SECURITY RESEARCH PAPER

A PERSPECTIVE ON TERRORISM

Piers Hutt piershutt@hotmail.com 1 March 2015

A PERSPECTIVE ON TERRORISM

ABSTRACT

Purpose: To critically examine the threat of modern terrorism to Western society.
Design/methodology: An assessment was made of publically available documentation. The paper is then divided into a number of sections. It initially deals with the difficulties of defining terrorism, followed by its symbiotic relationship with the media. The next section looks at the modern Islamic Fundamentalist threat and the primarily neocon response since 9/11. Whilst the US has withdrawn combat forces from Iraq and Afghanistan, a bipartisan approach has been maintained to counterterrorism. The dangers of such an approach are examined along with emerging threats.

Table of Contents * Abstract * Introduction * Define * Role of the Media * Psychology * Modern Terrorism * The Response * Counterview – The Dangers * Looking Ahead – The Next Potential Threats * Another Approach * Conclusion

INTRODUCTION

“Terrorism has become part of our daily news diet. Hardly a day goes by without news of an assassination, political kidnapping, hijacking or bombing somewhere in the world. As such, incidents of terrorism have increased in the past decade, the phenomenon of terrorism has become one of increasing concern to governments....”

Introduction. With the recent high profile terrorist attacks in Sydney and Paris and the ongoing terrorist incidents in Nigeria, Iraq and Afghanistan, terrorism has been described as the biggest threat to 21st Century security. However the opening quote was from a RAND paper written in 1980. Terrorism is not a modern phenomenon.

Historic Precedence. Terror as a tactic is not new. Some scholars date such actions to the Thugs; Assassins and Zealots. But it is generally accepted that the origins of modern terrorism date from the Reign of Terror (1789-94) during the French Revolution. The idea was later used to support the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, where it was termed “governance by terror”. State terror has often been used to describe internal national violence, such as the Israeli military occupation of Gaza, but the UN does not recognise such a concept. States by definition have a monopoly on power and any abuse of that power is regulated by international law.

Modern non-state terrorism can trace its routes to anarchists such as Sergei Nechayev and the “propaganda by the deed” in ninetieth century Russia. Rapoport describes four waves of terror. Anarchists; Anti-colonialist; Socialist and Islamic fundamentalist with each wave lasting some 40 years. Anti-colonial and socialist terrorism grew out of nationalist power struggles, which accompanied the European withdrawal from Empire and the ideological conflict of the Cold War (The Red Brigades, Stern Gang in Israel, and the FLN in Algeria).

DEFINE
Defining Terrorism: The difficulty in defining terrorism is that that there is no precise or widely accepted definition of the term. It is politically and emotionally charged - used liberally in the media to intensify perceptions of violence and used politically to delegitimize opponents. The mujahidin in the 1980s were referred to as “freedom fighters” whilst the Taliban are referred to as terrorists. Terminology influences how the audience considers the message.

Terrorism is a tactic to achieve an end. It is not the end in itself. The modern phenomenon of non-state actor violence for political ends is defined in a RAND paper as:

* Violence, or threat of, against civilians * motives are political or ideological * carried out for maximum publicity * to influence an audience beyond the immediate victim.

US officials add another distinction - one of ties to a larger strategy. This prevents the lone wolf violence such as the gunman who opened fire against the Pentagon on 4 Mar 2010 being termed a terrorist attack. This is an important distinction, as the lone wolf attack would be investigated as a criminal offence, whilst a terrorist threat would fall under the remit of the FBI. It would also draw more publicity to the incident, playing into the terrorists’ hands. A clear definition therefore gets frayed around the edges. Kofi Annan best sums up the distinction: “Any deliberate attack on innocent civilians, regardless of one’s cause, is unacceptable and fits into the definition of terrorism”.

Terrorism And Insurgency. Terrorism is a tool. Therefore it is often used by insurgency groups when faced by stronger conventional forces. This “asymmetric” warfare found its modern roots during the Peninsular Wars (1807-14) when the term Guerrilla was used to denote a small band of fighters. In response, the strength of the state is diluted by having to assign disproportionate resources to secure the population. Marxist and Maoist revolutionary theories promote such tactics and the Afghan Taliban are a modern example. Whilst the two can therefore be indistinguishable at times, the distinction has been used to frame policy in Washington - whether to pursue a counterterrorism (CT) or counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy in Afghanistan. (Many view AQs post 9/11 network as a global insurgency).

The contemporary view involving high profile acts for maximum publicity evolved out of the humiliating defeat of the Arabs and Palestinians in the Six-Day War (1967). Unable to compete on the battlefield, in 1968 the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked an El Al airliner, demanding the release of Palestinian prisoners. In 1972, the bungled rescue of Israeli hostages held by Black September initiated the growth of specialist counter terrorist forces in the West.

