduced two contrasting means, the helicopter and the horse. While there were other, more conventional solutions to the mobility problem, such as trucks, jeeps, and light armored cars, these vehicles required at least crude roads, had other terrain limitations, and were vulnerable to land mines. The advent of the helicopter and its application in counter-insurgency began with the British in Malaya on 1 April 1950, with the formation of the Far East Casualty Air Evacuation Flight at Seletar with strength of three Westland S-51 Dragonfly helicopters. During the Malayan Emergency the British used their helicopters primarily for casualty evacuation and later for airlifting troops. Question that looms ahead for the future, no matter what the outcome in Jammu and Kashmir, and North Eastern States, is how the army aviation succeeds against fierce insurgency in strategy and capabilities. The Taliban’s resurgence, tenacious resistance against NATO forces in Afghanistan, Al Qaeda’s ability to elude United States forces, and the trouble Israel has had in trying to subdue violence in tiny Southern Lebanon (Hezbollah) and tinier Gaza (Hamas) deepen concern that even world’s finest militaries have problems against any kind of insurgent movement.

Historical Background. The history of the use of airpower against irregulars’ dates back to 9 March 1916, Francisco "Pancho" Villa raided Columbus, New Mexico, and killed 17 Americans. The government of United States ordered General John "Black Jack" Pershing to organise a force of 15,000 troops to pursue Villa into Mexico and "take him dead or alive." Six days later, the 1st Aero Squadron, commanded by Captain Benjamin Foulois, arrived in Columbus. The force consisted of 8 Curtiss JN-3s, 11 officers, 85 enlisted men, 10 trucks, and 1 "tech rep." The most important role of the squadron was to help General Pershing keep track of his dispersed forces and deliver messages. Thus, the first combat missions ever flown by military aviators were communications and visual reconnaissance missions for the Army. Although General Pershing never caught Pancho Villa, the unique attributes of aircraft (elevation, range, speed) made visual reconnaissance and communication the most significant contributions and human ingenuity was essential to what limited success the effort could achieve. While the bulk of aviation activities in World War I supported the "conventional" aspects of the war, one little-known aspect of the war was the use of aircraft to support Colonel T. E. Lawrence in his Palestine campaign. Lawrence is generally viewed as riding across the desert wastes on a camel; but during the latter stages of his warfare against the Turks, he exploited the mobility provided by both armoured cars and aircraft. He used aircraft to maintain contact with his far-flung groups, provide visual reconnaissance, haul men and supplies, and attack Turkish communications. Basically, aircraft provided Lawrence with mobility to match the vastness of the desert. Between 1927 and 1933, General Augusto Cesar Sanditio and his followers fought and eluded the Marines who had intervened to resolve political strife in the country. The airplane, armoured car, and machine gun had mastered the desert and the plains; but the new guerrillas avoided the open, operated in small groups always under cover, and massed for attack only when the odds were clearly in their favour. The airplane quickly proved its value in the early counterinsurgency effort by the United States. In 1927, Sanditio attacked a Marine garrison in Ocotal and was defeated decisively when five Marine de Havillands launched a timely aerial assault that thoroughly demoralised the Sandinistas. This early defeat at the hands of Marine aviators and ground forces--the original air-ground team--convinced Sanditio that his only hope lay in the now-classic techniques of the rural insurgent--hit, run, and hide. For the next five years, a dangerous game of cat and mouse in the hills and mountains of northern Nicaragua was played as they sought to bring about a decisive engagement with the Sandinistas. In this effort, aircraft provided vital communications between far-flung remote outposts. Marine aviators also flew air cap for foot and mule patrols and attacked Sandinista bases, but they soon learned the limitations of conventional ordnance in thick jungles and the elusiveness of small, lightly armed guerrilla formations. Thus, Marine fliers never again achieved the spectacular successes they had scored in the early days of the fighting but nevertheless, air power did help the Marines offset the worst effects. Thus, the two classic roles of airpower in sub-conventional operations were revealed where the preponderant role of aircraft in operations was to support counter guerrilla or insurgency operations. Gathering intelligence and providing mobility, presence, and firepower were primary functions (although the threat of firepower was often more potent than its actual application). During World War II, the new role for airpower emerged--supporting the operations of partisans and small conventional units behind enemy lines, and the delivery of firepower. Following World War II, the Huk a communist organisation attempted to overthrow the newly formed Philippine government (1946-54). At that time, the combination of rural dissatisfactions, government inefficiency, and skillful Huk propaganda drew on anti-establishment themes which brought many areas of the Philippines to a state of near anarchy. Liaison aircraft of the Philippine Air Force (PAF) commenced day-to-day visual reconnaissance flights over areas where the Huks were known to operate. A system of informers was developed to work in conjunction with the reconnaissance flights. To keep the Huks from discovering the informers and intercepting the informers' information, special signals were developed. For example, the positions of haystacks, farm animals, plows, and other objects flagged the size and location of Huk units to PAF liaison aircraft flying overhead. Also, defectors were carried aloft to help locate Huk camps. Once a camp was pinpointed, leaflets and crude loudspeaker systems were used to wage psychological warfare against the camp's inhabitants. At other times, concrete information on camp locations was used by government forces to mount concentrated air and ground operations against the camps. The net effect of these varied uses of air power was to confine the Huks to and deny them the use of fixed bases. To support its operations against the Huks, the Philippine Air Force used a squadron of C-47s, a mixed squadron of liaison aircraft, and some P-51s and AT-6s. Most of the targets were such that the aircraft either made their strikes with 100-pound bombs or strafed with .50 caliber machine guns. Air attack and bombing were very carefully controlled. Attacks with heavy bombs were limited to large base camps located in the mountains, and these attacks were made only after commanders were sure that no government supporters lived in the area. The air operations and tactics of the Philippine Air Force were not in themselves decisive factors in the Huk campaign, but they were vital elements of integrated use of all the elements of national power to defeat the Huk insurgency. As the Huk campaign wound down in the Philippines, the French were facing their own unique problems against rebels in Algeria (1954-62). Several features of the French counterinsurgency effort distinguish it from other special operations. For example, although extensive fence systems or "barrages" were quite effective in sealing off Algeria's borders, they were difficult to maintain and patrol. Air power was a central element of French strategy to handle the problem. This will be dealt subsequently in this paper while discussing analysis of some case studies.

