SNITCHING FOR RICHES: WHISTLEBLOWER BOUNTIES AND THE $96 MILLION CHERYL ECKARD SETTLEMENT

Introduction Bounties have been employed by United States government over the history of our Nation. As differentiated from rewards, which offer payment for accomplishment of a specific act such as providing information that leads to the capture of a particular criminal, bounties are tailored to encourage the services or actions by some class of persons in pursuance of a governmental purpose. One of the earliest examples in the United States is the grant of bounty land grants during both the Revolutionary War and Civil War. For the purpose of encouraging longer military service, this bounty system would offer land to men fit for service in return for some specified number of years of military service. Although arguably not a major factor in the United State victory in both wars, this bounty system accomplished its purpose as evidenced by the United States enticing enough men into ranks of military service to further its war campaign. Today, a common use of bounties is as an incentive for a class of persons, commonly referred to as whistleblowers, with knowledge of misconduct on the part of private or public organization to report that misconduct which is in violation of the law or against the public interest. The government encourages whistleblowing through the use of bounties and anti-retaliation laws that make up a scheme for whistleblower protection. Whistleblowers face many obstacles that discourage their reporting of such misconduct, including being fired from their job and the stigma associated with being a “snitch” which may ruin their opportunities of finding further employment in their field. Whistleblower bounties serve to alleviate, monetarily, some of the adverse effects that result from reporting misconduct.
Whistleblower bounties play a part of many areas of government regulation, such as labor, health and safety, consumer protection, environmental protection, and finance and securities. The focus of this paper will be on whistleblower bounties used to protect procurement and securities as enacted through the False Claims Act (“FCA”), the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”), and Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”)(and collectively as “Acts”). Part I will lay out the framework of the whistleblower bounties as enacted under these Acts, including language of the statutes and the requirements placed upon the whistleblower in order to be eligible for these bounties. Part II will provide a discussion of Cheryl Eckard’s qui tam action against GlaxoSmithKline for violations under the FCA which resulted in the highest whistleblower bounty award to date, $96 million. Part III will examine how the bounty scheme under the FCA in the area of federal procurement has affected the strength and availability of whistleblower bounties as enacted in SOX and Dodd-Frank in the area of securities reform. Finally, in Part IV, I will give my opinion of the effectiveness of whistleblower bounties and whether they over or under incentivize whistleblowing. I. THE SUBSTANTIVE LANGUAGE AND PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE ACTS A. The False Claims Act.
The FCA is one of the earliest instances in the United States enacting a law to provide a whistleblower bounty. As enacted in 1863, the primary purpose was to combat fraud (war-profiteering) by suppliers of the United States during the Civil War by permitting citizens to sue on behalf of the government and be paid a percentage of the recovery. At this time, the statute provided that “the person bringing said suit and prosecuting it to final judgment shall be entitled to receive one half the amount of such forfeiture…”.
The FCA has undergone two major amendments, in 1986 and 2009, that have given more clarity to the law. In its most common uses, the FCA provides liability for any person who (a) “knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval”, or (b) “knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim” to the government. The FCA enforces this statute, in part, by allowing a private person, typically an employee or other agent of the violator with particular knowledge of a violation, to bring suit on behalf of the government, otherwise known as a qui tam action. This qui tam plaintiff, referred to as a relator, is entitled to a bounty between 15% and 25% of the settlement amount in the situation where the government proceeds with the action brought by the relator. In the case where the government doesn’t proceed with the action, the relator is entitled to between 25% and 30% of the settlement amount.
Traditionally there was a bar that limited a relator from bringing a qui tam action under the FCA and thus being qualified to receive any whistleblower bounty resulting from the settlement. The bar was basically two-fold. The allegations or transactions underlying the action cannot have been publicly disclosed, unless the relator was the original source of the information. Prior to amendment in 2010, this bar required the court to dismiss the action if the allegations had been public disclosed or the relator was not the original source of the information, which resulted in this becoming the primary defense in FCA actions. However, with amendment in 2010, the power to dismiss was effectively shifted from the court to the government with the addition of the language “unless opposed by the Government”.