Rise of Islamic fundamentalism. The Iranian revolution of 1979 provided an ideological alternative to Western influence in the Middle East. The Anti-US message resonated in Islamic societies living under US backed autocracies from Saudi Arabia to Egypt. The fall of the Soviet Union weakened pro-soviet alternatives, (initiating the demise of left wing terror groups) whilst America’s support for Israel alienated many. Support for militant Islam grew (the PFLP diverged from its Marxist origins and established links with Hamas and Hezbollah). The defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan (1979-89) emboldened Islamists and globalised the phenomenon as foreign Mujahedeen fighters returned home.

Increasingly Violent. With the limited success of hostage taking, mass casualty attacks became more widespread. Hezbollah’s success in influencing US foreign policy with its suicide truck bombing of US marines in Beirut in 1983 was noted by terrorist groups worldwide. Other Palestinian groups adopted the tactic. Hamas launched a suicide attack campaign in the 1990s and the secular Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka became renowned for such attacks. Al-Qaeda (AQ) attempted to topple both Twin Towers in a truck bomb attack in 1993. Terrorist groups live off publicity and therefore need to escalate the level of violence to gain attention. Prisoners digging their own graves and reporters being beheaded is less newsworthy as time goes on. The terrorist adapts and burns pilots alive instead.

THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA

“The Oxygen of Publicity.” Terrorism seeks to dramatise violence in order to exaggerate the importance of the organisation. Sergei Nechayev’s “propaganda by the deed”. In 1970, the PFLP hijacked 3 planes and staged a press conference in the Jordanian desert to demand the release of Palestinians held in Israeli jails.

PFLP’s “revolutionary airport” at Dawson’s’ Field. Source: Wikipedia.

Notably, the terrorists were unsure how to treat the press and treated the hostages very well! In 1985, Baroness Margaret Thatcher famously spoke of the need to “starve the terrorist of the oxygen of publicity” when referring to the IRA. The subsequent Broadcasting Ban sought to limit the airtime given to political parties linked to violence, but media outlets soon found ways around the ban. Al-Zawahiri, bin Laden’s successor, stated “We are in a war, and more than half that war is fought in the media.” Terrorists need the media to spread their message. The Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris in Jan 2015 gained worldwide press coverage. That same week, Boko Haram militants in N Nigeria killed between 150 – 2,000 civilians. It was barely covered. Location matters.

Medium Matters. Given the symbiotic relationship between terrorism and the media, it is no wonder that the information revolution has facilitated terror groups. Osama bin Laden’s videos and the hostage videos at the height of the Iraqi insurgency were of poor quality. The introduction of social media platforms (U-tube 2005) allowed groups to post their message without the restriction of intermediaries. Islamic State (IS) now produces slick propaganda videos (Flames of War) with cinematic effects specifically targeting young Western audiences and produces an English language magazine Dabiq. It works, in 2014, recruits were travelling to Syria at the rate of 1,000 per month! (As at Dec 2014, it is estimated that some 500 Britons had gone to fight). There is no longer a need to set up a press conference in the desert or rely on grainy footage from a cave to rally potential recruits.

Sageman in Leaderless Jihad has recognized that “top-down” messaging is less important that “bottom up” recruitment. People become radicalised less out of an organisation’s direct efforts, but more due to established social networks. A review of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) recruitment found that over 50% of foreign fighters were influenced by friends and family. In one case a whole football team from Saudi Arabia was recruited! In the UK, such recruitment is taking place in people’s bedrooms rather than in mosques. Social networking is therefore the new front line in the media wars. The UK has set up the Counterterrorism Internet Referral Unit and banned the glorification of terrorism. In Nov 2014 the Head of GCHQ accused technology companies of being in denial into how they were being used to propagate and coordinate terrorist activities. (But Google has 300hrs of content uploaded every minute!) The US confronts Jihadists online with counter messaging.

PSYCHOLOGY

The Illusion of Risk. Terrorism matters not because of its death toll, but through the psychology of fear. Psychologists have noted that people worry more about uncontrollable and the catastrophic events. In an era before logical deduction, such behaviour may have given an evolutionary benefit to those that remained wary. Due to the Recency Illusion, people have a tendency to view terrorism as a particularly 21st Century phenomenon. In fact 1975 has been dubbed by historians as the year of terrorism. In 1975, there were kidnappings in the Middle East; two attempts to shoot down airliners in Paris; an IRA bombing campaign in London; assassinations of Turkish Ambassadors in Austria and France; hijacking of a train in the Netherlands and seizure of OPEC ministers in Vienna! Its catastrophic nature; how recent it was and the level of media coverage therefore heavily influence the perception of the threat of terrorism. Hostage situations play out over days. Deaths only have a short news lifespan! The psychological impact of terrorism is intended to be greater than the physical threat.

