NELSON MANDELA METROPOLITAN ELECTRICITY & ENERGY DEPARTMENT
A CASE STUDY

It was an “Initiation” management committee meeting for Jack Simons, the newly appointed General Manager (GM) for the Electricity & Energy Department at Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality. He was recruited from Eskom just over three months ago. He was replacing Piet Volsoo who opted for an early retirement after 17 years with the Municipality. Management committee meetings are known for heated exchanges between various divisional heads, GMs, city manager and the mayoral committee members. Having worked for a corporate giant as Eskom, the challenges at Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality (NMMM) were not insurmountable he thought to himself.

Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality came into existence after 2000. It is the amalgamation of the Port Elizabeth, Uitenhage and Dispatch Municipalities. It supplies electricity to an area of 1959,9 square kilometres. It receives its supply at the Chatty main 132kV intake substation from Eskom and distributes it at primarily 22kV, 11kV and 400 V to 225 large industrial customers, 41 081 medium businesses and 155 758 domestic consumers. The Electricity department has also initiated a major drive to electrify the informal areas within the Metropole. This was a “strategic priority” according to the recently approved Integrated Development Plan of the Metropole for 2002 – 2006. It has electrified 62 600 erven at a cost of R63 million since 1995.

The Electricity & Energy Division is divided into 4 branches, namely; Development, Works, Management, and Technical. Each is headed by the branch head who reports to the General Manager. Works is responsible for maintenance and construction, Development for planning and extending the network to accommodate growth, Technical for continuity of supply, communications and metering, and Management is primarily responsible for tariffs and customer services (see figure 1). In total there are more than 250 employees working within the division. Since amalgamation the division faced a number of daunting challenges. These were particularly more glaring within the Electricity Department, which was plagued by a number of challenges. However these challenges had to be understood from the context of the socio-political evolution of the past 45 years in South Africa in general.

The municipal structures of the past were seen to be exclusive and deprived the majority any meaningful participation in the affairs of the council. As part of the “apartheid machinery” they were shunned and often boycotted by the majority of the citizens. This hampered any form provision of adequate services to the majority of the mainly African residential areas across the country, and the area of the Nelson Mandela Metropole was no exception. There are glaring disparities between the infrastructure found in the previously White areas when compared to the predominantly African areas. Because of the low skills base and other factors the local economy cannot absorb the available labour. Lack of access to capital, compounded by the lack of much need skills are all contributing to the high levels of unemployment. This leaves the majority of the inhabitants of the Metropole to depend on the social security system provided by the state. This further compounds the problems of the municipality as their revenue based is further eroded by the structural anomalies. This then forces the Metropole to rely heavily on the industrial sector for its revenue and competing for investments with well resourced cities like Cape Town, Johannesburg and Durban.

Internally like any other organisation undergoing transformation or transition, there are multitude of problems and challenges faced by the Metropole. Some are peculiar to certain departments, while others are generic for the entire organisation. One of the key factors which made the panel to offer the job of the head of department to Jack, was his ability to articulate so succinctly the challenges of re-organising and “re-configuring” (to use his term) the municipality and department to be responsive to the needs of its citizenry and aligned with developmental local government. His ability to “pull-out” these myriad of challenges, according to the City Manager, Viwe Sojola, demonstrated both an appreciation of the political and economic dimensions of the challenges of the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality by Jack. He further promised to develop a turn-around strategy for the department within three months of taking over the reins in the department.

This he would do after having interacted not only with the members of his department, but also engaging the entire Metropole to understand how the “business” of government was conducted. He was obviously bringing in massive experience from Eskom where he is credited for turning around the distribution department into a lean and viable division, an envy of the entire company. When news of his pending departure reached the higher echelons of Eskom, he was paid a personal visit to his office in Witbank, by none other than the company chairman, Mr Ezra Cossa.

Mr Cossa was so determined to keep Jack within Eskom, that he brought the company cheque-book with him. No form of persuasion could make Jack change his mind even after being offered almost double his annual salary. For him it was not a question of money. It was the magnitude of the challenges that attracted him to the job. What he did not reveal to the managers at Eskom was that he had a special relationship with the city of Port Elizabeth. It is in P.E. where he was born 37 years ago. Growing up and completing his Matric at J.G. Streydom Boys High School. He went to study B. Sc in Electrical Engineering at Wits University, and obtained a Master degree at the Kent University in the United Kingdom.

