Introduction
In this essay I will briefly outline the meaning of non-cognitivism, and then further explain one branch of non-cognitivism expressivism. This particular view of non-cognitivism is mostly targeted by the wishful thinking argument. I will then outline the main problem brought up by the wishful thinking argument. I will then outline the expressionist’s responses to the wishful thinking argument using David Enoch and James Lenman’s solutions to the problem, and show the flaws in their arguments. Therefore I will come to the conclusion that the wishful thinking argument is a valid objection to non-cognitivism.
Non-Cognitivism
Non cognitivism is the objection to the claim the moral facts express belief. According to this view they are not either true or false, neither do the assert anything about the world. Seeing as moral facts cannot be seen as true and no one can have knowledge of something that is not true, non-cognitivism implies the moral knowledge is impossible. The three main forms of non-cognitivism are; prescriptivism, emotivism and expressivism. In this essay I will be addressing the problems found in the expressivism branch of non-cognitivism.
Expressivism
Expressivism is the view that sentences about moral facts are not to descriptive terms, and do not relate to the real world problems. They are used for expressing either positive or negative attitude towards the object of the sentence.
The Wishful-thinking argument
This is an argument that rejects non-cognitivism presented by Cian Dorr (2002). The outline of this argument is the fact that we can come to a conclusion about how the world is, based on our desires about how we would like the world to be is wishful thinking (Schroeder, 2010, pp. 172-185). It should not be rational for us to accept a conclusion based on moral judgements according to non-cognitivism as it states that moral knowledge is impossible. For example:
P1 If lying is wrong; the souls of liars will be punished in the afterlife.
P2 Lying is wrong.
C The souls of liars will be punished in the afterlife.
We can intuitively see how a person can come to accept the conclusion of this argument as long as both premises are viewed to be true. This is a simple modus ponens argument and therefore it is rational to accept the conclusion, however if we accept C on the basis of “P2 Lying is wrong” then according to expressivism we are accepting it on the basis of a desire. Say someone was to believe P1 but not P2 initially, this would mean they would reject the conclusion. However if due to further reading about moral commitments he begins to believe P2 he must then accept C2. This seems unreasonable to accept a change in the way the world is due to a change in your desires or beliefs.
We also know that it is irrational to accept a claim on the basis of a desire, which according to non-cognitivism all moral claims are. In this example non-cognitivism assumes that our desire about the world that lying is wrong is a true fact about the world. So either the non-cognitivist can either try to show this intuitively rational argument is in fact irrational or accept that their view on moral statements is in itself incorrect. Enoch and Lenman’s response
Enoch, a non-cognitivist, has tried to address this argument by denying the idea that we have to accept the conclusion on the basis of a desire. He does this by suggesting that two other independently purely descriptive premises are required to accept C:
P2* I disapprove of lying.
P1*If I disapprove of lying, then the souls of liars will be punished in the afterlife.
Enoch then goes on to argue that a person would be rational to accept C on the basis of the premises P1 and P2 if he was justified in doing so. One of the ways in which one could be justified in accepting P1 is by gathering logical evidence for the universal generalisation:
∀P1 for any action, A, if it is wrong to do A, then the souls of those that do A will be punished in the afterlife.
Now we need to see if anyone who has evidence that can prove ∀P1 ,they can also prove: ∀P1* For any action A, If I disapprove of A, then the souls of those that do A will be punished in the afterlife.
The reason why Enoch believes that those that have logical proof for believing ∀P1 should also believe ∀P1* is simply because to gain evidence for the first premise means coming across many cases which result in, “doing A is wrong, and those that have done A’s souls have been punished in the afterlife” and none which result in “doing B is wrong, and those that have done B’s souls have not been punished in the afterlife. Enoch reasons then if someone is able to think ∀P1, based on this evidence then that person will disapprove of action A seeing as doing action A will always result in your soul being punished in the afterlife.
The problem with this argument is that a person can be wrong about what they disapprove of. For example if someone did not disapprove of junk food, and there is no evidence that shows that those that eat junk food’s souls will be punished in the afterlife; but due to a consultation by a nutritionist then became to disapprove of junk food would be guilty of accepting “I disapprove of eating junk food and the souls of those who eat junk food’s souls will not be punished in the afterlife”. This now contradicts the conclusion. This is a case of not having evidence for ∀P1* whilst still having evidence for ∀P1.
Enoch’s argument does not address the problem that even with the evidence that helps us to accept P1 there is no evidence that supports P2. James Lenman’s approach to solving the wishful thinking problem is to show that the evidence you find for both P1 and P2 is, in itself descriptive evidence for the conclusion. So whenever a person accepts the two premises it is based on beliefs that could also come to the same conclusion independently of them. The argument he gives to illustrate this is:
R1 Derek never contravenes the Decalogue.
R2 All and only contravention of the Decalogue are wrong.
R3 Therefore: Derek never does anything wrong.
R4 Therefore if looking at a woman with lustful intent is wrong, then Derek never looks at a woman with lustful intent.
R5 Looking at a woman with lustful intent contravenes the Decalogue.
R6 Therefore: Looking at a woman with lustful intent is wrong.
R7 Therefore: Derek never looks at a woman with lustful intent.
(Lenman, 2003)
Looking at the argument we can see a way in which just a selection of the premises will provide a modus ponens argument:
R4 if looking at a woman with lustful intent is wrong, then Derek never looks at a woman with lustful intent.
R6 Looking at a woman with lustful intent is wrong.
R7 Derek never looks at a woman with lustful intent.