MODERN TERRORISM

Growth of Jihadi Terrorism. According to Rapoport, we are currently experiencing the fourth wave of terrorism, a religious wave with Islam at its heart. The Iranian revolution precipitated the rise of Shia terrorist groups in the Middle East, whilst the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan attracted Sunni Mujahedeen particularly from Egypt; Saudi Arabia and Algeria. Following the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda turned its attention to the US and conducted a series of attacks: the 1993 WTC truck bombing; the 1998 US embassy strikes in East Africa and the attack on the USS Cole in Aden in 2000. AQ’s initial objectives were to force the US out of the Arabian Peninsula, in particular Saudi Arabia, where it had established a presence after the 1991 Gulf War.

AQ was forced to adopt following the US led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. Isolated in the Pakistan tribal areas, and no longer able to train and organize attacks, AQ central became a propaganda hub, with affiliates particularly active in Iraq (AQI), the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), N Africa (AQ in the Islamic Maghreb) and SE Asia (Jemaah Islamiyah). It is notable that these units were not new entities, but splinters from existing jihadist groups. However, continued attrition including the death of Osama bin Laden (2011) and inter-fundamentalist rivalry (particularly in Syria between AQ/IS and Jabhat al-Nusra) have degraded the group. It is assessed that there is no umbrella organisation, but a label for a brand that is intent on targeting the West.

Terrorist Manifestations: There are three main levels of international terrorism. State Sponsored - Such as the Libyan terrorists under the Gadhafi regime who conducted the Lockerbie bombing, Iranian sponsored Hezbollah etc. Stateless Groups, the main grouping - such as PLO and AQ. Lone wolf – individuals who are not being directed as part of a wider campaign: Examples include the London Underground attacks of 2005, the Norwegian Oslo attacks (2011) and the Boston Bombers (2013). David Kilcullen an Australian Army Advisor to General Petraeus in Iraq has described another manifestation, the “Accidental Guerrilla” – someone who fights not to defeat the West, but because his space has been invaded. A defensive Jihad.

THE RESPONSE

The Rise of the Neocons: The US response to 9/11 was as unique as the attack itself. US post Cold War world strategy has been dubbed “assertive multilateralism.” Military force was used, but within the framework of a multinational approach. The neocons however felt that the victory of the Cold War was being wasted. They wanted to reshape global relations through military force if necessary. Following 9/11, Secretary of State Colin Powell was increasingly marginalised by the neocons, led by Rumsfeld and Cheney. Powell wanted retaliatory strikes against AQ rather than a global war against Islamist terrorists. A traditional law enforcement approach to countering terrorism. But the Neocons wanted preemptive wars as “the world is a battlefield” and wanted a free hand. The result was the invasion of Afghanistan and then Iraq.

A New Kind of War. In Nov 2002, Abu Ali al Harithi identified as the mastermind behind the attack on the USS Cole - was killed by a drone strike in Yemen along with an American named Ahmed Hijazi. This was a pivotal moment – a targeted assassination of a US citizen with no due process away from the battlefield. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice declared: “ The president has given broad authority to US officials to do what they need to do to protect the country. We are in a new kind of war”.

Afghanistan/Pakistan. After the initial success of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, US policy switched to Iraq. One result of the Iraq focus was a thinning out of strategic assets committed to hunting AQ. Instead the resulting counterterrorist policy became largely a drone war in Pakistan’s ungoverned NW Frontier. The campaign successfully killed a number of AQ operatives, but resulted in large numbers of civilian casualties and increased support for the Pakistan Taliban.

Iraq. Although Iraq had a history of exporting state funded terrorism, its links to AQ prior to 2003 were marginal. Despite regime change and capturing the Baath party leadership, Washington persisted in denying that there was an insurgency, believing opposition was purely coming from remnants of the old regime. Violence increased in the spring of 2004 following the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal and the siege of Fallujah. Foreign fighters including members of AQ flocked to join the jihad. Al-Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) grabbed the limelight, in May, with the beheading of the American Nicholas Berg in an orange jumpsuit. Although, this allowed Washington to change the narrative to a fight against AQI, it also brought Zarqawi prestige and recognition to what had hitherto been an obscure network. AQI attacks although spectacular formed a small percentage of those against US forces. They did however serve to incite a savage civil war as Zarqawi announced a war against Shiites and they in turn formed their own death squads.

Al-Zarqawi. Source: Wikipedia/Getty.

