...DETERMINANTS OF CEO COMPENSATION: EVIDENCE FROM MALAYSIAN BANKING INDUSTRY CHONG KOK CHIEK (AC082799) MUHAMMAD AZWAN BIN MOHD ARIFFIN (AC082868) SITI SUHANNA BINTI ABDUL GHANI (AC083010) BACHELOR OF ACCOUNTING (HONS.) COLLEGE OF BUSINESS MANAGEMENT AND ACCOUNTING UNIVERSITI TENAGA NASIONAL 2012 DECLARATION We hereby declare that this project is our original work except for quotations and citations which have been duly acknowledged and that it has not been previously and/or concurrently submitted for any other degree at Universiti Tenaga Nasional and/or other institutions. CHONG KOK CHIEK AC 082799 MUHAMMAD AZWAN MOHD ARIFFIN AC 082868 SITI SUHANNA ABDUL GHANI AC 083010 Date of submission: 13th August 2012 i ACKNOWLEGDEMENT We would like to express our sincere gratitude to our project supervisor, Mr. Wan Mohammad Taufik bin Wan Abdullah, lecturer of Department of Accounting of Universiti Tenaga Nasional, for his valuable advices and continuous guidance throughout the research process. Mr. Taufik spent a lot of time enlightening us on various issues, giving us a comprehensive view in the academic aspect via our meetings within his busy working schedule. It is our pleasure to have him as our project supervisor. Without his unconditional support and care, our project could not be finished effectively. He let us try different approaches with confidence in the process, assisting us to solve a lot of problems especially at the time when we did...
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...amount of compensation CEO’s receive. CEO’s financial compensation packages were largely structured to incentivize risk taking in order to increase shareholder wealth (“Restraints on Executive Pay”, 2009). Yet, the 2008 financial crisis was mostly characterized by declining levels of company performance largely due to the increase of risk afforded to CEO’s by the attractiveness of lucrative executive incentives to perform. This essay argues that executive pay and its influence on company performance is both controversial and complex and concludes that executive pay has minimal influence on company performance and, when it does have influence, it tends to be negative. It is widely believed that companies and their shareholders suffer from poor performance unless the importance of incentives for executives – most notably through monetary and stock compensation – is realized (Jensen and Murphy 1990). The notion that the level and performance sensitivity of pay affects the quality of managers an organization can attract in a competitive labor market for executives seems, on the surface, uncontroversial. However, whether compensation policy is truly “one of the most important factors in an organization’s success” (p.139), as Jensen and Murphy (1990) assert needs further examination A series of empirical studies from a variety of industry, national, and time settings present evidence contrary to the conventional belief in the effectiveness of performance-related pay. In a paper exploring...
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...The impact of performance-based compensation on misreporting Natasha Burns and Simi Kedia * * Burns is at University of Georgia, Terry College of Business, Athens, GA. 30602, e-mail: nburns@uga.edu. Kedia is at Harvard University, Harvard Business School, Boston, MA 02163, e-mail: skedia@hbs.edu. This paper combines the results of two earlier papers: “Does performance-based compensation explain restatements” by Natasha Burns and “Do Executive Stock Options Generate Incentives for Earnings Management? Evidence from Accounting Restatements” by Simi Kedia. We thank Jean Helwege, Andrew Karolyi, and René Stulz for their comments and advice. We also thank Jim Hsieh, Kose John, Steven Kaplan, Kevin Murphy, Prabhala, Jeremy Stein, Christof Stahel, Ralph Walking, Karen Wruck, David Yermack, participants at the 2003 NBER Universities Research Conference of Corporate Governance, the 2004 AFA Meetings in San Diego, seminars at Arizona State University, Baruch College, Indiana University, Ohio State University, Penn State University, Rice University, Rutgers University, Southern Methodist University, University of Georgetown, University of Houston, University of Illinois, and University of Pittsburgh for helpful comments. All errors are the responsibility of the authors. The Impact of performance-based compensation on misreporting Abstract This paper examines the effect of CEO compensation contracts on misreporting. We find that the sensitivity of the CEO’s option portfolio...
