THEME
India enjoys distinct status of being the largest democracy. Biggest middle class and secularism are considered and propagated as the binding forces in a land of diverse culture and ethnicity. Sheer geopolitics combined with the land and mass of the country places India in an advantageous position in the comity of nations. However, the short history of India, as a republic has exposed her “Cloak of Secularism”. The secular political philosophy of India, which sought to achieve unity through diversity, is now faced with challenges of rising communalism and caste-ism heralded by Hindu fundamentalism and socio-economic discrimination of the socially backward sections of society. There are strong movements and simmering aspirations seeking for greater autonomy and even independence.
Analyze the socio-ethnic mosaic of India with a view to determine the causes of ethnic sub-nationalism/ conflicts and ascertain the future of these fissiparous tendencies and their impact on the national integration of India. SUB THEME – SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS IN INDIA
India has a host of separatist movements fermenting on its outer fringes; from the freedom struggle of Kashmiris in the North West to the Naxal, Naga, Mizoram and Manipur Movements in the North and North eastern parts particularly the ‘Siliguri Corridor’. From the 1980’s onwards, virtually the entire North has been plagued by such activities with a large proportion of religious and ethnic groups in the region forming movements of their own.
Analyze the various implications of these separatist movements and fissiparous tendencies on India’s national integration and security.

ABSTRACT
Latest since the 1980s India has been shaken by various insurgencies and separatist movements. This did not only endanger India’s stability but also gave hope to some of her surrounding countries which lived in unfriendly tensions with their big neighbour.
The reasons for these fissiparous movements differ in a large variety, such as religion, ideology or ethnic origin. However, the vast number of different movements leads to the presumption that they were all motivated by one common root cause.
To find out if such a root cause exists, three distinctively different movements are examined: The religious-separatist movement in Kashmir, the ethnic-separatist movement in Nagaland and the ideological-revolutionary movement of the Naxalites.
The examination shows that, although differing in many aspects, all insurgencies can be traced back to four common reasons:
a. Foreign support
b. India’s militant way to deal with the conflicts
c. India’s economy and social system
d. India’s multi-ethnic composition.
A further analysis shows that these reasons again are caused by one single element that is indigenously Indian: The attitude of the Hindu elite. Although this elite has recognised that its behaviour has led to various difficulties in the own country, it seems as if it will still be a considerably long time until these deficiencies can be overcome. However, the disintegration of India remains quite unlikely.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Serial Subject Page
a. Theme 2
b. Sub Theme 3
c. Abstract 4
d. Table of Contents 5
e. Introduction 7
PART – I: JAMMU AND KASHMIR
f. History of the Conflict 9
g. Structure of the Conflict 10
h. Effects of the Conflict 13
j. Attitude of Inflicted Parties 14
k. Analysis of Causes 15
l. Possible Solutions 16
PART – II: NAGALAND
m. History of the Conflict 17
n. Structure an Effect of the Conflict 19
o. Attitude of India towards the Conflict 19
p. Analysis of Causes 20
q. Possible Solutions 21 PART – III: NAXALITES
r. History of the Conflict 22
s. Structure and Effects of the Conflict 23
t. Attitude of India towards the Conflict 26
u. Analysis of Causes 27
v. Possible Solutions 28 PART – IV: ANALYSIS
w. Common Causes within the Conflicts 29
x. Differences between the Conflicts 30
y. Conclusions 32
z. Perspective 34