In 2005 Zarqawi increased his campaign against the Iraqi Shiites. AQ core warned him that sectarian violence should be secondary to driving the US out of Iraq. Zarqawi paid no attention and in 2006 bombed the Askariyya Mosque in Samarra whilst at the same time threatening the Sunni leadership in Anbar. The subsequent Sunni “Awakening” and US Surge saw the Sunni leadership side with the US and by June JSOC found, fixed and finished Zarqawi!
The Rise of JSOC. After 9/11 Joint Special Ops Command (JSOC) was expanded to conduct a “shadow war. ” Rumsfeld sought an organisation that would fit his view of the “World as a Battlefield” and which was not constrained by the checks and balances that had evolved around the CIA. By 2004, JSOC was firmly established in Iraq and led by General Stan McCrystal. McCrystal sought to fuse Task Forces operations with the CIA’s Special Activities Division and Activity (SIGINT wing). In doing so, McCrystal increased the targeting cycle of Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyse, Disseminate, (F3EAD).

Source: Afghan War News. F3EAD.

Intelligence gleaned from one night raid was immediately used to launch other raids - before the insurgents had had time to react. Between 2003-7, the special ops budget grew by 60% and Rumsfeld gave it a global mandate under AQN ExOrd, which allowed operatives to target AQ beyond the battle zones of Afghanistan and Iraq. JSOC developed into a paramilitary CIA, with an intelligence collection operation and an interrogation programme. It has been compared to the CIA’s Phoenix Programme in the Vietnam War. But whilst the CIA was subject to congressional oversight, JSOC was not. Despite a change in rhetoric and regime at the White House in 2009, JSOC’s role was considerably expanded, with the Obama administration’s reliance on drones being dubbed “Obama doctrine”.

Somalia. US planners assessed that AQ operatives fleeing Afghanistan in 2001 would move to Somalia and Yemen and set up Task Force 150 in Djibouti to intercept them. But the Iraq War shifted focus and resources. Instead the CIA ran a covert proxy war in Somalia, bypassing the Transitional National Government, and arming warlords, (namely Mohamed Qanyare). Despite ground rules for only targeting AQ, by 2004, warlord death squads held power and scores of suspects were abducted in the hope that they would be on the CIA wanted list. The UN Monitoring Group noted that “the general population, increasingly riled by overt support of the US to the warlords, is rallying to the jihadists”. (Radical Islam had not been widespread in Somalia prior to the War on Terror and the US Ambassador to Ethiopia, David Shinn doubted an AQ threat even existed!). The Islamic Courts Union (ICU) rose up against the US backed warlords and by June 2006, were in control of Mogadishu.

Growth of Al-Shabaab. The Bush administration publically branded the ICU as a front for AQ and the CIA backed an Ethiopian invasion at the end of 2006. By 2007, JSOC was conducting strike and assassination operations. As the ICU forces disintegrated, a group of young Islamic militants known as the Youth, or Al-Shabaab, called upon Islamists to come and wage Jihad. The occupation (2006-9) by a historic enemy, accompanied by heavy-handed JSOC strikes (using AC-130 gunships) resulted in large numbers of civilian casualties. Across the border in Northern Kenya, civilians were rendered to the Ethiopian military. Al Shabab with AQ leadership emerged as the main jihadi force controlling large swathes of southern Somalia.

Yemen. AQ launched a number of bomb attacks in Saudi Arabia in 2003, resulting in a crackdown that saw many of its members flee to Yemen. President Saleh whilst fighting a nationalist Houthi insurrection, used AQ affiliation as an excuse to imprison hundreds. Saleh played the AQ card to get more money and training from the US whilst at the same time using AQ in his fight against the Houthi! A mass prison break in 2006, resulted in the birth of AQ in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). In 2009, Saudi Arabia’s Prince bin Nayef was slightly wounded in a suicide attack, where the AQAP operative evaded security checks by hiding the bomb in his rectum! In 2010, it was responsible for a cargo bomb plot that was thwarted by the intelligence services. In 2011, The Arab Spring spread across N. Africa. The US backed regime in Yemen collapsed and AQAP rebranded as Ansar al-Shaia acquired a foothold in large areas in the south of the country. A subsequent government offensive in 2012 killed many fighters but the Houthi in the North continued to gain power and influence.

COUNTERVIEW - THE DANGERS

Military Response. Viewing terrorism primarily as a military threat, has led to a chiefly military response. When viewed within the context of a conventional war, High Value Target (HVT) lists; pre-emptive strikes; detention and the use of lethal force are reasonable responses. Assassination by association; rendition; detainee abuse are not however and when viewed within the context of criminal justice, such actions are not only illegal but counter productive. They surrender the morale high ground. “It (JSOC) grew out of control under the vice president. It kinda went wild” stated Vincent Cannistraro a CIA CT officer. As the CIA found with its clandestine wars of the 1960s and 70s, such tactics do not always work to the long-term strategic interest of the US.

