The Challenger disaster could have easily been avoided. STS-51L (Challenger's last mission) was originally scheduled to launch on January 22. However a vast ammount of delays and aborts pushed thelaunch to the 28th. The morning on the 28th had been particularly cold, with temperatures close to 31 degrees Fahrenheit, the minimum temperature allowed for launch. The low temperature brought up concerns from engineers at Morton Thiokol, the manufacturers of the Space Shuttle's Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs). They were concerned about the effects of the cold weather on the space shuttle'srubber O-rings, which prevent hot gases from escaping the joints in the shuttle's SRBs. On previous shuttle missions, cold weather had caused the O-rings to fail, allowing hot gases to escape. Thoughthis very dangerous problem had occured multiple times before, NASA and Thiokol management believed that because all of the past shuttle missions had been successful, the cold temperatures and athis very dangerous problem had occured multiple times before, NASA and Thiokol management believed that because all of the past shuttle missions had been successful, the cold temperatures and athat had already taken place, NASA did not want to delay the mission any longer. Not only were Thiokol engineers worried about the cold temperatures, but Rockwell International (The manufacturers ofthe Space Shuttle orbiters) were also concerned. When they saw the large amount of ice formed on the shuttle launch pad, they expressed concerns that ice could damage the shuttle's thermal protectiontiles during launch. Even so, the launch still continued as planned. Shortly after launch, one of the O-rings on the right SRB certainly did fail, and worse than on any preceding shuttle flight. Thehot gases that escaped knocked the right SRB off of its lower strut and burned a hole into the liquid hydrogen tank in the shuttle's external fuel tank (ET). As the lower liquid hydrogen tank in the ET failed, it was pushed into the upper liquid oxygen tank. With the ET failing structurally and disintegrating, and the right SRB spinning on its upper strut and firing in an anomalous direction, thespace shuttle was torn apart by abnormal aerodynamic forces. Because the SRBs were stronger, they survived the breakup and continued in uncontrolled flight before they were destroyed by the rangesafety officer. Had NASA management worked on solving the O-ring burn-through problems sooner or aborted the mission because of the cold weather, Challenger could have survived.
On January 28, 1986, seven astronauts were killed when the space shuttle they were piloting, the Challenger, exploded just over a minute into the flight. The failure of the solid rocket booster O-rings to seat properly allowed hot combustion gases to leak from the side of the booster and burn through the external fuel tank. The failure of the O-ring was attributed to several factors, including faulty design of the solid rocket boosters, insufficient low- temperature testing of the O-ring material and the joints that the O-ring sealed, and lack of proper communication between different levels of NASA management. The case "provides a summary of technical and organizational details that led to the decision to launch the Challenger Space Shuttle, and to the ensuing accident.