References: http://www.historynet.com/battle-of-gettysburg http://americancivilwar.com http://www.gettysburgphotographs.com Day 1: July 1, 1863
On the morning of July 1, Maj General Heth, of Lt General A.P. Hill’s Third Corps, sent his 7,500-man division down the Chambersburg Pike toward Gettysburg. Encountering resistance, they initially assumed it was more of the Pennsylvania Emergency Militia that they’d been skirmishing with during the campaign.
In reality, Colonel John Buford had deployed part of two brigades of Union cavalry as skirmishers in the brush along Willoughby’s Run three miles west of town. Two weeks prior, they were issued breech-loading carbines, and they used the guns’ fast-loading capability to create the impression of a much larger force and were able to slow the advance of Hill’s brigades for a time before they fell back.
The Confederates followed them across the stream, only to meet a line of Union infantry on McPherson’s Ridge. The Army of the Potomac was slowly arriving unit by unit, and among the first to arrive was Union Maj Gen Reynolds, commander of the left wing of the Army of the Potomac (I, III and XI corps), assessing the engagement and took charge of the defense. His men fought tenaciously, and Reynolds was shot dead during the fighting.
When Maj Gen Meade arrived, he set up his headquarters at Taneytown, and dispatched Maj Gen W. S. Hancock to take command at Gettysburg and assess whether or not the battle should be fought there. Hancock, seeing the strong defensive position offered by the hills near Gettysburg, chose to stand, and Meade ordered the other corps to the little crossroads town.
By afternoon, Confederate reinforcements had also arrived, and the general engagement Lee hadn’t wanted at this stage of the campaign was accomplished.
The Union’s XI Corps was driven back through the town of Gettysburg, losing 4,000 men, and by evening was entrenching on Culp’s and Cemetery hills south of town.
Lee expressed a desire for General Ewell to assault the hills without waiting for further reinforcement, but he failed to make it an express order. Ewell did not press his tired men forward, giving Meade time to reinforce the troops on the hills.
Day 2: July 2, 1863
Lt Gen Longstreet’s corps had arrived with 20,000 men and were sent to outflank the Union left, which was anchored to the south by two distinguishing hills known as Little Round Top and Big Round Top. Gen Lee learned early that morning from a reconnaissance report that the hills were unoccupied and offered a great position to flank the Union Army. The Union didn’t put troops on those hills until it’s position was recognized to be valuable. Ewell was to make a demonstration against Culp’s and Cemetery hills on the Union right and to use his own discretion about launching a full-scale attack.
Longstreet’s men, moving toward their objective, had to revise their route after Brig Gen McLaws discovered the planned route would put them in full view of the Federals, taking away any advantage of surprise. This cost valuable time but, as events turned out, a Union general was about to present them an unexpected opportunity.
All but one of Meade’s seven corps were now on the field, deployed in a fish-hook shape with its center along Cemetery Ridge; the defensive positions on Culp’s and Cemetery hills formed the hook at one end. The left was held by Maj Gen Daniel Sickles, whose men were positioned along the base of Cemetery Ridge in front of Little Round Top and Big Round Top.
Dissatisfied with his position at the lower end of Cemetery Ridge, he took it upon himself to advance his III Corps nearly a half-mile west toward the Emmitsburg Pike and open high ground in a wheat field near a peach orchard. The move dangerously stretched his 10,000-man corps. Longstreet’s men attacked Sickle’s new position, and the fighting at rocky Devil’s Den, the wheat field and the peach orchard was among the fiercest and bloodiest of the three days.
Meade, sent V Corps and part of the XI to reinforce Sickles. New York’s Irish Brigade received Last Rites from a Catholic priest before charging into the fight; 198 of them would not return from the desperate fighting in the hot afternoon.
Above the blood-soaked fields, a similar drama was playing out on Little Round Top. Around 4:30 p.m., men of Alabama, Texas and Arkansas, from Maj Gen Hood’s Division in Longstreet’s Corps, began ascending the steep hill from the west. Had they gotten there two hours earlier, they would have captured the hills unopposed, but by the time they arrived Meade’s chief of engineers, Brig Gen Warren, had discovered the potentially disastrous situation and sent messages to Sickles, who could not send even a single regiment by that time.
One message Col Vincent, commanding 3rd Brigade, 1st Division, of the Union’s V Corps. He double-timed his men and deployed them among the rocks and trees of Little Round Top’s western and southern slopes. The fate of the Union Army, at that moment, rested on the shoulders of 1,350 men of the 83rd Pennsylvania, 44th New York, 16th Michigan and 20th Maine regiments. Vincent’s orders were to “hold this ground at all costs!”
