(1A)
Donnellan makes a distinction between two uses of definite descriptions. He argues that definite descriptions can be used referentially or attributively. Donnellan states: “A speaker who uses a definite description referentially in an assertion […] uses the description to enable his audience to pick out whom or what he is talking about and states something about that person or thing” (Donnellan, 285). When definite descriptions are used referentially, they are used as a tool to pinpoint a certain thing or person. In other words, the definite description is used as a way to bring something to someone’s attention. For instance, a sentence with a definite description that is used referentially could be, ‘The guy with the Ray Bans looks pretty cool’. Here the definite description in the sentence is ‘the guy with the Ray Bans.’
Donnellan points out an important trait about the referential use of definite descriptions. He states, “In the referential use of a definite description we may succeed in picking out a person or thing to ask a question about even though he or it does not really fit the description” (Donnellan, 287). For the given example, ‘The guy with the Ray Bans looks pretty cool,’ the speaker or the person communicating to another picks out something, namely a person who is wearing Ray Bans. However, as Donnellan argues, we can still be successful in picking that specific person or thing out even if the person is not wearing Ray Bans. In other words, we can still understand that we have picked out a specific person, even if the person happens to be wearing a different type of sunglasses. This example shows that the definite description, ‘The guy with the Ray Bans,’ does not have to be a correct description of the ‘guy’ because it still functions to pick out the ‘guy’. In other words, in this example of the referential use of the definite description, the description still functions properly (to pick out the specific guy over there) without the person having to precisely fit the definite description. In short, the definite description used in this way, need not precisely describe the person that it is used to pick out.
Donnellan argues that the other way in which we use definite descriptions is attributively. He states: “A speaker who uses a definite description attributively in an assertion states something about whoever or whatever is the so-and-so” (Donnellan, 285). An example of this type of use of definite descriptions can be observed in the following sentence. ‘The person who was reading this book was wearing sunglasses.’ In this example, the definite description functions to pick ‘whoever’ was reading the book. The sentence then asserts that ‘whoever’ was reading the book was wearing sunglasses. Furthermore, in this attributive use of the definite description, the sentence is used to refer to a specific person who fits the description. Namely, ‘whoever’ was wearing sunglasses and reading a certain book.
Donnellan clarifies attributive uses of definite descriptions when he states: “In the attributive use, the attribute of being the so-and-so is all important, while it is not in the referential use” (Donnellan, 285). This means that when using definite descriptions attributively, it is contingent that the definite description pinpoints what type of person the sentence is asserting something about. In other words, ‘the person who was reading the book’ functions to pinpoint someone who was reading a book or whomever was reading a book. Then the rest of the sentence makes an assertion about this someone, or whoever fits the definite description. Namely, that this someone was wearing sunglasses.
Donnellan makes the distinction between the use of definite descriptions when used referentially and attributively. He argues that the attributive use has no reference. (Lecture) This means that when a definite description is used attributively, it only functions to pick someone or something out by way of describing what attributes this someone or something has. In other words, the attributive use does not function to pinpoint a certain someone or something. Instead, this use functions to pinpoint someone or something that has the described attributes. In comparison, the referential use functions to pinpoint a specific someone or something. As shown, the referential use functions to pinpoint this certain thing, and can still work properly even if the referent does not exactly exist as described. For example, ‘the guy wearing the Ray Bans look pretty cool’ can still pinpoint the ‘guy’ even if the ‘guy’ is wearing a different brand of sunglasses.
Donnellan argues that in the attributive use “such a person could be identified (correctly) only in case someone fitted the description used” (Donnellan, 286). This means that if no one was reading a book, then no one would fit the description. Furthermore, if the sentences displaying a attributive use states that, ‘the person that was reading this book was wearing sunglasses,’ and there was no one reading the book mentioned, then no one is identified correctly. This means that if no one fits the description, used attributively, then ‘such a person could’ not be identified correctly. These requirements, of the using definite descriptions attributively, contrasts the fact that referential uses can still function to pick out certain things or individuals without precisely describing them.