Loosening of Constrains. The JSOC High Value Target List (HVTL) system, increasingly used under the Bush administration became standardized under Obama. The system has made extrajudicial killing routine without providing oversight. The US Constitution and International Law prohibit the use of lethal force except where there is an immediate threat to life. Yet “immediate threat” is debatable when a name exists on a HVTL for months. In 2013 a US Dept. of Justice White Paper asserted that the US did not need clear evidence of a specific attack but could a conduct preemptive strikes – such action would be deemed lawful killing in self defence, not an assassination. This and other increased loosening of constraints has resulted in higher civilian casualties and increased resentment on the ground. The man who defeated AQI, Gen McCrystal was installed as ISAF Commander in 2010. Despite a highly publicized campaign of “courageous restraint” imposed on conventional forces and airpower, JSOC activity escalated - along with civilian casualties. The result was an increase in attacks on American troops.

Blowback. As Col Kilcullen alluded to in the Accidental Guerrilla, military options often come with blowback. In Dec 2009, an AQ target named Akron was tracked to the village of al-Majalah in the Yemen. A cruise missile strike killed 40 people - mainly nomadic Bedouin women and children, living near the training camp. Some 70,000 Yemenis gathered at the site over the following days to protest. A perfect opportunity for AQAP to recruit.

In Feb 2010, a botched JSOC raid on a police chief’s compound in Gardez, Afghanistan resulted in the death of seven family members, including two pregnant women. The Commander of JSOC Admiral McRaven personally went to the family compound to apologise. Sharabuddin, the head of the household accepted the apology but later said he would never forgive the Americans: ‘the Americans are terrorists. They not only destroyed my house, they destroyed my family.”

Vice Adm. McRaven delivers apology. Gardez. Afghanistan. 2010. Source: ABC News.

In 2009, Matthew Hoh a former marine and US diplomat stated that the US military presence in Afghanistan was “contributing to the strategic message of the Pashtun insurgency… We have the best strike force the world has ever know. We’ve got them chasing mid-level Taliban leaders who are not threatening the US and who are only fighting us because we are in their valley.”

Embroiled in Local Politics. US drone strikes have undoubtedly been successful in eliminating a number of AQ and Taliban leaders. However, leaders can be replaced but collateral damage alienates the population. In order to identify potential targets, the system relies on human intelligence - that can be massaged according to local politics. In May 2010, a US missile strike meant for an AQ target instead killed Jabir al Shabwani, the Deputy Governor of Marib Province who was en route to negotiate a truce with local AQ commanders. Some analysts believed that the US was fed defective intelligence after a feud between Shabwani and President Saleh’s family.

Existential Threat? 9/11 killed 3,000 Americans. Yet 40,000 Americans are killed each year in RTAs. It is estimated that since 9/11, 1,500 Americans have died in RTAs because they chose not to fly due to a perceived terrorist threat! Although terrorist attacks can create the conditions for change – the 2004 Madrid bombings resulted in the Spanish withdrawal from Iraq - at no stage did 9/11 threaten the US government. On their own, terrorist attacks do not pose an existential threat.

So How Much of a Threat? Terrorism virtually never works. Political scientists Abrahms and Cronin studied the data of a number of terrorist groups in the late 20th century. Abrahms found that only 5% of terrorist groups achieved their goals, and then only when they were limited in scope - such as ejecting a foreign power. Those trying to impose their ideology on a state were found never to attain their goals. Cronin noted: “States have a high degree of immortality in the international system. Groups do not!” NI is still part of the UK, Quebec still part of Canada and Indonesia and Egypt have not become Islamic theocracies.
Terrorist groups end. They join the political process or are neutralized by the state’s security forces.

LOOKING AHEAD. THE NEXT POTENTIAL THREATS.

Afghanistan Taliban. 2014 saw the main reduction in US troop levels in Afghanistan when Afghan govn forces took the lead combat role. Whilst the Afghan Taliban are likely to gain in power, they remain a nationalist focused organisation that have never shown any intent to conduct international terrorism. The high profile defection of a Taliban commander to IS in late 2014 was assessed to be due to internal disagreements with Taliban leadership as opposed to an espousal of global jihad.

AQ. Al-Qaeda has never recovered from US attrition and the death of Osama bin Laden. Al-Zawahiri lacks the charisma of bin Laden. Its goal has always been to be the forerunner in an attack on the West and to create the conditions for a global uprising for the establishment of a caliphate. Increasingly marginalised by IS, it has resorted to being primarily a propaganda hub. Analysts believe that the announcement of a new franchise group in South Asia (al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent) was a public relations stunt! Whilst some of its franchises have gained from the power vacuum left by the Arab Spring, they were not the cause of the uprisings and where it has attempted to regain the initiative as in Syria with its “Khorasan Group”, it has been constrained by US targeting and IS attacks.

