The Use of the Predator Drone in Afghanistan and Pakistan: An Essential Component of the War on Terror

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Photo Source: United States Air Force Website.

Matthew R. Green
CORE/PCON 322
Research Project March 27, 2007
I. Introduction/Thesis

The last two decades of the 20th century and the first five years of the 21st century saw an increase in terrorist attacks around the world. Many were connected in some way to the conflicts in the Middle East and directed at the United States, culminating in the attacks of September 11, 2001. Terrorism is unique in that the majority of the acts perpetrated have no direct connection to foreign governments. Rather, terrorism emanates from extremist cells within the populace, with a network of individuals and properties living everyday life alongside the general population. The problem is further complicated because the enemy is hardly ever together as one, instead spread across different countries, and indeed continents. In present day War on Terror, it is necessary to eliminate small cells of extremists living among the general populace, often in a covert manner. Small, low-profile yet highly accurate and effective strikes that do not involve US military personnel are essential to avoid harming innocent civilians. One of the most famous weapons to be developed from these emerging necessities in the 1980’s and 1990’s is the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), more commonly known as the Predator Drone. The politics, geography, and targets of the War on Terror make the Predator Drone an ideal weapon for use in Afghanistan and Pakistan, two of the most important areas of anti-American terrorist activity. Working alongside the CIA’s network of intelligence gathering, the past five years have seen increasing utilization of the Predator Drone for both reconnaissance and air strikes. Some of the missions have been resounding successes, but there are several areas of the operation that need to be improved. First, the Predator Drone is a new weapon with many technical difficulties, ranging from control problems to being vulnerable to the weather. It needs to be made more reliable in order to complete its assigned missions more often. Second, when a mission is carried out based on faulty intelligence, innocent civilians are often killed, worsening relations between the locals and the occupying forces. This needs to be kept to a minimum, and ideally not happen at all. By examining the background and results of attacks, the effect on/reaction of the local population, and also future prospects, solutions can be effectively proposed toward improving what is potentially a great weapon of the future.

