What would utilitarianism, rights theory, and justice say about these activities of ExxonMobil, Amerada Hess, and Marathon Oil in Equatorial Guinea?

ExxonMobil’s, Amerada Hess’ and Marathon Oil’s actions, intentions and decisional consequences can be analyzed by utilitarianism, rights theory, and justice sub-theories and ideas, as the companies, governments and citizens are all affected. Utilitarianism focuses on the companies’ decisions’ consequences; rights theory zeroes in on if the companies maintain and respect relevant parties’ rights; and the justice ideas concentrate on the companies’ embracement of civil equality of liberties and justification of inequalities.
A utilitarian may view the companies’ actions and consequences under four of utilitarianism’s characteristics: consequentialism, hedonism, minimalism, and universalism, as listed in a business ethics textbook (W. P. Kissick, Contemporary Utilitarianism 17-18). Firstly, and theoretically the most significant in context, as consequentialism involves decision validity, the three companies’ intentions matches this principle, for their main goal, the ultimate consequence, included helping West African countries produce $4 billion annual oil revenues. Additionally, as these companies acquired eighty percent of the annual oil revenues, while the majority of Equatorial Guinea’s population remained poor, and the companies claimed to invest in Equatorial Guinea’s social, educational and health institutions, a utilitarian may dismiss these controversial actions because he or she would feel as if these actions are justified by maximalist and universalist beliefs. In other words, observing these questionable results, paired with T. Nguema’s lavish expenditures from the oil revenues, and the U.S human rights report’s criticism of social and socio-political rights, the companies may argue that their actions catered to as many people (sustainable investments, which results in consequences of well-being), while T. Nguema’s interests (the interests of a single person) are irrelevant to the companies’ decisions. Also, even though everyone’s happiness was debatable, universalism dictates to specifically consider everyone’s happiness – not to ensure it; therefore, this justifies three of the four characteristics. Moreover, a utilitarian might arguably claim that the fourth trait, hedonism, is nonexistent unfulfilled. To clarify, the normative hedonist lens remains absent, as the consequences of the companies’ oil drilling assistance preceded the government’s supposed (by the U.S human rights report) apathy of Equatorial Guinea’s residents, a form of pain and harm.
Moreover, as a utilitarian can attest that these four utilitarian ideas relevantly involved the companies’ activities, he or she can also argue that the companies’ decisions signify act utilitarianism or rule utilitarianism, which is also explained in a business ethics textbook (W. P. Kissick, Contemporary Utilitarianism 17-18). Firstly of the two, the companies’ may have possessed act utilitarian traits, as the decisions to help produce and acquire billions of dollars of oil, along with the decisions of sustainably investing in Equatorial Guinea, are situation-specific decisions that may have been formulated by analyzing the prior four characteristics. For example, while evaluating the situation-specific decision of investing millions on the local educational system, the companies probably assessed the consequence itself (social and economic sustainability), the utility level (pursuing the well-being of individuals) and the number and quality of individuals affected. Additionally, since drilling, receiving billions each year and environmentally investing are all mostly dissimilar decision-specific situations, a utilitarian can argue that rule utilitarianism does not apply to the companies’ decisions unless a single likely outcome resulted in all decisions. All in all, one must observe the companies’ and government’s decisional consequences’ attributes, such as the citizens’ well-being or rights, to realize utilitarian aspects.
Kantian ethics criticism is relevant to this case, as the companies’ activities eventually involve Equatorial Guinea’s citizens’ rights. Controversially, Equatorial Guinea’s government compromises the locals’ rights, such as free speech, religion and others, because, it can be assumed, of the consequential ignorance of the government. In other words, as noted earlier, the financial deal between companies and the government resulted in the government’s ignorance, while the companies, on the other hand, claimed to build a socially responsible profile in Equatorial Guinea. If the latter is true, a Kantian critic might articulate that this duty affects the rights of the citizens, which is hinted in a business ethics textbook, as part of the revenues that derive from oil drilling contributes to these societal investments, while the government’s twenty percent deal is continuously withheld to itself and T. Ngeuma’s family (W. P. Kissick, Challenges to Kantian Ethics 21). In other words, a cause-and-effect situation involving a duty versus a right persists, in which the initial financial deal between two parties (companies and the government) resulted in the companies’ duties and the government’s violation of the citizen’s rights, for if the deal never existed, the financial transactions (no consequential duty to citizens) and the government’s indifference to its citizens (citizens’ rights) arguably would not have occurred. A Kantian critic will thus oppose the categorical imperative of applying maxims (in this case, possibly receiving money for charitable giving) universally because the total financial transactions result in the alleged local rights violation. However, Immanuel Kant himself would have contended that the companies’ corporate responsibility (applying the maxim of charitable giving) supersedes the consequential violation of the citizens’ rights, as he firmly believes that Kantian ethics is irrelevant to maxims’ consequences.