INTRODUCTION
1. The significant number of different conflicts in Northern India, bloody and partly very heavy clashes between insurgents and Indian security forces, lead to the presumption that they may all rely upon one and the same reason, which can be found behind the different faces of the respective conflicts.
2. The research question of the following paper therefore is:
“Is there a root cause which all the different internal armed conflicts in Northern India have in common, and if yes, what is it?”
3. The answer on this is essential as it gives knowledge about the question whether India could manage to get rid of this burden it carries in the near future and by this gain additional power to its outside.
4. To answer the research question, the following Zero-Hypothesis may serve: “The different internal armed conflicts in Northern India have no common root causes.”
5.If this hypothesis turns out to be true, India will not be able to solve her internal struggle with a simple change of attitude in one issue. If it is false, India may find a way to shake off its problems in the north – a fact that would also have serious impact on Pakistan.
6. To test the hypothesis, three major conflicts of northern India are picked out as examples; The scope of this paper is limited to these three conflicts with respect to the extent of this paper: Kashmir in the west, Nagaland in the east and the Naxalite Insurgency in between. These three conflicts will be described and analysed.
7. This process is accompanied by some limitations: The author himself is no intimate expert of the region and was to a high degree restricted to Indian sources.
8. The insurgencies described in the following are seen as sheer terrorist activity by India. As this paper is written by a guest student of a Pakistani institution, it seems due to mention that especially the insurgents in Jammu and Kashmir are perceived as “freedom fighters” by Pakistan. To keep a balance as neutral as possible between both positions, in this paper they will be called “insurgents” or “separatists”. Yet, depending on the quoted sources, it may happen that they are called “terrorists”. Whenever this is the case, it is not the author’s perception but the point of view of the quoted (Indian or Western) individual.
9. For Pakistan, India is an essential issue and her weaknesses are thoroughly observed. Here lies the relevance of the topic. It may, how little ever, contribute to the thought process that shapes Pakistan’s attitude towards her eastern neighbour. It is – for sure – also an emotional matter and as a guest of Pakistan the author intends to respect the Pakistani point of view when writing this research paper. At the same time, he will not give up objectiveness due to his respect of the faculty, which has a seriously borne scientific entitlement.

PART – I: JAMMU AND KASHMIR
History of the Conflict
10. Without doubt, Kashmir is the best known area of internal conflict in India, although over centuries it was an exemplary of tolerance between Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs. After the withdrawal of Great Britain from the Indian subcontinent in 1947, Kashmir remained independent under the rule of the Hindu Maharaja Hari Singh.
11. Soon, first tensions between the Muslim majority and the Hindu minority arose, and short hereafter Pathan tribal warriors invaded the principality and a civil war broke out.
12. As a reaction, the governing Hindu Maharaja joined the Indian Union to get help from Delhi, which sent her troops the very next day and occupied Kashmir. As Pakistan supported the Pathan warriors, this led to the first Indo-Pakistani war that ended in January 1949 with a division of Kashmir into Azad Kashmir (Pakistan) and Jammu and Kashmir (India).
13. A second Pakistani attempt to seize Kashmir was defeated by India in 1965/66. Since then, the final status of the former principality depends on a plebiscite that was never held.
14. Large parts of the Muslim Kashmiri population on Indian held territory felt discriminated by the government in Delhi and several militant groups still fight against government troops in the region. The first terrorist attacks took place in 1986. Until 1990, the conflict forced 100,000 Hindus to leave Kashmir valley.
15. 1999 the city of Kargil became an issue between India and Pakistan which led to the Indo-Pakistani Kargil conflict. This conflict gained special international attendance with both countries having gone nuclear.
16. The claim for more autonomy by the Indian held state of Jammu and Kashmir in 2000 was not accepted by the central government. At the same time, India refused to raise the issue in a dialogue with Pakistan.
17. In 2006, Delhi changed her attitude of rebuffing any constructive talks and re-opened the dialogue with Pakistan.

