‘Why according to Russell can we not be sure of the table’s existence?’

Russell begins by asking his reader to consider what knowledge exists that can be known beyond reasonable doubt. His purpose is to produce the realization that doubt soon brings even the most simple assumptions in our everyday lives under reconsideration. Russell describes a scene: "I am now sitting in a chair, at a table of a certain shape, on which I see sheets of paper with writing or print." All of these "facts" are easily called into question.
In order to consider ordinary assumptions at issue, Russell concentrates on one example, the table. Walking around the table, he sees different colors from different points of view, in places some reflect more light, a brighter shade of brown appears. In reality we assume that there is only one color of the table, yet the appearance of many colors contradicts our belief. The color seems to vary depending on the observer and conditions like "the way the light falls on the table."
Since it seems clear that no two people could share one identical point of view, Russell addresses a doubt as to whether one real color of the table even exists. Russell continues his investigation of color by reasoning that in ordinary language, when we refer to the color of an object; we actually refer to something perceived from the usual perspective of observer. However, there is no reason to assume that the normal view should be considered real and other perspectives, under other conditions, be considered less real. Russell does not think that the most usual brown should be considered the colour of the table, which then gets rid of other shades of brown
As with colour, the existence of just one texture of the table is correct, because "to the naked eye, the table appears to be smooth and hard. With the help of a microscope, the grain of the wood enlarges to appear as mountains and a range of different roughnesses and textures." Russell argues that you cannot consider one texture more real than the others. The shape of the table, a rectangle, also changes shape as you walk around it. Sensation of pressure depends on the force we put on the table, as does the creation of sound when we tap on the wood. Therefore, the sensations of touch and sound, like sight, are not fixed by a reality; they are possibilities and each depends on the conditions of observation. Because of these observations we begin to question what things seem to be and what they are. Russell says that we are not aware of these differences because in our daily life, you learn "to construct the 'real' shape from the ‘apparent’ shape." The real shape exists because we create it with our senses. "The real table, if there is one, is not immediately known to us at all.
The next thing that is spoken of is one of understanding how the real table, if there is one, relates to our sense-data. Russell says that it is impossible to understand, if or how the relation would work. The first problems are: "is there a real table at all" and "if so, what sort of object can it be?" This comparison, between sense-data and the real table, is a concern for Russell's ideas .Russell admits that when we have been saying the "real table," we have meant the "physical object." Physical objects may be called "matter." The questions then become: "is there any such thing as matter?"
Russell considers one possible answer to the question with the thought of the philosopher Bishop Berkeley. Berkeley brought out the position that the immediate objects, which we call physical objects, do not exist because of us. Rather, they depend on our minds. On his view, matter does not exist. What we call physical objects are really just ideas, mental ideas that we project onto the world. The existence of objects that appear to adapt to our sensations is doubtful on this view. Russell's idea of the table shares Berkeley's spirit of enquiry as he agrees with Berkeley that "if there are any things that exist because of us they cannot be the immediate objects of our minds." However, Berkeley's arguments offer a more philosophical view, belief in the impossibility of a reality of man.
Berkeley denies that a common version of matter is something opposed to mind, He does not deny matter in the sense of things like sense-data, which signify an existence of something independent of ourselves. According to Berkeley, this independence is possible; he believes that there is something that always happens when we close our eyes or walk out of a room. However, he believes that this act depends on the mind that it may be independent but must be mental. It must not be "independent of seeing altogether, though it must be independent of our seeing.” Berkeley regards the reality of the table and other such physical objects as ideas in the mind of God. Things can exist independently as long as they are not things essentially unknowable.
Berkeley's view is just one example, the view that there is "nothing acceptable as real except minds and their ideas." Ideas supporting this view are that "whatever can be thought of is an idea in the mind of the person thinking it; therefore nothing can be thought of except ideas in minds; therefore anything else is not the same, and what is different cannot exist." Other philosophers say that the physical objects of the world depend on being observed by something, not necessarily God. Leibniz thought that physical objects existed because they were observed by some a collective mind, like the universe. These philosophers denied matter "as opposed to mind."
Russell also accepts the version of matter that they do not deny. Coming back to his question "Is there a real table at all?" Russell points out his agreement with Berkeley and Leibniz in believing that there is a real table. However, Russell disagrees with the idealists over the question of the nature of the real table, the second question "what sort of object can it be?" Russell says that "almost all philosophers agree that there is a real table" and that our sense-data are signs of something that exists because of us, Russell concludes by emphasizing that what we gather from our senses in terms of "appearance" are but signs from which we see reality Sean Gregory