Nonetheless, this previous argument’s parties can also relate to rights-based stakeholder theory, which is elaborated in a business ethics textbook, (W. P. Kissick, What is a Stake? 53), as citizens may subconsciously assume they are, proven in the prior argument, directly (social responsibility) and vicariously (citizens’ violated rights) the three companies’ rights-based stakeholders; therefore, the high legitimacy of rights-based stakeholders justifies the consequences, the citizens’ benefits from the companies’ investments and violated. In other words, the entitlement to these desired outcomes exceeds the government’s financial and/or legal stake of spending for personal services since rights-bases stakeholders theoretically possess the highest legitimacy. Nevertheless, the textbook also indicates that stakeholder theorists must also consider the power and urgency of the citizens’ stakes because one can assume that the government’s power and the government’s decisions’ urgencies are both relevant to determining the “relative importance” of all contextual stakes (W. P. Kissick, How Do You Analyze Competing Stakes? 55). This reflection can influence an observer to cogitate rights and justice, both elements of Jon Rawls’s theory of justice, presented in a business ethics textbook (W. P. Kissick, Methodology for a Social Contract 23-24).
John Rawls’s theory of justice is significantly reflected in the transactions/establishments between the oil companies and Equatorial Guinea’s government and citizens. Firstly, the case states that, generally, companies earn fifty percent of revenues from developing countries’ oil projects, whereas Equatorial Guinea’s government agreed to give eighty percent to the companies. Also, as noted earlier, this deal’s existence leads the government to selfishly spend its oil revenue disbursement, while the majority of the country’s population remains comparatively poorer. Additionally, the companies claim to be investing millions in social and economic causes; however, the claim’s validity is questionable, so the citizens’ benefits are unjustified. All noted, John Rawls and his supporters may question if justice is acknowledged and pursued, assuming that the amount and/or existence of funds equals level of possible provisions for the society. In other words, Social Contract theorists may debate that the government’s actions were unjustified, whereas the companies’ investment levels may or may not be unjustified, as the Rawls primarily argued that “minimal provisions” normatively should be given to those at the bottom of the social order. In fact, the two principles of the theory of justice may support this, as the difference principle implies that the government’s withholding of funds and the companies’ donating of funds are unjustified and justified, respectively. Moreover, from what can be gleaned from the case, the companies’ perceptions and decisions excluded unequal worth of citizens; a social contract theorist might validate that the companies respected the citizens’ individual rights. Furthermore, the second principle indicates that the financial inequality between the companies and the citizens is reinforced by the companies’ societal outlays.
The effectiveness of John Rawl’s application may be challenged in this case. In fact, the justice theory’s first principle may be only loosely useful in explaining the companies’ activities because the companies supposedly invested millions; no credible proof exists of if the companies actually did invest millions. In addition, the second principle can be inadequately adhered to as well, as the inequality that exists does not intend to primarily cater to the society. In other words, the inequality exists as a result of the companies’ receiving eighty percent of the oil revenues, which is predominantly circulated for the companies’ activities with other stakeholders, and the government’s spending of twenty percent of its share for itself.
In summary, the theories may be relevantly applied, as many ideas of each explain, support and oppose the companies’ activities. Five utilitarian traits explained the entirety of the company’s decisional consequences even though the hedonist trait was loosely relevant. Power, urgency and the categorical imperative were also controversially relevant; however, Kantian duty and stakeholder theory cemented the of rights theory’s significance. The companies justified their financial involvement through distributing funds and realizing fair liberties even though these funds’ debated priority and proof.