Implications for Airpower. Both in rural and urban settings (whether in the mountains, jungles or townships) the insurgent force fights much like past guerrillas have done through asymmetric tactics that emphasise a strategy of exhaustion. They are non-traditional in their tactics and resort to asymmetric and asynchronous strategies designed to inflict damage on both the fielded forces and the will of the counterinsurgent by exploiting ethical constraints and an obsession with the declared end state of a better state of peace. The asymmetric means most favoured by the insurgent today is convoy attack and assault on security bases rather than direct confrontation and ambushes. Both army and air force recognise that air support plays a valuable role in protection and force movement in the insurgency ridden terrain. None of the activities on the part of the insurgents is new or unique in this type of war. Past examples of the use of airpower have yielded good results in supporting ground forces. The direction needed to combat the problem of troop and convoy security can only be answered by air assets designed to support such an operation. While the present use of utility and armed helicopters provide much needed assistance, their own operational flaws leave a gap within the mission when needed. Examples of this type of conflict have shown that matching the weapon with the task proves successful. Each insurgency has its own character, therefore, without questioning capabilities lessons can always be drawn on aspects experienced in history by armies for implementation in a fundamental manner. There is always a flux in the security environment to predict precisely in any manner the requirements that future will present for counter insurgency capabilities. Moreover, capabilities last years or even decades, and, while they should be versatile and adaptable, they cannot anticipate exact requirements that far in advance. Yet capabilities must be planned, not just assembled from what is available in reaction to a crisis. The absence of serious planning during Vietnam aggravated the disadvantage there. Specific future needs are unpredictable but planning capabilities is crucial. What we may have to understand in a deeper sense is the relationship between the army aviation capabilities and that of the insurgents. The problem with countering insurgency is that it is very difficult to organise and operate in a crisis. Action followed with utmost diligence could translate into domestic use of force which has an inherent potential to weaken the ultimate bulwark: legitimacy, and as a result an inverse relation may come into existence. Unabashed brutal force can, in some conditions, crush insurgency, as Russia did in Chechnya, and countries that use such methods have little or no legitimacy to lose and thus may have no concern with its loss. Therefore a few answers become necessary to the following after having taken into account the lessons from past experiences:-
(a) Challenges posed by insurgency.
(b) Determining the particular requirements to adapt to the needs of counterinsurgency in India, that is, capabilities and tactics that need to be met to combat the challenges.

Past Experiences

It has been said, time and time again, that to forget history is almost a sure way of repeating it. (“Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it”). To frame the argument of this paper, that of re-applying past, requirement of technology and thought to the application of airpower in fighting insurgents, we must look at past examples of the use of airpower in insurgency situations and their outcomes. In almost all cases though, politics, world opinion and host of other factors defined the eventual outcome. While the aspects mentioned cannot be separated from insurgency as it is a primary motivating factor often defining the situation, the manner in which these conflicts were fought holds valuable lessons for the students of airpower application. The French in Algeria. The first analysis will come from a look to the French experience in Algeria from 1954 to 1962. The French were extremely successful militarily thanks to the application of airpower. Though the Algerians still won independence,(argued as a foregone conclusion at the outset, and it was not through military defeat, but political factors that forced the French government to acquiesce to the Algerian). To defeat this insurgency, French Air Force General Maurice Challe was placed in command of French forces in Algeria. His goal was a mobile campaign to purge the Wilayas (ALN territorial segments) by destroying Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN) forces, not occupying territory. General Challe’s vision was a ground campaign with airpower used extensively to provide mobility and fire support. Of primary concern to the ground force was air cover for convoy operations and force movement and fire support. Convoy escort aircraft would often stage from rough, forward operating fields, or even roadways, to support the column or provide reconnaissance ahead of the force and provide firepower as necessary. Helicopter assets would provide logistics and fire support provided by slow-moving T-6 or A-4 aircraft as cover. Close coordination between Army and Air Force during planned or contingency operations was facilitated through mobile command posts that reported back to the area JOC (Joint Operation Centre) to keep the overall command structure informed and provide additional assets as required. Thanks to the particular organisational structure of the armed forces, the Air Force could react quickly, often within 30 minutes or less, to support the army against an enemy that was highly mobile and familiar with the terrain. Though the French were to give the Algerians their independence in 1962, the military side of the war was a success and validation of the French counterinsurgency effort with respect to air integration. The use of “low technology” aircraft coupled with the first use of helicopter gunships gave the French Army a decided advantage against the ALN. Through the adaptation of new technology in helicopter gunships, the use of rugged fixed wing aircraft, and close coordination with the ground component, the French proved that airpower is essential to counterinsurgent operations. In the words of the study conducted soon after the war by the Aerospace Studies Institute, “counterinsurgency is by nature a ground effort…but in this instance it was a ground effort in which airpower was the equaliser.” aircraft supported ground patrols, provided supplies to outposts, and flew strike missions against insurgents when they threatened sectors of the fences. For internal defence, the French used a system called "quadrallage." They divided Algeria into areas of operation and then subdivided the areas into small sectors. Air units assigned to special operations maintained almost constant surveillance of the sectors and played a vital role in other intelligence-gathering schemes. Centralised control of air assets ensured that they would be employed in sectors where they were most needed. A favorite French tactic was "netting." This involved locating an enemy force by aerial reconnoitering, identifying all access routes to the enemy's location, and selecting the best landing zone (LZ) near the enemy's headquarters. Having taken care of these preliminaries, the French launched a coordinated air-mobile attack, placing troops in the LZ immediately after preparatory fire. The air-mobile troops were deployed to confuse, disrupt, and demoralise the enemy while, simultaneously, more powerful ground forces closed in from all sides. In this way, the rebels were trapped like fish in a net. The keys to success in these operations were excellent intelligence and the ability to react quickly and effectively when the situation warranted--both of which relied heavily on air support. Two pertinent conclusions can be drawn from the Algerian experience: Coordinated small unit actions supported by air were the most effective operations in this theater; and the most valuable assets that air power contributed to these operations were aircraft mobility and flexibility.