Structure of the Conflict
18. Background. Historically, Kashmir was known as a region of religious tolerance. But immediately after the independence of the Indian subcontinent, it came into the focus of the two neighbouring nations India and Pakistan and thus was turned into a symbol of their antagonism. At the same time, big parts of the indigenous Muslim population strived for independence.
19. Therefore, in contrary to many other conflicts, there are three major players: India, the Kashmiri natives and Pakistan, who all claim Kashmir their own.
20. Inflicted groups
b. Separatist groups. The number of parties inflicted is rather high, and their importance, influence and relationship towards Pakistan have permanently changed.
The most important are:
 Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), formed in 1965, originally Pakistan based, one of the first groups that advocated secession of Jammu and Kashmir from India – more as an independent state rather than as part of Pakistan .
 All Party Hurriyat Conference, a secessionist conglomerate of different political parties and radical groups that demands a referendum about the future state of J&K; it recently showed an increasingly positive attitude towards negotiations with India and Pakistan and took distance from forceful attacks, especially by mercenaries. Its position towards joining Pakistan is ambivalent.
 Hizb-ul Mujahideen (militant wing of the Islamic organisation Jamat-e-Islami, stands for the integration of Kashmir into Pakistan and enjoys according sympathies from there ; it is listed in the European Union’s terrorism list )
 Al Badr (splintered off from Hizb-ul Mujahideen)
 Lashkar-e-Toiba (Pakistan based, forbidden Pan-Islamist underground organization, at least 10% of its members are foreign mercenaries)
 Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (ex Harkat-al-Ansar, Pan-Islamist group with close relationships to Afghan Taliban)
 Jaish-e-Muhammad (Pan-Islamist organisation claiming to be an alternative to the other Pan-Islamist groups in terms of bravery)
 Foreign mercenaries
c. India. From the Indian side, there are about 500.000 soldiers provided in Jammu and Kashmir.
d. Pakistan. Pakistan welcomes the separatist movement (but rejects the accusation of being actively involved in terrorist activities). India and some international sources claim the Pakistani intelligence service ISI playing an important role in the insurgency which yet has not been proven. In contrary to India, that clearly claims Kashmir a natural part of its dominion, Pakistan’s attitude is more moderate: somewhere between joining its territory and leaving the Kashmiri vote for their own solution means of a plebiscite.
21. Development of the Conflict. Several tendencies can be observed:
• Incidents slowly shift from Kashmir valley towards Jammu and increasingly are pointedly directed against Hindus and Sikhs.
• The violence develops in a direction away from pointed firearms to terror causing bombing.

(Graphic from: Jammu and Kashmir backgrounder)

• Indian security forces act more effectively and the number of killed insurgents rose increasingly since 1999 but also the security forces suffered more dead.

(Graphic from: Jammu and Kashmir backgrounder)

Effects of the Conflict
22. “The proxy war has claimed 26,226 lives between 1988 and 2000 in an estimated 43,956 incidents of terrorist violence. Of these casualties 10,310 (40 per cent) were civilians, 3,520 (13 per cent) were security forces personnel, and 12,396 (47 per cent) terrorists.” Until today, the amount of victims summed up reaches over 50,000
23. Tourism as important economic source has suffered badly from the separatist activity, and the poverty of the region again supports the recruitment of new members for the different separatist groups.

Attitude of Inflicted Parties
24. The incidents of September 11 have changed the attitude of some separatist groups, but their attempt to become more moderate or to offer cease-fires is hampered by the pressure of more radical groups .
25. Pakistan and India are caught in a vicious circle: Secessionist leaders demand withdrawal of Indian troops before the start of negotiations, while the Central Government argues that India as a democracy will not get the backing of its population for a withdrawal of the forces before the attacks have decreased . India declares not to negotiate as long as Pakistan does not take visible measures against the incidents in Kashmir , but at least has started the first time since 30 years to show readiness to listen to Pakistan’s suggestions.
26. Indias opposing Bharatiya Janata Party and parts of the governing Congress Party are still against the beginning peace process with Pakistan and India still uses poorly controlled force as main strategy, as many civilian victims of police firing show.
27. On the other hand, appeasement measures like the 1994 release of some militant leaders encouraged the insurgency to increase its attacks. Nevertheless, after a very strict and forceful course in the 90es, India has also taken some softer approaches: Jammu and Kashmir was declared a backward state to get economical help under the new industrial policy 1995, it is financially supported and a human rights commission was established in January 1997.
28. Meanwhile, a cease-fire for has been declared by India and is more or less lasting until today.

Analysis of Causes
29. The origin of the Kashmir conflict has two interlinked reasons: Firstly it is a religious matter, which yet was, secondly, only possible in the current form because of the “Two-Nations-Theory” after the withdrawal of Great Britain from the subcontinent. The soil for the conflict – the two religions – was already there in Kashmir, but the seed was brought in from outside by the attempts of India and Pakistan to pull Kashmir closer to their respective sphere of influence.
30. The attitude of both states most of the time was not helpful to calm the insurgency down: India held a stubborn position and was not even ready to raise the issue, while Pakistan was encouraging the struggle of the insurgency.
31. It is questionable whether the massive police and military force by the Indian central government is helpful to get the situation under control or counter-productive. On the one side, police firing is regularly an issue of international critique, on the other side a softer course already once encouraged the separatists to raise their efforts. In all cases the Indian forces lack of the necessary sensitiveness to differ between civil population and insurgents .
32. In the course of the conflict, two more elements came into being: Radical religious organisations from outside that found in Kashmir a suitable ground to fight their own battle and the organized crime that seeks profit in the Kashmir circumstances. The two latter elements bear a serious danger: They are not interested in an ending of the conflict.

