How successful was Bismarck as Chancellor of a united Germany?
The question of how successful Bismarck was as Chancellor between 1870 and 1890 is a question that has several different levels that each need to be analysed in order to get a well rounded and accurate answer. I will call upon Bismarck’s domestic and foreign policies, using them to illustrate the leaders triumphs and failures in his Chancellorship. I will also use Bismarck’s political ability, decision making and methods to further my understanding of his success in the German political sphere. Furthermore I believe that it is important to get an understanding of his political accomplishments and perhaps downfalls if the question is to be fully answered. Although the iron Chancellor is seen by many historians as responsible for Germany’s unification, I will not allow this variant to alter or effect my position on Bismarck as Chancellor because I will structure my analysis around an already united Germany. Thus, I will simply support my line of argument with relevant information to the precise question as opposed to complicating it using evidence from before the specific era in matter.
Although Germany became unified in 1871 I would suggest that this actually only solved the literal problem in regards to bringing the variety of separate states together. It did nothing for uniting the people of these states under one nation. In the early years of Bismarck’s Chancellorship his ‘primary objectives’ so to speak were to continue the unification process, eliminate any form of disunity- mainly in the form of the Catholics and Socialists, both while maintaining some extent or normality and tradition. The individual German states were without doubt unified from above, as opposed from below by the day-to-day people[1]. This process although seen to have occurred in 1871 continued to develop into Bismarck’s Chancellorship. Consequently one can suggest that this asserts the Prussian statesman as succeeding as unified Germany’s chancellor because it resulted in Germany becoming a major player in global affairs and helped balance the power that kept Europe at peace up until the First World War. Therefore the actual unification of Germany doesn’t have any bearing on Bismarck’s success as chancellor both in terms of chronology and achievements, but what resulted from the entire process through his chancellorship can be said to show Bismarck’s success in the art of diplomacy and country development. Myself, like some other historians see the German development (1871-1890) as illustrating how good a chancellor Bismarck truly was. He took a segregated country full of internal disputes and slowly but surely developed it until it was one of the world’s leading nations. Thus his success as chancellor can be seen to directly correlate with Germanys overall success in terms of its transition from a fractured state system to a united nation.
Because of the nature of the German constitution, Bismarck could practically rule the country unchallenged by other politicians and members of the Reichstag. He was unchallenged in his domestic policy, although the German electorate were led to believe that power was shared proportionally between the German ruling classes. However, his relationship with Wilhelm meant that Bismarck often had the political advantage over his peers because of his ability to convince Wilhelm that his policies served the most purpose for the German nation. Despite the nature of the German constitution, it would seem that Prussian dominance controlled the balance of an authoritarian system. Almost 1/3 of the Reichstag’s deputies were Prussian, resulting undoubtedly with Prussian interests being paramount.
As I have already established; Bismarck was the head on an authoritarian system, being only accountable to the Kaiser of Germany. This meant that Bismarck’s policies were virtually untouchable by the Reichstag which, at this time had very little influence over important political decisions. However, because of the way in which the German constitution was structured and presented, the Reichstag were able to influence decisions on the amendments to the military budget as this decision was said to be in the hands of the imperial assembly. Regardless of this constitutional reality, Bismarck was able to have dominance over the issue because of the Reichstag’s fear of another constitutional conflict like the one in 1862. Accordingly, between the years of 1874 and 1881, the military budget, the one factor that if the constitution was followed properly should have been at the hands of the Reichstag, was still controlled by the iron chancellor. So regardless of Bismarck according to the constitution being a ‘’responsible officer’’[2], in reality the only person Bismarck was responsible to was himself.
Between 1871 and 1879, Bismarck aligned himself with the National Liberals. This has to be seen as a tactical political move that furthered his overall power within the Reichstag. The National Liberals, at this point in German history held the most influence over the Reichstag which made them attractive allies to a strategic, power concerned Bismarck. Bismarck’s attraction to them came from the fact that he united Germany, which was the primary policy aim of the party. They also shared interest in Bismarck’s anti-Clerical desires and the instatement of free trade. Bismarck was happy to work with the Liberals who were a very capable political party.