The Vietnam Experience

The second study is that of the United States in Vietnam from 1961 onwards. The initial insurgency was managed through a successful application of airpower and rotary-wing aircraft were a ubiquitous component of the Vietnam War. From the beginning, with obsolete Korean war helicopters carrying troops into battle, to Huey gunships evacuating wounded at Ia Drang in 1965, and transport helicopters evacuating the troops from Saigon rooftops in 1975; from the war's reality to its subsequent representations in popular culture, the sight and sound of helicopters was as integral an aspect of the war as the men who fought it and describes how helicopters came to occupy a central part of the arsenal in Vietnam. Based upon the positive experience of the marines in Korea, the United States army formed twelve helicopter battalions in 1952. However, it was the prospect of nuclear weapons on the battlefield drove the army's implementation of the use of helicopters. When an air cavalry brigade was substituted for an armoured division, the air cavalry was superior to armour in holding off Soviet units in West Germany. The army concluded that light forces with high mobility could apply firepower better than standard infantry, and that the requirements appeared to be much the same as for nuclear wars as envisaged against the Soviet Union. Army General Maxwell D. Taylor was sent to Vietnam and he arrived in Saigon in October 1961. The following month, recommendations were that three squadrons of Army helicopters be sent to Vietnam to increase mobility. By getting South Vietnamese forces out of their static defence positions, they would be better able to meet the VC (Vietnamese Congress) threat. In September 1961 fifteen HU-1 "Huey" helicopter gunships were already deployed for evaluation as to their utility in counterinsurgency operations. The head of the evaluation team, Army Brigadier General Edward Rowny, said his mission was to find better ways to "find and fix" guerrillas. By 1962 a major factor in this shift was the deployment of thirty-three H-21 helicopters, which first brought the concept of air mobility to South Vietnam. These helicopters were used solely for transporting troops to the battlefield, which gave ability to surprise the VCs in their areas. Initially, the VCs were terrorised by these mobile operations, and large numbers of VCs were killed as they attempted to flee the strike area. Over time, the VCs developed counter measures, which reduced the efficacy of helicopter operations. Foxholes were dug deep enough for soldiers to stand up inside. Machine guns and automatic rifles were positioned to achieve interlocking fields of fire. VC officers instructed their forces for many months in anti-helicopter tactics. Pamphlets were distributed which explained how VC gunners were to lead American aircraft based on the angle of approach and airspeed. The idea was to shoot ahead of the target so the aircraft would fly into a hail of bullets. Cardboard models of H-21s, Hueys, and fixed-wing airplanes were pulled along a string between poles to simulate aircraft in flight. Fire discipline was emphasised as massed fires offered the most effective means of putting sufficient rounds into an aircraft to disable it. In addition to providing maneuverability on the battlefield, the concept of air mobility is always attractive to the Army. Army aircraft totaled 725 at the beginning; by 1960, over 5,000; and by 1969 the Army had more aviation units than ground maneuver battalions. Although helicopters were originally incorporated into the American military establishment as a means to deal with the problems of the nuclear battlefield, in Vietnam, rotary-wing aircraft was initially deployed as counter-guerrilla vehicles. Hundreds of helicopters were integrated into America's emerging doctrine of air mobility. Approximately, one million Americans carried into battle in Vietnam in helicopters. The number of helicopter units and breakdown sorties flown in Vietnam given in Appendix indicate that 61 percent of divisional helicopter units were deployed in Vietnam as against 26 percent in other areas with 13 percent being retained within the country. It is also apparent that among the non divisional units 68 percent were deployed in Vietnam, 20 percent in other areas and 12 percent retained in the United States. This brings about an average of 64 percent of Army Aviation deployed in Vietnam. The helicopter breakdown of sorties and losses till May 1968 accounted for is given in the Appendix and by the end of 1972, according to Pentagon figures, 4,857 helicopters were lost by the United States in Vietnam. It will also be evident that the number of other sorties by far exceeds not only the attack and assault sorties but also attack, assault and cargo sorties combined. Does this indicate over-reliance with generous allocation of air effort? A derivative answer may be forthcoming when we account for the helicopter losses during the same period which indicates a 24.08 percent increase of loss in other areas including non hostile locations. We may have two theories to plausible deduction pointing at fatigue, complacency as a result and stretched maintenance leading to the compilation of such loss figures. However, having mentioned the figures one cannot but help conclude that the end result does emanate as a direct or indirect result of the prolonged engagement.
An Insight. By the early 1960s helicopters were sent in large numbers to develop counterinsurgency. The famous battle of Ap Bac (a small hamlet in Dinh Tuong Province on 2-3 January 1963 where the United States suffered its highest ever casualty of any battle in Vietnam at that time. Of the 14 United States helicopters 11 were shot at and five crashed. The fear of the helicopters had reduced. The weakness of dependency on helicopters was obvious then and is also tacit admission that we do not control the ground and in the long run it is the control of the ground that wins or losses the situation. The counterinsurgency battle was seen as an area war, much like the possible nuclear scenario in Europe was to be. American Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) and Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) units in combating guerrilla warfare would use air mobility to first find the enemy units, then fix them in place and assemble troops by helicopter to destroy them. There are more often than not too few spots where a landing can be done and ambush will follow ambush. A definite mode for operations was established and this happened to be the extensive reliance on this flying machine. Helicopter warfare suited the needs of war managers. With helicopters commanders could simultaneously be close to the battle-fields and at the same time safe from combat hazards as long as they stayed above 1,500 feet, the range if machine guns. When you updated your commander you updated everybody. When the pilots asked you to mark position with smoke candles identically coloured smokes would appear in three or four places in an area of 1000 metres by 1000 metres. Technowar squandered its technological advantage by managements’ proliferating communications. War managers lost touch with reality and issued orders that were extremely dangerous and often impossible to follow. A plausible reasoning is the lack of availability of the flying machine and consequent adaptability to operations as seen in the next paragraph. A dichotomy existed in the use of this versatile machine and example exists from the use UH-1E was being subjected to two conflicting demands for missions. By the end of 1967, the equivalent of the Marines’ entire helicopter observation forces were committed. In July 1967, a report was submitted by General Krulak regarding the task performance of UH-1E during the period July 1966 to June 1967:- Administration/Liaison 5579 Tactical Air Controller(Airborne) 1086 Casualty evacuation 1109 Command and Control 1099 Search and Rescue 116 Reconnaissance 1756 Total 10745
The startling information was then announced. In addition, to the flights listed another 19597 missions had been flown as armed helicopters. The commanders were largely denied the opportunity to imbibe learn and utilise the machine for what it was meant. Capital intensive weapon systems like an armed helicopter assumed an empty space in a transparent battlefield. The joke of La Drang Valley was, if you cannot bring in a chopper in to give air support what good is it? If they cannot fly because they would not let them get off or land or they will burn too much fuel in getting back to base then you are at the same level of the insurgents and they are the masters there. Therefore, to utilise and rely overly a weapon system which has inherent limitations and that too as the main platform did prove to be inhibiting.