Possible Solutions
33. India will not be able to solve this internal conflict without Pakistan, which usually showed more serious interest for a solution than India did. It is therefore up to India to do the next step and open itself for serious negotiations with Pakistan.
34. After both countries have found a common and coordinated way of dealing with the issue, a second step is possible:
• Making borders irrelevant
• Closer cooperation and personnel exchanges between different Pakistani and Indian institutions like universities (Jammu and Srinagar / Muzaffarabad and Mirpur)
• Common advising institutions for health care, education and environment protection along the Line of Control
35. India still postpones different solutions to make borders „irrelevant“ (student exchange, cooperative institutions etc) with the argument, Pakistan should first take the “terrorist problem” more seriously and stop “terrorist attacks” in India.
PART – II: NAGALAND
History of the Conflict
36. As Tibeto-Burmese tribes, the Naga tribes form a group of their own close to the Indian-Myanmar border. Under the Naga National Council (NNC), immediately after Great Britain’s withdrawal they claimed for independence on August 14, 1947, one day before India’s declaration of independence, yet Nagaland became part of Indian Assam. India’s restrictive attitude towards a self-organised referendum in 1951 in which the vast majority of the Nagas opted for an own state led to a violent secessionist movement with raids of villages and police outposts. In the subsequence, the Naga Federal Government (NFG) and a Naga Federal Army (NFA) were founded in 1956. India reacted with military responses, which led into the first Naga war that, in 1964, finally resulted in the creation of an own Nagaland state.
37. Peace talks between the Central Government and the Nagas were overshadowed by continuing insurgences, and the warlike acts broke out again. India condemned the NFG and NFA as unlawful organizations under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act of 1967 and inducted massive military power that gained control over the situation again in 1975. Peace was restored under the Shillong Accord in which the rebels accepted the Indian constitution.
38. Yet, some Naga activists who had gone through some paramilitary training in China refused to accept the accord and founded the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) on Myanmarese soil in 1980. Under a Maoist banner, the insurgence thus was continued. After internal clashes, the then most radical movement was split into two fractions called “IM” (Isaac-Muviah) and “K” (Khaplang).
39. In the 90s, the two fractions newly went into separate peace talks with the central government that were accompanied by inter-fractional clashes. Since then, the talks with the Indian government are going on:

Disturbances in Nagaland

Source: Subrata K. Mitra: Harihar Bhattacharyya: The Multicultural Challenge. The Post-Colonial State and Subnational Movements in India´s Northeast. In: Lidija R. Basta-Fleiner e.a. (Ed.): Rule of Law and Organisation of the State in South Asia. Munich 2000, p. 98

40. "’We want the government to come up with a response to our demands and help expedite a solution to the longstanding problem. The ceasefire is now on for 10 years and people are getting edgy,’ a senior NSCN-IM 40. leader said on conditions of anonymity” .

Structure and Effects of the Conflict
41. Inflicted groups. Today, the conflict is dominated by the two fractions of the NSCN “IM” and “K”. “IM” claimed that Nagaland has never been part of India and an “inheritance” from Great Britain to India could not be accepted as a fate of a people could not be passed on from one power to another , while “K” was more cooperative and moderate. Furthermore, “IM” follows the strategy to demand an agreement that covers all the territory that is inhabited by Nagas and reaches over the borders of the current Nagaland state (so called “Greater Nagaland”).The claim for Greater Nagaland woke up the protest of the concerned states Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur and Assam that partly became violent. The danger of another open civil war thus became present . Even Myanmarese military was inflicted as Nagas inhabit its border area and a first acceptance of India was cancelled in 2001. Yet, the rebels still continue negotiations and do not return to all-out violence.
42. Victims. The conflict had so far cost the lives of more than 25000 people , some sources even speak about 300 000.