Here we have only used the premises R4 and R6. R4 is only justified on the premises of R1 and R2, and R6 is justified on the premises R2 and R5. Lenman argues that if we can come to accept R7 on just the basis of R4 and R6 then this is no more incorrect then accepting R7 on the basis of our desires. Lenman seems to have solved the problem of by proving that there are some cases in where a moral judgement can be used to make a belief about the world where there is no need for wishful thinking. He then states that if there is an example in which someone does not have a descriptive background belief for their premises, then accepting a conclusion based on these premises would in fact be irrational.

The problem with Lenman’s argument is that it would have to apply for non-moral arguments as well. He is saying that for any argument someone would be irrational to accept the conclusion without presenting another argument independently of the original premises. This is quite a restrictive conclusion to come to. There is no reason to believe that all modus ponens arguments that we come across can possibly satisfy this claim and therefore have to reject Lenman’s response as a valid one.

Both Enoch and Lenman try to solve the problem of wishful thinking by suggesting that we accept the conclusion based on a descriptive argument, where P1 and P2 are justified by additional premises. The problem that arises with this is the fact that there are cases where we have to accept a conclusion based on only the premises, otherwise it leads to a never-ending regression. At least some arguments have to only depend on their premises with no need for further evidence; otherwise no arguments support their conclusion at all.

Conclusion
In this essay I have outlined the wishful thinking argument as a response to non-cognitivism as well as outlining the responses to the argument itself. As I have stated there is no reason to reject the wishful thinking argument as an opposition to non-cognitivism. This is because according to non-cognitivism a simple modus ponens argument containing a moral fact requires us to accept a fact about the world based on a desire, which is irrational. The responses to this argument propose adding further justifications of the premises, which I view as an inadequate response because there are cases where an argument not containing moral facts can be verified based on the premises alone. Therefore I see the wishful thinking argument as a valid objection to non-cognitivism.
Bibliography
Lenman, J., 2003. Noncognitivism. Ethical Theory and Moral practice, 6(3), pp. 265-274.
Schroeder, M., 2010. Epistemology: Wishful Thinking. In: Noncognitivism in Ethics. s.l.:s.n.
Dorr, Cian .,2002. Noncognitivism and Wishful Thinking. In: Nous, 36:1, pp. 97-103