IS. The current threat to Middle East stability is assessed to be IS and has been termed the post AQ jihadist threat. Although it uses terror as a tactic – burning the Jordanian pilot alive caused the UAE to leave the coalition - it differs significantly from traditional terrorist groups. It has created a Sunni Islamist state based on Sharia law - a Caliphate - headed by al-Baghdadi.

ISIS/IS grew out of the remnants of AQI. The organisation defeated by McCrystal’s JSOC and the Sunni Awakening. As Syria descended into civil war in 2011, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi seized control with former Iraqi military officers in Syria’s Northeast. The alienation of the Sunni population under Iraqi PM Nouri al-Malaki provided IS with an opportunity and they expanded into the Sunni heartlands in 2014, capturing Fallujah, Ramadi and Mosul. Foreign fighters flocked to join and its routing of the Iraqi Army gave it an abundance of modern weapons. The former Baathist Sunni elite were able to provide it with the military and bureaucracy required to run a state, whilst its ransacking of the banks gave it unlimited finance. Its control of vast oil producing areas meant that it was estimated to be making $1.5m/day in 2014. (Subsequent analysis following the

Source: BBC News Middle East. Feb 2015.

collapse of the oil price and Western targeting has severely reduced that estimate). Its stated aim is to expand the Caliphate, incorporating Jordon and Lebanon and freeing Palestine from Israel.

Vulnerabilities. Its sudden rise onto the world stage, aided by a slick propaganda wing underlies its weaknesses. Baghdadi is no bin Laden. For AQ, the Caliphate was a utopian idea, by proclaiming himself Caliph, Baghdadi risks ridicule and the de-legitimization of IS. Its uncompromising stance has also led to a coalition that would have been unthinkable just a few years ago, ranging from the US to UAE to Iran! Protecting the Caliphate means that IS forces can be targeted by superior conventional combat power. With defeat in Kobane in Feb 2015 and a Kurdish/Iraqi coalition set to retake Mosul in the summer, some commentators have concluded that IS has already reached its high water mark. Many who were drawn to its initial success have subsequently became disillusioned, and taken against the backdrop of Iraqi politics, IS’ success in Sunni areas should not be so surprising. It should be viewed less as a terrorist threat and more as a cross border insurgency. Less a revolutionary jihadist group and more a general uprising of disenfranchised groups.

Franchise Groups. Despite fears of IS and AQ core, the main threat from the jihadist movement has shifted to the franchise groups. However, it is important to remember that the majority of these groups existed before as national jihadist organisations. Many only have tenuous links to AQ. Baghdadi’s announcement of IS franchise groups in former AQ strongholds like Yemen also represent a challenge for leadership in the global jihad.

Yemen. AQAP is considered to be the most active of the AQ franchises with close links to AQ core. It was involved in the failed cargo plane bombs in 2010 (admittedly over 5 years ago) and its English language Inspire magazine has been inciting Lone Wolf attacks in the West. Although it claimed to be behind the Charlie Hebdo attack, security analysts are sanguine. Frank Gardner, the BBC Security Correspondent believes that they are likely to be the main beneficiaries of the recent (Jan 2015) political turmoil where Houthi rebels took control of the capital and the government resigned.

The Sunni tribes are likely to side with AQAP against the Shia Houthis just as US trained CT forces relieve the pressure due to the collapse of the government. The US is committed to a containment policy, which is unlikely to change.

Somalia. A civil war between al-Shabaab and the TNG supported by a UN peacekeeping force, the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) has seen the steady attrition of this terrorist group. Despite high profile attacks in N Kenya, including the Westgate Shopping Mall attack in 2013, al-Shabaab has been steadily attritted. It is assessed that a JSOC strike in 2014, which killed the group’s leader Moktar Ali Zubeyr will lead to the fragmentation of the group.

Nigeria. Boko Haram’s growth mirrors the rise of IS. It has grown from a terrorist organisation in N Nigeria to holding ground and declaring a Caliphate. Like IS, it has massacred civilians, kidnapped girls and used them in suicide attacks. Its success however is in no small part due to the inept response of the Nigerian military (soldiers being sent into battle with no ammunition) and political corruption. However it has neither shown the capability nor intent to conduct international terrorism and remains locally, albeit cross border focused.

N Africa. Libya has been in chaos since the overthrow of Col Gadhafi in 2011, with tribal, IS and rival AQ militias operating across the country. IS linked fighters operate in Tripoli, Benghazi and Derna. They successfully attacked a Western Hotel in Tripoli in early 2015 and executed some 21 Egyptian Coptic Christians in Feb 2015. Whilst there is a concern of radicalized fighters returning from Syria, Thomas Jocelyn a senior editor of the Long War Journal stated to the BBC that whilst IS has grown in Libya, its strength should not be exaggerated. “Its zones are more aspirational than real.”