Finally, the process of filing a qui tam action is generally quite involved and time consuming. The qui tam action must be filed in district court. At the same time the action is filed in district court, the relator must concurrently submit a written disclosure of substantially all material evidence and information, which the Department of Justice uses in making its determination to intervene. Because of the importance of this written disclosure in the decision-making process of government intervention, a relator is best served enlisting the services of an attorney to help ensure the development and adequacy of the evidence. Most attorneys tend to work on a contingency fee basis in representing a relator , however a successful relator is entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees as well. For 60 days from the date the action is filed, subject to an allowance for effectively limitless extensions, the complaint remains under seal while the Department of Justice investigates the material evidence. It is not unusual for the investigation stage to last two to three years for major cases. At the conclusion of the investigation, the Department of Justice must decide to intervene and proceed with, decline, or motion to dismiss the action. B. SOX.
SOX, in relation to the subject of this paper, is introduced here mostly in anticipation of the discussion in the final two parts. SOX was the first major legislation to address whistleblower protection with regards to the securities market. In summation, SOX makes publicly traded companies liable for any retaliatory action taken against an employee who lawfully provides information or participates in a proceeding against the company in which the employee reasonably believes a violation of the securities laws has occurred. Procedurally, an employee claiming relief under this section must file a complaint with the Office of the Whistleblower Protection Program of the United States Department of Labor's Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”). If OSHA does not issue a ruling within 180 days from the date of the filing, the employee may bring the action in the appropriate federal district court.
In the way of an incentive, if it can be so called, to report violations, SOX provides for only restitutionary damages suitable to make the employee “whole”. These damages include back pay with interest, costs of litigation, and attorney’s fees. C. Dodd-Frank.
The Dodd-Frank regulation mostly expands the availability of whistleblower bounties available for reporting securities violations by incorporating some of the concepts behind both the FCA and SOX. It provides for a bounty system more similar to the FCA with procedural aspects more similar to SOX.
As Dodd-Frank lies out, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) “will pay an award or awards to one or more whistleblowers who (1) voluntarily provide the Commission (2) with original information (3) that leads to the successful enforcement by the Commission of a Federal court or administrative action (4) in which the Commission obtains monetary sanctions totaling more than $1,000,000.”
Procedurally, Dodd-Frank is much more stringent than previous whistleblower bounty provisions. Amongst other procedures, there are eligibility requirements, disqualification of certain individuals, a clearer definition of original information, and particular methods that much be used to submit original information. There are many hoops a whistleblower must jump through to earn their bounty under Dodd-Frank.
The bounty offered under Dodd-Frank is between 10% and 30% of the monetary sanctions collected in the action. The determination of the percentage awarded is at the discretion of the SEC. The payment of the bounty is made from a “Security and Exchange Commission Investor Protection Fund” (“SEC Fund”) established, in part, to pay bounties to whistleblowers.
Having laid out a framework by which whistleblower bounties are administered, the next part will examine the FCA scheme in the case of Cheryl Eckard. II. CHERYL ECKARD’S $96 MILLION PAYDAY FOR BLOWING THE WHISTLE ON GLAXOSMITHKLINE

The basis for the qui tam action brought by Cheryl Eckard (“Eckard”) is that GlaxoSmithKline (“GSK”) made false claims to the government as to the quality of the drugs it manufactured at its Cidra plant in Puerto Rico (“Cidra”) because the drugs were “defective, misidentified as a result of product mix-ups, not manufactured in accordance with Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) approved processes, and/or did not come with the assurance of identity, strength, quality, and purity required for distribution to patients; and/or approvals for the drugs were obtained through false representations to the FDA”. As a result of the systemic violations of FDA current Good Manufacturing Practices (“cGMPs”) at Cidra, defective products were released to the market and paid for by the government through Medicaid, Medicare, and other government health programs. A. The FDA Investigates.
Cidra had been repeatedly cited by the FDA for cGMP violations since 1991. Beginning on March 29, 2001 and ending on April 10, 2002, as related to this action, the FDA conducted several investigations at Cidra. After finding significant cGMP deficiencies during these inspections, the FDA issued a series of Warning Letters detailing the violations that must be fixed. These quality assurance failures included: 1. Product comingling of different drug type or strength of several different popular drugs including Paxil (anti-depressant), Coreg (heart), Avandia (diabetes), and Tagamet (heartburn). 2. Ineffective quality control measures, including understaffing the quality control unit, overdue or incomplete process investigations, and poor documentation. 3. Inadequate equipment calibration. 4. Contamination of the drug Bactroban (ointment to treat skin infection in children). 5. Substandard air and water control systems.
