...The Effect of Board Size and Ownership Structure on the Financial Performance: An Empirical Study on Egypt Nourhan K. Karkoura* Pharos University in Alexandria, Egypt Abstract Corporate governance can be viewed as a mechanism that ensures external investors receive proper returns on their investments. This paper investigates the effect of board size and the effect of ownership structure on firm performance in Egypt. Using a sample non- financial corporation from the most active 50 corporations listed in the stock exchange after excluding banks and financial firms for the period 2007 to 2009. This study adopts a correlational research design using secondary data from the disclosure book issued by the Egyptian stock exchange. Multiple regressions are used to determine the extent to which variations in performance of the most active corporations is explained by the board size and ownership structure. Firm financial performance is measured by return on assets, returns on equity and Tobin Q ratio, while corporate governance aspects were board size and ownership structure. Keywords: board size, ownership structure, financial performance, and Egypt Nourhan K. Karkoura, Graduate Teacher Assistant in Finance and Investment Department, Faculty of Financial and Administrative Sciences, Pharos University in Alexandria, Egypt, E-mail: nourhan.khaled@pua.edu.eg 1. Introduction The importance of corporate board size and ownership structure as a mechanism of corporate governance...
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...Impact of Ownership Concentration on the operating Performance of Pakistani Firms Author Waseem Anwar Center for Excellence in Research, Department of Management Sciences COMSATS Institute of Information Technology, Lahore, Pakistan. Email: wasyhcc@yahoo.com This study investigates the Impact of Ownership Concentration on the operating performance of Pakistani firms. Sample of 50 non-financial firms is selected from KSE-100 index of Karachi Stock Exchange of Pakistan. Descriptive analysis shows that there is an immense level of ownership concentration in Pakistani firms. Regression analysis suggested that there is a significant positive correlation among ownership concentration and firm’s operating performance. Naila Tabassum Center for Excellence in Research, Department of Management Sciences COMSATS Institute of Information Technology, Lahore, Pakistan. E-mail: naila058@yahoo.com Key Words: Ownership Concentration, Operating Performance Introduction In this research, we scrutinize the affect of ownership structure on company performance. The relationship between ownership structure and performance has always been the area under discussion in the literature of corporate finance. The discussion on this area was started with the thesis of Berle and Means (1932). They argued that defuse ownership is inversely correlated with performance of a company. Most of the earlier studies found a positive relation among ownership concentration and firm’s performance (Cubin and...
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...effect of managerial ownership on performance and the determinants of managerial ownership for small and medium-sized private companies. We use a panel of around 1300 firms in the German business-related service sector for the years 1997-2000. Managerial ownership up to around 80 per cent has a positive impact on firm performance (incentive effect); for higher shares the effect becomes negative (entrenchment effect). Moreover, risk-aversion of managers and signalling of f rm quality leads to a non- linear i relationship between managerial ownership and the risk exposure of a firm. The determinants of performance and ownership are estimated simultaneously. JEL Classification: G32; C23 Keywords: corporate governance, managerial ownership, firm performance, small and medium-sized enterprises. This paper was produced as part of the Centre’s Labour Markets Programme Acknowledgements We thank Bernd Fitzenberger, Steve Nickell and Marcia Schafgans for helpful discussions and Irene Bertschek, Dirk Czarnitzki, Ulrich Kaiser and Joachim Winter for useful comments. All remaining errors are our own. Elisabeth Mueller is a member of the Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics. Contact: E.Mueller@lse.ac.uk. Alexandra Spitz is a member of the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), Research Group Information and Communication Technologies, PO Box 103443, 68034 Mannheim, Germany. Contact: spitz@zew.de Published by Centre for Economic Performance London School of Economics...
