HIE 208 – Canadian Military History
Assignment 4-1-1

Canadian Armed Forces at the Outbreak of War in 1939?
Lessons Learned and Relearned from Great War

Royal Military College of Canada (RMC)

To discuss the condition of the Canadian Armed Forces prior to the outbreak of

World War II we must first look at the political climate, culture and economy leading up to

1939. During this time Canada was in a policy of Isolationism after recovering form the

massive loss of life in the Great War.1 An anti-war sentiment stemmed from the

war time losses of over 60,000 Canadians – great losses for a country with only 8 million

people at that time. This Isolationist policy was further strengthened by closer economical

ties with the United States who were investing heavily in Canada and providing markets for

Canadian exports. Nevertheless, the economy was devastated during the Great Depression

and importance was placed on saving the economy and not developing the military.

Therefore, with the average Canadian having a bad image of the Great War and an economy

on the verge of collapse the Canadian Armed Forces in 1939 was in a sorry state, much

similar to its state prior to the Great War and many lessons had to be relearned. Canada had

to relearn its preparedness, conscription and technology lessons all over again.

It is clear to see that the military situation leading up to 1939 was poor and the worst

state since prior to World War I. “The professional army had just 4000 troops; the navy,

3000; and the air force, only 1000”2 The Army went from training for war to constantly

being used for aid to civil power such as the coal strikes in Cape Breton in 1922 and 1923.3

In 1936 many of the Regiments disappeared when the militia had its 15 Divisions cut in half.

The Navy was devastated by King’s 1922 decision to reduce it by 40 percent only

maintaining two Destroyers.4 Despite the cutbacks, Commodore Hose was able to establish a

1000 man strong Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve. The Air Force established in

1920 was due to British contribution of almost 5 million dollars.5 To ensure the survival of

the Air Force it was tied to civil aviation development. Coupled with the development of the

British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, which trained aircrews from Commonwealth in

Canada at the British expense, the Air Force was able to maintain a small element. After

World War I Canadians were not mentally prepared for another war and the King’s

government went as far as to reject Hitler as a major threat. Nevertheless, on the eve of

World War II, Canada was not prepared for war. “Twenty years of neglect had weakened

Canada’s defences. The nation could not even defend its own coasts, let alone dispatch fully

equipped and trained forces to Europe.”6 This narrow vision of world events resulted in

Canada relearned the same lessons of unpreparedness it had been situated in prior to outbreak

of World War I.

During World War I, Hughes chaotic mobilization included recruiting problems and

problems producing war equipment – the very same problems now faced by King.7 At the

start of World War I the military was not ready to go to war when it was sent and they were

not prepared for a long fight. The same was true for the Canadian military at the start of

World War II. Consequently, much like the Borden government in World War I, the King

government had to use conscription and force military service. Conscription divided Canada

along language and cultural lines – French versus English Canada. Once again, conscription

had little impact on the war as World War II ended less than a year later and worsened

relations between English-French Canada.

The military of World War I had failed to grasp technology fast enough before battle

and this was the similar fate for the soldiers going to the front in World War II. In both cases

it can be argued that a lack of funding created the situation. The first several disasters to

allied arms in Europe during 1940 led the government to extreme military expansion. “The

fiscal restraints of the fall of 1939, and the cautious husbanding of what the government

conceived to be very limited resources, were jettisoned virtually overnight.”8 Canada became

a massive importer of technology and by the end of the war was well on their way to

development programmes drawing world attention. Canada emerged from the war with the

fourth largest manufacturing output. “And to a degree it permitted the establishment of an

autonomous Canadian research and development programme.”9 But, like World War I,

Canada eventually forgot its war production and returned to focus on an export based

economy. As stated by Bothwell, “In the process, however, the derivative origins of that

programme were forgotten, as were the special circumstances that persuaded Canada’s allies

freely to give up their technological secrets.”10 Nevertheless, Canada did have success after

the war in developing technology such the AVRO ARROW, but like the past the government

ordered the project stopped. The government believed they could no longer afford to play in

the major leagues scrapping the project destroying both national pride and technological

potential.

In short, Canadian’s having a bad image of the Great War and an economy on the

verge of collapse the Canadian Armed Forces in 1939 was in a sorry state, much similar to its

state prior to the Great War and many lessons had to be relearned. Canada had to relearn its

preparedness, conscription and technology lessons all over again.
Bibliography

Francis, Douglas R., Jones, Richard, and Smith, Douglas B., Destinies: Canadian History Since Confederation. Toronto: Thomson Canada, 2000.

Morton, Desmond, A Military History of Canada: From Champlain to Kosovo, Fourth Edition. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1999.

Bothwell, Robert, Who’s Paying for Anything these Days? War Production in Canada, 1939-45, In Mobilization for Total War: The Canadian, American and British Experience. Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1981.