On July 2, 2002, GSK met with the FDA to discuss the Warning Letters. The FDA informed GSK that approvals of GSK’s two new drugs would not proceed unless GSK adequately responded to the Warning Letters and the FDA re-inspected Cidra. In early July, GSK brought in their Manage of Global Quality Assurance, Eckard, to assist in the preparation of GSK’s preliminary response to the Warning Letters. On July 17, GSK made specific commitments in response to the Warning Letters. B. The Role of Cheryl Eckard.
Eckard was an expert in cGMP compliance. On August 2, 2002, GSK assigned Eckard to lead the Warning Letter Recovery Team at Cidra in preparation for the FDA re-inspection scheduled for October 9, 2002. On August 14, Eckard received a report from Cidra’s Quality Assurance Manager identifying any compliance issues, at which time several were reported. Eckard recommended to her superiors that same day that shipments from Cidra cease for two weeks to investigate and resolve the reported issues that presented a public health risk. Her superiors, with authority to issue recalls or suspension of manufacturing or shipping, did nothing in response to this recommendation. Eckard continued to urge action on the part of GSK to resolve the problems at Cidra from this time until April of 2003.
Sometime during September of 2002, Eckard was removed as lead of the Warning Letter Recovery Team and assumed an oversight role. The FDA inspection took place as scheduled and GSK received approval of their two new drugs on assurance to the FDA that a corrective action plan had been put in place.
Eckard believes her superiors refused to acknowledge or act upon on her recommendations because the FDA would not approve the two new drugs if they had been aware of the significant pervasiveness of the violations occurring at Cidra. Cidra played an important part GSK’s operation as it accounted for $5.5 billion of GSK’s products, almost 100% of which were sold in the United States. As evidence of this belief, Eckard learned in February 2003 that she had been repeatedly lied to, by Cidra’s Quality Assurance Manager, about the progress of the actions taken to improve the quality control at Cidra. Further, Eckard learned that the Compliance Action Teams had been disbanded following the October 2002 FDA inspection. During this time, Eckard also conducted an internal audit at Cidra and found continuing cGMP violations. Eckard again reported this to her superiors and informed them that she would not participate in a cover-up of the quality assurance problems at Cidra nor take part in any meeting about Cidra with the FDA. Eckard made a final report of her findings of cGMP violations at Cidra to the Vice President of Global Quality Assurance on April 2, 2003.
In May 2003, Eckard was told she had no choice but to accept a “redundancy package” as she was being terminated by GSK. Even after her termination, Eckard continued her efforts to get GSK to address their quality control problems. She had a final discussion with GSK’s Compliance Department regarding the cGMP violations at Cidra that was unlikely to result in any action. In October 2003, Eckard reported the cGMP violations and GSK’s failure to address them to the FDA which led to the investigation of Cidra. The investigation led to the seizure of defective drugs worth hundreds of millions of dollars and the closure of Cidra in 2009. Finally, on February 25, 2004, Eckard filed this qui tam action against GSK and ultimately the Department of Justice proceeded with the case. C. The Settlement.
On October 26, 2010 GSK agreed to settle the civil case with the United States. Under the terms of the settlement agreement, GSK paid the sum of $600 million in civil penalties to the United States and the Medicaid Participating States. Of this amount, Eckard received a relator’s share of 22% of the settlement amount. This amounted to an unprecedented whistleblower bounty of $96,016,800 (Eckard’s 22% was based off the pre-interest Federal settlement of $436,440,000). Eckard was represented by Getnick & Getnick LLP (a Manhattan law firm) who assumedly worked on a contingency fee basis as each party bore their own legal costs.