Attitude of India towards the Conflict
43. India follows a two-fold strategy in the conflict. On the one hand, it is ready to negotiate with the inflicted parties, on the other hand it treats the conflict as a “law and order – problem” and responds with massive military engagement. This attitude led to the decision to choose the most radical and militant fraction “IM” as representative for the conflict and as main negotiation partner, because focus was on brute force only . The diffuse Indian strategy partly blocked successful negotiations, as more moderate fractions thus were excluded from the talks.
44. In 1956 India passed the Armed Special Forces Power Act as a direct answer to the conflict in Nagaland. By this, the central government can declare a region as area of disturbances and thus give numerous competences to the armed forces, such as opening fire on suspicious persons in case of smaller offences of arrest without warrant. The National Security Act of 1980 empowers security forces to arrest suspicious individuals for up to six months without warrant. A new law, the Prevention of Terrorism Act, which replaces the internationally criticised Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act from 1987 will enable the security authorities of further large-scale arrests.
45. There is a feeling that the Centre does not have a long-term vision of where it wants to go. All it has done so far is to announce that its will not alter the borders of any of the existing states .

Analysis of Causes
46. The separatist movement of the Nagas is of ethnic origin. They have felt as an independent people already during the British occupation. The religious aspect seems to be secondary.
47. After India’s independence, their disappointment rose when they did not even receive an own state territory, and the fact that the insurgency calmed down as soon as a Naga state was created shows that the unfulfilled wish for autonomy was the driving force for the conflict.
48. Meanwhile, like so often, the conflict has created profitable conditions for the leaders on both sides and some criminal elements. Nagaland receives huge amounts of development funds and the political elite grows richer: “Nagaland is one of the three states in the country, which has constantly received the highest per capita development funds from the Centre. (…) It is evident that the rebels are in no great hurry to bring peace to the state. To ensure that the peace talks continue indefinitely the rebels have raised various demands, which no self-respecting government will be able to concede. (…) The status quo suits the rebels. The NSCN (IM) leadership lives in great comfort and luxury in a foreign country. It is very doubtful if the leaders would like to return to Nagaland and trek for hours over dusty, uneven roads.” Since the 90ies, NSCN-IM has developed a new source of power by its involvement in drug trafficking . This makes the conflict even more difficult to be solved peacefully.

Possible Solutions
49. The concession of an own independent state has once proved to have the potential to calm down the conflict. Yet, an expansion of the Naga territory is not possible as it would raise forceful resistance in the concerned states.
50. A better trained police that fights criminality instead of violates human rights could aim at reducing the newly emerged sources. Peace talks should include all influential separatist groups and not only the most violent ones.
PART – III: NAXALITES
History of the Conflict
51. The Naxalite insurgency started as an uprising of farmers in West-Bengal and Andra-Pradesh between 1967 and 1970. It is named after the Naxalbari village where it broke out on 25 May, when security forces attacked a public meeting as an act of revenge for a killed policeman. As a Maoist movement it quickly gained supporters and spread out over the states Bihar, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh und Maharashtra. There, Naxalites fought against governmental security forces and private armies of the big landowners. During the 70s, the conflict cooled down due to sharp prosecution by the security forces. The movement was nearly extinguished and only some leaders survived in the neighbouring countries, especially China. Yet, the conflict rose again and is said to having got warlike shape latest since 1997 . It has meanwhile reached 13 out of 26 Indian states.
52. It is represented by numerous legal and illegal parties and militant groups that are focused on different states each. Therefore, it is difficult to estimate the overall strength of the movement. As a consequence, numbers differ, and the hard core of the Maoist “Army” is estimated to be between 500 to 3000 up to even 15.000 individuals.
53. During 2006,the Naxalite conflict came to be recognised as the “single biggest internal security challenge ever faced” as the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh stated in April 2006 .