The Soviet Experience The Soviets in Afghanistan used their air component with weapons that were standard with soviet ground forces which included T-72 tanks and 152mm self-propelled howitzers. But the weapons receiving most world attention were the armed helicopters which were widely used. Noteworthy and interesting application of the weapons and tactics used by the Soviets were:-
• Armed Helicopters. These aircraft were the single most significant weapons used by the Soviets in Afghanistan. Not only were they used extensively in combat roles, they were the most popular mode of transportaion for Soviet forces in the field. They were employed in a wide variety of tasks: supporting attacking ground units; reconnaissance, spotting artillery fire, landing airborne units, moving weapons and supplies and evacuating the wounded. Soviet helicopters almost always traveled in pairs. Three types of helicopters were used: the MI-6 Hip; the MI-8 Hook; and the Mi-24 Hind armed helicopter or gunship. It carried a 12.7 mm heavy machinegun, four anti tank missiles and 128 57mm rockets. The MI-24 also could transport eight combat-equipped soldiers. Until the guerillas became equipped with heavy machine guns in 1983, they were virtually powerless against the MI-24 Hind. Among weapons the mujahidin constantly sought were rockets or cannon capable of downing it. In carrying out air strikes, the MI-24 gunships often were used in combination with Su-25 fighter bombers or MiGs. When a guerilla band was located, gunships and fighter bombers would be summoned in to bomb and strafe the target until the suspected guerilla group was believed to be eliminated. During the five years of 1980 to 1984, the number of helicopter sorties steadily increased. By mid-1981 three sorties per day was normal. The helicopters were used not only in patrols and direct counterinsurgency operations, but also to supply beleaguered outposts. The MI-8 Hook helicopter could carry 28 to 32 passengers, and the large MI-6 Hip could carry 65 to 90 passengers. Helicopter losses often were caused by factors not directly related to mujahidin fire. As much as 80 to 85 per cent of these losses are estimated to have come from accidents. Most were due to pilot error but many were from mechanical failures. The rugged terrain and often harsh weather caused severe problems; the Soviets also apparently suffered from inadequate instrumentation and insufficient pilot training. Night and adverse-weather operations were almost never attempted, even when air support was badly needed by troops in difficulty. At the end of 1983 more than 600 helicopters, mostly Soviet were based in Afghanistan.
• Heavy use of Aerial Warfare. The single greatest application was the use of the use of airpower. In fact, Soviet reliance on helicopters probably was the most significant military development to come out of the war. Extensive use by the Soviets of helicopter and fixed-wing aircraft in counterinsurgency operations was an operational practice not previously known to exist in the Soviet army. Among the most commonly used aerial tactics were the following: the use of the MI-24 Hind helicopter gunship in a variety of tasks; use of fixed-wing aircraft for massive, concentrated bombings; dropping small butterfly mines on fields and passes. By 1983 mujahidin- manned heavy machine guns were starting to take their toll against some helicopters. One result of this effectiveness was that the Soviets were flying much higher and thus were somewhat less effective.
• Airborne Troop Strikes. In 1982, and especially in 1983 and 1984, the Soviets occasionally landed commandoes by helicopters in resistance held areas. This tactic was designed either to wipe out suspected insurgent stronghold and then withdraw, or to establish a permanent blocking post. Examples of these tactics were the following: helicopter landings of Soviet airborne troops in Kundaz and Balkh provinces in late 1983; and establishing a permanent Soviet blocking post on the strategic Anjoman Pass connecting the Panjshir Valley with Badaskhan province in 1982. Heliborne operations appeared to be carried out by special Soviet air assault brigades. At least five different such units possibly saw action through 1983.
• Convoys. Long convoys stretching over a kilometre moved usually by daylight – usually between 9 a.m. and 3 p.m. Helicopter gunships patrolled overhead, particularly in mountainous areas where the threat of guerilla ambushes was high. Other aircraft always were within call for air strikes in case of engagements. Despite these precautions, convoys often were attacked, road mined, and bridges culverts blown up. In the main, mujahidin tactics consisted of daytime ambushes of highway convoys, night attacks on fortified posts, and assassinations of Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) party officials and Soviet personnel. Sniper fire from insurgent was a particular headache for the Soviets. Estimates of helicopter strength range from 500 to 650 machines, of which up to 250 may be the Mi-24 Hind gunships. In 1980, losses to surface-to-air missiles( SA-7 ), a hand-held heat-seeking missile led to a change in tactics at the end of 1980 and early 1981. They resorted to nap-of-the-earth, for which the crew requires extensive training. There were reports of rotors striking the rear of their own helicopters and excesive wear on airframes and systems caused by these lower-altitude flights thereby greatly increasing rates of operational attrition.
The Russians in Chechnya.(1994-96). The Russians had started the campaign by using 55 helicopters of all types. By late March 1995 the number had risen to 105 (this included 52xMi-24 Hinds).
• Overall the Russian helicopters flew more than 16,547 sorties.
• Of these nearly 36 per cent were fire support missions.
• 44 per cent were transport assault.
• 8 per cent were recce missions.
• 12 per cent were special missions such as pilot rescue, propaganda or radio relay.
• Helicopters evacuated over 90 per cent of the wounded. The Russians did not field their Kamov KA-50/52 helicopters in the first Chechen Campaign. Helicopters took heavy losses from Chechen ZU-23 AD guns and DShK (for Degtyarev-Shpagin) Machine guns mounted on jeeps and Toyota trucks. Besides, they used Strellas, Iglas and Stinger surface to air missiles (SAMS). An interesting feature was the Chechen use of Rocket Propelled Grenade Launchers (RPG-7) against helicopters. Five helicopters (two Mi-8s and three Mi-24s) were lost in the first three months of the conflict. By the end of the first Chechen campaign, statistics indicated that every tenth Russian helicopter was lost and every fourth damaged. The noise of the helicopters alerted the opposition and its slow flight speed permitted them to lay ambushes for these. This is a typical shortcoming of the use of helicopters in the mountains wherein its entry and exit can be predictable. The Chechens also employed a unique tactic; they would pinpoint the location of the Forward Air Controller (FAC) aircraft by radio direction finders and ambush them regularly.
Nature of the Fight: Challenges of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency

