Case Study Emergency Management (25 APRIL 2013)

My study will provide a brief overview into the following subcomponents of Emergency Management concerning “The Station” Nightclub Fire of 2003 in Warwick, Rhode Island.
This tragic event took the lives 100 patrons and approximately 200 were injured. The band that played before an estimated crowd of 450 people used pyrotechnics for special effects purposes during the opening performance. The pyrotechnics ignited highly-flammable polyurethane foam insulation lining the wall and ceiling of the platform area where the band was performing, resulting in the deadly fire. 1) Mitigation- the act of mitigating, or lessening the force or intensity of something unpleasant, as wrath, pain, grief, or extreme circumstances:
Prior to the fire at the Station fire and City code inspectors failed to examine all relevant model building and fire codes in reference to high occupancy buildings and or gatherings other incidents with similar circumstances in places of public assembly; fire detection and suppression systems that were not at the time part of the structure or planned in the materials used in the construction and interior finish of the building; points of entrance and exits and the fire department response to the incident. Federal investigators are able to develop new information, and confirm reports as to the initiating event, the reason for the rapid spread of the toxic smoke and fire, the difficulties encountered by patrons during egress, and the mass casualty situation confronted by the fire department.

2) Preparedness - the state of being prepared or ready for an event or action.
Prior to the fire the station did not have trained crowd control persons on the scene, in the aftermath of the smoke and fire people were crushed trying to evacuate the building as a result nightclubs must have at least one trained crowd manager on duty, for every 100 people, whenever a club is open to the public. Crowd managers are required to conduct a daily safety inspection using a checklist in addition to directing patrons to safety during an emergency. This was not a requirement before.
Use of pyrotechnics in bars and nightclubs is banned. Limited use of pyrotechnics is allowed in certain sprinklered theaters and large venues. A permit from the fire department has always been required but in this incident was not requested
Safety inspections by fire and building officials are now required in order to obtain or renew liquor licenses. Prior to the incident it was not mandated This includes ensuring no building or fire code violations exist and in addition,( there was a violation concerning a door that opened inward and noted as an egress hazard ) where required, there are trained crowd managers on staff and that the daily safety checklists are completed.
A two-strike rule was created for bars, nightclubs, discotheques, etc. with occupancies of less than 100 that exceed capacity. If a club is cited for an occupancy violation twice in a year, or exceeds its capacity by more than 50%, automatic sprinklers must be installed within 90 days or the business will be shut down (MGL C 148, S 26 G1/2). Brockton’s Emu Safari club was the first nightclub required to install sprinklers due to overcrowding.
A statewide non-criminal ticketing system was implemented that streamlines enforcement of fire and building codes. This program has been adopted in 189 communities to date. Communities are required to select and train a hearings officer in order to participate in this method of code enforcement (MGL C 148A). Violations are subject to $100, $500, and $1,000 fines for a respective 1st, 2nd, or 3rd violation of the applicable code requirements.
3) Communication- the imparting or interchange of thoughts, opinions, or information by speech, writing, or signs.
The major shortcoming and resulting deaths in the fire was from failure to recognize the threat too late and then the ensuing panic. Some would simply say that the patrons lacked situational awareness. The manager supposedly did not have permission to use the pryrotechnics or “Gerbs” as they were called. Failure on the inspectors part prior to the incident by communicating the need for sprinkler systems and also the changing of the occupancy capacity.
The events following the fire in subsequent days and weeks lead to some very bad discoveries. There was no shortage of reporters covering the fire. By late morning, over one hundred of media personnel were on the ground at the site of Americas fourth deadliest club fire in the cold of winter. They awaited any new bit of news, to phone in stories and practice interviews beside network uplink trucks strategically parked about the area.