II. Buildup to 1998

The Predator Drone is notable in that when it is used for an airstrike, its limited payload capacity (two AGM-114 Hellfire Missiles) means that the missions are usually target-specific. Combined with the fact that the covert nature of the PD defeats the purpose of sending a large fleet of them, single MQ-1 Drones have been sent to take out some of the most important, high profile targets of the United States’ efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Airstrikes using PD’s are usually reported by the media sooner or later. If they are successful, or on the flip side a failed mission that takes innocent lives, the news media will prioritize the stories even more. At the same time (unfortunately, the case of this paper), there is no telling how much or how little information remains classified, never picked up by any media outlet. In the mid-1990’s Afghanistan and Pakistan were not focused on by the US Government as major centers of terrorist activity, nor was Osama Bin Laden a major target (the CIA’s Counterterrorist Unit had him labeled as late as early 1998 as merely a “Terrorist Financier,” even after he had moved to Afghanistan from Saudi Arabia in May 1996). 1 Several of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing conspirators, including its mastermind Ramzi Yousef were captured in Islamabad, Pakistan in 1995, but the vast majority of them were apprehended in Egypt and the US in 1993 and 1994. 2 Thus, the counterterrorist actions of the US in Afghanistan and Pakistan were to seek out and capture rather than prevent. And of course, the first part of the decade saw a reemphasis on Homeland Security by the US (although this pales in comparison to post 9/11 efforts) in the wake of Oklahoma City, the Olympic Park bombing, and a slew of abortion clinic attacks. Abroad, efforts were focused on the Balkans, and on Iran, although the latter to a much lesser extent than had existed under Reagan in the 1980’s. Two events in 1998 changed the course of US strategy; the surprise nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in May, and the US Embassy bombings in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania in August. Osama bin Laden was named as the prime suspect in the bombings within a fortnight. All of a sudden, South-Central Asia was seen as a very dangerous part of the world, potentially threatening to U.S. Security. The anti-terrorist resources of the US began to focus on Afghanistan and Pakistan, working to eliminate the growing influence of Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda organization. The initial response by the Clinton Administration to the August 7, 1998 Embassy Bombings were a series of cruise missile attacks on suspected sites, including camps in Afghanistan associated with Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda. Dubbed Operation Infinite Reach, the August 20-21 attacks have generally been considered a failure, with one of the targets in Sudan famously turning out to be a pharmaceutical facility. 5 Not wanting to make the same mistake, and also being focused on Kosovo and an escalation in tension with Iraq, efforts were not stepped up in Afghanistan and Pakistan for over another year. While the military buildup in South-Central Asia was significant because the US didn’t have major military presence in the area, one has to remember that the US launched airstrikes against Saddam Hussein via Operation Desert Fox in November 1998, so the buildup in South-Central Asia was not as big as one may initially think. Nevertheless, this military buildup and the ensuing reconnaissance activities brought the Predator Drone into use in what would become the United States’ War on Terror. The MQ-1 Predator Drone was developed by General Atomics Aeronautical Systems from 1994 to 1996, and saw its first action during the Balkans conflict in 1995. With a price tag of $4 million compared to $18 million for an F-16, along with the nil prospect of a pilot’s life being lost, flight simulators for Predator Drones were not an investment that the US Government would make. To compound this, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles do not have what the Air Force calls “self-preservation instinct,”3 so they are more easily shot down or subject to the elements. Thus, it experienced many technical difficulties in its first round of missions. As the new weapon was introduced it took time before its operators learned how to effectively fly the missions. This resulted in a higher loss rate in the Balkans conflict than in Afghanistan, which in turn had a higher loss rate than recent missions in Pakistan. The Department of Defense had acquired approximately 60 Predators and placed them in the Air Force by the time of the Embassy Bombings. Of this initial fleet, about 20 were lost. As expected, the crashes were mostly weather-related, with only a handful directly related to anti-aircraft fire. 4 In the period of time between the Balkans conflict and the deployment in Afghanistan, improvements were made.

