Somalia is a country with a history of violence, unrest, and strategic implications regarding counterterrorism for the United States (U.S.). Of particular interest is the Al Shabaab organization, an Islamic extremist group attempting to overthrow the United Nations (UN) sanctioned Transitional Federal Government (TFG). According to the National Counter-Terrorism Center, the group has exerted temporary and, at times, sustained control over strategic locations in southern and central Somalia by recruiting, at times forcibly, regional sub-clans and their militias, using guerrilla asymmetrical warfare and terrorist tactics against the TFG of Somalia and its allies, African Union (AU) peacekeepers, and Nongovernmental aid Organizations (NGO).

Traditional warfare should not be considered an option as the threat faced does not constitute a conventional war where military forces are attempting to achieve strategic objectives against a recognized state. Commensurate to the threat, an Islamic extremist organization, irregular warfare strategies and capabilities are ideal in neutralizing these threats. The U.S., in support of the AU, is uniquely positioned to provide support through irregular warfare capabilities implemented by U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM).

Although the Al Shabaab organization could be categorized as aninsurgency, it may not necessarily be feasible to approach the threatwith a counterinsurgency strategy. The organization does not appearto have the support of the people as much as commanding obedience through fear. It is assessed a more viable approach through counter terrorism and foreign internal defense is necessary to minimize U.S. troop presence and bolster the relationships and credibility of AU partners. Ethiopia and Kenya border Somalia and have the most to gain and/or lose as a result of this issue. Whether it is an influx of refugees attempting to escape the violence imposed by Al Shabaab or protecting themselves from Al Shabaab cross-border attacks, Ethiopia and Kenya are key partners in executing an effective irregular warfare campaign.

The southern and central regions of Somalia are those most affected by Al Shabaab. In 2008, Ethiopia led a military campaign to oust Al Shabaab elements from Mogadishu and the southern portion of Somalia. After a two week campaign, the organization’s capacity to control Mogadishu was greatly diminished, forcing the organization to regroup in more rural areas. The ability of the TFG to maintain control of country is yet to be determined; however, addressing the economic and governmental issues driving Al Shabaab recruitment will be a part of an enduring solution. By addressing the deficit in trade, commerce, and governance in Mogadishu and the outlying regions, the U.S. can provide Somalis with a viable alternative to accepting the strict and oppressive ideologies of Islamic extremism. Bolstering the AU partners’ military capabilities will provide the control along the border regions of Kenya and Ethiopia with the intent of marginalizing Al Shabaab’s ability to conduct operations outside of Somalia establishing the base for more aggressive, kinetic counterterrorism operations and enhanced intelligence capabilities.

Interagency cooperation considerations must be addressed to effectively implement such a campaign. International partners, specifically Ethiopia and Kenya, NGOs, and the TFG will all be considered stakeholders and partners, bringing an array of capabilities and requiring support from U.S. Forces. Ethiopia and Kenya appear to be the primary, direct recipients requiring the most support with NGOs as secondary recipients. The relationship between
U.S. Forces and the TFG cannot be overlooked as the TFG is the continuity for transition of authority once U.S. Forces scale back support.

The Ethiopian and Kenyan military forces will require significant training and material support for border control operations and subsequent counter-terrorism direct action missions. Intelligence sharing will be important to facilitate successful operational planning and execution in addition to equipment support such as the Biometrics Automated Tool Set (BATS) for border control and humanitarian concerns.

NGOs providing humanitarian assistance to the indigenously displaced person (IDP) population will require support in the form of security. As the relationship with NGOs is developed, it is important to establish the communication means between the NGOs, U.S. forces, and AU partner militaries. The relationship should be developed early on in planning and address the capabilities and limitations of all parties, supported-supporting nature of the relationship, and rules of engagement for situational awareness as operations progress.

The TFG must be deeply integrated in the conduct of such a campaign as to prevent undermining the ongoing efforts of the TFG and align U.S. strategy with regional objectives. U.S. Forces bring a highly effective and advanced set of capabilities which could unintentionally give a false sense of accomplishment to the TFG and AU partners. The TFG and AU partners must understand, although these capabilities are there while U.S. Forces are present, the responsibility of sustaining the progress achieved through such capabilities is only viable if the efforts are continued through TFG and AU actions.

Unity of effort and understanding the operational environment are two keys to success achievable through this campaign with the identified partners. AU military elements are indigenous to the region and very familiar with all the aspects associated with the weather, enemy, and terrain including cultural, social, economic, and political dynamics relatively unfamiliar to U.S. Forces. A unified approach through the TFG and AU provides the basis for successful unity of effort driven by U.S. capabilities and military muscle. NGOs presence provides an additional means to stay abreast of second and third order effects concerning the IDP population and can be used as a metric to scale ongoing U.S. support.

As the campaign unfolds, providing such metrics also ensures U.S. forces are capable of flexibility to alter strategies and serve as a cue to conduct certain types of operations. For instance, if the AU partners along the border of Ethiopia are facing an influx in refugees from the southern region of Somalia, NGOs can be communicated with to establish essential services in the area affected most, delaying the refugees from having negative effects on Ethiopian military forces preparing for direct action in the same region. In this instance, AU reports are used by U.S. Forces to increase the support to the affected population while maintaining progress on counter-terrorism operations and build credibility for the TFG by attributing the humanitarian efforts to the TFG effectively instilling confidence with the Somali people in their own government.