He went back to Wits to enrol for an MBA which he passed cum laude. He felt he owed Port Elizabeth something, and the job of a General Manager offered him any opportunity to make a contribution to his favourite city as well as being closer to his parents who were in their late sixties. Jack Simons was married to Ann McKenzie a Port Elizabeth girl. She was a qualified Clinical Psychologist. At the same time that Jack was offered the Metropole job, Ann was offered a job a senior Clinical Psychologist at the Mercantile Private Hospital in the city. Their two children were both below the school going age, so moving back to P.E. was not going to be a hassle for the children.

Amalgamation Process
Before the Municipal Demarcation Act of 2000, the Port Elizabeth, Uitenhage and Despatch Transitional Local Councils were separate entities. In April 2000, these municipalities become one municipality called the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality (NMMM) in terms of the Municipality Demarcation Act of 2000. Although legally and politically these municipalities are one entity, the process of having them to function as one single unit has been fraught with major legal, structural and financial difficulties.

The completion of this process would unlock substantial financial resources which could be utilised to speed up service delivery to the previously unserviced areas. However the modalities of dealing with some of the problems faced by the municipality were not cut-and-dry. Serious trade-offs would have to be entertained by management as certain activities would encroach on the benefits achieved by others. These problems proved to be manifested in the following areas:

Tariffs
The tariffs levied by the three former transitional local councils (TLCs) as they were called before 2000 were largely informed by the revenue base of the respective TLC, the number of ratepayers who qualified under the indigent policies, and the equitable share that each TLC received from the national treasury to deliver basic services to communities, amongst others. In a more affluent and highly industrialised area like Port Elizabeth, the per capital cost of basic services was relatively less because of massive cross-subsidisation from the industrial sector and to a lesser extent the affluent traditionally white areas.

This could not be said of Uitenhage and Despatch TLCs and striking the equitable balance within the single entity has proven to be tricky because of political and economic consequences. Financial indicators warn that the Metropole cannot afford to extend “benefits” enjoyed by Port Elizabeth to two towns, instead there was a need for a marginal increase on the rates previously levied to the Uitenhage and Despatch towns and a substantial increase to the Port Elizabeth rates. Any adjustments from either side are sure to raise serious contestations from the already overburdened ratepayers. The majority of politicians within the Metropole do not support any moves to increase rates. In fact since the amalgamation of the three municipalities, petitions by various organisations mainly from the Uitenhage and Despatch areas have been delivered to the office of the Executive Mayor, Councillor Andile Grootboom. The Masakhane campaign which was an initiative from the Presidency, collapsed within three months of being launched amid fanfare in March of 1997. Ratepayers in some areas are known to owe more than R30 000 per household in rates.

Staff or HR policies
Although the new organisational structure is in place, each municipality still has its own staff policies and there already accusations that certain staff members were being treated “differently” although they work for the same organization. The second phase of the restructuring within Metropole which Jack has inherited from his predecessor is matching person to post exercise. The process involved ensuring that the existing organogram is staffed by right skills and competencies. This process would need to take into account the affirmative action policies of the Metropole as well as ensuring that much need skills were not lost especially in critical areas. Beside this, personnel bill of the Municipality was one of biggest expenditure items in the annual budget which was conditionally approved by Council four weeks ago.

The two major unions IMATU and SAMWU were not happy with the process of restructuring. They were arguing that the process was not transparent and lacked credibility. The further claimed that management was merely “informing” them of the decisions that were taken and limiting any meaningful participation by them. Rumours doing round within the Municipality was that both unions were planning massive strike as well as a legal challenge to the entire restructuring process. The Management Committee especially the politicians who sit in the committee were concerned that such actions would derail the transformation of the Metropole. The committee was debating as part of its rationalisation of the organisation incentives for early retirement targeting the unskilled personnel. However, there were concerns from the HR Director that this scheme could attract the skilled workers which were need most, and were difficult to replace.

Regulations and By-laws
The current legislative environment continues to be challenge for the Metropole. There is no institutional capacity to enact new by-laws by the current council, and neither are guidelines on how this would be done. This puts the Metropole in a precarious position which could even lead to unnecessary litigation. Some of the bylaws which were passed under the old TLCs are in obvious conflict with the constitution and other pieces of legislation such as the Municipal Systems Act.