Following protocol, all but designated spokesmen (authorities) avoided contact with the press. The area had immediately been declared a crime scene, and yellow tape, soon to be replaced by chain-link fence, kept reporters far from what remained of the building itself. During the first daylight hours, news helicopters flew overhead, disrupting the tarps erected by firefighters to shield the dismal recovery effort from nosy eyes. That vantage point was lost after one Helo got too close to the site and it blew open body bags containing victims’ remains. Immediately, the FAA declared the site a “no-fly” zone.
Video of the fire from ignition to tragic human crush, had already been broadcast throughout the United States and abroad, because a news cameraman happened to be shooting inside the club a documentary in the wake of another tragic club just days prior. The world had saw the horrible images: an ’80s heavy-metal band, Great White, sets off pyrotechnics, igniting foam insulation on the club’s walls; concertgoers’ festive mood changes in 90 seconds to puzzlement, then concern, then horror as flames race up the stage walls and over the crowd, raining burning plastic on their heads; a deadly trap forms at the main exit.
4) Response- The immediate actions to save lives, protect property, and meet basic human needs.
From the time of ignition to the point where the facility was well involved in flames less than 6 minutes passed. The initial 911 calls for assistance were received from cellular phones at the scene. The police officer stationed at the club on a paid detail notified his dispatcher of the fire as well. The West Warwick Fire Department, upon notification of the severity of the situation, requested mutual aid from surrounding communities for both fire apparatus and ambulances. A Multiple Casualty Incident (MCI) was declared and the local MCI plan was put into effect.
A triage area was established in a restaurant across the street from the nightclub. As fire and rescue units converged on the scene, victims were transported to nearby hospitals and trauma centers, quickly filling many to capacity.
Over 200 victims were treated on the scene and transported to several medical facilities in the area in under 2 hours from the time of the fire. It was even rumored that they were so shorthanded of first responders that the Fire Chief was going through the yellow pages searching for medical staff persons.
In response to the tragic fire RI and MASS convened and Fire Commission administration convened the Secretary’s Task Force on Building and Fire Safety, made up of fire and building officials, club owners, parents who lost children in the fire, and other important stakeholders. They produced a report in September 2003 making 34 recommendations in seven categories including: sprinklers, egress, pyrotechnics, interior finishes, training and education, laws and regulations, and funding and resources. All of the recommendations were considered by the appropriate regulatory agencies or governing bodies and nearly all were implemented.
Some of the most important accomplishments are: * sprinklering existing nightclubs with a capacity of 100 or more; * sprinklering new nightclubs with a capacity of 50 or more; * requiring trained crowd managers when clubs are open; * completion of daily safety checks; * banning the use of indoor pyrotechnics except under limited circumstances; * tying liquor license renewal to safety inspections by fire and building officials; * creating enhanced penalties for violating building and fire codes and for knowingly putting the public at risk. * creating a streamlined ticketing system ( failure to comply ) for enforcing fire and building codes.

5) Recovery- Process or function characterized by a complex set of issues and decisions that must be made by individuals and communities. These actions involve the time immediately following an event and has no strict timeline.
Ten years after the fourth deadliest fire in US history There are still 100 crosses outlining the site where The Station once stood, but the makeshift memorial will someday be replaced as new plans are unveiled for a new memorial on the site of the deadly nightclub fire. In response to the tragic fire RI and MASS convened and Fire Commission administration convened the Secretary’s Task Force on Building and Fire Safety, made up of fire and building officials, club owners, parents who lost children in the fire, and other important stakeholders. They produced a report in September 2003 making 34 recommendations in seven categories including: sprinklers, egress, pyrotechnics, interior finishes, training and education, laws and regulations, and funding and resources. All of the recommendations were considered by the appropriate regulatory agencies or governing bodies and nearly all were implemented.

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References 1. Tally of patrons at Station night of fire climbs by 3 to 430. The Providence Journal. October 5, 2003. 2. Parker PE (2007) Tally of a tragedy: 462 were in The Station on night of fire. The Providence Journal 3. City of Rochester Fire Safety Division (2004).Inspection Procedures – (retrieved 24 April 2013)