Concluding, this case illustrates just an example of a situation that whistleblowers can find themselves in and the incentive that can result from their reporting the violations. The FCA accounts for the highest value of whistleblower bounties awarded because of its interaction with the pharmaceutical industry. GSK ended up paying a total of $750 million with the inclusion of the criminal sanctions levied against it. While that number seems awe inspiring, the record belongs to Pfizer, for off-label marketing and kickbacks, which led to a jaw dropping total settlement of $2.3 billion, $1 billion of which resulted from the FCA civil suit. Six whistleblowers were awarded bounties in that case, the highest share going to a former sales representative named John Kopchinski in the amount of $51.1 million. The next part will examine how actions such as these under the FCA have had an effect on the implementation of the whistleblower bounty provisions in securities regulations SOX and Dodd-Frank. III. THE FCA MODEL AND ITS EFFECT ON THE WHISTLEBLOWER PROVISIONS OF SOX AND DODD-FRANK If anything, the FCA model has demonstrated that bounty schemes can work to incentivize whistleblowing to an extent that it brings fraud to light that might otherwise go unseen. According to Department of Justice, the government has recovered over $21 billion in civil penalties resulting from the filing of 7,843 cases from 1987-2011 thanks to whistleblowers using the qui tam procedure available under the FCA. Assuming typical whistleblowers form a rational basis for deciding when to report violations, they would be much more likely to do so when their marginal benefits exceed their marginal costs. As such, a bounty scheme such as the one in FCA provides an incentive to report violations. Given information such as this, the question presents itself as to why Congress chose to ignore enacting a whistleblower bounty in the SOX legislation, but then inserted such a provision in Dodd-Frank. Securities regulation reform has seemingly been a hot button issue since the time SOX came into being. The disparate treatment of whistleblower bounties in these two Acts reflects the changing attitudes towards the use of incentives to undercover fraud in securities. As demonstrated in part I-B above, SOX is oddly devoid of any sort of meaningful bounty scheme. The SOX whistleblower provision limits its incentive to report fraud on the securities market to restitutionary damages. Considering the scandals (Enron, WorldCom, etc.) that, in part, led to the SOX legislation, one would think that Congress would be more concerned with providing incentives for employees with inside information about the pervasive fraud that was occurring at this time. The FCA’s qui tam system, bolstered by the bounty scheme, seemed like a near-perfect model for encouraging employees with unique inside information regarding fraudulent activities in the securities market to come forward. At least part of the reason it seems Congress didn’t continue an FCA-like bounty system in SOX was the rampant use of abusive class-action suits in the private litigation of securities. It seems at the time SOX was being pushed through Congress, the
“[p]reservation of securities litigation reform was a non-negotiable item for congressional republicans. It was a “line in the sand” over which they would have killed any reform legislation. Whereas the Democrats were at best ambivalent about securities litigation, the Republicans were almost universally intensely hostile to it. As a result, Sarbanes did not even raise the issue of private causes of action when drafting legislation. Sarbanes’ draft legislation never contained new private rights of action.”
From this information, it appears that there were significant political restraints that kept any meaningful FCA-like bounty scheme from finding its way into SOX. The end result is that SOX provided a minimal level of protection through its anti-retaliation provision without opening the floodgates to additional private causes of action, but lacked a sufficient incentive to really lure employees to blow the whistle on the fraudulent activities of their employers. And then it was 2007. The securities system was again dealt a major blow by the bursting of the housing bubble and the subsequent fallout from the mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt obligations whose value derived from the housing market. Investment banks effectively masked their leverage levels from investors and regulators through the use of these complex, off-balance sheet derivatives and securitizations. Thus, it was left to Congress to address securities reform again, this time resulting in the much more awarding whistleblower bounties as enacted in Section 922 of Dodd-Frank. The legislative history suggests that the purpose for providing a stronger whistleblower bounty provision in Dodd-Frank was to entice insiders with quality information “to come forward and assist the Government to identify and prosecute persons who have violated the securities laws”. To accomplish this purpose, Congress gave authority to the more appropriate SEC, as opposed to OSHA under SOX, to promulgate rules and regulations geared towards awarding bounties to whistleblowers in the securities market.
Substantively, Dodd-Frank has much the same type of a bounty scheme as that utilized in FCA. Although the bounty is similar (15-30% under FCA, 10-30% under Dodd-Frank), the significant differences lie in the lack of a qui tam procedure and the payment of the bounties out a fund specified for that purpose. Whether this is a modernization of bounty schemes or an aberration peculiar to the securities realm remains to be seen.