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...I think that people consider CEO compensation to be unfair because they simply see a large compensation. However, when determining if CEO compensation is fair I think there is more to be considered. People unaffiliated with the company are not going to have an unbiased opinion. Therefore, we need to look to those affiliated with the company of interest. Research shows that 93% of companies in the Russell 3000 index approved of their CEO's pay. (Feloni 2014) Also, we should consider that only 20% of CEO compensation is base pay, the rest is based on the performance of the company. Therefore, the majority of their compensation is contingent on working hard to see their company succeed. A paper by Kaplan and Joshua Rauh of Stanford found that the highest paid CEO’s also generated higher stock returns. “The highest-paid CEOs in terms of realized pay—the top 20% out of 1,700 firms—generated three-year stock returns that were 60% higher than those of other firms in their industries.” (Sumo and Weitzman 2013) It should also be noted that the increase of current CEO’s compensation packages are reflecting US stock highs. Finally, CEO’s are appointed. They have to climb the corporate ladder and have adequate qualifications. Therefore, it is not accurate or fair to compare their compensation to an average worker’s compensation. If you compare a CEO’s pay with other high –earning professionals their pay is reasonable. Steven Neil Kaplan, Neubauer Family Distinguished Service...
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...The best form of compensation for corporate executive for optimizing long –run performance. Over the past two decades, there has been a stream of research which has focused on the characteristics of corporate executive and firm performance. This paper examines five academic and practitioner-theory focused research articles by (Baker et al, 2006; Babchuk et al, 2003; Hartzell et al, 2003; Murphy et al, 2003; and Kathleen et al, 1989) on the subject of corporate performance and compensation. The purpose of this essay is to advocate the best form of compensation for corporate executive for optimizing long –run performance based on the listed above studies. The components of CEO compensation are classified into four categories: salary, bonus, long-term incentive rewards (e.g., stock options), and benefits. In examining these components, equity based compensation and agency theory were employed and investigated as key factors of analysis. Many academic scholars advocate that the issues of CEO compensation have been a subject of debate and research, due to the agency problem. Thus, for the past three decades, issue of executive compensation was approached from the perspective of the principal-agent relationship. Agency problem, in the context of the five papers mentioned above ‘is the possibility of conflicts of interest between the shareholders and managers of a firm’. According to agency theory, each firm consists of principals (shareholders) and agents (managers)...
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...Journal of Economic Perspectives—Volume 17, Number 3—Summer 2003—Pages 71–92 Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried E xecutive compensation has long attracted a great deal of attention from financial economists. Indeed, the increase in academic papers on the subject of CEO compensation during the 1990s seems to have outpaced even the remarkable increase in CEO pay itself during this period (Murphy, 1999). Much research has focused on how executive compensation schemes can help alleviate the agency problem in publicly traded companies. To understand adequately the landscape of executive compensation, however, one must recognize that the design of compensation arrangements is also partly a product of this same agency problem. Alternative Approaches to Executive Compensation Our focus in this paper is on publicly traded companies without a controlling shareholder. When ownership and management are separated in this way, managers might have substantial power. This recognition goes back, of course, to Berle and Means (1932, p. 139) who observed that top corporate executives, “while in office, have almost complete discretion in management.” Since Jensen and Meckling (1976), the problem of managerial power and discretion has been analyzed in modern finance as an “agency problem.” Managers may use their discretion to benefit themselves personally in a variety y Lucian Arye Bebchuk is the William J. Friedman Professor...
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...the financial incentive is consistent with business performance, while some may argue that there is no relationship between them. This paper will discuss this problem and give some evidence below. There is a prediction raised by Principle-agent theory that directors are more motivated while the performance-pay sensitivity increases (Kubo, 2005). However, after testing this prediction, the results do not support the hypothesis. Conversely, the study suggests that it is hard to improve performance in firms with high financial incentive measures. Moreover, it also points out that executives cannot be motivated by directors’ pay. Overall the results indicate that there is no consistence between financial incentive and business performance. The connections between incentive pay and future stock performance can also reflect this problem, where incentive pay refers to restricted stock, options and other forms of long-term compensation. Cooper, Gulan and Rau (2009) examined whether the long-term performance of a company could be better if incentive pay is in such forms. The study shows that performance of the companies in the highest compensation decile worsens significantly over time. Overall, it is concluded that incentive compensation and stock performance documented in the research is inconsistent. Moreover, the results suggest that compensation components could not create higher future returns for shareholders. But on the other side, some experts argue that high executive...