(1B)
Donnellan argues that one can use the same definite description either referentially or attributively. Take for instance the sentence, ‘the guy wearing Ray Bans looks pretty cool.’ The definite description could be used referentially if the the speaker was trying to pick out a certain someone, possibly wearing Ray Bans or another brand of sunglasses. On the other hand, the same sentence could be used attributively by a speaker if she or he was only making statement about whomever is wearing the specific brand of sunglasses, namely Ray Bans. Donnellan shows this difference of use made by the speaker. He states, “in the attributive use if nothing fits the description, no straightforward answer to the question can be given” (Donnellan, 287). This means that when a definite description is used attributively as opposed to referentially, then it is possible that there does not exist a someone who fits the description. This means that the speaker can use these descriptions in two ways for Donnellan. For example, ‘tell the person wearing Ray Bans to drink a martini,’ can be use the definite description either referentially or attributively. In the referential use, the speaker is talking a about a certain specific person. This could be shown by the fact that the speaker is picking out this specific person from a group of people. On the other hand, the attributive use employed by the speaker would be a command to another. This attributive use would be used to tell someone to find someone in a group of people, specifically displaying these certain attributes, and to tell them to drink a martini.
(1C)
Russell’s theory argues that “definite descriptions are not ambiguous semantically” and that ‘the F is G’ is true if and only if the unique object that is F, is G” (Lecture). This means that under Russell’s view, definite descriptions either refer to something or do not refer to something. This means that when one uses the definite description, ‘the guy wearing Ray Bans,’ one can only reference the ‘guy’ if he exists. This means that to actually refer to someone, this someone must completely fit the description given. This means that for Russell, there is no ambiguity when using a definite description. Either the definite description refers to a unique object, or fails to refer to anything at all. It can be said that Donnellan presents arguments against Russell’s view on the grounds that Russell does not account for the two types of uses of definite descriptions. Donnellan states that “a definite description occurring in one and the same sentence may, on different occasions of its use, function in either way” (Donnellan, 281). He states that Russell’s view does not deal with the the two types of uses that he argues for. Furthermore, since Russell’s view of definite descriptions requires that the description must accurately describe a unique object, his view of definite descriptions does not line up with Donnellan’s referential use of definite descriptions. This is because Donnellan’s argument for referential descriptions makes it clear that a sentence can still properly function even though the description is not accurate. For example, referential uses of definite descriptions function as tools to pick out specific objects. Furthermore, they can successfully pick out objects without Russell’s requirement of the description being completely accurate. Donnellan also argues that Russell’s view, the use of definite descriptions could possibly “presuppose or imply that something fits the description” (Donnellan, 283). Presupposing that something specifically fits a definite description in order for it to function properly leads in the wrong direction if attempting to argue in favor of the referential uses of definite descriptions. This is because Donnellan’s argument for the referential use of definite descriptions accounts for the fact that they can function properly even when objects do not specifically fit. In short, Donnellan’s argument for the referential use of definite descriptions greatly differs from Russell’s view. This is because Donnellan argues that definite descriptions can be used properly without correctly describing an object.
(2A)
Kripke argues that referential-like cases can also occur with the use of proper names. He is saying that proper names can be used in a similar fashion as the the referential use of definite descriptions as proposed by Donnellan. Kripke puts forth what he calls ‘complex cases.’ Kripke gives an example of a complex case. He argues that when a speaker wishes to refer to a certain object or person, the speaker could incorrectly believe that object or person has a certain proper name. For example, I could wish to refer to a person whom I believe is named Zac. However, his name has always been Toivo since birth. Suppose someone then corrects me of the person’s correct name. I have still intentionally referred to the person, Toivo, and have only made an error in naming. Again, under Donnellan’s theory, the referential use of definite descriptions allows for the inaccuracy of the definite description. Even though the proper name is inaccurate, I have still used it to pick out an individual.