The SEC specifically considered using qui tam method of negotiated settlement. This consideration was in light of the exhaustive procedural aspects of the system as proposed (and ultimately enacted). The reason the qui tam method was denied is mostly due to the relationship of the agency with the whistleblower. Relators, using qui tam, are generally the sole source of information leading to the investigation and therefore have a much more intimate relationship with the agency. Dodd-Frank, on the other hand, contemplates a common situation where there are multiple whistleblowers, some of which would not have much of a relationship with the SEC, would still have a claim on any bounty through their contribution of original information. Therefore, the SEC thought the mechanisms put in place best served the due process interests of any whistleblowers by giving them a procedure to follow to ensure their piece of the pie.
The other glaring difference is the establishment of the Investor Protection Fund (the”Fund”) from which bounties are to be paid. The Fund appears to be a necessity bore by the difference in the parties in an FCA action and a securities one. The reason the FCA negotiated settlement bounty works is because the whistleblower is awarded monies otherwise going to the Government. In a securities whistleblower case, the monetary sanctions are both disgorged profits that ideally end up back in the defrauded shareholders’ accounts and penalties assessed by the Government. In order to award a bounty to a whistleblower in such a circumstance the Fund is needed as the source of any such payment to avoid the pitfalls of the Takings Clause (paying a bounty from the money entitled to the shareholders). The Fund effectively isolates monetary sanctions due the Government from that due to shareholders. The Fund appears to be a practical solution to the problem created by awarding bounties in the securities litigation context.
Concluding this part, the FCA bounty scheme has seemingly had some effect on the whistleblower provisions of both SOX and Dodd-Frank. The whistleblower provision of SOX, although limited, was enacted in part by the realization that, as evidenced by the FCA, some form of whistleblower protection is valuable tool in generating evidence of fraud that may have otherwise gone unknown. This realization is further demonstrated in the addition of whistleblower bounties in the field of securities under Dodd-Frank. The final part that follows will illuminate my perspective as to how effective bounty provisions are and whether they over or under incentivize whistleblowers. IV. AUTHOR’S PERSPECTIVE.
If I had to clarify what the most valuable effect is resulting from the use of a bounty system, it would be its benefit as an information generating tool. Insider information is a valuable commodity in any case involving fraud. Bounties serve as a carrot on a stick for those insiders who may otherwise not report fraud for fear of all the disincentives, of which there are many, associated with being a whistleblower.
At their core, I like to think most people have a good moral compass. Insiders who are privy to fraudulent activity that harms the public likely feel morally compelled to make this activity known. But no matter how good or right it may feel to bring the wrongdoers to justice, the whistleblower must still face the realities that ensue from his decision to blow the whistle. Whistleblowers are likely to be subject to termination from a lucrative paying job, social ostracism, the psychological strain of “snitching”, or being blacklisted by other potential employers. As the whistleblower weighs his or her choice, it is arguable that many times the moral compass just isn’t enough to tip the balance against the weight of the disincentives. Additionally, as previously stated, most people are likely rational actors. In this context that means they are only more likely to blow the whistle when the benefit of doing so outweighs the cost. Intangible benefits such as inner peace or fame is likely not enough to sway the balaqnce in most cases. This is where bounties can play its part.
A bounty, by definition, is an incentive to entice a class of persons to some purpose set forth by the offeror. As contemplated by these Acts, that purpose is to uncover fraud. To uncover fraud quite often requires the unique knowledge of insiders. Here, whistleblower bounties work as an incentive for insiders to report fraud. Effectively, whistleblower bounties tip the scales in favor of reporting in the face of the disincentives.
It can’t be overlooked that, while the bounty incentive is monetary in nature to the whistleblower, the Government benefits by generating information they would otherwise not have. For example, take the case of Cheryl Eckard laid out in this paper. Without the information provided by Ms. Eckard, it could be impliedly true that the Government would have never uncovered the fraud. The FDA had conducted several investigations at the Cidra plant and although they found several deficiencies, it’s apparent they did not uncover the serious fraud that was being systematically hidden without the information Ms. Eckard provided. While it’s not clear that the bounty played a dominant role in her particular decision to report the fraud, it’s seems logical to assume that other potential whistleblowers give it some weight in their decision-making process where they know it is available.
