The Axis powers did certainly encounter supply problems with their campaign in North Africa. Especially towards the end of the campaign, they were experiencing serious difficulties in this sphere. Fuel, troops and ammunition were running out at such a rate that it was becoming increasingly difficult to replace it and Rommel’s pleas to Germany were being ignored. However there were certainly two more important factors that contributed to the Axis power’s defeat. These were Hitler’s, and to a lesser extent Rommel’s, poor grasp of strategical and logistical warfare in the North African area as well as the superiority of Allied naval and air power with the welcome introduction of American forces after 1941.

After an unsuccessful Italian campaign in Egypt, Mussolini requested help from their German ally, and the Italian Commando Supremo sent motorized and armoured forces to protect their colonies in North Africa. The Germans hastily put together a motorized force, whose lead elements arrived in Tripoli in February 1941. Thus the rush to support the ailing Italian forces also played a part in the defeat of the Axis powers in North Africa as Germany certainly viewed North Africa as a peripheral area. The force, termed the Afrika Korps by Hitler, was placed under the command of Erwin Rommel. In April of the same year Rommel launched a series of attacks on Tobruk, the heavily garrisoned port fortress manned by an Australian infantry division. However when he failed in his attempts at its capture, the first supply problems for Rommel were in evidence which contributed to the Axis power’s defeat in the long term in North Africa. His front line positions at Sollum were at the end of an extended supply chain that stretched back to Tripoli and had to bypass the coast road at Tobruk. His forward units were particularly badly affected through lack of petrol meaning their motorized unit could not function to full capacity. Tobruk was particularly important in terms of supplies and thus its capture was central to the German and Axis advances. After this series of failed attacks a four-month stalemate ensued during which Rommel was denied reinforcements and the British Army had the chance to re-organise. This lack of supplies and thus inability of the Axis powers to attack Allied forces at full capacity and strength weakened their offensive as well as defences and contributed to quite a significant degree to their ultimate defeat at the hand of the Allied forces.

The ultimate loss was a stunning strategic setback for Germany. At first, North Africa had been a rather effective economy-of-force campaign. At the risk of only three German divisions and a number of Italian divisions of questionable quality, the Axis was able to tie down a proportionately larger force and at the same time pose a significant threat to one of Britain's strategic lines of communication. But after the defeat at El Alamein, Hitler's sense of pride once again overcame his meagre grasp of strategy, and he committed a second field army to North Africa that he could neither sustain logistically nor afford to lose. The forces Hitler threw away in May 1943 just might have made some difference for the Germans fighting in Russia or Sicily. On the tactical and operational levels, several factors conspired against the Axis despite the battlefield brilliance of Rommel and the superb fighting of the Afrika Korps. Although North Africa was a logistician's hell, logistics was the deciding factor. In the end, the Allies triumphed with sheer mass. The Americans joining the war towards the end of the campaign meant the Axis forces could not overcome Allied air and sea power - both of which enhanced Allied logistics and degraded Axis logistics. Thus Hitler’s poor grasp of strategy and his poor communication with Rommel as well as his somewhat panicked attempts to keep North Africa under Axis influence contributed massively towards the Axis defeat in North Africa.

Another massively contributing factor which lead to Axis defeat in North Africa was the success of Operation Torch and the success of the Battle of El Alamein through Allied naval and air supremacy and the superior logistical planning of Allied commanders. The Battle of El Alamein began on 23rd October with a massive artillery barrage fired by 900 British guns. The Allies tried for five days to break through the Axis positions, sustaining 10,000 casualties in the process. On 30th-31st October, Montgomery renewed the attack with strong support from the RAF. Thus air supremacy hugely contributed towards the Axis defeat at Al Alamein and the ultimate defeat of the forces. The Allies were able to corner the Germans, giving them The Allies were able to corner the Germans, giving them no other choice than to retreat and sure enough, critically short on fuel and ammunition, Rommel started to disengage on 3rd November. At first, Hitler insisted on his usual no-retreat orders. On the 4th, he grudgingly gave Rommel permission to withdraw, and the 1,400-mile pursuit to Tunisia began. Despite constant urging from his German and Italian superiors, who wanted him to save Libya, Rommel was more interested in preserving his force to fight another day. Thus another contributing factor towards German defeat was Rommel’s overly offensive strategy. He did not know when he was beaten and consequently his forces were hugely depleted throughout the North Africa campaign, weakening Axis power. On 8th November, 1942, just four days after Rommel started his long withdrawal, the British and Americans had executed Operation Torch and the Axis powers were essentially defeated. He paused at El Agheila between 23rd November and 18th December, and again at Buerat and Wadi Zemzem, from 276th December, 1942, to 16th January, 1943. Rommel reached Tripoli on 23rd January and the Tunisian border at the end of the month. By the time he got to Tunisia, however, another Allied force was awaiting him. Rommel had been out-manoeuvred, out-gunned and essentially outnumbered and thus this was the most significant contributing factor towards Axis defeat in North Africa.

In conclusion, the North Africa campaign failed for the Axis powers due in part to supply problems. Rommel did not have the means to attack Tobruk effectively in April 1941 due to being at the end of a supply chain and a few months later was refused supplies of fresh soldiers by Hitler, further deepening his supply crisis. However this was not the greatest contributing factor towards Axis power’s defeat in North Africa. Hitler’s poor grasp of desert warfare strategy meant he was poorly prepared logistically to wage war on Allied powers, Britain especially had experience of war in this environment due to their previous colonisation of desertified areas such as Egypt and thus were somewhat prepared for the environment they were entering. However, the most important reason the Allied powers were able to beat Axis ones in North Africa was due to their naval and air superiority as well as the introduction of American soldiers. The Allied powers were able to perform a ‘pincer’ movement, trapping Axis forces and giving them no option other than to surrender. With the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in December 1941, the Americans joined the war and thus the Allies were also able to beat the Axis forces in North Africa based on mass of manpower. Thus it was this naval and air superiority as well as superior numbers due to the Americans joining the war effort and thus bolstering the Allied numbers that was the most significant catalyst towards Axis defeat in North Africa.