Revenue Collection Levels
Revenue collection is a significant challenge that NMMM has grappled with for the past three financial years and the Electricity Department is not an exception. Looking at the financial statements for 1999, 2000, and 2001, the debtors balance was R133 247 351, R159 753 174 and R179 718 586 respectively. In addition, the average over the past three years of number of day’s sales outstanding is ± 80 days compared to a 30 day payment period required on the department's short term liability. This shows the magnitude of the problem the Electricity Department has also been grappling for the past three years, something that is even attributed to Piet Vosloo to take earlier retirement. Erosion of cash balances, restricted borrowing opportunities, cut-backs on capital expenditure and inadequate service delivery, all contribute to the failure in recovering payment for service delivery or electricity. Unless the Metropole addresses this problem, it will find it hard to ensure that it delivers on its constitutional mandate.

Sustainability
Currently there is a debate as to whether electricity departments within municipalities should continue to provide electricity to the communities served by their municipalities or the so-called Regional Electricity Distributors (REDS). REDS is a body to be created in each region which is purported to be used a vehicle to provide electricity in the regions, however, this is still a proposal under discussion by all the municipalities. If the idea of REDS is adopted, it means that the electricity department would be abolished.

Credit Control Mechanism
Presently the municipalities in general are using the electricity as a credit control mechanism. The NMMM is not an exception in this approach. If the idea of turns out to be favourable, it means that the Electricity Department will no longer be under the jurisdiction of the NMMM Municipality. The municipality will no longer have an effective control mechanism.

Staff Turnover
Despite this being a technologically intensive department, approximately 15 engineers and technicians and 90 other technical staff have resigned since 1998. This means that there is an unacceptable high staff turnover within the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Electricity Department. This high turnover increases the workload on the remaining staff since a moratorium was put in place not to replace staff. Interviews conducted with staff members who resign reveals that most staff members leave for better salary offers. The restructuring process has created anxiety and uncertainty among almost all the staff. Others have attributed their resignations to the steady increase in the crime rate as another reason why they were leaving the employ of the Metropole.

Infrastructure

The state and performance of the infrastructure is poor, primarily due to poor maintenance. This is primarily attributed to a lack of skilled staff. The faults per 100 km experienced on bare low voltage and rural 6,6 and 11 kV lines are approximately 100. The industry standard is 30 faults per 100 km.

Approximately 2 700 faults on the system per annum were experienced in 2000/01 and 2001/02. This is unacceptably high. The number of cable faults on LV cable per 100 km due to road construction work was 45,48 in 2000/01 and 50,43 in 2001/02. This is unacceptably high. Repairs to all faults have, however, always been within the statutory time constraints. It is of concern that there are 50 faults per 100 streetlights per annum. It may be due to the purchase of inferior materials.

SYSTEM PERFORMANCE

8.1 System Performance Trips

The term trip refers to the disconnection of a part of the electricity network. This occurs primarily when a fault is experienced on that part of the network. It could be due to a contractor cutting through a live cable or, for example, due to lighting striking a high voltage overhead line. This event will cause massive currents flowing from the supply substation through the mediating cables and overhead lines into the fault. These currents will cause massive heating which will destroy all immediate cables, overhead lines and equipment such as million rand transformers unless it is immediately interrupted. It could also be due to equipment failure.

The total number of trips experienced in 1997/98 was 362, 377 in 1998/99, 386 in 1999/00, 467 in 2000/02 and 472 in 2001/02. The four major sources of trips were experienced on 6,6 kV overhead lines, 6,6 kV underground cables, 11 kV overhead lines and 11 kV underground cables. This gives an annual year-on-year percentage increase in trips of 7%, which is unacceptable.

A more detailed analysis follows.

6. 6 kV Overhead Trips
The number of 6,6 kv overhead trips was 100 in 1997/98, 110 in 1998/99, 114 in 199/00, 172 in 2000/01 and 133 in 2001/02. As a percentage of the total annual number of trips, it contributed 27,6% to the total number of trips in 1997/98, 29,2% to the total number of trips in 1998/99, 29,5% to the total number of trips in 1999/00, 36,8% to the total no of trips in 2000/01 and 28,2% to the total number of trips in 2001/02. This accounted for by far the main source of trips per annum.

6,6 kV Underground Trips
The number of 6,6 kV underground trips was 60 in 1997/98, 55 in 1998/99, 67 in 1999/00, 51 in 2000/01 and 55 in 2001/02. As a percentage of the total annual number of trips, it contributed 16,6% to the total number of trips in 1997/98, 14,6% to the total number of trips in 1998/99, 17,4% to the total number of trips in 1999/00, 10,9% to the total no of trips in 2000/01 and 11,7% to the total number of trips in 2001/02.