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...(Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Anderson, Duru and Reeb, 2009) Researchers have found similar statistics for family firms around the world (Dreux, 1990; Martinez, 1994; Owens, 1994). Therefore, a better grasp of the unique characteristics of family firms is a basis for understanding a significant part of the world’s economy several papers have been written about the unique characteristics of family businesses and their performance compared to that of non-family businesses. Most research done in the field focused on corporate governance measures, family relationships, succession, and performance indicators of family owned businesses. This research article also deals with capital structure & performance of family businesses in India. Article 1: (Kim & Gao) Does Family involvement increase business performance Family involvement in business management attracts much scholarly attention in the field of family business. This paper's main objectives are answering two questions. They are 1) how does family involvement in management affect firm performance? 2) Is the relationship between FIM & Firm performance contingent on a firms goals? This study defines family business as a firm owned and managed by a family or family clan (litz, 1997). This study employs snowball sampling as it is difficult, the study also asked the respondents to indicate whether the firm was owned and managed by a family through...
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...PROPOSAL The Impact of Foreign Share Ownership on Financial Performance in Australia Word Count: 2,696 Table of Contents 1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 3 2. Literature Review ............................................................................................................... 5 2.1 2.2 3. 4. Corporate Governance in Australia ............................................................................. 5 Ownership Structure and Financial Performance........................................................ 6 Hypothesis .......................................................................................................................... 8 Methodology....................................................................................................................... 8 4.1 4.2 Model Design .............................................................................................................. 9 Sample ....................................................................................................................... 10 5. 6. References ........................................................................................................................ 11 Appendix .......................................................................................................................... 14 6.1 6.2 Structure ....................................
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...governance mechanisms and performance of public listed family firms in Malaysia H. Ibrahim* School of Management, Universiti Sains Malaysia, 11800 USM, Penang, Malaysia haslindar@usm.my F.A. Samad Faculty of Business and Accountancy, University of Malaya, 50603 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia mfazilah@um.edu.my Received June 2009 We compare corporate governance and performance between family and non-family ownership of public listed companies in Malaysia from 1999 through 2005 measured by Tobin’s Q and ROA. We also examine the governance mechanisms as a tool in monitoring agency costs based on asset utilization ratio and expense ratio as proxy for agency costs. We find that on average firm value is lower in family firms than non-family firms, while board size, independent director and duality have a significant impact on firm performance in family firms as compared to non family firms. We also find that these governance mechanisms have significant impact on agency costs for both family and non family firms. *To whom all correspondence should be addressed. Introduction The family-controlled firm or family ownership is the most common form of business organization in the world. A various stream of literature explains that family ownership is central in most countries. La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) studied the 20 largest publicly traded companies in the richest 27 countries worldwide and found most companies are private and the ownership of listed firms is highly concentrated...
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...the board in a corporation. On the other hand, if different individuals serve in these two pivotal positions, the firm can be said to adopt a separate leadership structure. The fundamental question surrounding CEO duality leadership is whether the chairperson‘s position should be filled by the CEO or by a different person (Daily & Dalton, 1997). The all round concern has been whether one person‘s positioning at the corporate pivotal positions of CEO and board chairperson weakens corporate governance effectiveness, leading to managerial opportunism and resulting in reduced firm performance (Brickley, Coles, & Jarrell, 1997; Finkelstein & D‘Aveni, 1994). From the agency theory perspective, having one individual in charge of both management implementation and control is not consistent with the concept of checks and balances. However, from an organization theory perspective, CEO duality may enhance organizational efficiency in corporate leadership. Most theoretical arguments against the practice of CEO duality leadership have centered on the issue of power concentration on dual CEO (Brockmann, Hoffman, Dawley, & Fornaciari, 2004; Daily & Dalton, 1997). Duality has been described as a concentration of power on the dual CEO, enabling dual CEOs to dominate the board, reducing board effectiveness in monitoring and controlling the management’s performance. CEO duality leadership implies a heightened formal authority and greater informal power for the one individual...
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...IMPACT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ON FIRMS PERFORMANCE: CASE OF FAMILY FIRMS IN MALAYSIA CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1.0 Background of Study For many years and in many economies, most of business activity was accompanied by proprietorships, partnerships, or closed corporations. In these forms of organizations, a small and closely related group of individuals belongings the same family or co-operating in business for lightly periods runs the firm and share the profit. A lot of attention, has focused on the relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance for instance, a research agenda on the implications of ownership structure on corporate governance by La Porta et al (2000) sustain the legal structure does not offer sufficient protection for outside investor or entrepreneurs, original owners are forced to maintain large position in their companies which results in a concentrated form of ownership thus having implications on ownership structure. On the other hand, more of evidence according to Shirley and Walsh (2001) indicates the private held firms are more efficient and more profitable than publicly held ones although the evidence differs on the relative merit of the identity of each private owner. In 1976, Jensen and Meckling provided results of their researches on ownership structure and firm performance by dividing shareholders into internal investor with management right and external shareholder who are investor without the ballot right. The...