However, in 1879 he switched his ‘allegiances’ to the Conservatives to counter the growing Social Democrat party. These switches in Bismarck’s loyalties simply show that he had none. His primary interest was maintaining a high level of authority in the Reichstag, and whichever political party offered this was the party in which he would align himself with.

As a result of Bismarck’s unrivalled and unchallenged rule of the Reichstag and Germany I would suggest that it indicates how powerful he was as a chancellor. However does this clear wield of power connect to his success? In terms of personal success I would be inclined to say yes, Bismarck had complete dominance and authority over more-or-less all of Germanys political affairs. Wilhelm was the only figure that could really influence or stop Bismarck, and from hindsight it is clear that he never truly had the desire to do so. And also, I would suggest that Bismarck’s supremacy over German affairs can be seen to have been in Germanys favour in that under his chancellorship Germany progressed from a splintered society to a nation united under the umbrella of Germany. Thus, in regards to Bismarck’s success as chancellor, his authority has to be noted as a factor furthering his overall success.
Moreover, his political flexibility is also a contributing dynamic behind his success as chancellor. The way in which he dealt with internal issues in the Reichstag can only be described as genius. It can also be said to have suppressed any further opposition in the Reichstag effectively maintaining a consistent and strong government.
Bismarck’s success as chancellor can be separated into two categories; foreign and domestic policy. With regards to his Foreign policy, it has to be said that he was very successful in achieving what he set out to achieve. He was committed to sustaining and promoting peace in Europe, and used his Prussian statesman status to help him do so. As a direct consequence of the Franco-Prussian war and Alsace Lorraine, Bismarck engaged in a policy of isolating France through diplomatic means whilst maintaining pleasant relations with the other countries of Europe. Bismarck knew that to keep France isolated he would need to have some support from at least two of the 5 main European powers; Great Britain, Russia, Austria-Hungary, France and Germany. Bismarck managed to place Germany at the heart of Europe’s balance of power through his skill in diplomacy.
He managed this particularly in the East by maintaining peace between Austria and Russia who were conflicting over the influence in the Balkans. The outcome was a peace treaty that interlinked the three nations, commonly known as Dreikaiserbung or the league of three emperors. Bismarck anticipated a two-fronted war in the future, so it has to be said that this strategic allegiance from the outset would seem as proactive. However, the chief intention of the alliance was to maintain existing borders in Europe; however the flaw of the Dreikaiserbung could be found in the entrenched suspicion and dispute between Austria-Hungary and Russia over the Balkan question. Historian Taylor has referred to the coalition as a ‘’fair-weather system’’, he goes on to suggest that ‘’a new twist of the Eastern question would destroy it’’[3]. It is clear from the historiography of Austria-Hungary and Russia that their relationship was always going to be volatile, in or out of any sort of coalition. Taylor further supports this by suggesting that their relationship could ruin the entire pact between the three nations. For this reason, in regards to Bismarck’s foreign policy one could suggest that it doesn’t represent good decision making on behalf of the chancellor. However, when analysing the situation and the results of the association it is clear that Germany most certainly benefitted from the union which inevitably enhanced Germany’s global and future position which would assert Bismarck as a successful German chancellor.
However, possibly one of Bismarck’s miscalculations was in the fact that he did nothing in regards to preparing a successor to his complicated system of checks and balance. Furthermore, Bismarck had practically delayed all initiative within the foreign office, he made it clear that he was a dictator and his views were final. His single minded nature is perhaps one of Bismarck’s downfalls as a chancellor, it is quite commonly accepted that Bismarck did well in regards to foreign policy, but maybe he might have succeeded to a greater extent had he listened to others.
