Harmless Arbitrariness de Leon, Ramon Luis W.
11043644

Abstract In this paper, I address the issue of whether or not we are prudentially rational in accepting a belief on the basis of arbitrary reasons. This issue is derived from Peter Klein's discussion of possible objections against a view which he advocates called Infinitism. More specifically, this issue is located within the scope of matters concerning Infinitism's Principle of Avoiding Arbitrariness (PAA). Klein briefly acknowledges a possible objection from a line of reasoning by Steven Luper-Foy, who argues that we can be rational in accepting a belief on the basis of arbitrary foundations because these arbitrary foundations serve as the means to attain what Luper-Foy thinks is the goal of cognitive beings: a complete and accurate picture of the world. Klein identifies Luper-Foy's line of reasoning as going against his views. In defending PAA, Klein argues that it is not prudentially rational to accept a belief on the basis of arbitrary reasons since whether or not one accepts on the basis of arbitrary reasons, the likelihood of attaining the complete and accurate picture of the world is the same. I believe that Klein's defense against Luper-Foy's line of reasoning leaves much to be desired. I claim that when positive belief management principles as advocated by Luper-Foy are taken into consideration, the likelihood of attaining the epistemic goal is increased, and thus makes it more likely for an epistemic agent to attain the epistemic goal when one accepts on the basis of arbitrary reasons. Keywords: Infinitism, Foundationalism, Principle of Avoiding Arbitrariness, harmless arbitrariness

Introduction

In traditional epistemology, knowledge is commonly interpreted to be epistemically justified true belief. One object of concern for this traditional analysis is how beliefs are justified for the subjects who accept them. If so, what account of epistemic justification is acceptable?

Perhaps an account of epistemic justification must be one that states that he way by which we justify our beliefs must be rational. Some epistemologists suggest that having rational beliefs is a necessary condition for some kinds of knowledge. Among them is Peter Klein, who is one of the few who advocate a view called Infinitism. To understand the view, an introduction to justificational chains is in order. A justificational chain is a series of reasons that support a belief that requires justification, where a belief p is supported by a reason R1, and R1 is supported by R2, and R2 is supported by Rn. The series of reasons which support the belief that p—namely, R1 to Rn—is the justificational chain. Infinitism as a view states that in order for a subject to be justified in accepting a belief, the justificational chain is employed in the justification of the said belief must be both (i) infinite and (ii) non-repeating (Klein, 1999 pp. 299). To support this view, Klein establishes two principles to rule out irrational elements: the Principle of Avoiding Arbitrariness (PAA) and the Principle of Avoiding Circularity (PAC). From this point on, I will limit my discussion to PAA. Here is Klein’s formulation of PAA:

PAA: For all x, if a person, S, has a justification for x, then there is some reason, rl, available to S for x; and there is some reason, r2, available to S for rl; etc. (Klein, 1999 pp. 299)

PAA claims that if a subject is to be justified in accepting a belief, then the series of reasons that are used to justify that belief does not terminate in a reason that does not require any further reasons, and there is available to the subject an infinite series of reasons which favors believing the said belief.

Since arbitrariness is irrational and irrational sources of justification are not acceptable, then any justification which comes from these sources are not acceptable.

Problem and Thesis

In Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons, Klein discusses a line of reasoning by Steven Luper-Foy which one might cite against Klein's Principle of Avoiding Arbitrariness. According to Luper-Foy, one could still be rational despite accepting a belief on the basis of arbitrary reasons, contrary to PAA and its motivations (Luper-Foy p. 45, 1990). If Luper-Foy is correct, then supposed non-rational elements, such as arbitrary reasons for accepting beliefs, may still count in how a subject might be justified in believing (and it is prudentially rational to believe on the basis of these arbitrary beliefs).

For clarification's sake, some reason is arbitrary if the subject possesses no further available reasons for accepting that reason.