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...Capital Structure and Ownership Structure: A Comparative Study of Textile and Non Textile Manufacturing Firms Muhammad Arslan* M.Phil (Management Sciences) Bahria University Islamabad, Pakistan, PO box 44000, E-8, Islamabad, Pakistan Email: MuhammadArslan73@gmail.com Rashid Zaman M.Phil (Management Sciences), Bahria University Islamabad, Pakistan Email: Rashidzamantanoli@gmail.com Abstract The current study explores the impact of ownership structure on capital structure in textile sector and rest of the manufacturing sectors (non-textile) in Pakistan using regression analysis with fixed effect model. As textile sector is the largest manufacturing sector in Pakistan and having diversified financial characteristics, however, there exists a gap whether textile sector’s ownership and capital structure relationship matches with other manufacturing sectors or not. Current study tries to fill this gap. The results indicate that in textile sector, no significant relationship exists between ownership concentration and capital structure whereas a significant negative relationship is found between these two variables in case of non-textile firms in Pakistan. However, institutional ownership variable was found to be non-significant in both textile and non-textile sectors. Other control variables were found to have the results as hypothesized. Period of study used in this study is 2006-2009 and sample comprises of KSE listed firms. Keywords: Ownership concentration, capital structure, institutional...
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...Paper Title: Trading favors within Chinese groups Discussant: Federica Capriglione Abstract Pyramidal structures is a dominant aspect of ownership in the developing world, which allow shareholders to control corporations with relatively low investments. On the one hand, the mismatch of cash flow and control rights leads to a range of agency problems and resultant resource misallocations, potentially impacting the macro economy. On the other, pyramids are one important mechanism that enables the formation of diversified business groups that are a dominant feature of business organization in much of the world. The paper aims to give an illustration of this within-firm trade-off of costs and benefits in the context of publicly traded firms in China. Moreover, capital investment and firm performance are investigated from the perspective of pyramidal ownership structure. In the last part of paper it is examined why when a listed firm gets into financial trouble and is designated as special treatment (ST) firm by the regulatory authorities, could have generated overwhelmingly favorable market reactions. That will be considered from the perspective of “tunnelling” and “propping up” practice within Chinese listed firms. 1. Introduction A dominant aspect of ownership in the developing world is pyramidal structures, which allow shareholders to control corporations with relatively low investments. The uneasy relationship between these controlling investors and minority shareholders, and...
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...Ownership and Disclosure A Review of Literature By BADRU Bazeet and Mousa Sharaf Adin Hezam Abstract This is a review of various literatures on ownership and disclosure which has been carried out by various researchers in different countries. So far majorities of the researchers shows that the extent of corporate disclosure is negatively associated with a higher management of ownership structure and the extent of corporate voluntary disclosures is positively related with a higher institutional ownership structure. But findings also show that the negative relationship is weaker if the firm has a higher proportion of independent non- executive directors. Introduction Ownership Structure is a mechanism that aligns the interest of Shareholders and Managers. Corporate governace is the capstone of the activities that can reduce agency costs. Corporate mangers disclosure policies are influenced by firm’s ownership and governance on the level of various types of information disclosure. This is a summary of literature review on ownership structure and corporate disclosure. Studies have shown that ownership structure can be state, legal, managerial and block holder depending on the countries and cultural environment. Blockholder ownership is the percentage of shares held by substancial shareholders( that is shareholdings of 5% or more). Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that substancial shareholders are expected to have both greater power and incentives to monitor management, as...