S East Asia. The first generation of East Asian jihadists who trained in AQ camps in Afghanistan hit soft targets in Bali (2002/5) and Jakarta. However successful counterterrorism operations throughout the region and a higher acceptance of autocratic state power has reduced their capability. Whilst some have declared their allegiance to IS, their capability remains limited and their support locally centred.

The Lone Wolf Threat. Given the lack of success AQ and its franchises have experienced in exporting terrorist attacks, they have been espousing a “leaderless resistance model” for some time. Members of the diaspora or returning fighters are encouraged to launch attacks from inside the West. Although the Kouachi brothers claimed affiliation to AQAP in the Charlie Hebdo attacks, it is assessed that they were not part of a wider plot, especially as their accomplice, Coulibaly (at the Jewish supermarket) claimed affiliation with IS. The two groupings being in competition. Such attacks although harder to intercept are generally less spectacular and more susceptible to counter radicalization programmes from within the community.

ANOTHER APPROACH?

Pan-Arabian Military Response? With an increased threat from radicals in Egypt and Saudi-Arabia, President al-Sisi has recently proposed a coordinated regional military response. On the face of it, Saudi money and Egyptian military capability might look like an effective counter to increased radicalization. However calls for a Pan-Arabian security solution are not new. They date back to the Arab Revolt against the Ottomans in 1916. US shale and Iranian rapprochement means that Saudi Arabia is looking to secure its position in the Middle East and Egypt comes with a formidable military force. However conflicting national, and religious differences are unlikely to support such a scheme.

Influence. Whilst President Obama has withdrawn US forces from the Neocon wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, US Counterterrorism has evolved into a lethal form of unconventional warfare. Michael Boyle argues against viewing Islamic fundamentalism as a global insurgency as it legitimizes groups like AQ and IS and gives them too much credit. Instead, a 'soft' approach to counter radicalization is being proposed, generally known as counter radicalization (Counter-de-Rad) they include “influence” and counter messaging.

CONCLUSION

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon. It, and in particular Islamic fundamentalism is a fact of modern life, but it must be kept in perspective. It does not pose an existential threat to Western governments. According to Interrogator Matt Alexander, economic necessity and a fear of Shia reprisal as opposed to fervent religious belief was behind the decision of the average Sunni to fight for AQI. There is a danger of blurring the boundaries between global threats and local injustice. Whilst CT strikes have their place, their response must be measured and kept in perspective, the tactical gains need to be weighed against the strategic interests. As John Kerry stated in 2004:

“We have to get back to the place we were, where terrorists are not the focus of our lives, but they are a nuisance. We’re never going to end illegal gambling, but we are going to reduce it, to a level where it isn’t on the rise. It isn’t threatening peoples lives every day and its not threatening the fabric of your life.”

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NY Times. UAE Disengages from ISIS Effort. Feb 2015.
Stratfor Analysis. Pan-Arab Military Remains Elusive. Feb 2015.
Stratfor Analysis. Defining Terrorism. Nov 2014.
Telegraph. I want to come back home. 2014. Nov 2014.
Terrorist Research Initiative. Perspectives on Terrorism. Jason Rhineheart. Vol 4. No 5. Undated.