III. Use in Afghanistan

The Predator Drone has experienced mixed success on its mission in Afghanistan. Between 1998 and 9/11, PD’s were used for reconnaissance, but since 9/11 have been increasingly utilized for air strikes. In the last year of Clinton’s Presidency, the CIA and the Air Force began cooperating on a mission to locate Bin Laden. The mission was to use the MQ-1 PD (cost: about $4 million) and the much larger RQ-4A Hawk Drone (cost: $15 million) in a series of reconnaissance flights over Afghanistan, thus beginning the use of UAV’s in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The result was Operation Afghan Eyes. The initial flights were performed in September, 2000. The Pentagon and the White House were pleased by the resulting video footage. Chief of Security Richard Clarke and high ranking officials at the CIA including Cofer Black were equally content, and a program was initiated to arm the drones with the hope of taking out Bin Laden. 6 The 9/11 Commission Report provides a good description of the setup; "A large video screen loomed in the middle of the CIA's makeshift flight operations center. Air Force drone pilots and CIA officers from the Counterterrorist Center and the CTC's bin Laden unit huddled in the darkened room in Langley twenty-four hours a day". 7 Of the remaining reconnaissance flights, about 70% were rated as successful. On at least two of these flights, a Predator spotted a tall man in white robes a known base of Osama bin Laden, the “Tarnak Farm” complex that was a known terrorist training camp. After several reconaissance missions, the footage was concluded to be "probably bin Laden.” 8 The 9/11 Commission’s report also reports that the Taliban scrambled to get several MiG fighters in the air to shoot down the drones, without success. One month later, Al-Qaeda fighters in Yemen bombed the USS Cole, and Bin Laden had another successful attack under his belt. At the same time, as winter approached at the home bases for the drones (USS fleet in the Arabian Sea, and also at U.S.-friendly military bases in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the missions were cut back, and finally stopped altogether. After the New Year, the 9/11 Commission Report (the only consistently reliable source about the pre-9/11 period) indicates that there was a squabble over arming the predators. Cofer Black and George Tenet (#1 and #2 at the CIA at the time) advocated a quick arming of the drones based on intelligence. However, they became entangled in a dispute with Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz over whether the CIA or the Department of Defense should have the authority to launch an armed drone. Defense Secretary Powell was furthermore skeptical about targeting just one individual, given the nearly impassible and hostile geography of the Afghanistan/Pakistan border area. There were no additional reconaissance missions at this time. One week to the day before September 11, George Tenet gave the approval to resume reconaissance flights. After September 11, the Predator Drones were used extensively in the U.S.-led Invasion of Afghanistan. Because of greatly increased manpower, the drones were generally relegated to secondary duty between October 2001 and the New Year. Their duty was often to provide pre-airstrike reconaissance for incoming F-16’s and F-18’s. A notable example is the incident that took place on November 16, 2001 in an attack on a hotel building in the southern portion of Kabul. Predator Drone reconaissance located several SUV’s and confirmed the identities of members of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. United States fighter jets (F-18’s) swooped in within the hour and bombed the building. Mohammed Atef, one of Bin Laden’s senior men, was killed along with several others. The PD stayed in the air during and after the raid, capturing it on camera. When several of the survivors attempted to flee, the PD followed their vehicles and took them out with its two Hellfire missiles. 9 On February 7, 2002, a convoy of SUV’s was taken out on intelligence that Osama Bin Laden was a passenger. Up to five Al-Qaeda members were killed, but this number is not for certain. Finally, on March 4, 2002 a PD was used for the first time in close proximity (i.e. below 500 feet above the ground). The CIA sent an MQ-1 in harm’s way during Operation Anaconda to save Army Rangers stranded after a helicopter crash in close proximity to an Al-Qaeda bunker near the top of Takur Ghar Mountain (refer to Appendix 1, Takur Ghar is at the end of the “Air Assault” arrow). After the opening to the bunker proved too difficult to reach with aircraft, the PD was sent in. It took out the bunker in one shot. This situation was perhaps the most well-suited to the PD in the War on Terror so far. A hard to reach area that was heavily armed, yet did not possess anti-aircraft guns. This allowed the PD to come into close proximity and take it out with ease. The aforementioned three examples are the foremost instances of successful missions involving drones in Afghanistan. In a trend that is particularly true of this new weapon, with the successful missions came failures as well. The weapon has its shortcomings. While technical issues have been reduced, they still happen with frequency. Given, when a drone goes down a US Serviceman does not lose his life. However, it costs the taxpayers money. As the harsh Afghanistan winter hit the mountainous border region, several drones were lost. From September 23, 2001 to September 17, 2002, six drones crashed due to mechanical issues or the weather. This included two of the larger RQ-4A Hawk Drones. 10 These went largely unreported in the media. While this is an improvement over the 33% loss rate in the Balkans conflict, the loss rate was still a drain on the Department of Defense’s budget (refer to Appendix 3 for a complete breakdown of causes during this period). The reported failures are the ones that are high-profile, or lead to loss of life. The first such of these occurred on October 26, 2001 with a PD that was sent to protect the leader of the Opposition, Abdul Haq. The mission failed, and along with a possible betrayal by covert agents (but never proven), Haq was executed by the Taliban that same day. On February 4, 2002 a widely-reported incident occurred in which a PD fired a Hellfire missile at three tall men in white robes in the mountains south of Khost, near the Pakistan border. They were targeted because they shared a common body type with Osama Bin Laden; tall and lanky. Despite conflicting reports, the one common aspect of the information surrounding this incident is that three poor, innocent men were killed. They were possible scavaging for metal. This dealt a major blow to support of the United States in Khost. 11 All in all, the death toll resulting from Predator Drone/Hellfire attacks (in which a PD is the sole weapon, i.e. no joint fighter jet/drone operations) is estimated between 20 and 50 innocent civilians and between 10 and 17 Al-Qaeda operatives and leaders. While the numbers may seem small, it is a fact that killing innocent civilians does not help a war effort. A better intelligence operation is essential to better ensure that the US is going after the right places, and the right people.