Structure and Effects the Conflict
54. Inflicted groups
a. Insurgency. The insurgency recruits the mass of its members from the poor and suppressed parts of the local population, the Dalits and Adivasi. The ideological base for the movement manifests itself in several political parties and militant groups:
• Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) Liberation: founded 1974, currently strongest legal Naxalite organisation, represented in the parliaments of Bihar, Assam and Jharkhand.
• Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) New Democracy: founded 1988, based in Andhra Pradesh, close to classical Maoism.
• Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) [Kanu Sanyal]: created 2005, combines legal political and illegal militant activities.
• Communist Party of India (Maoist): Created 2004 from People’s War Group (PWG) (focus on Adivasi regions in Andhra Pradesh) and Maoist Communist Centre of India (focus on the south of Bihar and Jharkhand); follows the classical Maoist guerrilla strategy and is responsible for numerous militant actions of partly over average cruelty.
• Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) Janashakti: created 1992 out of seven smaller groups, focus on Andhra Pradesh, partly political, partly militant.
• Provisional Central Committee, Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist): founded 1971, centre in Bodo region and high vote results of its political organisation United Reservation Movement Council of Assam
b. Government. On the governmental side, the states and the Centre are involved but do not follow a coordinated policy. So it may happen that in some states peace talks are going on while in others, paramilitary groups are involved in fire fights against the Naxalites.
c. Salva-Judum. In Chattisgarh the government has started to arm the villagers against the Naxalites and organise them in the so called Salva-Judum, which means “Peace March” or “Peace Hunt” in the local Gondi language. To train them and to protect them from acts of revenge, they are collected in huge mass camps – often complete villages are concerned. Meanwhile, these camps comprise of about 50 000 Adivasi and are the objective of frequent Naxalite attacks .

55. Victims. Latest since 2002, the incidents carried out by Naxalites have been rising steadily:
2002  1,465 incidents
2003  1,597 incidents
2004  1,533 incidents
2005  1,608 incidents
56. In 2006 they carried out 1292 attacks, killed 585 people and suffered 215 own losses . Many of their killings are mere massacres among the village population that is considered to cooperate with the police, such as 27 slaughtered in Darbhaguda or 31 in Errabore. Many victims are killed in most despicable manner including repeated stabbing and slitting of the victims’ throats in front of other hostages or villagers after trial in so called Jana Adalats, peoples courts .
57. Tactics of Insurgency. The weaponry of the insurgency is not very sophisticated. Yet, while the Naxalites initially used small firearms, hand grenades and mines that were captured from police forces, they meanwhile have established own ammunition and weapons production sites. Their tactics comprise of jungle camps based operations, often directed against the population of a village where they suppose “police informants” or against Salwa-Judum camps. Recently, they have started to coordinate their raids and attack several targets at the same time.
58. Besides the military tactics, there is a socio-political strategy that aims at identifying grievances of the population they can exploit. Their activity is guided by visionary plans that reach up to 20 years into the future .
59. However, due to the recent massacres, they tend to loose the support by the local population.

Attitude of India towards the Conflict
60. To counter the insurgency, India claims to use a trifold strategy: (1) Strengthening of regional secret services, (2) Military actions, and (3) economical development ; however, until now the main stress is on the security forces .
61. In the attempt to use the masses against the insurgency, the Chattisgarh government has created the Salwa Judum which is thought to be a righteous counter action of the plagued population. Yet, both the police force and Salwa Judum have a tendency to violate human rights themselves.
62. In Salwa Judum, even children are recruited and made “Special Police Officers” and the whole phenomenon is critically questioned as civilians are pulled into the conflict and are made military targets . Moreover, Salwa Judum is accused of intimidation, exortion, rape and murder and forces unwilling villagers to participate in their campains.
63. Salwa Judum as well as the security forces seem to operate beyond the rules of law according to several civil-liberties groups .
64. Another approach is the surrender policy which was adopted by most of the affected states. This policy includes rewards, freedom from punishment and educational and economical support for every Naxalite who leaves the insurgency. This policy turned out to be quite successful.

Analysis of Causes
65. The reasons for the conflict lie in India’s indigenous system of inequality. The eastern Indian states are among the poorest and less developed ones, and the area is inhabited by a large number of tribal and casteless population. The regionally differing success of the Naxalites is linked with the existence of private armies of the big landowners that terrorise the population .
66. However, the soil itself is rich of minerals and other resources . Yet the local Adivasi are not permitted to participate in the profit but are expropriated or driven from the ground .
67. At the same time, also the Naxalites hamper the development process by opposing infrastructural work of the governments as means to further exploit the local population . They also destroy infrastructure that could shelter police, there included schools and community centres .
68. By the time, the Indian authorities begin to recognise that the Naxalites are more a socioeconomic rather than a security problem, linked to the backwardness of the Dalits and the Adivasi .
69. A special reason for the danger of the Naxalite movement compared with others is that it aims at India’s weakest point: delivering basic government services to those who need them most .

