Delving into the history of the East Ukrainian conflict and recent annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by Putin-led Russia brings one to the scene of Ukraine’s former president, Viktor Yanukovych, facing a difficult choice while his country plowed toward economic cataclysm. He could either opt to form deeper ties with Europe in the form of a long-term, initially challenging deal with the EU to bolster trade, or join the Eurasian Union, for which Putin offered an appealing reward package instantaneously. The pro-Russian president of Ukraine at the time decided not to sign the agreement with the EU in the fall of 2013. This EU agreement wasn’t merely a trade agreement, but also a political agreement through which Ukraine would commit to adhering to certain European values and principles. Following this, widespread demonstrations broke out across Kiev, the city’s capital, in what is considered the Ukrainian Revolution.
It is important to note, without overemphasizing, that Ukraine has a history of political and cultural divide, with the West (including the capital of Kiev), leaning more towards Europe, while the East having stronger ties with Russia. In the public’s eye, failure to sign the agreement from EU marked a move away from European principles and values. In the wake of the Ukrainian Revolution, then President Viktor Yanukovych fled the capital, which resulted in the Ukrainian parliament deposing him and appointing an interim President, Oleksandr Turchynov, followed by the formation of an interim government. The international community had mixed responses, with the EU and the USA recognizing the new government, while Russia and a few others condemning it illegitimate and the direct result of a coup d’etat. A few days later, pro-Russian forces gradually began to take over the Crimean peninsula. A number of media sources have reported the involved forces included former members of the Ukrainian military as well as forces clad in Russian made uniforms without insignia. In a series of subsequent events, the Crimean parliament voted to dissolve the Crimean government, oust its Prime Minister, and call a referendum on Crimea’s sovereignty. The outcome of the referendum appeared overwhelmingly in favor of joining Russia, and resulted in the separatist government of Crimea signing a treaty of accession of the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol into the Russian Federation.
Examining the motivations of the different geopolitical players in this conflict, from Vladimir Putin of Russia to the interim government in Ukraine, backed by the Western nations of the EU as well as the US, enables us to explore the role of diplomacy in the events leading up to the east Ukrainian Crisis. The problem, I will argue, lies in Russia and the West having competing interests in post-soviet space. However, though these interests differ, they hold greater priority to certain players than they do to others. My paper seeks to assess these interests as they shape the players’ roles in and proportionate responses to the east Ukrainian conflict.
Morgenthau’s view of diplomacy examines many of the core principles of realism within international relations. For Morgenthau, it is necessary for diplomacy to determine its objectives in light of the power actually and potentially available for nations to pursue these objectives. Moreover, nations also need to determine the means that are actually and potentially available to nations to pursue these objectives. For the purpose of carrying out such diplomacy, nations had three tools at their disposal: persuasion, compromise, and the threat of force. The Russian understanding of diplomacy lends itself to this realist conception presented by Morgenthau. For one, Putin attempted to persuade Ukraine to join the Eurasian Union by offering attractive economic benefits in the form of $15bn in aid and cheaper gas. In his prerequisites to compromise, Morgenthau asks to “give up the shadow of worthless rights for the substance of real advantage” and to “never allow a weak ally to make decisions for you.” It can be argued that it was in Russia’s national interests to have Ukraine, the largest formerly soviet country after Russia itself, join the Eurasian Union. In a move that would have led, and inevitably did lead to allegations of international law violations and the breaching of Ukraine’s sovereignty, Putin sought real advantage in lieu of living in a shadow of worthless rights.
Looking at this from the American standpoint and examining closely America’s struggle between prudence and principles in dealing with this matter, we find that despite carrying out certain asset freezes and implementing some economic sanctions on Russia, it seems unlikely that the US will risk a major war to aid democratic forces in Kiev. But given a hypothetical scenario where the US was to risk the threat of war with Russia, did it have the means to pursue these objectives in a conflict of sorts? Certainly. Moreover, it is conceivable that harsher immediate retaliation in Russia might have stopped Putin there. But is facing Russian hard power and activating the threat of another Cold War for the purpose of being the savior of democracy in Kiev conducive to American interests and national security concerns? Likely not. This brings us to another one of Morgenthau’s prerequisites for compromise, “nations must be willing to compromise on all issues that are not vital to them.” In a purely realist turn of events, the US takes a step back to examine whether the country in question, in this case, Ukraine, actually merits the expenditure of American money and the spilling of American blood. As a result, when determining the US’ response to Russian annexation of Crimea, it seems that the Kremlin did not look at US response to aggression in other nations, but rather, at how much the US cared for Ukrainian sovereignty. To Russia, America’s decision not to include Ukraine in NATO served as further evidence in reaching the conclusion that the US was not ready to risk war for Ukraine. In this case, it seems that the US is not ready to micro-manage every conflict and is inclined to abandon NATO’s global cop role in the Ukrainian crisis. This brings us to the sphere of military influence among stakeholders in the Ukrainian crisis.
Morgenthau argued, “The armed forces are the instruments of foreign policy, not its master.” American foreign policy, in willing to register objections through renewed economic sanctions but refraining from exacting any military influence, seems aligned with Morgenthau’s perception of the armed forces as one of many instruments, but not the leading face, of foreign policy. The NATO alliance, and the disbursement of forces through it, is a highly complex undertaking. It involves a rigorous process where unanimous approval to deploy forces must be gained from its 28 member states, before it can get involved with a conflict. After approval has been sought, NATO has to put together an army, a navy, and an air force for its mission. Members contribute what military assets they can afford. Is it really likely that all the European members of NATO, notwithstanding the US, Canada, and Turkey, will agree to go to war with Russia over Ukraine? Not at all, especially considering Europe’s inability to hit Russia with any significant sanctions, and fragmentation of opinion within EU states given their deep commercial and energy ties with Russia.
On the other hand, it can be argued that Ukraine is vital to Russian interests. It may have been the case that as the newly installed Ukrainian government began to distance itself from Russia and seemed unlikely to join the Eurasian Union as Putin had hoped, Russia felt that its access to the strategically important port and military bases in the Crimean peninsula were in jeopardy. On the other hand, it also might be the case that to President Putin and the Kremlin, annexing Crimea was merely a matter of repairing a historical wrong. After all, on the annual Victory Day celebrations in Russia, President Putin broadcasted the following on national television with regards to the Crimean Peninsula, “People living here firmly decided to be together with Russia, and thus confirmed their faith in the historic truth and the memory of our forefathers.” (Neil MacFarquhar, New York Times, http://tinyurl.com/oofo4mp)
Russia’s takeover of Crimea, conducted under the guise of a “peacekeeping” operation, seems to have been effected without a shot fired by Russian hands. Only recently has President Putin admitted that Russian troops were active in Crimea during the referendum, maintaining that they facilitated self-determination for the region. He also claimed that though the unmarked forces in the eastern areas were Russian, the separatists were certainly not. The West’s response to Russia’s vision of post-soviet space in Ukraine, in line with it not being vital to their individual interests, has been arbitrary – for the most part lacking in hard-hitting economic sanctions, with military intervention being an even greater unlikelihood. From Morgenthau’s realist standpoint, a lack of vital interests provides leeway for compromise, which is precisely why this crisis has not obliged concrete western intervention. On the contrary, Russia’s vision of re-integration of post-soviet space, whether conducted out of historical ambition or strategic association, may very well rest on how far Russia is willing to go to bring Ukraine back into its sphere of influence, proportionate to how vital this sphere of influence is to Russia’s national interests.