IV. Al-Qaeda scatters, necessitating use in Pakistan. (Refer to Appendix 2 throughout this section)

By 2002, most of the members of Al-Qaeda had dispersed, many hiding out in rural villages in the mountainous Bajur region. Prior to 2006, the MQ-1 PD had a record of success in Pakistan, with not nearly as many mechanical problems and/or crashes as had ocurred in Afghanistan. Surveillance from PD’s helped track down Khalid Sheik Mohammad in Rawalpindi in 2003, and several other Al-Qaeda leaders. As the weapon has come into greater use, it has been improved in terms of stability and control, and the CIA and Air Force have learned how to handle it through bad weather. More importantly, with the exception of the Al-Qaeda controlled areas, Pakistan is cooperating so much that the PD’s are able to operate without the threat of being shot down. Among the continued success in not losing the drones, the other area in need of improvement lags behind; the killing of innocent civilians. Two successful Predator Drone attacks made the news in 2005. On May 13, Haitham al-Yemeni, the Al-Qaeda operative and noted pyrotechnics expert who designed the USS Cole suicide bomb in 2000, was killed in a village in northwest Pakistan near the Afghanistan border. ABC News was the only major US outlet to report it, and the Pakistani government has never corroborated the report. 12 The major accomplishment for 2005 involving a PD came on December 3. The BBC reported that “The Syrian-born Al-Qaeda #3-in-command Abu Hamza Rabia was killed while he slept in a safe house in Haisori, a town in North Waziristan province outside of Miramshah.” Four other Al-Qaeda operatives were killed, and there were no innocent civilian casualties. 13 The New Year brought a reminder that more effective intelligence is needed to prevent civilian casualties. High-profile, unsuccessful airstrikes were launched with the intention of taking out Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Al-Qaeda’s second-in-command. On January 13, 2006, a fleet of six MQ-1 PD’s conducted an airstrike on Damadola, a village in Northwest Pakistan where Zawahiri was located, according to US intelligence. Central Intelligence Agency PD’s reportedly fired over ten 10 missiles killing 18 civilians, including five women and five children. Pakistan’s President charged that the U.S. strike was based on faulty intelligence and al-Zawahiri was not present in the village. However, Al-Qaeda’s “two top bomb assemblymen and chemical weapons expert, Midhat Mursi” 14 were killed in the attack. Later in the year, Pakistan said that Al-Qaeda’s operations manager for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Khalid Habib, was killed in the attack. On October 30, the biggest disaster in the Predator Drone’s short career occurred when the Chenagai airstrike was conducted. It targeted an alleged militant school where Ayman al-Zawahiri was reported to be. The school turned out to be a religious school (a “madrassa”) where operatives were reportedly being harbored. Pakistani government officials reported that Predators were used in the strike, utilizing Hellfire missiles. Although Zawahiri does not appear to have been caught in the strike, Pakistani officials have stated that “between three and seven senior Al-Qaeda fighters, including the mastermind of the August 2006 UK Airliners plot,” 15 were killed in the attack. Despite this, about 85-90 students at the school were killed, indicating that the CIA should have sought out the Al-Qaeda members in a different manner.

