She enthusiastically posted and commented on YouTube videos of supporting al-Qaeda and their allies, but her enthusiasm for jihad went beyond watching videos and offered moral support as well. She made contacts on-line with other jihadis, solicited funding, and orchestrated an actual terror plot. Her case is a shocking example of how easy it can be to find jihadi content on-line and make operational connections with others who speak aspirationally about violent acts of terror against the homeland. The Jihad Jane case is not the only one. Only a few weeks ago, Jose Pimentel was arrested for preparing bombs to use in attacking targets in New York City. Before his arrest, Mr. Pimentel had been active on-line. He ran a blog, held two YouTube accounts, and operated a Facebook profile, all dedicated to jihadi propaganda.
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Social media is the No. 1 activity on the world wide web, we know that, accounting for over 22 percent of all time spent on-line in the United States. For instance, Twitter averages about 200 million tweets per day, Facebook boasts about 800 million active users throughout the world. Social media spreading messages to many users at one time is commonplace and their power has proven to be remarkable.
Al-Qaeda forum users are usually anonymous. The links between them are unknown, and the administrators heavily moderate the discussions. There are only a handful of these fora and the most prominent of them only numbers 50,000 members, many of whom have multiple accounts or, like Aaron and I, are researchers, passively watching. Participating on the forums may harden the views of al-Qaeda supporters and it may push them to take action, but no one is being radicalized on them. They are already members of the radical choir singing to one another. If the internet does play a role in radicalization, it is happening elsewhere. Sometimes recruiters fish for susceptible youth on mainstream websites, sometimes youth find the content themselves on sites like YouTube, led to it out of curiosity or following the trail of their own conviction. They then share what they find with their
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acquaintances on social networking sites like Facebook. Thankfully, the vast majority of youth who watch and read al-Qaeda propaganda are either unaffected or choose not to act. As tested recently by one anonymous on-line recruiter he posited that if you post al-Qaeda propaganda to all of the mainstream websites, only .00001 percent of the people who viewed it would go out to fight for al-Qaeda and even fewer would carry out suicide operations. By his reasoning that is 10,000 people out of a population of 1 billion Muslims. Those numbers might be a bit off, but I don’t think by much. We are talking about a relatively small
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number of people.
So where and how are al-Qaeda supporters initially radicalized on-line? The where question is easier to answer than the how: Sometimes recruiters fish for susceptible youth on mainstream websites. Sometimes youth find the content by themselves on sites like YouTube, led to it out of curiosity or by following the trail of their convictions. They then share what they find with their acquaintances on social networking sites like Facebook. In the so-called ‘‘Five Guys’’ case, there is a mix of both trends. Young men in the D.C. area watched al-Qaeda videos on YouTube and shared them with one another. A Taliban recruiter contacted them through
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YouTube and facilitated their travel to Pakistan.
Thankfully, the vast majority of youth who watch and read al-Qaeda propaganda are either unaffected or choose not to act, as attested recently by one anonymous on-line recruiter. He posited that if you post al-Qaeda propaganda to all of the mainstream websites, only 10% of the people will likely look at it. Of those, only 10% will like what they see. Of those, only 10% will embrace the idea of jihad. Of those, only 10% will propagandize for it. Of those, only 10% will go out to fight in a jihad.
And of those, only 10% will seek martyrdom. By his reasoning, 10,000 people out of a population of one billion Muslims, or 0.00001%, would go out to fight for al-
Qaeda and even fewer would carry out a suicide operation. Those numbers might be a bit off but not by much. We are talking about a relatively small number of people. Because the number of people is so small, it is difficult to say why some become active supporters of al-Qaeda and others do not. What we can say is that the vast majority of people who watch and read al-Qaeda propaganda will never act violently because of it. Put metaphorically, the material may be incendiary but nearly everyone is fireproof. Since that is the case, it is better to spend our resources putting out the fires and issuing warnings about the dangers of fire rather than trying to
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fireproof everyone or remove incendiary material. Extending the fire metaphor a bit, how do we know where the flames are? We
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look for smoke. In this case, the smoke is the distribution and celebration of al-
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Qaeda propaganda. People who celebrate al-Qaeda propaganda on-line and who distribute
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large amounts of it on mainstream websites for the purposes of recruitment
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should be watched. Chances are that a few of them will decide to do something stupid,
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like Zachary Chesser, a recent Muslim convert from the D.C. area who was active
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in on-line recruitment and was arrested while trying to go fight for al-Shabaab
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in Somalia
The next home-grown violent extremist who either attempts a terrorist attack or who is arrested before they can do so will be someone I already know something about. Assuming they have a
YouTube account, they will likely be within 2 degrees of separation of someone who has similarly either attempted a terrorist attack or has been arrested on terrorism charges. The following examples help to illustrate this point.