(2B)
Kripke would analyze the case of using the incorrect proper name in the case above by making the distinction between the semantic referent of the name and the speaker’s referent of the name. Kripke states:
“the speaker’s referent of a designator to be that object which the speaker wishes to talk about, on a given occasion, and believes fulfills the conditions for being the semantic referent of the designator. He uses the designator with the intention of making an assertion about the object in question (which may not really be the semantic referent, if the speaker’s belief that it fulfills the appropriate semantic conditions is in error).” (Kripke, 264).
Here, he is explaining that the speaker’s referent is the object (person, thing, place...) that the speaker is purposefully talking about. For example, the speaker’s referent is the person that she or he is talking about. This means that the speaker mistakenly uses the name, Zac, to talk a person whose name is actually Toivo from birth. This seems reasonable because the speaker is focused about talking about the person, not the name that the person specifically has. This means that Kripke is putting forth the speaker’s referent, and this referent is the one that the speaker could believe is the semantic referent. Kripke then establishes the semantic referent. The semantic referent of the name Toivo is the specific individual that the speaker was also talking about. This means that the semantic referent is only picked out by the correct name, Toivo. Furthermore, the semantic referent is not influenced by the speaker’s intentions of picking out the specific individual. So, Kripke would argue that a speaker could still say something that is true of a certain object even though the named used to do so does not correctly name the object. This means that by the defined speaker’s referent, one can state something true even while using the incorrect name. For example, a speaker could say that ‘Zac looks pretty sleepy. He just spilled milk all over himself.’ For Kripke, the sentence could be true by way of the speaker’s referent. In other words, if it is the case that the sentence truly states something about the referenced person, then the speaker can still say something true even though she or he used the incorrect name. Furthermore, if it is the speaker’s intention to talk about the person spilling milk, then the speaker’s referent is this specific person. So, with the use of the incorrect name pardoned, the speaker can still say something true about the person spilling milk.
(2C)
We might take Kripke’s view as being in support of Russell because his argument for speaker’s referent. Kripke’s account of the speaker’s referent seems to clear the ambiguity of Donnellan’s attributive like cases and referential like cases. This seems to be in support of Russell’s theory. Russell’s theory does not allow for the ambiguity of definite description (Lecture). Furthermore, Kripke’s account also provides a non-ambiguous approach. The speaker’s referent is not ambiguous because it depends on the speaker’s intention. Even though the speaker could possibly use an incorrect name to reference an object, the speaker is wholeheartedly sure what she or he is intending to talk about. Kripke states: “The “strong Russell language” goes further: definite descriptions are actually banned from the language and Russellian paraphrases are used in their place” (Kripke, 265). Here, Kripke is talking about Russell’s explanation of sentences like, ‘the present king of France is bald.’ Russell replaces the definite description with an existence claim and uniqueness claim. This means that for Russell, the sentence reads as: [There exists [a unique king of France & [this king is bald]]]. The ambiguity of certain sentences can easily be cleared up when using the longer but more thorough Russellian method. This replacement of definite descriptions seems make clear what one is saying. In other words, sentences become unambiguous when correctly paraphrased in a Russellian fashion. So, it seems that as long as the speaker knows what she or he wishes or intends to say, an unambiguous Russellian paraphrase could be used. So, it seems that Kripke is in support of Russell’s method of paraphrasing sentences into a more precise format. Furthermore, it seems that if one knows what she or he wants to say, then Russell’s methods could be acceptable.

Works Cited:
Reference and Definite Descriptions Author(s): Keith S. DonnellanReviewed work(s):Source: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 75, No. 3 (Jul., 1966), pp. 281-304 Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical ReviewStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2183143
Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference Saul Kripke: Midwest Studies in Philosophy (1977)
Philosophy 172 Lecture. Ashley Feinsinger. UCLA 2012