Possible Solutions
70. The Asian Centre for Human Rights has given a large number of suggestions what is to be done to solve the problem in a peaceful way. The development of the affected states is the most urgent problem and probably even requires the creation of a separate ministry. Secondly, the Central government should coordinate the policies of the different states. This includes an intervention against Salwa Judum and the practice to draw civilians and children into the conflict.
71. Finally, a broad dialogue should replace the simple use of force. Where the use of force seems to be necessary, the security forces must be much better trained and abolish the numerous violations against human rights .

PART – IV: ANALYSIS

Common Causes within the Conflicts
72. According to the Hypothesis, these conflicts are at the root of some common causes. A comparison results in the following similarities:
a. Foreign support. Most of the conflicts are not openly supported by foreign countries, yet the suspicion remains in the eyes of the former Indian Home and Defence Secretary Govind : “Again, some foreign powers started playing games against us in our protectorate of Sikkim … The happenings in Jammu & Kashmir, Nagaland, Mizoram and recently in Punjab also show significant pointers in the same direction.” It is out of question that also the Naxalite movement is at least morally supported by China.
India is surrounded by states that welcome the internal struggles of India and support them accordingly .
b. India’s attitude. India’s position towards the conflicts was very similar in all three cases. All conflicts were seen as law-and-order problems and answered by sharp reactions of the security forces. Usually, the police forces were not well trained, corrupt and brutal and violated human rights during the conduct of their mission. They were encouraged by strict Indian acts of law that enabled them to act rather uncontrolled.
Also India’s attitude towards the countries that felt sympathy for the insurgencies was similar for a long time: denial of the righteousness of the insurgency and a frozen relationship with the foreign supporters. Yet, India has recognised this as a dead-end road and starts to change its tactics. More and more, it tries to combine soft pressure and convincing attempts and thus gained first support by Myanmar and Bangladesh .
c. India’s economy and social system. India’s economical system supports the insurgencies. The difference between rich and poor in India goes to an extreme. Cast thinking makes it difficult for the poor to move to more promising positions in society. Moreover, the poverty in the northern belt has been neglected by the Central government for a long time.
Moreover it is revealing to see that the insurgencies are not carried out by Hindus but by minorities of different faith.
d. India’s multi-ethnic composition. Naturally, the different ethnic groups that inhabit India form clusters that mark themselves off from the others.

Differences between the Conflicts
73. Despite the numerous similarities, there are also several differences visible between the conflicts.
74. Baumik for instance finds five different categories of insurgencies :
a. Insurgencies based on a deep belief in the own independence (like Nagaland).
b. Insurgencies that strive for more autonomy but not for independence (like Tripura).
c. Initially separatist insurgencies that calm down after Indian concessions (like the Mizo conflict).
d. Insurgencies that aim at changing the Indian system (like the Naxalites).
e. Rebels that are supported and guided by other Union states (like the Arunachal Dragon Force).
75. These and other differences will now be shown and tested against the hypothesis. If one of the conflicts should show peculiarities that do not lead back to one of the above mentioned common roots, the hypothesis has been proven wrong.
76. Kashmir. The Kashmir conflict is different from the others, as “(t)his is thus an example of the internal and external threats combining in an actual violation of … (Indian) national security” . Yet, even if the Kashmir conflict has a different threat-quality, this does not influence the root causes which are examined in this paper.
77. Kashmir seeks independence from India due to religious reasons and as such differs from the other conflicts. These reasons are based on the two-nations-theory. This theory finds its origins in the suppression of minorities by the Hindu elite and thus leads back to the Indian social system as reason.
78. Nagaland. Nagaland seeks independence from India not due to religious, but due to historical and ethnic reasons. Not only this differentiates it from the Kashmir issue, but also that the Nagas stand on their own, while Kashmir has Pakistan for its support. However, multi-ethnicity as one of India’s main problems is the driving force. As such, Nagaland perfectly represents the typical Indian insurgency.
79. Naxalites. The Naxalite insurgency differs in many varieties from all the other conflicts that are shaking India. In fact, as a purely political movement that does not strive for independence it differs so much that it could be questioned whether it fits in this research paper at all. But this is exactly what makes it important to analyse this movement in the context of other insurgencies. Should it be possible to find reasons that the Naxalite movement has in common with separatist tendencies it can be regarded as proven that it lies within today’s India’s nature to provoke fissiparous tendencies.
80. And it seems as if these reasons exist in the way India treats its poorest. The Indian society and its understanding of poor and rich have caused this rebellion that is now considered India’s most dangerous; or, as the Economist puts it: “Other terrorists attack the Indian state at its strong points — its secularism, its inclusiveness, its democracy. Naxalism attacks where it is weakest: in delivering basic government services to those who need them most.”

