The Chinese Civil War KMT vs. CCP

The Chinese civil war of 1946-49, is considered one of the most brutal and bloody conflicts near the final stages of the Second World War, which took the lives of millions of soldiers and civilians. The war was fought between two parties, the Kuomintang (KMT or Nationalists) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP or Reds). The leaders of these parties respectively were Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong. The war between the KMT and CCP wasn’t a new struggle but a continuation that dates back more than a couple decades and resumes after the Japanese had surrendered in 1945. In 1949, the better armed KMT were ultimately defeated by the CCP. The reasons for the CCP’s decisive victory are due to the poor mismanagements of Chiang Kai-shek combined with the corruption of the KMT, the superior leadership and tactics of Mao Zedong and the communists, the positive support from the peasants, and the aid provided by the Soviet Union.

Although Chiang and his Nationalists looked like they had all the advantages over the CCP at the end of the Japanese war, Chiang’s leadership and the corruption of officers in the KMT’s forces known as the “Nationalist Revolutionary Army” (NRA), would be a major cause in the KMT’s defeat. One of Chiang’s military goals was to be the head of a national army that would heed all of his orders which was never fully accomplished. Throughout the civil war, the armies he controlled were a mixed bag. There were some units highly loyal and devoted to him, but quite often, the other units were more concerned and committed for their own region. Chiang’s control over his own armies was very restricted by the extent of how loyal his commanders were. Corruption within the KMT was pandemic. The KMT forces consisted of officers that were experienced and fully trained but were vastly outnumbered by the locally recruited officers who used bribes and other means of shady tactics to gain commissions. Desertion was very common within the armies and would result in the KMT forces being decimated. Chiang’s lack of etiquette policy with the peasants of China also played a role in showing the corruption of the KMT in plain view. Peasants were mistreated in that they were brutally beaten, killed, raped, and forced to hand over their own resources. Where management and corruption in the KMT was disastrous, the CCP was the exact opposite.

Mao Zedong who led the CCP to victory over the KMT was able to do so with his superior leadership and strategies that helped bolster the CCP’s position in the war. Even though the KMT had better equipment and outnumbered the CCP forces, Mao used his knowledge of guerrilla warfare and integrated its tactics within the CCP forces known as the “People’s Liberation Army” (PLA). The tactics used by the CCP were based on the awareness that “land could be retaken at a later date but men could not be brought back to life”. With that in mind, the CCP used the terrain around them to their advantage, employing in hit and run tactics, opting to retreat when the enemy advanced and attack when they camped or withdrew. This strategy on destroying armies regardless of location proved to be highly effective against the KMT’s traditional trench warfare, prepared fortifications and territorial control. Superior military tactics aside, Mao directed his armies into gaining the respect and aid of the Chinese peasants and by providing land reforms and health care. As I have stated before, the peasants of China were exposed to many mistreatments by the KMT. This mistreatment would cause the peasants to detest the KMT which in turn made it more favorable for the CCP to win over the general populace for where Mao saw the potential. Contrary to the KMT, with Mao’s instructions, the CCP treated the peasants with respect by following sensible policies called “Mao’s Eight Points”. The eight points directed the CCP soldiers to pay for everything used or consumed, return all borrowed items, pay for any damages that occur, not to swear or hit civilians, not to damage crops, not to take advantage of women and not to mistreat captives. These policies created by Mao would ensure the support of the peasants and in turn strengthen the CCP forces.

The majority of China’s population during this time period consisted mainly of poor peasants and so gaining the aid and support from them would be crucial to the CCP’s victory. The peasants, who were in favor of communism as everyone would be treated equal, helped the CCP soldiers who treated them nicely by providing food and shelter from the opposing KMT troops. Gaining popularity over the KMT, there was also an increased number of army volunteers from the peasants which was essential to the CCP since the KMT had the material superiority and higher soldier count. The CCP’s main strength lied within these peasant armed forces which were the backbone of its support base. Whereas the KMT remained completely oblivious towards the general populace and never made any real attempt to establish a support base and thus becoming the less clean party of the two in the eyes of the peasants Although the support from the peasants played a major role in the civil war, victory for the CCP wouldn’t have been ensured without aid from the Soviet Union.

In order to preserve its own interests and to resist American imperialism, the Soviet Union gave support and decisive material aid to the CCP, which ensured the complete defeat of the KMT. The Soviets, who occupied Manchuria which was one of the greatest centers of heavy industry in China, blocked all main lines of communication and prevented the transportation of supplies to the KMT troops, thus dealing a fatal blow. On the other side, the Soviets armed the CCP troops with a large amount of heavy and light weapons taken from the Japanese soldiers which was estimated to be able to rearm around a million soldiers. This helped shift the power balance between the two parties by a fair amount since the peasant forces of the CCP were originally armed with lack luster equipment. With the Soviets dealing successive blows to the KMT, victory was ensured for the CCP.

The outcome of the Chinese Civil War in the end was nothing short of the CCP’s complete dominant victory over the KMT. As I have stated before, the reasons for this outcome is due to the poor mismanagements of Chiang Kai-shek combined with the corruption of the KMT, the superior leadership and tactics of Mao Zedong and the communists, the positive support from the peasants, and the aid provided by the Soviet Union. Chiang Kai-shek was most likely the main reason why the CCP won the war because of his incompetence as a leader. If Chiang had changed his policies and enforced discipline within the KMT, then the outcome of the war may have been different.

Bibliography
Michael Lynch Essential Histories: The Chinese Civil War 1945-49. Osprey Publishing, May 25 2010.

Westad, Odd Arne. Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War, 1946-1950. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003.

E.R Hooton. The Greatest Tumult: The Chinese Civil War, 1936-49. Brassey's Inc; 1st edition, June 1991.

Chen, Jian. Mao’s China and the Cold War. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001.

Corr, Gerard H. The Chinese Red Army: Campaigns and Politics Since 1949. Reading: Osprey Publishing, 1974.

Garver, John W. Chinese-Soviet Relations, 1937-1945: The Diplomacy of Chinese Nationalism. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988.

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[ 1 ]. Michael Lynch Essential Histories: The Chinese Civil War 1945-49. Osprey Publishing, May 25 2010. 21.
[ 2 ]. Westad, Odd Arne. Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War, 1946-1950. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003. 32.
[ 3 ]. E.R Hooton. The Greatest Tumult: The Chinese Civil War, 1936-49. Brassey's Inc; 1st edition, June 1991. 18.
[ 4 ]. Chen, Jian. Mao’s China and the Cold War. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001. 14.
[ 5 ]. Corr, Gerard H. The Chinese Red Army:Campaign and Politics Since 1949. Reading: Osprey Publishing, 1974. 55.
[ 6 ]. Garver, John W. Chinese-Soviet Relations, 1937-1945: The Diplomacy of Chinese Nationalism. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. 30.