Now, to the subject of over or under incentivizing whistleblowers, I find it’s a matter of perspective. As gaudy as some of the dollar values can be, such as the $96 and $51 million bounties stated in the paper, underlying the mechanics of the bounty schemes are percentages of sanctions collected. Again, take Ms. Eckard’s record-setting $96 million bounty settlement. That number was really 22% of whatever federal settlement amount the Government received. In that case, the federal settlement amount happened to be $436 million of the $750 total the Government recovered in civil and criminal penalties. However, no matter how high or low the federal settlement amount had been, Ms. Eckard was going to receive 22%. I think many people, let’s call them US, would take a deal with someone, and let’s call him Whistle, where Whistle could provide US with information that would entitle US to a return of $100 that was fraudulently taken from US for a $22 cut. To quote Lt. Aldo Raine (from the movie Inglourious Basterds), “I’d make that deal”.
Though I’m no mathematician, I’m sure there’s a way to quantify the value of a whistleblower’s information to a successful action. In the case of Ms. Eckard, I would likely argue that 22% may be a little on the low side of the value of her information in the success of the action against GSK. To set a floor and a ceiling to the bounties seems like a reasonable approach to averaging out the value of the information a typical whistleblower provides. Certainly there will be outliers, like in the case of Ms. Eckard, from a pure dollar value perspective, but when measuring the bounty as a percentage of value the information has to the success of the case, I believe the whistleblower provisions as enacted provide reasonable incentives.
In conclusion, the Eckard case gives some evidence that whistleblower bounty provisions provide an incentive for insiders with information of fraudulent activities to report such conduct. The Government in turn receives the benefit of that information as it prosecutes actions for fraud it may not have otherwise uncovered. It’s likely that the bounties have a positive impact on the Government’s ability to uncover fraudulent activity. Ultimately, the use of bounties in the context combating procurement and securities fraud appears both effective and reasonable.

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[ 1 ]. Qui tam is short for “qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur,” which means “he who pursues this action on our Lord the King’s behalf as well as his own.”
[ 2 ]. False Claims Act, 12 Stat. 696, 698 (1863).
[ 3 ]. False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §3729(a) (2009).
[ 4 ]. False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §3730(b) (2010).
[ 5 ]. 31 U.S.C. §3730(d)(1).
[ 6 ]. 31 U.S.C. §3720(d)(2).
[ 7 ]. 31 U.S.C. §3730(e)(4)(A).
[ 8 ]. Id.
[ 9 ]. 31 U.S.C. §3730(a)(2).
[ 10 ]. Overview of Qui Tam Law, http://www.fraudlaw.org/Definitions%20and%20concepts/Law%20by%20Topic/Qui%20Tam/Qui%20Tam%20overview.htm (last visited May 5, 2012).
[ 11 ]. See generally False Claims Act Facts, http://www.prjlawyers.com/False-Claims-Act-Law/False-Claims-Act-FAQs.shtml (last visited May 5, 2012).
[ 12 ]. 31 U.S.C. §3730(d).
[ 13 ]. Supra note 9.
[ 14 ]. Overview of Qui Tam Law, supra note 10.
[ 15 ]. Supra note 9.
[ 16 ]. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C. §1514A(a) (2010).
[ 17 ]. 18 U.S.C. §1514A(b).
[ 18 ]. Id.
[ 19 ]. 18 U.S.C. §1514A(c)(1).
[ 20 ]. 18 U.S.C. §1514A(c)(2).
[ 21 ]. 17 C.F.R. §240.21F–3 (2011).
[ 22 ]. See 17 C.F.R. §240.21F-9 through §240.21F-11 (2011).
[ 23 ]. 17 C.F.R. §2401.21F-4(b)(4) (2011).
[ 24 ]. 17 C.F.R. §2401.21F-4(b).
[ 25 ]. 17 C.F.R. §2401.21F-9 (2011).
[ 26 ]. 15 U.S.C. §78u-6(b) (2010).
[ 27 ]. Id.
[ 28 ]. 15 U.S.C. §78u-6(g).
[ 29 ]. Second Amended Complaint at 1, United States ex rel. Eckard v. SmithKlineBeecham Corporation, No. 04 CV10375 (Mass. Dist. Ct. July 34, 2007), 2007 WL 4598593.
[ 30 ]. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 29, at 13 (defining cGMPs).
[ 31 ]. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 29, at 25.
[ 32 ]. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 29, at 26.
[ 33 ]. Id.
[ 34 ]. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 29, at 26-28.