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[ 1 ]. Jenkins. Brian. A Study of Terrorism. RAND paper. Dec 1980.
[ 2 ]. Robertson. Ann. Terrorism and Global Security. US. 2007.
[ 3 ]. Rapoport, David. Fear and Trembling. American Political Review. 1984.
[ 4 ]. Terrorism and Counterterrorism post 9/11.
[ 5 ]. Rapoport, David. Four Waves of Terror. USA. 2004. http://international.ucla.edu/media/files/Rapoport-Four-Waves-of-Modern-Terrorism.pdf
[ 6 ]. Jenkins, Brian. A Study of Terrorism. RAND. California. 1980.
[ 7 ]. https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100310_terrorism_defining_tactic
[ 8 ]. Kofi Annan. UN Security General. Press Conference. Iran Jan 2002. http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/sg-teheran26.htm
[ 9 ]. http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/122/html
[ 10 ]. IS released a video showing Jordanian pilot, Moaz al-Kasaesbeh being burnt alive. Feb 2015.
[ 11 ]. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/09/boko-haram-deadliest-massacre-baga-nigeria
[ 12 ]. aka ISIS – Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham
[ 13 ]. AQAP produces Inspire.
[ 14 ]. Sageman. Leaderless Jihad. US. 2008.
[ 15 ]. Hoffman, Prof Bruce. Who Fights? Washington DC. 2009.
[ 16 ]. Comment by Lady Warsi a former British minister, in response to three school girls who left the UK to join IS after one of their school friends completed the same journey in December 2014. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/22/uk-counter-terror-officials-criticised-syria-bound-london-schoolgirls
[ 17 ]. http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b04vf2qh
[ 18 ]. Pinker, Steven. The Better Angels of our Nature. USA. 2011.
[ 19 ]. Jenkins, Brian. A Study of Terrorism. RAND. California. 1980.
[ 20 ]. Not exclusively Islamic however. The Sarin attack on the Tokyo subway by the Aum-Shinrikyo’s religious sect in 1995 and the Tamil Tigers separatist struggles in Sri Lanka are other examples., David. Four Waves of Terror. USA. 2004.
[ 21 ]. Stratfor Analysis. Jihadism. 20145.
[ 22 ]. Sageman. Leaderless Jihad. US. 2008.
[ 23 ]. Fischer et al. Introduction to Security. 9th ed. USA. 2013.
[ 24 ]. Kilcullen, David. The Accidental Guerrilla. UK. 2009.
[ 25 ]. http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-soviet-collapse-the-growth-of-islamic-fundamentalism-and-the-intensification-of-u-s-hostility-toward-iran/6759
[ 26 ]. Their defence manifesto in 1992 entitled The Project for the New American Century (PNAC), called for the “shaping of the international security order in line with American principles and interests.” “The crazies” as they were sometimes referred to had a quest for global military dominance, contempt for the UN and multinationalism. – Scahill, J. Dirty Wars. US. 2013.
[ 27 ]. Al-Zakawi was able to finance his operations after intercepting some $600m, that Saddam Husain’s sons had looted from banks in 2003. Dean Aimen. (Former Jihadi/spy) Eternal Bridge. UK. 2015.
[ 28 ]. Scahill, J. Dirty Wars. US. 2013.
[ 29 ]. By the 1970s, CIA operations were felt to be out of control. In 1976, President Ford banned US agencies from carrying out political assassinations and President Carter made the ban more sweeping. Subsequent Presidents found work-arounds, asserting that these restrictions did not apply to foreign terrorists. During the Clinton era, lethal force was signed off by the president on a case-by-case basis. Clarke states: “We did not want to create a broad precedent that would allow intelligence officials in the future to have hit lists and routinely engage in something that approximated assassination”. That all changed after 9/11. – Scahill, J. Dirty Wars. US. 2013.
[ 30 ]. http://www.afghanwarnews.info/intelligence/F3EAD.htm
[ 31 ]. For many who had been following the AQ threat for over a decade, the shift in focus of limited strategic assets severely hampered the CT response, with half the intel and commando units in the Afghan AOR reassigned to Iraq in 2003. Scahill, J. Dirty Wars. US. 2013.
[ 32 ]. Scahill, J. Dirty Wars. US. 2013.
[ 33 ]. Ibid.
[ 34 ]. Ibid.
[ 35 ]. Yemen: Grey Areas = AQ Green Area = Houthi Source: Wikipedia. Oali1. Feb 2015. Ibid.
[ 36 ]. Terrorist Attack Disruption Strikes (TADS). A pre-emptive strike where pattern of life is deemed signify terrorist activity and positive identification of the target is not required.
[ 37 ]. Scahill, J. Dirty Wars. US. 2013.
[ 38 ]. Ibid.
[ 39 ]. Kilcullen, David. The Accidental Guerrilla. UK. 2009.
[ 40 ]. Although forbidden from doing so, a group of AQAP made a speech from a car to the rally. They were subsequently tracked by drones and killed in a missile strike!
[ 41 ]. Scahill, J. Dirty Wars. US. 2013.
[ 42 ]. Ibid.
[ 43 ]. Scahill, J. Dirty Wars. US. 2013.
[ 44 ]. Pinker, S. The Better Angels of our Nature. GB. 2011.
[ 45 ]. http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/jihadism-2014-defining-movement#axzz3QMXqP6phhttp://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG741-1.pdf
[ 46 ]. https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/jihadism-2014-jihadist-franchises-2
[ 47 ]. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/143043/audrey-kurth-cronin/isis-is-not-a-terrorist-group
[ 48 ]. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/04/world/middleeast/united-arab-emirates-key-us-ally-in-isis-effort-disengaged-in-december.html?_r=0
[ 49 ]. A French Jihadi lamented that he had only handed out clothes and his i-phone was broken. He wanted to return home! http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11268208/Jihadists-in-Syria-write-home-to-France-My-iPod-is-broken.-I-want-to-come-back.html
[ 50 ]. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27930414
[ 51 ]. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-30937495
[ 52 ]. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-31518698
[ 53 ]. https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/jihadism-2014-jihadist-franchises-2
[ 54 ]. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30789123
[ 55 ]. Stratfor Analysis. Pan-Arab Military Remains Elusive. Feb 2015.
[ 56 ]. He supervised over 1,000 interrogations in Iraq and obtained the intelligence to hunt down al-Zarqawi.
[ 57 ]. Hoffman, Prof Bruce. Who Fights? Washington DC. 2009.