11 kV Overhead Trips
The number of 11 kV overhead trips was 60 in 1997/98, 64 in 1998/99, 66 in 1999/00, 68 in 2000/01 and 97 in 2001/02. As a percentage of the total annual number of trips, it contributed 16,6% to the total number of trips in 1997/98, 17,6% to the total number of trips in 1998/99, 17,1% to the total number of trips in 1999/00, 14,6% to the total no of trips in 2000/01 and 20,6 % to the total number of trips in 2001/02.

11 kV Underground Trips
The number of 11 kV underground trips was 60 in 1997/98, 65 in 1998/99, 72 in 1999/00, 87 in 2000/01 and 88 in 2001/02. As a percentage of the total annual number of trips, it contributed 16,6% in 1997/98, 17,2% in 1998/99, 18,7% in 1999/00, 18,6% in 2000/01 and 18,6% in 2001/02. The other sources of trips are due to 22 kV, 66 kV and 132 kV overhead and underground trips. These account for ± 20% of the rest of the trips experienced per annum.

8.2 SYSTEM PERFORMANCE: FAULTS

The term fault refers to a disconnection of a significant duration due to the physical damage of a cable or an overhead line, the failure of a joint, or the interruption of supply due to a branch or other object connecting a live overhead line or cable to ground as well as due to the failure of an overhead line insulator. It could also occur due to the failure of the insulation of a cable or transformer thereby connecting the live conductors either to each other or to ground. In the case of a fault, excessively large currents flow from the supply substation through the intermediate transformers, overhead lines and underground cables until it enters the ground at the site of the fault. These large currents cause excessive heating and will damage equipment and start fires if not interrupted soon enough by the disconnection of the faulty circuit at the supply substation circuit breaker. This will therefore disconnect the electricity supply to all consumers on the faulty circuit.

The total number of faults experienced is 1 994 in 1997/98, 2 079 (+4%) in 1998/99, 3 023 (+45%) in 1999/00, 2 714 (-10%) in 2000/01 and 2 677 (-1%) in 2001/02. This gives an annual percentage increase in faults year-on-year of 8%, which is unacceptable. A breakdown of the major faults is as follows:

LV Underground Failures
These are the most frequent types of faults occurring on the network. They are primarily due to contractors, when excavating to install water and sewerage services in the townships, stretching the underground cables when repositioning them.

The most frequent faults experienced per annum are LV underground failures. In 1997/98, 420 faults occurred, in 1998/99 there were 600, in 1999/00 there were 1 239, in 2000/01 there were 701 and in 2001/02, 874 faults occurred.

As a percentage of the total number of faults experienced per annum, the number of faults experienced in 1997/98 was 21,1%, 28% in 1998/99, 41,0% in 1999/00, 25,8% in 2000/01 and 32,7% in 2001/02. When the faults, due to damage by the excavating contractors, are added to the above, the total LV underground failures and damages amount to 30% of the total number of faults in 1997/98, 37% in 1998/99, 50% in 1999/00, 40% in 2000/01 and 45% in 2001/02.

The only way that this can be reduced is by enforcing heavy penalties and ensuring that site plans indicating the location of all electricity cables are requested prior to any contractor starting any excavation work.

Faults on Rural Overhead 6,6 kV and 11 kV Lines

The second most frequent faults experienced per annum were rural faults. In 1997/98, 720 rural faults occurred, in 1998/99 there were 500, in 1999/00 there were 801, in 2000/01 there were 814 and in 2001/02, 823 rural faults occurred.

As a percentage of the total number of faults experienced per annum, the number of rural faults experienced in 1997/98 were 36,1%, 24,1% in 1998/99, 26,5% in 1999/00, 30% in 2000/01 and 30,7% in 2001/02.

Although about 25% of these faults are due to insulator failure and 5% due to conductor failure, these faults occur primarily due to trees and shrub growth in and bordering on the servitudes touching the live conductors and thereby causing massive fault currents to flow from the supply substation to the fault area. This is also aggravated by the windy conditions of the area. In order to prevent any further damage, the circuit breaker at the supply substation will disconnect the line and thereby also disconnect customers on that line.

Faults per 100 km

The total length of 6,6 kV and 11 kV overhead line is ± 790 km. This gives a number of faults per 100 km of 91 in 1997/98, 63 in 1998/99, 101 in 1999/2000, 103 in 2000/01 and 104 in 2001/02. The industry average is 30 faults per 100 km.