Divorcing ideological motives and frameworks, and focuses on operational aspects of combating insurgency with airpower as these may be different throughout history but the manner in which these have been dealt and fought have remained essentially the same. Military theorist Carl von Clausewitz put it: “they [insurgents] are meant to operate just outside the theater of war—where the invader will not appear in strength……in order to deny these areas.” The Soviets in the Afghanistan War used technology, specifically airpower in the form of helicopter gunships, to battle insurgent forces bent on attacking their bases and supply lines. This strategy was largely successful until advanced surface to air missiles effectively negated this Soviet advantage. But before this, the guerrilla fighters of the Vietnamese Congress (VC) found much assistance using similar tactics that the greater powers had to adapt to—that of avoiding direct confrontation. Insurgents, regardless of ideological or political aims, function similarly and require the same resources to continue their struggles. Each tries to postpone decisive action until they have a decided advantage or until the opponent become exhausted by the effort. Each requires a safe location from which to train and project power as well as logistic or financial support. Also, each must have the ability to melt into the terrain or population to effect their disengagement from the security forces so that their fight can continue another day. Insurgents also benefit from their greater flexibility both in the form of tactics and the absence of ethical or legal restraints. At the operational and tactical level, counterinsurgency has changed little in the past 62 years (a list of Insurgencies since 1945 have been listed in Appendix). We still find that “tactics favour the regular troops, while strategy favours the enemy.” The regular army must maintain bases of operation and lines of communication that are not vulnerable to attack from insurgents who specialise in this type of work and who can disappear at will. An answer to this dilemma can be found within Clausewitz’s work: “the [army’s] only answer to such actions is the sending out of frequent escorts as protection for convoys, and as guards on all of his stopping places, bridges, defiles, and rest.” And, just as deduced by Callwell, Lawrence, similar to what other military writers have stated, the counterinsurgent force is extremely hampered by its supply lines and fights an enemy that has little need for such lines, and often supplies itself from what it can take from the population. Not unlike T. E. Lawrence’s indirect approach to insurgent warfare, the goal is to cut lines of supply and demoralise rather than attack him directly. To combat this, we must look to past examples of the use of tactics and technology to re-learn what has been forgotten. Airpower is a powerful tool, but technology is not always a panacea in the arena of counter insurgency. Linking the past with the present in this regard will only help the future and our ability to capitalise with airpower in fighting such menace. Even in the early 1980s, the term insurgency was merged with the phrase low-intensity conflict: Low intensity conflict is a limited politico-military struggle to achieve political, social, economic, or psychological objectives. It is often protracted and ranges from diplomatic, economic, and psycho-social pressures through terrorism and insurgency. Low intensity conflict is generally confined to a geographic area and is often charcterised by constraints on the weaponry, tactics, and the level of violence. The historical instances cited have similarities that make them invaluable for analysis in the context of application of airpower. The French in Algeria developed their tactics from experiences in Indochina and used aircraft that were readily available as they were limited in strategic (high-tech) aircraft. The United States also had the benefit of previous experience in Indochina aiding the French to prepare them for counterinsurgent operations against the communists and also favored lower tech aircraft leaving the jets at home until 1964-65 when escalation turned the war more conventional. Both France and the United States entered these wars fighting a guerrilla army and modified their approach to warfare accordingly. They both realised early on that airpower in support of ground operations was to be a decisive factor in this type of war. Contemplating on the types and roles of the aircraft used will present us with a wealth of knowledge that may prove invaluable in the counterinsurgencies of today.