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...HOW TOTAL WEALTH OF THE CEO AFFECTS THE RISK POLICY OF FIRM OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY FIN 863 FINAL PROJECT BY SONIK MANDAL CHARLIE SWARTZ INTRODUCTION Agency theory states that the goals of the owners and the managers of a firm diverge in a way that the managers take less risk since their ownership of the company is much less compared to the owners of the firm who have a much bigger stake in the company. Thus managers being risk averse, they forego profitable ventures if they anticipate them to be risky (Guay, 1999, Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Making the salary structure more convex by introducing more option-based compensation and stock awards is one way owners try to align the goals of the managers with the owners. But managerial wealth attached to the firm is only a fraction of their total personal wealth in the portfolio. Other components of manager’s total wealth could be stocks owned in other companies, real estate portfolio, and other debt related securities. A lot of research has been done in the past explaining how managerial compensation structure (options, stock awards etc.) affect his risk taking abilities (Knopf et al. 2002, Rogers, 2002, etc.). But not much research has been done showing how manager’s outside wealth affects his risk taking in the firm. As far as we know, the only paper that has looked at this relationship is by Elsila et al. 2013 but that paper only looked at the Swedish listed firms...
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...bombard the media in recent times. Executive remuneration is one of the most hotly debated topics in the Human Resource (HR) world. Bergmann and Scapello (2002) argue that during the reign of Julius Caesar, centurions received attractive incentives. However, they stressed that longevity of an idea does not mean a lack of controversy surrounding it. In the aftermath of the financial crash and recession 2007-2009, the debate of the executive compensation again has surfaced to the forefront by the media and became the hot issue for academicians, researchers, regulators, policy makers and public. The purpose of this paper is to clearly discuss the issue of executive compensation by presenting arguments for and against it. While there has been an undisputed escalation in Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) pay and in comparison to the earnings of “average” workers over recent decades, academic researchers have taken positions on both sides of the debate. This paper would, therefore, provide a brief review of the basic frameworks within which CEO pay is viewed, and presents the principal arguments characterizing this debate. My OPINION WOULD FOLLOW. BRIEF BACKGROUND As mentioned previously, Bergmann and Scarpello (2002) stated that executive...
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...serious flaws in how they have been implemented, particularly for executives. In this paper, we are going to discuss the incentives of four different CEO from Pharmaceutical Industry. Pfizer Merck & Co Bristol-Myers Squibb Vertex 2012 Revenue $59B $47B $21B $1.5B 2011 Revenue $65B $48B $19B $1.0B CEO Read Frazier Andreotti Leiden Base $1.75M $1.5M $1.6M $1.0M Annual Incentive $3.4M $2.5M $3.8M $2.1M Annual LT Incentive (Stock and Stock Options) $12.9M $7.1M $10.9M $2.5M Perks/Other $175k $0.06M $808k $0.01M Vested/Exercised Shares $5.6M Approx. Total $25M $11.1M $17.2M $5.7M According to the Proxy statements, both Pfizer and Mereck have approximately 90% of their compensation as variable, based on company performance. The large discontinuity between the two companies is mostly due to the vested or exercised shares of Pfizer’s Ian Read. Excluding this amount, the companies’ compensation plans are generally aligned with their comparable sizes and company performance. Pfizer offered the largest incentive-based payout to it’s CEO in 2012, justified by the company exceeding two of three performance metrics despite key patent losses and the leadership Read showed throughout the year. Merck ranked their CEO performance as high in a tough environment, but due to a low internal scorecard results and shareholder return rankings Frazier was awarded a lower amount of variable compensation than in 2011. Overall, both of these industry leaders seem to have incentive programs...
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...Regulation of Executive Compensation and its impact on the stability of the financial system | | Introduction In corporate circles, the financial crisis and its effect on companies is sometimes illustrated as a systematic phenomenon in which there is no individual responsibility. Public discussion, on the contrary often assigns the blame of the crisis to bankers or managers, and suggests conclusions of salary reductions or individual liability in terms of losses. In this paper the implications of executive compensation surrounding the financial crisis will be debated. Firstly, the types of executive compensation will be discussed and the implications of them. Secondly, how executive compensation contributed to the financial crisis will be conferred and thirdly the legal improvements and current process will be analysed. To aid understanding, articles and examples will be used to emphasise the various views of economists regarding executive compensation. Non-Regulation of Executive Compensation Executive Compensation can be described as the monetary bonus, or the non-monetary benefits which an executive receives for their work in an organisation. Executive Compensation can be a highly motivating incentive to work more efficiently, thus benefiting the organisation and keeping the executive content with his contribution and performance. However, this compensation can have adverse effects where the executive does not have the organisations best interest in mind, but...