Faults on Bare LV Overhead Lines
These faults occur due to tree and shrub growth in residential areas touching the live conductors and initiating massive fault currents from the supply substation to the point of fault. They are often aggravated by the adverse windy conditions of the area. In 1997/98, 370 faults were experienced on LV bare overhead lines, 420 in 1998/99, 388 in 1999/00, 412 in 2000/01 and 338 in 2001/02.
As a percentage of the total faults experienced per annum, this amounted to 18,6% in 1997/98, 20,2% in 1998/99, 12,8% in 1999/00, 15,2% in 2000/01 and 12,6% in 2001/02.

Faults per 100 km
The total length of bare overhead LV mains is 408 km. Reworking the number of LV overhead mains faults to faults per 100 km gives 91 faults in 1997/98, 103 in 1998/99, 95 in 1999/2000, 101 in 2000/01 and 95 faults per 100 km in 2001/02. The industry benchmark is 30 faults per 100 km.

If the number of LV overhead mains faults is combined with the rural faults, which are also due to the encroachment of tree and shrub growth, the totals in percentages of the total number of faults experienced per annum will be 55% in 1997/98, 44,2% in 1998/99, 39,2% in 1999/00, 45,2% in 2000/01 and 43,3% in 2001/02.

SYSTEM PERFORMANCE: RESTORATION OF SUPPLY

The number of forced interruptions in 1999/2000 was 334. It increased by 323% to 1 078 in 2000/01. In 2001/02, it increased by 103% to 1 111. The large increase in the number of forced interruptions and its poor time to restore supply per annum is due to insufficient staff being available for timely maintenance of the network.

Legislation stipulates that 30% of all forced interruption be restored within 1,5 hours, 60% within 3,5 hours, 90% within 7,5 hours and 98% within 24 hours. The actual percentage of total forced interruptions restored within 1,5 hours was 39% in 1999/2000, 37% in 2000/01 and 36% in 2001/02.

The actual percentage of total forced interruptions restored within 3,5 hours was 76% in 1999/2000, 78% in 2000/01 and 76% in 2001/02. The actual percentage of total forced interruptions restored within 7,1 hours was 92% in 1999/2000, 94% in 2000/01 and 93% in 2001/02.

The actual percentage of forced interruptions restored within 24 hours was 100% in 1999/2000, 98% in 2000/01 and 100% in 2001/02.

SYSTEM PERFORMANCE VOLTAGE DIPS

Voltage dips occur on the network either due to faults on the system or switching surges due to the operation of equipment. They can also be due to the incoming supply from Eskom. They have varying orders of severity namely, Insignificant, Type X, Type Y, Type Z, Type S and Type T. Type X exists for between 0,02 and 0,15 seconds with a standard deviation of between 20% and 60%. Type Y has a standard deviation of less than 20%. Type Z has a duration exceeding 0,6 seconds and a standard deviation exceeding 20%. Type T exists between 0,02 and 0,6 seconds with a standard deviation between 60% and 100%. Type S has a duration of between 0,15 and 0,6 seconds with a standard deviation between 20% and 60%.

Voltage Dips on the PEM Network as Measured at Mount Road Substation

The total number of dips was 77 in 1997/98, 57 in 1998/99, 58 in 1999/00, 99 in 2000/01 and 127 in 2001/02. The increase in the total number of dips is of concern. As a percentage of the total, the insignificant type of dips accounted for 10% in 1997/98, 18% in 1998/99, 24% in 1999/00, 33% in 2000/01 and 52% in 2001/02. Type X accounted for 39% in 1997/98, 43% in 1998/99, 26% in 1999/00, 13% in 2000/01 and 6% in 2001/02. It therefore seems to indicate a downward trend. Type Y accounted for 31,1% of the total in 1997/98, 26% in 1998/99, 36% in 1999/00, 44% in 2000/01 and 33% in 2001/02. Types Z, S and T, which are more serious, account for less than 10% per annum on average.

Voltage Dips on the Uitenhage Network as Measured at Mount Road Substation

The total number of dips was 27 in 1997/98, 30 in 1998/99, 31 in 1999/00, 15 in 2000/01 and 43 in 2001/02. The increase in the total number of dips is of concern. As a percentage of the total, the insignificant type of dips accounted for 4% in 1997/98, 27% in 1998/99, 26% in 1999/00, 6% in 2000/01 and 54% in 2001/02. Type X accounted for 59% in 1997/98, 47% in 1998/99, 45% in 1999/00, 60% in 2000/01 and 7% in 2001/02. It therefore seems to indicate a downward trend. Type Y accounted for 30,1% of the total in 1997/98, 20% in 1998/99, 19% in 1999/00, 33% in 2000/01 and 40% in 2001/02. Types Z, S and T, which are more serious, account for less than 10% per annum on average.