[ 35 ]. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 29, at 47-49.
[ 36 ]. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 29, at 51-63.
[ 37 ]. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 29, at 58-59.
[ 38 ]. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 29, at 64-64.
[ 39 ]. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 29, at 65, 68-69.
[ 40 ]. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 29, at 28-29.
[ 41 ]. Id.
[ 42 ]. Id.
[ 43 ]. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 29, at 29.
[ 44 ]. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 29, at 5.
[ 45 ]. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 29, at 31.
[ 46 ]. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 29, at 32-34.
[ 47 ]. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 29, at 34.
[ 48 ]. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 29, at 36.
[ 49 ]. Id.
[ 50 ]. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 29, at 38.
[ 51 ]. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 29, at 37.
[ 52 ]. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 29, at 36-37.
[ 53 ]. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 29, at 25.
[ 54 ]. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 29, at 38-39.
[ 55 ]. Id.
[ 56 ]. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 29, at 39.
[ 57 ]. Id.
[ 58 ]. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 29, at 40-41.
[ 59 ]. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 29, at 45.
[ 60 ]. Id.
[ 61 ]. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 29, at 46.
[ 62 ]. Id.
[ 63 ]. CBS News, Glaxo Whistle-Blower Lawsuit: Bad Medicine (January 7, 2011) http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-18560_162-7195247.html (last visited March 24, 2012).
[ 64 ]. Settlement Agreement at 2, U.S ex rel. Eckard v. GlaxoSmithKline, No. 10-cv-10375 (Mass. Dist. Ct. October 26, 2010) 2010 WL 4339999.
[ 65 ]. Settlement Agreement, supra note 64
[ 66 ]. Settlement Agreement, supra note 64, at 5.
[ 67 ]. Settlement Agreement, supra note 64, at 6.
[ 68 ]. Id.
[ 69 ]. Settlement Agreement, supra note 64, at 16.
[ 70 ]. CBS News, supra note 63.
[ 71 ]. Grant McCool, Analysis: U.S. whistleblower awards rise as fraud cases grow (October 29, 2010) http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/29/us-whistleblowers-awards-analysis-idUSTRE69S4LZ20101029 (last visited March 24, 2012).
[ 72 ]. Id.
[ 73 ]. Ed Silverman, A Pfizer Whistleblower Tops Business Ethics List (December 18, 2009) http://www.pharmalot.com/2009/12/a-pfizer-whistleblower-tops-business-ethics-list/ (last visited March 24, 2012).
[ 74 ]. Fraud Statistics – Overview (December 7, 2011) http://www.taf.org/DoJ-fraud-stats-FY2011.pdf (last visited March 24, 2012).
[ 75 ]. Marsha J. Ferziger & Daniel G.Currell, Snitching for Dollars: The Economics and Public Policy of Federal Civil Bounty Programs, 99 U. ILL. L. REV. 1141, 1171-72 (1999).
[ 76 ]. 18 U.S.C. §1514A(c).
[ 77 ]. Geoffrey Rapp, BEYOND PROTECTION: INVIGORATING INCENTIVES FOR SARBANES-OXLEY CORPORATE AND SECURITIES FRAUD WHISTLEBLOWERS, 87 B.U. L. Rev. 91, at 107 (February 2007).
[ 78 ]. Rapp, supra note 77, at 108, quoting John W. Cioffi, Irresistible Forces and Political Obstacles: Securities Litigation Reform and the Structural Regulation of Corporate Governance 28 (Comparative Research in Law & Political Econ., Research Paper No. 7/2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstractid=902648.
[ 79 ]. Michael Simkovic, Secret Liens and the Financial Crisis of 2008, American Bankruptcy Law Journal, Vol. 83, p. 253 (2009).
[ 80 ]. SEC, Annual Report on Whistleblower Program (October 2010). http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/whistleblower_report_to_congress.pdf (last visited March 29, 2012).
[ 81 ]. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34300, 34343 (June 13, 2011).
[ 82 ]. Id. at 34344 (showing a flowchart of the general overview of the procedural aspects of Dodd-Frank whistleblower claims).
[ 83 ]. Id. at 34343.
[ 84 ]. Id.
[ 85 ]. Id.
[ 86 ]. Id.
[ 87 ]. U.S. Const. amend. V, “…nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”
[ 88 ]. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, supra note 81, at 34348.