V. Future/Closing In consideration of the emerging necessities in the War on Terror, weapons such as the Predator Drone are a good start. At the same time, they need to be made more effective. There has been significant progress in making the aircraft more effective in terms of completing their mission without crashing or being shot down. However, the killing of innocent civilians is a sore thumb that casts a shadow over the entire Afghanistan/Pakistan operation. What happened in Chenagai may have inspired a number of young men in that town to join forces with Al-Qaeda after seeing their friends die at school. As of now in Central Asia, I think that the ends justify the means in terms of the number of Al-Qaeda operatives that have been taken out versus the number of civilians killed. However, the best way to win this War on Terrorism is to win over the people and villages who harbor the various cells of Al-Qaeda. The way to do that is to make clear to them that they are safe, and as of now that is not the case. What needs to be done to mitigate this is a vastly increased covert intelligence operation and spy network that involves American operatives, and normal Afghan and Pakistani citizens. More effective communication between the three, provided that it works, will hopefully reduce the number of incidents where innocents are killed. Indeed, no Americans have been killed by friendly fire from a Predator Drone. We should also focus on that not happening to foreigners. Either way, it is an issue that needs to be considered, because in the years to come the Predator Drone will no doubt evolve and become an essential asset of national defense, while assuming a more prominent position in the War on Terror. Therefore, it is very important to continuously improve the shortcomings of the weapon.
Notes/Works Cited: 1, 2. The 9/11 Commission Report: The Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. W.W. Norton & Company. New York, New York. 2004. Pages 175-76. 3. Website; United States Air Force Public Domain. “Factsheets: MQ-1 Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle.” http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=122 4. Website; “Officially Confirmed/Documented NATO UAV Losses.” http://www.aeronautics.ru/official/lostuavs.htm 5. Website; CNN News. “U.S. Missiles Pound Targets in Afghanistan, Sudan.” and “Sudan Wants UN to Probe U.S. Bombing of Drug Factory.” http://www.cnn.com/US/9808/20/us.strikes.01/ http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/africa/9908/18/sudan/ 6. 9/11 Commission Report. 2004. p. 189. 7, 8. 9/11 Commission Report. 2004. pp. 210-16. 9. Website: CNN, November 16, 2001. “Reports suggest Al Qaeda Military Chief Killed.” http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/central/11/16/ret.atef/index.html 10. Herold, Marc W. “The Problem With The Predator.” Available at http://www.cursor.org/stories/dronesyndrome.htm 11. Rall, Ted. “U.S. Drone Planes Have a Nearly Perfect Record of Failure.” Available at www.commondreams.org - This website is very liberal/progressive, I used it to balance out the bias, as I feel most of the Drone stories that make headlines are the successful missions. 12. Website: ABC News, May 13, 2005. “CIA Aircraft Kills Terrorist.” http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/Investigation/story?id=755961 13. Website; ABC News. 12/3/2005. “Al Qaeda Commander Killed in Pakistan.” http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200512/s1522962.htm

14. Darling, Dan. “Al Qaeda's Mad Scientist; The significance of Abu Khabab's death.” The Weekly Standard, January 19, 2006.

15. Website; CNN. 10/31/2006. “Tribal Fury at Airstrike in Pakistan.” http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/asiapcf/10/31/pakistan.attack.reut/index.htm

Appendix 1
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Map Source: “The United States Army in Afghanistan: Operation Enduring Freedom.” http://www.army.mil/cmh/brochures/Afghanistan/Operation%20Enduring%20Freedom.htm
Appendix 2 (The area outlined in black is contained in Appendix 1)
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Key to Appendix 2:

Red Square – Approximate location of the May 13, 2005 airstrike that killed Haitham al-Yemeni, an Al-Qaeda operative and noted bomb expert.

Yellow Square – Approximate location of the December 3, 2005 airstrike on Haisori, Pakistan that killed Al-Qaeda’s #3 in command, Abu Hamza Rabia.

White Square – Approximate location of the January 13, 2006 Airstrike on Domadola. Several Al-Qaeda members were killed along with 18 innocent civilians (5 women, 8 children included)

Blue Square – Approximate location of the October 30, 2006 airstrike on the village of Chenagai. This was a botched attempt to assassinate Ayman al-Zawahiri. While several Al-Qaeda operatives were killed, one of the missiles hit a primary school, and up to 80 innocent people, mostly children, were killed.

Source of Information:

Citations 12-15 in this paper.

Image from http://www.worldpress.org/specials/pp/afghan_pak_border_map.htm

Colored boxes added to image via Photoshop.
Appendix 3

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Source of Statistics:

Herold, Marc W. “The Problem With The Predator.” Available at http://www.cursor.org/stories/dronesyndrome.htm The 9/11 Commission Report: The Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. W.W. Norton & Company. New York, New York. 2004.