Taimour al-Abdaly launched an attack in Stockholm, Sweden.
Mr. al-Abdaly had connections to Arid Uka. Arid Uka opened fire on a bus full of U.S. service personnel at the airport in Frankfort,
Germany killing two. Arid Uka was connected on-line through
YouTube to Abu Khalid Abdul-Latif. Mr. Abdul-Latif is awaiting trial. He is accused of plotting with friends to attack a U.S. military facility in Seattle, Washington. Mr. Abdul-Latif had friends in common with Jubair Ahmad. Mr. Ahmad of Woodbridge, Virginia pled guilty to one count of material support for terrorism at the end of last week. He had made a video under the direction of
Lashkar-e-Taiba, and he uploaded that video for Lashkar-e-Taiba
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to YouTube.
Terrorism—violence for political aims—requires a steady output of media for the movement to remain relevant, to maintain morale, and to recruit new members. For the terrorist organization or movement, the low cost and ease of access of the internet
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make it an ideal channel for the distribution of terrorist media. Terrorism is
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also a social phenomenon. Individuals may act alone, but in almost all cases, the
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terrorist is a product of a community of extremists. The genuine lone wolf is extremely
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rare. Because of their political and social needs, social media sites are very
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attractive to violent extremists.

Computers affect how we experience media and how we interact with others. Extremists are as susceptible to these effects as we are. The on-line environment is immersive. We feel we are in a place, often called cyberspace. When we are on a social media site, we feel that we are virtually together with our friends, family, and comrades in arms. We feel we are present in the videos we watch. On-line interaction brings people closer, faster. On-line relationships get off to a strong start, and then move off-line if possible. In the case of aspiring terrorists, the result may be less positive. On-line social networks tend to mirror off-line social networks. People—extremists included—use social media to keep in touch with people they already know.
An individual’s ability to get involved in terrorism is directly related to who they
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know, and this is precisely what social media sites reveal to us.
Although all terrorist groups use the internet, al-Qaeda is the first to fully exploit the internet and the social media. This reflects some unique characteristics of al-Qaeda itself. It regards itself as a global movement that therefore requires a global network of communications to support it. It sees its mission as not simply one of creating terror but one of awakening the Muslim community. Its leaders regard communications as 90 percent of their struggle and therefore, despite the security risks, these leaders communicate
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regularly with video and audio messages.
Many would-be jihadists begin their journey on the internet seeking solutions to their personal crises, validation of their anger, the thrill of clandestine activity. Of these, a few move beyond the internet to seek terrorist training abroad or to plot terrorist attacks here, but overall the response in America to al-Qaeda’s intense marketing campaign thus far has not amounted to very much.
Indeed, between 9/11 and the end of 2010, a total of 176 persons,
Americans, were identified as jihadists; that is, accused of providing material support to one of the jihadist groups or plotting terrorists attacks. In fact, despite years of on-line jihadist exhortation and instruction, the level of terrorist violence in the United States since 9/11 has been far below the terrorist bombing campaigns of the pre-internet 1970s.
This suggests a failure of al-Qaeda’s strategy. It indicates that not only are America’s Muslims rejecting al-Qaeda’s ideology, not only is this a remarkable intelligence ascent, but there are some
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inherent weaknesses in this on-line strategy.
Al-Qaeda has embraced individual jihad as opposed to organizationally-led jihad.
Increasingly, it has emphasized do-it-yourself terrorism. Those inspired by al-
Qaeda’s message are exhorted to do whatever they can wherever they are. This represents a fundamental shift in strategy. As part of this new strategy, al-Qaeda has recognized on-line jihadism as a contribution to the jihadist campaign. Despite some grumbling from jihadist ideologues about on-line jihadists not pushing back from their computer screens to carry out attacks, the threshold for jihad has been lowered.
Action remains the ultimate goal but on-line warriors are not viewed as lessdedicated
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slackers.