Q3) Separatist and secessionist movements have been a common and persistent feature in post-colonial Southeast Asia. Using specific examples provide an argument as to why you think this is the case.

The balance of armed conflicts has shifted towards those which take place predominantly within states. The growing number of separatist and secessionist movements in Southeast Asia has become an increasing threat to political stability in the region and have been a major source of disruption in post-colonial times. The region has both the highest incidence of ethnic conflict and the highest number of independent ethno-political groups, with most internal conflicts based around communal, religious or ethnic issues (Reilly 2002, 8). This essay will argue that separatism is a result of a collective sense of grievance from social, economic, ethnic or political marginalisation. It will present the case studies of West Papua and the GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka) movement in Aceh, Indonesia to demonstrate this marginalisation and its relation to national coherency in the terms of perceptions of identity and inclusion within national discourse. Firstly, this essay will discuss the modernisation and democratisation of the region and the role it plays in marginalisation. It will then explore the marginalisation in West Papua and Aceh and compare the effect on both separatist movements.
The region of Southeast Asia is in the midst of significant economic, social and political change. From authoritarian rule to democracy and from tradition to modernity, these transitions can often lead to conflict (Reilly 2002). The rapid democratisation of multi-ethnic states is likely to lead to ethnic-based quests for self-determination and therefore the creation of separatist movements, as evident in Southeast Asia (Reilly 2002, 12). As a result, the democratisation of countries like Indonesia – after the fall of President Soeharto in 1998 – has also contributed to separatism in some regions. With a population of 220 million, Indonesia is vital to regional security but it has also become a highly unstable country since the beginning of transition towards democracy (Reilly 2002, 13). This rapid social, economic and political development can cause marginalisation in certain regions. As argued by Vellema, Borras and Lara, violence and war are ingrained in processes of social transformations in regional political economies (Sietze, Vellema, Saturnino M. Borras Jr and Francisco Lara Jr 2011, 299). It is important to note modernisation and democratization in this context and the impact it has on indigenous communities. This impact is evident in the geographically and culturally distinct, West Papua.

The West Papua dispute is centered on the desire for independence from Indonesia. West Papuan discontent towards Indonesia has existed since 1962, when the Netherlands handed over the territory of Dutch New Guinea (West Papua) to Indonesia. Indonesia claimed they were the legitimate successor to the Dutch East Indies, and had a right to all its territories. The majority of West Papuans are Christian, opposed to Indonesia’s Islamic majority. This religious difference has led to feelings of marginalisation amongst the West Papuan population and has contributed to their understanding of their separate identity (Kingsbury 2005, 146). The move towards independence and nationalist aspiration has been expressed through the Papuan Executive Council (Presidium Dewan Papua, PDP) and Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM), an ongoing guerilla movement, which has opposed Indonesian occupation since 1963. Indonesian heavy-handedness, including the widespread killing of civilians and dispossession, has ensured a strong sense of West Papuan marginalisation from Indonesia. This authoritarian response has also strengthened the PDP and the OPM, helping them legitimise their claim for international intervention and to become a more cohesive political force (Kingsbury 2005, 147). The lack of responsible investment in solving the economic and social problems of the West Papuans is intimately connected to the further alienation of the population (Roddan 2013). West Papua hosts the largest gold and copper mine in the world, which Indonesia has exploited in a bid to marginalise indigenous West Papuans (Roddan 2013). Indonesia has also introduced a transmigration program that has led to over 1.5 million Indonesians settling in West Papua. The Indonesians now outnumber the indigenous Papuans and pose a threat of ‘slow-motion genocide’ (King 2013, 8). Even in regional areas where indigenous Papuans remain the majority, they are excluded from basic services like education and health care (Roddan 2013). This marginalisation will inevitably fuel the desire for independence and will result in separatism persistence in West Papua. Like West Papua, the province of Aceh has struggled for economic, social and political justice.