The Indian Experience

Applications of airpower in its offensive form against own people, even if they turn hostile, have always been a debatable choice. It also opposes the established principle of minimum force. However, the implied use of minimum force has fundamentally changed over a period of time and within the scope and meaning of internal security which includes proxy war and low intensity conflict where the protagonists are equipped with sophisticated weapons the ‘adequate minimum force’, the adequacy of weapons and firepower for each situation would be determined by the field commander. The Indian experience with the use of helicopters for military purposes started in the sixties when they were used as air mobility platforms in North-East India. The Indian Army used helicopters to induct and de-induct troops in counterinsurgency (CI) operations in Manipur and Mizoram. In Nagaland dropping supplies to beleaguered garrisons under threat from hostiles was resorted with defensive intents, but its use for strafing rebel positions was quite another matter in a desperate situation as a last resort to save garrisons at Purr in Nagaland and in Mizoram at Aizwal and Lungleigh to save the Assam Rifles posts from being run over by insurgents. Since 1960s, helicopters have been used extensively for movement of troops, casualty evacuation and reconnaissance as integral part of CI operations, but the offensive use of air power has seldom been seriously considered. In 1964, helicopters were utilised in Manipur in support of the Army in Cl operations. Tusom Kaulem, Chasec, and Kungai were places to where Army troops were heli-lifted from Imphal. The army had in the meantime greatly refined its counterinsurgency operations. It extensively used helicopters to speed up movement by using helicopters and rotated the region’s infantry battalion through the Counter Insurgency School at Varingate in the Mizo hills. The commanders used the helicopters to move troops at short notice which proved very effective in cordon and search operations. The Eighth Infantry Division conducted several successful operations against the Mizo National Front (MNF), especially with helicopters. In 1967 special heli-borne operations involving the Fifth Parachute Battalion captured the MNF ‘home’ and ‘defence’ ministers. The helicopter was used for air mobility operations, both for short notice operations and for long-range pre-planned Cl operations. These came to be termed as Special Heliborne Operations (SHBO). The peacekeeping operations in Sri Lanka also saw extensive use of the helicopter both in attack and assault roles. The operation in Sri Lanka may not be termed as a classical low intensity conflict but examples are informative and insightful for deliberating future tactics in selective and similar operations. During the build-up in the Jaffna Peninsula in October 1987, some 3,000 tactical transport and assault helicopter sorties were flown in twenty days throughout Northern and Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka. Helicopters were used for insertion of units for search, raid, domination of selected areas and subsequent extraction. They were also used in the initial stages during the siege of Jaffna to land a platoon of 13 Sikh Light Infantry to defend the LZ which was preceded by heli-landing of a team of 10 Para to secure it. They were also used as observation posts to control large-scale ground operations in built-up areas. The battle for Jaffna saw supply sorties, as no roads were open. The Mi-25 attack helicopters performed particularly well in the later stages of Operation Pawan, providing covering fire to troops and performing independent attacks on LTTE camps. On 3rd November 1987, with 1st Para Commando the helicopter was used in attack role destroying two LTTE boats at Mulai. Light observation helicopters were used by the armed forces as elevated command posts and observation posts, and casualty evacuation where the terrain is inaccessible. The United Nation missions in Somalia also have seen use as aerial convoy escorts on scouting missions. As one of the leading crusaders against insurgency India finds itself against insurgents seeking to fight on his own terms using asymmetric means. At his disposal are weapons and tactics that have changed little in the past two decades. While the current emphasis is to transform the armed forces into a lighter, leaner force capable of fighting the enemy on any terrain with 21st century technology, we cannot fail to use history as a guide for this transformation. Indian force levels must be adequate to meet the contingency of low intensity operations against large-scale infiltration in Kashmir. The Army Aviation could well figure out inadequacies while supporting ground forces, and in the prosecution of a counterinsurgent operation, a re-look into the future will bring about the need to further enhance certain capabilities.