Voltage Dips on the Incoming Eskom Supply as Measured at Mount Road Substation

The total number of dips was 73 in 1997/98, 61 in 1998/99, 51 in 1999/00, 39 in 2000/01 and 69 in 2001/02. The increase in the total number of dips is of concern. As a percentage of the total, the insignificant type of dips accounted for 11% in 1997/98, 8% in 1998/99, 7% in 1999/00, 6% in 2000/01 and 44% in 2001/02. Type X accounted for 38% in 1997/98, 38% in 1998/99, 36% in 1999/00, 14% in 2000/01 and 13% in 2001/02. It therefore seems to indicate a downward trend. Type Y accounted for 23,1% of the total in 1997/98, 13% in 1998/99, 6% in 1999/00, 15% in 2000/01 and 11% in 2001/02. It shows a beneficial downward trend. Types Z, S and T, which are more serious, account to less than 10% per annum on average. This is satisfactory.

Jack Simons was sitting in office at the Madiba Office Complex, the main building housing the offices of Executive Mayor, City Manager and Divisional Head. He had nice office overlooking the beautiful and tranquil Summerstrand Beach, the face of Port Elizabeth as some call it. He was studying the report of the “Transformation Task Team”, which outlined and suddenly realised that his division was mostly affected by the problems contained in the report, when his phone rang. It was his secretary Liz Taylor, the Strategic Manager in the office of the City Manager was there to see him.

“Please send him in”, he said. Sipho Ngwenya, the Strategic Manager has been with the Metropole since 2000, he was recruited from VW plant in Uitenhage, where he worked as a Corporate Services Manager. He was a brilliant young man in his late 20s. He spent his adolescent life in exile with his parents who left the country in 1975 because of their political activities. He came back in 1996 with a MBA from Harvard Business School.

“Jack, good morning, I’m sorry for bugging you in the early hours of the morning, as you know I am busy preparing for the Management Committee meeting, scheduled to take place in two weeks time. I need to have all presentations and reports ready for distribution by next week so that we can all have time to read and prepare for the meeting. I need your report on the state of your department and ofcourse your turn-around strategy, which was must prepare in report format and presentation format. Oh, one more thing, it better be good. The City Manager has invited OD Specialists from Deloitte and Touché to come and listen to your presentation.”

“What is OD Specialist? Sipho”, Jack asked tamely. “And why was I not informed about this decision earlier?” he continued.

“Organisational Development Specialists, I mean”, Sipho responded. “I thought you knew how the “business of government” operates by now Mr Simons”. I am sorry I’ll have to leave you know, I have a meeting with the Executive Mayor. Please make sure that your stuff is in my desk within the next 48 hours.

Needless to say Jack was irked by Sipho’s attitude and how things were unfolding three months into the job. However, he was resolute to make the environment work for him. The memo he received as a guide for the presentation was as follows:

a) [1]Your Vision for the Electricity & Energy Division. b) Your diagnosis of the nature & cause of the problem(s) experienced in this department. c) Your plan of action to solve the problem(s) identified, including strategies and an implementation plan. d) What systems & procedures need to be developed, cover the areas of human resource management, resource allocation, and relationships management and conflict resolution? e) In view of the uncertainties in the electricity regulation environment propose horizontal and/or vertical diversification strategies for the department.
Appendix A

Figure 1(a)

Figure 1 (b)

Appendix B
|ADDITIONAL INFORMATION |
| | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| |Res| | | |603,589 |345,158 |347,593 |
| |erv| | | | | | |
| |es | | | | | | |
|CONSUMER DEPOSITS:SERVICES | |48,914 |37,414 |30,140 |23,119 |19,741 |
| | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | |
|INVESTMENT | | | |931,416 |681,674 |578,360 |530,987 |
| | | | | |1,885,654 | | |
| | | | | | | |
| |Cash | | | |9,645 |10,646 |4,239 |
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | |R'000 |

| | | | | |183,847 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |Funds/Reserves written back | | | | |71,117 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |Prior Year Adjustments | | |(7,413) |(2,359) |6,405 |6,289 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |Appropriations for the year | | |(123,049) |(60,655) |(89,684) |(22,198) |(9,447) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |Retained Income at end of the year | | | | |53,385 |nil |nil |4,981 |Nil | |

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[1] This is must be in line with the strategic priorities contained in the IDP

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