The US government passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) in 2010. The Act was challenged in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 576. US 2012. The Supreme Court ruled that the individual mandate, which requires individual to purchase a health insurance policy providing a minimum level of coverage, unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause, but stands under taxing method. I personally view that this PPACA is constitutional under Commerce Clause. The majority opinion in the decision is delivered by Justice Roberts in the following points. The majority opinion held that the government’s theory of controlling cost-shifting by increasing supply is invalid because it gives Congress unlimited power to make decisions for individuals who choose not to do something. In Wickard v. Filburn, the court rejected the farmer’s argument that growing wheat for “home consumption was beyond the reach of the commerce power” on the ground that the “aggregate effect of similar decision will impose a substantial effect on the interstate market for wheat” (Sebelius). If we apply the same logic of buying insurance in Wickard, Congress can also order people to buy more wheat to support the price of wheat. The majority opinion argued that tt might make more sense for Congress to order people to buy more vegetables because the aggregate effect of Americans not eating a balanced diet is more significant than that of people living without health insurance. The argument of forcing people to make the right decision for the greater good overrides the power under the Commerce Clause. The Commerce Clause gives Congress power to regulate activities but not compel it. Wickard falls under the Commerce Clause because the wheat farmer is actively engaged in wheat market, both from demand side and supply side, and therefore can be regulated. The government’s theory would essentially allow them to regulate anything by forcing people to do it. For the above reasons, Congress cannot compel uninsured individual enter into a market on the ground that this aggregate effect could be a potential trigger, among many others, to unaffordable medical costs. Furthermore, the majority opinion also argued that the precedent from Gonzales v. Raich authorizes Congress to regulate “classes of activities” (Raich), but not classes of individuals. In Raich, Congress has a “rational basis” (Raich) for expecting that growing marijuana within the state for home consumption will affect the interstate price and market condition, especially considering the easy diversion into illicit channels. Therefore, intrastate Marijuana is an exemption on the ground that its production and consumption have economic impact on interstate commercial activity. The government argued that health-insurance is also a unique product that can be sustained as an exemption like marijuana, because the insurance is used to “finance health-care consumption and cover universal risks” (Sebelius). The majority opinion held that this theory cannot find analogies from the precedents in Raich and Wickard. Even though Congress can anticipate the effects on commerce of an economic activity, the Constitution does not “permit Congress to anticipate that activity itself in order to regulate individuals not currently engaged in commerce” (Sebelius). Therefore it is not a rational basis to expect the economic impact from those who are not in the insurance market. Justice Ginsburg delivered dissenting opinion from the following perspectives. First, in both Raich and Wickard, “Congress has the power to regulate economic activities that extend even to local activities, that viewed in the aggregate, have a substantial impact on interstate commerce” (Raich). Large amount of overgrown wheat for home consumption will drive down the price in interstate wheat market; large amount of marijuana home production will have a substantial impact on the marijuana market, let alone the illegal practice of marijuana business. Here in the health insurance market, uninsured individuals annually consume “more than $100 billion in healthcare, nearly 5% of the Nation’s total” (Ginsburg). The aggregate effect of uninsured group heavily burdens the national health care market and causes economic and social inefficiencies, which gives Congress the power to regulate. Second, when applying the Commerce Clause, we should emphasize whether Congress had a “rational basis” for concluding that the activity affects interstate commerce and whether there is a “reasonable connection”(Raich) between the regulatory means. The Chief Justice considered that the “connection between the uninsured today and subsequent commercial activity is too lacking” (Sebelius). In fact, it is a rational basis that everyone will need to go to hospitals and incur medical costs at some point. The individual mandate is not compelling individual to become active in commerce by purchasing an unwanted products because everyone, including those uninsured, is or is expected to consume health care at some point. There is a reasonable connection that their inaction in health insurance will adversely affect the price of health care. It is also reasonable to regulate current individual conduct based on prophesied future activity. In Wickard, we predict the excess wheat overhangs the market and tends to flow into the market. In Raich, we predict the high demand in the interstate market will likely draw such home grown marijuana into the market. These rulings are all based on rational prediction. The Congress’ actions are even more rational in this case, giving the consumption of medical care and the cost-shifting problem are certain to occur. Finally, the dissenting opinion also shed light on the point that “underlying the Chief Justice’s view of the Act is the fear” (Ginsburg) that Congress would abuse its power if such regulation is granted. In Lopez vs US, the Court held that the “Federal Government lacked power, under the Commerce Clause, to criminalize the possession of a gun in a local school zone” (Lopez). The Court believed that possession of gun is not an economic activity in any sense. Neither is the individual mandate, according to the majority opinion. Dissenting opinion believed that the PPACA is very different from the Gun Free School Zone Act, because instead of has only an attenuated effect on interstate commerce, health insurance is an urgent problem that correlates with many economic problems. The dissenting opinion thus held that the Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to enact the minimum coverage provision. The Commerce Clause is designed to regulate channels, instrumentalities and activities that have substantial effect on interstate commerce. From the perspective of protecting general interests-- a more efficient and fair public health system-- that cannot otherwise be recognized through means by each state, the dissenting opinion is stronger. If we left the matter to individual state, they would “fail to take actions critical to the success of the Nation as a whole” (Ginsburg). The majority and dissenting opinions disagree mostly on one issue-- whether Congress could regulate activities of those uninsured individuals? The majority opinion interpreted the individual mandate as Congress overreaching its power and compelling people to purchase unwanted products. This ruling emphasizes the difference between engaging actively and inactively in market. For those trading actively in the market like Wickard (wheat) and Raich (marijuana), it is reasonable to predict their impact on the interstate market and regulate their activities under the Commerce Clause. The uninsured group, on the contrary, are not engaged in insurance market and therefore cannot be related to any economic activities. This interpretation of Commerce Clause and precedents in majority opinion is too literal and preoccupied with potential backfire of granting Congress seemingly unlimited power. The fact that the uninsured are not in the insurance market does not mean they are not actively consuming health care. In Wickard,the home consumed wheat is also not in the market but nonetheless affect the interstate commerce. In fact, instead of drawing analogies between health insurance market and usual supply-demand market like wheat or marijuana, health insurance should be considered at the same level as Social Security Act, which is installed by the federal system as an efficient way to maximize collective social benefits. It asks people to put aside a certain amount of money in advance to pay for their living expenses later in the same manner that individual mandate requires people to purchase health insurance. If we reject the constitutionality of individual mandate under Commerce Clause, the rationality of Social Security Act, Tax and any public interest related payment system would also be challenged based on the same logic that these people are not currently in the market. Our precedents from Raich and Wichard authorizes Congress the power to regulate activities that may not be regarded as commerce but exerts a substantial economic effect. Health insurance definitely falls under this test because it finances the public health system. And the aggregate effect is large enough to trigger national economic concern, unlike the relatively smaller scale impact in Lopez. These characters of the health insurance market naturally make itself subject to Commerce Clause. For the above reasons, I agree with the dissenting opinion that the individual mandate of PPACA is constitutional under Commerce Clause.