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...ARTICLE IN PRESS Journal of Financial Economics 73 (2004) 497–524 Who is in whose pocket? Director compensation, board independence, and barriers to effective monitoring$ Harley E. Ryan Jr.a,*, Roy A. Wiggins IIIb a Department of Finance, E. J. Ourso College of Business Administration, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA 70803, USA b Department of Finance, Bentley College, Waltham, MA 02452, USA Received 8 October 2003; accepted 18 November 2003 Available online 9 June 2004 Abstract We use a bargaining framework to examine empirically the relations between director compensation and board-of-director independence. Our evidence suggests that independent directors have a bargaining advantage over the CEO that results in compensation more closely aligned with shareholders’ objectives. Firms with more outsiders on their boards award directors more equity-based compensation. When the CEO’s power over the board increases, compensation provides weaker incentives to monitor. Firms with more inside directors and with entrenched CEOs use less equity-based pay. Furthermore, firms with entrenched CEOs and CEOs who also chair the board are less likely to replace cash pay with equity. r 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: G30; G34; G38 Keywords: Board of Directors; Compensation; Bargaining power; Agency theory; Regulation $ We thank Tom Arnold, George Baker, Lucian Bebchuk, Alex Butler, Sudip Datta, Mai IskandarDatta, Melissa Frye, Stuart Gillan...
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...equity-based compensation which is based on the price of company’s stocks, like stocks and options, and non-equity-based compensation, such as cash compensation- including salary and bonus (Bebchuk & Fried, 2006 ). A company’s performance can be measured by its economic return, in other words, the accounting performance on financial statement (Gulen & Rau, 2009). This essay supports that executive pay may have no significant influence on company performance, because there are some ways that managers can decouple their payments from performance, and this essay will investigate these possible underlying reasons. There are studies examine the relationship between the pay policy and performance, and the results do not support the hypothesis that there is significant link between payment and performance. Kubo (2005) examined this link by investigate a group of Japanese companies and the result showed that companies with high pay-performance sensitivity did not get better performance. Gulen and Rau’s (2009) study on incentive pay also suggested that managerial compensation components such as restricted stock, options and long-term incentive payouts, that are meant to align managerial interests with shareholder value, do not necessarily translate into higher future performance. The reasons for this weak link may be quite complex and here are some possible explanations. By reaching contractual agreements, managers can completely decouple their payments from performance. A CEO may...
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...Is CEO Power Bad? E. Han Kim and Yao Lu1 Abstract Recent evidence suggests that CEO power reduces shareholder value and the efficacy of incentive pay systems. To better understand how the power affects firm governance and performance, we decompose CEO power into three dimensions--structural, ability based, and ownership related. While structural power is indeed harmful--it is associated with higher managerial entrenchment, lower pay for performance sensitivity (PPS), and weaker firm performance--its impact on firm performance is benign when CEO power is restrained by strong external governance mechanisms. Concentration of ability based power in CEO appears to enhance firm performance, but only when external governance is strong. CEO share ownership (as independent variable) shows a U-shaped relation with entrenchment, and -shaped relations with PPS and performance. These results imply that ownership power arising at a high level of share ownership negates the beneficial effects of aligning CEO-shareholder interests through cash flow rights. November 10, 2008 JEL classification: G30, G34, J 33, L25, M52,G32, Keywords: CEO power, managerial entrenchment, Pay for Performance Sensitivity, Firm performance, Share ownership, CEO Centrality 1 Both are at Ross School of Business, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109. Email: ehkim@umich.edu and yaolu@umich.edu. We have benefitted from helpful comments and suggestions from Sugato Bhattacharyya, Amy Dittmar, Luo...
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...Governance. This is a set of principles intended to assist corporate management and boards of directors in their individual efforts to implement corporate governance best practices. 1) Role of CEO - i) The CEO, with senior management, operates the corporation on a daily basis. In addition to having the requisite skills and experience, the CEO should be a person of integrity who takes responsibility for the corporation adhering to the highest ethical standards. ii) CEO certification. CEO has to assess the adequacy of the procedures and the diligence of carrying out the procedures for verifying the accuracy and completeness of information provides to investors. 2) Role of board of directors – i) Effective directors are monitors the business operations. The board’s most important function is the selection, compensation and evaluation of a well-qualified and ethical CEO. ii) The non-management members of the board, under the oversight of a committee made up of independent directors, should annually review the performance of the CEO and participate with the CEO in evaluation of senior management. iii) The board should have contingency plans to provide for traditional board leadership if questions arise concerning management’s conduct, competence, or integrity or if the CEO dies or is incapacitated. 3) The independence of outside, non-executive directors – i) The board must have a majority of independent directors. The board must...
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