Since 1976, Aceh, a province of Indonesia that is located on the northern tip of Sumatra, has been embroiled in conflict. The Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) seeks to establish an independent state after years of profound Acehnese alienation from Indonesia. GAM received traction after the combined desire to fight the growing brutality of Indonesian security forces and the alienation caused by the lack of significant change in everyday life despite decentralisation and democratisation (Schulze 2004). The main economic grievance of the Acehnese was the major exploitation of the oil and gas industry by Jakarta. The gas and oil revenues, for many years, were fully controlled by the central government in Jakarta, with only three percent of revenue being returned to Aceh (Basyah Said 2008). This resulted in strong discontent with the central government and bolstered the Free Aceh Movement cause. It was only in 2002 when the special autonomy law took effect that Aceh received a seventy percent share of oil and gas revenue (Basyah Said 2008). Infrastructure in Aceh was, and still is very poor. Twenty-five percent of the population lives below the poverty line, with poor public services and lack of opportunities all leading towards conflict (Basyah Said 2008). Rising levels of unemployment and poverty, especially in rural areas, prompted the escalation of the conflict in the early 2000s. Aceh, as a former sultanate, has always been more devoutly Islamic compared with the rest of Indonesia (Milallos 2007, 290). Another factor for Aceh’s separatism was the marginalisation of Muslims groups and political parties in Aceh. Members of Islamic political parties were harassed and despite Aceh’s special territory status, it was not allowed to implement sharia law (Aspinall 2009, 52) Proposals to integrate Islamic religious schools with national schools were also ignored by the central government (Morris 1983, 276). Although both West Papua and Aceh are contextually different, these case studies both present incidence of marginalisation. This marginalisation is possibly a ‘by-product’ of Indonesia’s state-centric security approach. If the central government shifted their focus to the security of the individual, movement towards peace could be possible (Collins 2007, 8: 127).

This essay has argued that separatism is a result of a collective sense of grievance from social, economic, ethnic or political marginalisation. Demonstrated through the secessionist movements in West Papua and Aceh, the rapid development of post-colonial Indonesia has contributed to the alienation of these regions. The evident exploitation of the indigenous population of these provinces will inevitably lead to continual discontent. Even though separatism movement in Aceh has decreased, it will persist until the population’s quest for ‘self-determination’ and their idea of national identity is satisfied. West Papuans on the other hand, are becoming further marginalised which will result in conflict for years to come. This does not necessarily mean that these areas will be able to become independent from Indonesia, but rather that there will be a high level of instability and dissent for the foreseeable future.

Reference List
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-Basyah Said, Nazamuddin. 2008. Economic injustice: Cause and effect of the Aceh conflict. Concilation Resources. Online: http://www.c-r.org/accord-article/economic-injustice-cause-and-effect-aceh-conflict
-Collins, Alan. 2007. Contemporary Security Studies. 2nd Edition. New York: Oxford University Press.
-King, Peter. 2013. Indonesia and Ethno-nationalist “Separatism” since Independence: East Timor, Aceh and Papua. Sydney: University of Sydney. Available online: http://sydney.edu.au/arts/peace_conflict/practice/west_papua_project.shtml#papua_papers
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-Morris, Eric Eugene. 1983. Islam and Politics in Aceh: a Study of Center-Periphery Relations in Indonesia. New York: Cornell University Press.
-Reilly, Benjamin. 2002. ‘Internal Conflict and Regional Security in Asia and the Pacific’. In Pacifica Review. Vol. 14, no. 1. London: Routledge.
-Roddan, Michael. 2013. West Papua – Genocide and Economic Marginalisation. ESSA. Available online: http://economicstudents.com/2013/04/west-papua-genocide-and-economic-marginalisation/
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-Sietze, Vellema, Saturnino M. Borras Jr and Francisco Lara Jr. 2011. ‘The Agrarian Roots of Contemporary Violent Conflict in Mindanao, Southern Philippines’. In Journal of Agrarian Change. Vol. 11, Issue 3. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell Publishing.
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