Here, Klein closely paraphrases and directly quotes (indicated in Klein's quotation marks) the line of reasoning from Luper-Foy:

The epistemic goal is to acquire a complete and accurate picture of the world. Granted, at base our reasons are arbitrary but “an injunction against believing anything... would obviously make it impossible for us to achieve the goal of arriving at a complete and accurate understanding of what is the case... Indeed, given that our ultimate beliefs are arbitrary, it is rational to adopt management principles that allow us to retain these foundational yet arbitrary views, since the alternative is to simply give up on the attempt to achieve the epistemic goal.” (Klein, 1999 p. 305, from Luper-Foy, 1990)

Luper-Foy argues that it is rational to accept foundational and arbitrary beliefs if it means that, with them, we can least attempt to achieve Luper-Foy's epistemic goal, where the epistemic goal is a complete and accurate picture of the world. Luper-Foy consents that while these beliefs which are considered foundational reasons are arbitrary (or have no further reasons to support them, and thus are irrational for Klein), we are better off having these reasons rather than not having any, for if we didn't have any, it would be impossible to attain the epistemic goal of a complete and accurate picture of the world.

To eliminate some of the confusion which might come from the constant use of “rational” and “irrational” and their related terms in the article which could lead one to confuse one sense of rational/irrational with another, Klein uses the terminology “prudential rationality”, where this sort of prudential rationality, from Luper-Foy, is to be understood as “rational to the extent that our efforts to attain the cognitive goal are efficient given our resources” (Luper-Foy, 1990 p. 43). I will make use of “prudential rationality” through the rest of my paper.

It seems to Klein that Luper-Foy's line of reasoning fails to threaten PAA—and by extension, Infinitism—for two reasons. His first reason is that PAA and PAC ensure that the regress does not stop, so it is impossible for the justificatory chain to be finite. His second reason is that even if the regress ends anyway and does so with a reason which happens to be unsupported, Klein claims that it is still not prudentially rational to accept a belief on the basis of arbitrary reasons.

To support his claim that doing so is not prudentially rational, Klein offers the following argument:

1. It is rational to accept a means to a given goal only if the means are more likely to achieve that goal rather some incompatible and highly undesirable goal. 2. Suppose that the goal of epistemic agents is to achieve a complete and accurate picture of the world. (from Luper-Foy) 3. Believing on the basis of x, an arbitrary foundation, would be rational only if believing x furthered that goal instead of rather some incompatible and highly undesirable goal. 4. -------------------------------------------------
But if my basic beliefs are arbitrary, or that there is no available reason for thinking that accepting them is more likely to further that goal rather than some incompatible and highly undesirable goal, then, for all I know, accepting the basic beliefs could equally well lead to obtaining a complete and inaccurate picture of the world. Conclusion: So, if at the base, reasons are arbitrary, it is not even prudentially rational to accept them since doing so is no more likely to satisfy rather than frustrate my epistemic goals.

First, in (1), what Klein means by “rational” here is perhaps a loose sense of being rational, but later in the argument, he means more specifically “prudentially rational”. To Klein, a subject is prudentially rational if the subject chooses a means that likely satisfies rather than frustrates the achievement of subject’s goals. Extending the notion of prudential rationality to an epistemic agent, the goal to strive for is a complete and accurate picture of the world, rather than an incomplete and inaccurate picture of the world—more accurate beliefs; less inaccurate beliefs.

Second, in (2), Klein assumes for the sake of argument that epistemic agents have the goal of obtaining a complete and accurate picture of the world, which Luper-Foy claims to be the case.

Third, in (3), Klein assumes that Luper-Foy affirms that believing on the basis of an arbitrary foundation is the means that is necessary to attempt obtaining the epistemic goal of a complete and accurate picture of the world, rather than some incompatible and highly undesirable goal.

References

Klein, Peter. "Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons." Noûs, Vol. 33, Supplement: Philosophical Perspectives, 13, Epistemology (1999), pp. 297-325. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2676107 (accessed October 14, 2014).

Luper-Foy, Steven. "Arbitrary Reasons." Doubting: Contemporary Perspectives on
Skepticism, Michael Roth and Glenn Ross, eds., (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990), pp. 39-55. http://www.trinity.edu/departments/philosophy/sluper/Arbitrary%20Reasons.pdf (accessed November 18, 2014).