Conclusions
81. The research question of this paper was, if there is a root cause which all the different internal armed conflicts in Northern India have in common, and if yes, what it is. As it was pointed out, all conflicts described have at least four elements in common:
a. Foreign support
b. India’s militant way to deal with the conflicts
c. India’s economy and social system
d. India’s multi-ethnic composition.
82. It was shown that the reasons of all conflicts could be traced back towards these elements. However, these elements seem to be of very different nature and quality. The foreign support stems from outside India and is beyond its influence. India’s way to tackle these problems is a policy that easily could be changed, while India’s multi-ethnic composition is not changeable at all. India’s economy and social system both are changeable, but only in a very long term perspective, as they are linked with the social culture.
83. Yet, it seems possible to find a common reason for these four differing elements:
a. The foreign support of several Indian insurgencies is reasoned by the negative relationship between India and her neighbours. India’s foreign politics as a regional hegemony power obviously cause deep mistrust. This politics are designed by the leading Indian elite – the Hindus.
b. India’s militant way to deal with the internal conflicts again is a decision of the leading political elite: the Hindus.
c. Also India’s economical and social system was designed by this Hindu elite.
d. India is multi-ethnically composed, but most of the different ethnics do not participate equally in the political process. Again, they find themselves in a minority role against the leading elite – the Hindus.
84. It therefore becomes obvious that it is the governance of the Hindu elite which causes the internal conflicts. By this conclusion, the Zero-Hypothesis may be rejected: There is indeed one common root cause for the internal conflicts of India. It lies in the hands of the Hindu elites whether India will remain instable or not.
Perspective
85. India was capable to keep the country united and to tackle various numbers of insurgencies at the same time. For this purpose, it used the four principles of Hindu politics, Sham (reconsiliation), Dam (bribery), Danda (force) and Bhed (splitting) .
86. However, in the recent years, the Indian Central Government has noticed that its current policy towards society will lead to a continuous destabilisation of the country. India’s population has grown tired of the political force. The unemployment rate is high and many people lack a perspective . First economical attempts to address the poorer population and concessions for more autonomy have been made. The cast system as a source of poverty and grievance has been recognised.
87. If these measures do not work as they should, this is to a big part due to the corrupted Indian administration. “(D)istribution of development funds remains a challenge. ‘The problem is the delivery system,’ says Chadda. ‘They’re throwing money at it but the delivery system is corrupt.’” . Mistakes have also been made in tackling the cast system: By binding financial support to the cast membership instead of the economical situation, the division among the society was underlined instead of softened up . Furthermore, the judicial system still treats people differently according to their social origin . Police still is overtasked and underequipped as well as poorly trained .
88. Also the demands of local states for more autonomy are still partly overheard. But the claims grew louder: “Since the fourth decade of independence, the ‘nations’ of India have begun to acquire their own identities. They demand not only a larger share of the national cake but also their right to govern themselves in their own distinctive linguistic-cultural territories within the vast Indian landmass. Those who have spent three decades building the State rather than the nation (and the nations within the nation) regard this groundswell of political awareness and demands as disintegrative and subversive of the State. Essentially and fundamentally, these are, however, demands for extension of democracy to the last frontiers of the country and for ending the vestiges of colonialism that have survived the years since independence in the depths of an ancient traditional society ruled by foreigners for 200 years.”
89. So far, India’s central government seems to have realized the reasons for the internal instability but has not yet been able to overcome its own deficiencies: Hindu nationalism and arrogance, that leads to social and economical injustice and exaggerated centralism.
90. On the other hand, as these deficiencies are recognised, it seems probable that India will contain them sooner or later, more or less successfully. A disintegration of India, as desired by several of its neighbours, therefore is not very probable. India will remain an important factor on the subcontinent and will continue to play its dominant role.

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