In 1879, Bismarck initiated a defensive alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary known as the dual alliance. In it Germany and Austria-Hungary assured each other that they would come together if either of them were attacked by Russia. Its main purpose was to prevent and limit war in Europe after the congress of Berlin which sees relations between some European nations take a turn for the worst, specifically Russian and German after the amendments made to the Treaty of San Stefano which see Russia compensate Austria-Hungary with some of its territorial gains in the Balkans. After 1871 Bismarck tried to portray Germany as a peace maker and preserver of the European status quo, he continued this throughout his chancellorship, all the time while trying to expand the German Empire. Bismarck was the organiser of the Congress of Berlin and tried to play the role of ‘’honest broker’’[4], however the outcomes of the congress did nothing for Russo-German relations and soon after the Dreikaiserbung was discontinued, now asserting Russia as a potential enemy rather than ally. The Dual Alliance over the next three years went through a transition and eventually invited Italy to join, becoming what we now refer to as the Triple Alliance, the first formal war-camp in Europe. As head of the German political system, the Dual Alliance and eventually the Triple Alliance are both examples of Bismarck’s forward thinking nature, a characteristic that is representative of a successful chancellor. It is quite clear that he always had Germany’s future interests at heart. And by securing a formal European war-camp, Bismarck not only tried to ensure German military strength and support, but he also took measures to perhaps increase public unity.
As I have established; Bismarck was generally successful in his approach to German foreign policy despite having some flaws linked to his management of it. However, to get a full understanding of Bismarck’s chancellorship and its success it is essential to scrutinize the effect of his domestic policies and how they effected his time in power.
I will start my investigation of German domestic policy with Bismarck’s Catholic persecution starting as early as 1871. The Catholic community made up large proportions of German society, and because of the tradition of papal infallibility it can be said that their allegiance was to the Pope and not the German nation. Bismarck sees this as potentially jeopardising the unity of Germany along religious lines as well as undermining the political structure that he was at the head of.
Consequently Bismarck implemented ‘’the struggle for culture’’ (Kulturkampf) which was aimed to unfalteringly and absolutely constrain the Catholic churches influence on the German nation. All marriages had to be performed by state officials and Catholic education was outlawed. The Churchmen that rejected the laws were either imprisoned or exiled. However, regardless of the severity of the legislation historians typically agree that Kulturkampf had an adverse affect[5]. From the outset, the majority of German Catholics didn’t concur with the Pope’s assumed infallibility, but detested the policy implemented by Bismarck and supported by the National Liberals to a greater extent, resulting in them aligning themselves with the church.
When Leo XIII became Pope in 1878 ‘quietly opened negations to end Kulturkampf’[6], despite the failure of this legislation Bismarck still maintained unquestionable political control over Germany. However, as a result of his misjudgement he potentially segregated the nation by trying to keep it united. Nevertheless he kept control of the nation like any respected leader would and used his proficient political skill to accept his mistake and switch his focus to another suppressive domestic policy aimed at preserving the German nation and protecting it from outside foreign manipulation.
The Social Democrats had found new economic affluence from 1880 onwards, and because of the rise in the working class, state welfare and social policy was starting to become a relevant political issue. The combination of the desires of the nation and the economical prosperity of the Social Democrats seems to have provided Bismarck with enough reason in 1878 to launch an attack on them. Carr has noted that “Socialism, like Catholicism, had allegiances beyond the Nation state which Bismarck could neither understand nor tolerate”.[7] Accordingly, when two attempts were made on the life of the Kaiser Bismarck seized his chance to use Germany’s devotion to his own advantage particularly against his political opponents. Consequently the Social Democrats were essentially prohibited from all political activity until around 1890.
To preserve his own authority and perhaps Germanys unity Bismarck introduced a series of anti-Socialist laws designed to further limit the party’s influence over German politics and society. This legislation didn’t outlaw the Socialists, but it banned them from meeting and circulating their policies, effectively out casting them from the political sphere. At this point Socialism was effectively banned in Germany, and from around 1880 the SPD met in Switzerland to escape Bismarck’s ruthless course. Although members of the Socialist party were still allowed to occupy their seats in the Reichstag, because of the legislation they were politically ineffective.
However ineffective Bismarck tried to make the Socialist party between 1878 and 1890, similar to the Catholic question it would seem that his policies had the opposite effect to what he intended. According to Eyck, between 1884 and 1890 in particular votes for the SPD doubled[8]. Bismarck observed the Socialists with stern individual and ideological scorn mainly because their policies contradicted with those of his own and that of the Free Conservatives, his upcoming allies.
In retrospect, Bismarck understood that as chancellor he was unable to end socialism as a concept so embarked of a programme of ‘state socialism’, a programme that was designed to improve conditions for the German workers.