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...Corporate Governance refers to the way an organization is directed, administrated or controlled. It includes the set of rules and regulations that affect the manager’s decision and contribute to the way company is perceived by the current and potential stakeholders. The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among different participants in the corporation such as; boards, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders and spells out the rules and procedures and also decision making assistance on corporate affairs. By doing this, italso provides the structure through which the company’s objectives are set and the means of obtaining those objectives and monitoring performance. Corporate governance may be the ways of bringing the interests of investors and managers into line and ensuring that firms are run for the benefit of investors. Given the state of the economy of Pakistan in 2010, troubled as it is; ideally it would be more desirable to look at the governance issues at macro level for Pakistan. As a famous economist, Dr Shahid Javaid Burki- a long observer of Pakistan’s economy has recently stated “Pakistan can generate a greater bounce in its economy than India by creating better governance. It has occurred before in the country’s difficult economic history and could happen again.” (Improved Governance: Dawn, 12th, October 2010). However, as a starting point , in this paper we look at closely the governanceissues for the...
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...CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE November, 2003 Jorge Farinha* Keywords: agency theory, corporate governance, ownership structure JEL Classification: G300 *CETE-Centro de Estudos de Economia Industrial, do Trabalho e da Empresa, Faculdade de Economia, Universidade do Porto, Portugal. Correspondence to: Jorge Farinha, Faculdade de Economia da Universidade do Porto, Rua Roberto Frias, 4200 Porto, Portugal. Tel. (351)-22-5571100, Fax (351)-22-5505050. E-mail: jfarinha@fep.up.pt. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE ABSTRACT This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on the nature and consequences of the corporate governance problem, providing some guidance on the major points of consensus and dissent among researchers on this issue. Also analysed is the effectiveness of a set of external and internal disciplining mechanisms in providing a solution for the corporate governance problem. Apart from this, particular emphases are given to the special conflicts arising from the relationship between managers and shareholders in companies with large ownership diffusion, the issue of managerial entrenchment and the link between firm value and corporate governance. Keywords: agency theory, corporate governance, ownership structure JEL Classification: G300 1 1 Introduction Recent financial scandals associated to accounting and other frauds allegedly blamed to top company managers (e.g. Enron, Worldcom, Adelphia) have...
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...among stakeholders and to determine and control the strategic direction and performance of organization. Effective governance that aligns managers’ decisions with shareholder’s interests can help produce a competitive advantage for the firm. * Three internal governance mechanisms (1) Ownership concentration, (2) The board of directors, (3) Executive compensation. The market of corporate control is an external governance mechanism. This market is a set of potential owners seeking to acquire undervalued firms and earn above-average returns on their investments by replacing ineffective top-level management team. * Ownership is separated from control in the modern corporation. Owners hire managers to make decisions that maximize the firm’s value. Thus, modern corporations are characterized by an agency relationship that is created when one party hires and pays another party to use its decision making skills. As risk-bearing specialists, owners diversify their risk by investing in multiple corporations with different risk profiles. * In a large number of family-owned firms, ownership and managerial control are not separated at all. Family-controlled firm face at least two problem related to corporate governance. First, as they grow, they may not have access to all of the skilled to effectively manage the firm. Second, they may need to seek outside capital and thus give up some of ownership. *...
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...managerial ownership is positively related to both offer price and market price premium, which is consistent with a high level of managerial ownership reducing agency costs leading to a closer alignment of interests between managers and shareholders. High blockholder ownership is positively related to offer price premium but not market price premium which implies that underwriters, but not investors, perceive that the quality of the IPO is associated with blockholder ownership. Board size is negatively associated with both measures of IPO pricing, suggesting that smaller boards are better. The other conventional corporate governance variables are not significant. Family ownership and family management are negatively related to both offer price and market price premium, which is consistent with the suggestion that the lack of separation of ownership and management causes family-controlled firms to suffer from cloudy financial vision, resulting in a negative relationship with pricing. However, family chairman is positively associated with offer price premium which implies that underwriters view family leadership on the board as beneficial. The other family governance variables are not significant. None of the board expertise variables examined are significantly related to IPO pricing. I. Introduction The launching of an initial public offering (IPO) is a pivotal event in a firm's history. In the pre-IPO period, firms tend to have high levels of inside ownership. Consequently...
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