Developing Capabilities and Tactics

Indian operations in Jammu & Kashmir and also in North – East have been marked by maximal restraint, unlike the Russian outright military solution with no restraints whatsoever and no pretence to any sophistry designed to mould global or regional public opinion or shape the information environment. While all conceived and range of operations have been enabled through active participation of army aviation the Indian restraint is understandable and logical when dealing with indigenous insurgents (with a few exceptions) and operates close to civilian habitats. The Indian State is sensitive to the degree of violence that could be subjected to and is always understandably keen to restrict any collateral damage to the civilian population. For the advocates of all inclusive “Air Power”, the best way to achieve a decisive result in any conflict will face a central argument in the question “Is Air Power required in low intensity conflict?” Also, very little is written about power projection in such conflicts though the Russians see no distinction in the lessons learnt at the low end of the spectrum of conflict and those applicable to conventional war. At the tactical level the helicopter and airmobile techniques give the commander new capabilities; the old time-distance factors and terrain considerations become outmoded. The helicopter is often appreciated in its use in tactical roles other than as a prime mover of supplies and men. Blocking of withdrawal and escape routes, and direct fire adds to the dimension of aggressive tactical use of the helicopter A very popular sentiment is the use of gunships in counterinsurgency. Helicopter gunships play an important role in providing security for the movement of men and material. However, each weapon system has its drawbacks. Helicopter gunships provide much of the work covering troop or supply movement, but again, their few numbers and slow speed and vulnerability to ground fire do not make them ideal platforms in this environment. However, gunships provide tremendous rate of firepower, lethality and mobility but hindering offsets of slow airspeeds in mountains and poor maneuverability renders them comparatively unsuitable. A few reported cases of gunship helicopter and hell-lift operations in the Jammu and Kashmir valley that can be cited is when troops were lifted in helicopters to cordon and kill six militants in Kandi Yusmarg woods before they could exit and come down to the plains. On another occasion a Mi-35 armed helicopters fired rockets and guns on isolated hutments located on hilltop and supposedly sheltering militants were destroyed. There would have been numerous other occasions but is it effective in the context where night capability remains unexplored in the face of “wait till daybreak concept”. Helicopters are themselves targets that are extremely vulnerable to ground fire. The armed helicopter pilot is up against a problem similar to a fighter on a horse (after all the armed helicopter has repeatedly been compared to cavalry) where he is trying to engage a hidden adversary who is in a dismounted state. First, the chances of a hit remains unpredictable as the target is not an outlined trench or bunker and second a slight injury to the pilot or the conspicuous could well bring about fatality to the mission itself. Tactics that use scout helicopters for target acquisition are adoptable. These scouts would rather be smaller and light helicopters; stay high, out of range of the target, giving crews a better field of view while directing attacks. This tactic has been a standard in conflicts and can be adapted in coordination with ground troops also as compared to use in conjunction with attack helicopters and fixed wings. Division commanders in Vietnam found the helicopter to be an effective instrument for deceiving the enemy. In an airmobile operation the commander was able to concentrate or disperse his forces quickly for tactical advantage. The same speed and flexibility was often applied in a feint to distract the enemy from the real airmobile objective or to lead him into a position favourable to the airmobile force. An enemy observer was deceived followed by false landing of a flight of helicopters, which then quickly turned and flew to the actual objective. The 9th Infantry Division used the helicopter to deceive the VC in many instances. During several operations a false pickup was staged, leaving a portion of the force in the area to conduct ambushes or patrols. The division also used false helicopter landings to fix a Viet Cong force. To hold the VC in place, false landings were made along probable withdrawal routes to make the enemy feel that he was surrounded. Sometimes the aircraft would touch down in a landing zone with the soldier-passengers clearly visible. As the helicopter lifted out of the landing zone, the soldiers would lie on the floor of the helicopter giving the impression that the ground forces had unloaded. It has to be an understood fact that the availability and therefore maintenance of this machine needs to be exceptionally high in order to support any operation and subsequent ones at a sustained rate. The relevance increases with induction of new types of helicopters in such operations. With the introduction of CH-21s in Vietnam several maintenance problems plagued the forces. For nearly six months they operated with 50 per cent average availability and 25 hours of flying per month. The rotary winged aircraft proves to be extremely useful in casualty evacuation from inhospitable terrain. Before 1965 in Vietnam, the Kaman HH-43s were sent but their relatively short endurance restricted them to local base rescue. With the intensification of conflict and increase in casualties helicopters made 93 rescues in the second half of the year compared to 29 during the first six months. By 1967 almost 50 aircraft were dedicated to rescue operations. By the end of 1968, over 1500 persons had been rescued from difficult locations. The requirement therefore is two-fold, dedicated effort and adequate endurance. Dedicated effort caters to the morale of troops and endurance to ensure mission accomplishment even if ground situation does not allow evacuation for certain duration of time due offensive ground action. Whether as a result of increased sensitivity to casualties or simply because helicopters permitted such operations extractions under fire in South Vietnam was a common occurrence. Army aviation in India has done yeoman’s service in this field and the need of the hour would perhaps be a capability similar to the “Dustoff” emergency medical helicopters which flew almost half a million missions air lifting some 90,000 casualties from battlefields in rice paddies and triple canopy jungles under almost all weather conditions, and under intense fire. Often, a helicopter with an airborne personnel detector aboard swept the area at tree-top level. This brings us to the realm of newer technology at the behest of the aviation force. Not only does the ground soldier needs to be equipped but the latest technology insertion with forecasting inclusive must become a norm in the march towards a more capable force. In the form of warfare in which multifarious considerations regularly outweigh military requirements, extensive aggressive use of airpower is likely to be self-defeating. This reveals the possibility of unrestricted use for observation which does not involve firing. This brings us to the requirement of providing these platforms the equipment to carry out this task. This at least will dilute greatly any adverse fall out of mistaken targeting. There also exists an argument in favour of selection of targets across the line of control where the use of aircraft would yield effective results. Helicopters with capability used especially at night provides for low chances of detection and identification. Whether or not to use airpower across the Line of Control is a debatable issue. The other way to assess the use of helicopters and of other aircraft by aviation forces is to see how they can be used to promote the overall strategy and the individual low level plans designed to collect and develop information. The plan of operations can now include inaccessible forest and mountainous terrain where base camps can be set up with saving of large number of man-hours and consequent fatigue. It will also be inclusive of re-supply options beyond the self-sustaining period. Here arises the need to expand the area of air surveillance including the capability for night operations of which we are devoid of at present in the normal course operation planning as far as air capability of the army is concerned. Night capability in non-combat role exists in great measure to fulfill nearly all tasks ranging from transportation, supplies and reinforcements. Command and control forms a singular important factor in any operation and is recognised as such. In the scarcity of doctrinal guidance on how best army aviation operations can be controlled both from air and ground there exists a gap in the depth of how to execute a mission under continued firm guidance. The need for set requirement for an integrated communication system between ground troops, aircrew and commanders is ever so essential. Good intelligence is ever so essential in counterinsurgency. The absence of photo cover, more so, in areas not visited regularly will result in the ability of the ground forces to plan and strike at short notice. Optical and infra red line scan are basic examples in the present day fast developing techno-world. The use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Micro Aerial Vehicles (MAVs) in conjunction with airborne observation aircraft will assist in identifying Improvised Explosive Device (IEDs) planted targeting convoys and foot patrols with the possibility of forensic tracking when the need arises. Helicopters with their limited range as compared to fixed wing aircraft and their higher cost of operation limits their role in aerial surveillance. Integrating rotary-wing with the fixed wings will provide invaluable measure of benefits. Allocation of adequate flying hours for the rotary version, however, must not be dispensed with. Army aviation bases are vulnerable to attacks. In the entire Kashmir valley there are only two operative bases besides the airfield. There is only one other location which can provide shelter and security to overnight basing. The cost of hangars may be substantial but so is the cost of inconclusive air operations. The aircraft has to be able day and night at the shortest possible time which will provide flexibility and mobility to options and when applied would result in tactical advantage with rich dividends. The question to an argument favouring requirement for security arrangements and logistic bill will be “What is the difference in combat situation in such scenarios in a time lapse of one hour?” -the minimum time lapse that can be expected in present day, till air effort can be made effective at the place of intention. Opportunities for more in-depth training and education with appropriate career paths for counterinsurgency specialists will require attention. At high altitude based squadrons an aviator is posted only in the second tenure. This does not remain the case for aviators being posted to counterinsurgency areas. The result is, more flying hours in ab-initio training for initial categorisation and subsequent

Conclusion

Complete integration of air component of the Indian land forces will necessitate the doctrines as an operational part of the training and ground forces will have to consider counterinsurgency as a case which requires or does not require relevant involvement of the air component. The guiding principles of fighting counterinsurgency have remained constant but the operational imperatives have undergone many changes. It must be realised that air operations are inter-services operations and the future will witness the increasing importance of combined operations, in an all-weather, day-and-night conflict environment. To enhance counterinsurgency capabilities army aviation requires to be made an institutional priority. Clear signals and exposure to employment of air component even at branch level organisation in existing headquarters become an absolute requirement to achieve victory in such an operational scenario. A few technological essentials and the operating envelope of the platform will have to be expanded to include higher speed, better manoeuvring and increased load-carrying capacity of the rotor craft. The faster the insertion of forces can be completed, the better our forces can operate within the enemy's observation-orientation-decision-action (OODA) cycle and seize the initiative from them. To complete any mission successfully, army aviation does require total integration of mission and flight management systems. Advanced cockpit designs and computer-based mission management systems for information and decision-making for commanders and aircrew allows for more effective management of the entire mission profile. Network-based communication systems for improved situational awareness, advanced navigation systems and integrated night-vision, and thermal-imaging with true all-weather, day/night capability to accomplish all that finds mention. Corresponding improvements in the threat environment is expected to be much higher in future and therefore this arm is expected to traverse an environment where survivability will be equivalent to capability. In addition to high-tech measures, the platform will also have advance in systems reliability, aerodynamic tolerances, and crash-worthiness thereby allowing the ground troops to continue and succeed in their missions.

