paid, was replaced by the “originate and distribute” banking model, in which loans are pooled, tranched, and then resold via securitization. The creation of new securities facilitated the large capital inflows from abroad.
The first part of the paper describes this trend towards the “originate and distribute” model and how it ultimately led to a decline in lending standards.
Financial innovation that had supposedly made the banking system more stable by transferring risk to those most able to bear it led to an unprecedented credit expansion that helped feed the boom in housing prices. The second part of the paper provides an event logbook on the financial market turmoil in 2007– 08, ending with the start of the coordinated international bailout in October 2008. The third part explores four economic mechanisms through which the mortgage crisis amplified into a severe financial crisis. First, borrowers’ balance sheet effects cause two
“liquidity spirals.” When asset prices drop, financial institutions’ capital erodes and, at the same time, lending standards and margins tighten. Both effects cause fire-sales, pushing down prices and tightening funding even further. Second, the lending channel can dry up when banks become concerned about their future access to capital markets and start hoarding funds (even if the creditworthiness of borrowers does not change). Third, runs on financial institutions, like those that occurred at Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and Washington Mutual, can cause a sudden erosion of bank capital. Fourth, network effects can arise when financial institutions are lenders and borrowers at the same time. In particular, a gridlock can occur in which multiple trading parties fail to cancel out offsetting positions because of concerns about counterparty credit risk. To protect themselves