Nearly 650 Rebels of the 15th Alabama stormed into the saddle between the Round Tops around 6:00 p.m., and were meet by the muzzles of Col Chamberlain’s 20th Maine. After an hour of intense fighting, Chamberlain’s 300-plus men had nearly exhausted their 15,000 rounds of ammunition. He ordered a countercharge. Surprised, the Alabamians fell back and attempted to make a stand, but Company B of the 20th Maine, which had been detached to cover the regiment’s flank, and fourteen of Col Berdan’s Sharpshooters rose from behind a stone wall and charged the Confederates’ flank. Convinced they were outnumbered, the men of the 15th and 47th Alabama retreated. By the time the sun went down on the second day at Gettysburg, the Union left still held, but III Corps was no longer a significant unit in the battle, and V Corps had also counted heavy losses. Meanwhile, a desperate contest was taking place on the slope of Cemetery Hill.
Ewell’s troops had advanced from around the town of Gettysburg to assault Culp’s and Cemetery hills. For an hour they struggled across rough ground while Union batteries fired shot canister and cannon shell at them, but when they got far enough up the slopes, the artillery couldn’t engage with the cannons any more, and the Rebels pushed back infantry from the XI Corps. Union regiments pulled from one area of Cemetery Hill to plug a gap created by the retreat creating another gap, and Confederate infantry poured through.
On Cemetery Ridge, Hancock sent two regiments to reinforce Cemetery Hill. Arriving after dark, they formed up and charged into the Rebels who were fighting with artillerymen around the Union guns. The Confederates retreated soon after realizing they wouldn’t push any further.
In one of the ironic events of the war, the 7th West Virginia, which had been the 7th Virginia (Union) until June 20 when West Virginia was admitted as a state, fought hand to hand with the 7th Virginia of the Confederacy, capturing a nephew of their own regimental commander.
The long day of bloodshed finally ended. Meade called together his commanders for a council of war. He’d already sent a message to the War Department stating that he intended to stay and fight; he may have called the council in order to make sure no one would do the next day what Sickles had done. Meade’s army had been attacked on the left and the right; that fact, combined with other intelligence he’d received, led him to believe his center would be the target the next day.
Day 3: July 3, 1863
Throughout the war, Robert E. Lee had always sought a way to “get at those people over there.” His aggressiveness had served the Confederate cause well on many battlefields, but on July 3, 1863, it led to disaster.
Despite arguments from Longstreet, Lee instructed his “Old War Horse” to strike the Union center on Cemetery Ridge, using the divisions of Brig Gen Pettigrew, Maj Gen Trimble, and the recently arrived division of Maj Gen Pickett. In all, approximately 15,000 men were to advance three-quarters of a mile across open ground, climb fences along the roads, and charge up the gradual but steep slope of Cemetery Ridge to assault a force of about 6,500 Union Soldiers, but the Federals had reinforcements close by.
At 1:00 in the afternoon, a prolonged artillery barrage by the Confederates, utilizing an unprecedented number of cannons spread two miles wide, preceded the assault, intended to silence the Union’s cannons and weaken the infantry. Most of its shells went high, plunging behind the Union line, but some found their mark. One nearly struck Meade as he was standing outside his headquarters.
For a brief moment, Union cannons returned fire, until the order came down to conserve ammunition for the attack that was obviously coming. When the Union cannons fell silent, Lee’s artillery chief, Col Alexander, sent word for Longstreet to bring up his men.
Pettigrew’s division of four brigades formed the left of the attack line, with two of Trimble’s brigades behind and to their right for support. Pickett’s men formed the right of the attack line.
The advance was disordered by terrain and by flanking fire on Pettigrew’s left as it neared the Union line. Pickett’s advance drifted left, exposing his right to enemy fire. Through shot, shell, canister and rifle fire, the long Confederate line surged forward. Near the Union center, it broke through temporarily until reinforcements drove it back. As the survivors straggled back to Confederate lines at Seminary Ridge, many of them passed Robert E. Lee, who told them, “It is my fault.”
The day also saw cavalry action, as the horsemen of Brigadier Generals Custer and Gregg stopped Stuart’s attempt to get into the Union rear.
Aftermath: July 4, 1863
On July 4, Lee started a 27-mile-long train of hospital wagons down the road to Virginia. His army halted at the flooded Potomac River and entrenched for another battle, but Meade’s army, too, was battered and exhausted and had consumed much of its ammunition. The Army of the Potomac did not pursue, for which Meade would be soundly criticized. He remained in command of that army for the rest of the war, even after Ulysses S. Grant was promoted to Lieutenant General, placed over all Northern armies and attached himself to the Army of the Potomac. Lee offered his resignation to Confederate president Jefferson Davis, but it was refused and he, too, remained in command for the rest of the war.
Ammunition expenditure report at Gettysburg: An estimated 569 tons of ammunition was fired during the three days of fighting