Appendix (Refers to p14 and footnote 33)

INSURGENCIES SINCE 1945

China 1946-1950
Greece 1945-1949
Philippines 1946-1942
Vietnam 1945-1954
Burma 1948-
Malaya 1950-1956
Colombia 1948-1962
China/Tibet 1950-1951
Kenya 1952-1956
(Mau Mau)

Cuba 1958-1959
Algeria 1954-1962
Lebanon 1958
Indonesia 1958-1960
(Darul Islam)
Congo/ 1960-1965
Katnga
Guatemala 1968-1996
South Africa 1983-1994
(African
Nacional Congress)
Etiopía/ 1974-1992
Eritrea
Laos 1960-1973
Vietnam 1960-1975
Namibia 1960-1991
Iraq(Kurds) 1961-1974
Yemen 1962-1969
Guinea-Bissau 1962-1974
Angola 1962-1974
Columbia 1963-
Mozambique 1964-1974
Dominican 1965-1965
Republic
Zimbabwe 1972-1979
(Rhodesia)
Nigeria/Bifara 1967-1970
Argentina 1973-1977
(Montaneros)
Cambodia 1970-1975
Northern Ireland 1969-1999
Philippines 1972-1994
(New Peoples Army)
Jordan 1970-1970
(Black September)
Philippines 1968-
(Moro National Liberation Front)
Pakistan 1971-1971
(Bangladesh)
Pakistan 1973-1977
(Baluchistan)
Angola(Unita) 1975-
Morocco 1975-1988
(Polisaria)
Indonesia/ 1975-1999
East Timor
Uruguay 1963-1973
Philippines 1977-
Moro Islamic Liberation Front
India(Naxalite) 1980-
Nigeria/Biafara II 1999-
Afghanistan 1996-2001
Lebanon 1975-1990
India(North-East) 1952-
Indonesia/Aceh 1999-
Mozambique 1976-1995
(Renamo)
Sri Lanka 1983-
Nicaragua 1978-1979
Afghanistan 1978-1992
Cambodia 1978-1992
El Salvador 1979-1992
Somalia(anti-Barre) 1981-1992
Senagal 1989-
Peru 1981-1992
Nicaragua(Contras) 1981-1988
Turkey 1984-1999
Sudan 1983-
Uganda 1993-
Papua New Guinea/ 1988-1998
Bougainville
Liberia 1989-1996
India-Kashmir 1989-
China/Xinjiang 1991-
Rwanda 1990-
Moldova 1992-1994
Sierra Leone 1991- Somalia 1991-
Algeria 1992-
Croatia/Krajina 1992-1995
Afghanistan 1992-1901
Tajikistan 1992-1997
Georgia/Abhkazia 1992-1994
Azerbaijan/Ngo-kar 1992-1994
Bosnia 1992-1995
Burundi 1993-
Pakistan 1993-1999
(SindhisVs Majahirs)
Chechnya 1994-1996
Congo(Kabila) 1996-1997
Congo(Kabila) 1996-1997
Nepal 1997-
Congo 1998-
Chechnya-II 1999-
Serbia/ 1998-1999
Kosovo
Nigeria 1999-
(Communal)
Israel 1996
Afghanistan 2001-
Ivory Coast 2002-
Sudan/Darfur 2002-
Iraq 2003-

Appendix (Refers to p8 and footnote 14)

INVENTORY AND DISPOSITION OF ARMY AVIATION UNITS

Aviation Unit
Division/Brigade United States Vietnam Other Areas Total
Air Cavalry Troop 11 17 7 35
Aviation Company(General Support) 1 7 2 10
Aviation Company(Airmobile Light) 1 6 2 9
Aviation Company(Assault Heptr –Airmobile Division) - 6 - 6
Aviation Arty Bty(Aerial Weapons-Airmobile Div) - 4 - 4
Aviation Company(Aerial Weapons- Airmobile Division - 2 1 3
Aviation Company(Separate Brigade) 1 - 1 2
Aviation Detachment (Berlin Brigade) - - 1 1
Total 14 42 14 70
Non Divisional Units
Aviation Company(Airmobile Light) 3 38 44 85
Aviation Company(Surveillance)@ 1 20 22 43
Aviation Company(Medium Heptr)* 3 13 19 35
Aviation Company(Army & Corps) 1 2 9 12
Medical Company(Air Ambulance)# 1 2 5 8
Aviation Company(Heavy Heptr) 1 3 4 8
Aviation Company(Fixed Wing) - 2 3 5
Aviation Company(Armed Escort) - 2 2 4
Total 10 82 108 200

@ 3 types of surveillance units including OV-1, O-1(Lt) and U-6/U-8 aircraft
* Includes the Advanced Weapons Support Command
# Does not include air ambulance detachments

Appendix (Refers to p8 and footnote 14)

HELICOPTER SORTIES AND LOSSES

Helicopter Type Sorties$ 1961-65 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1970 Total
Attack sorties - 332 627 862 915 799 417 3952
Assault sorties - 672 1151 1687 1826 1467 744 7547
Cargo sorties - 289 546 819 798 690 406 3548
Other sorties - 1700 3192 4050 4902 4608 2646 21098
Total NA 2983 5516 7418 8441 7564 4213 36145
Helicopter losses*
North Vietnam 3 1 4 2 - - - 10
South Vietnam 106 123 260 495 459 393 230 2066
Other location & non-hostile 166 197 400 511 589 419 284 2566
Total 275 321 664 1008 1048 812 514 4642
$ Sorties are in thousands
* Losses based on helicopters shot down or crashed. Some were recovered, repaired and returned to service unlike most downed fixed wing aircraft.