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Abacus Goldman Sachs

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CONFIDENTIAL – INDICATIVE TERMS

ABACUS 2007-AC1
$2 Billion Synthetic CDO
Referencing a static RMBS Portfolio
Selected by ACA Management, LLC

February 26, 2007
The information contained herein is indicative only and the actual terms of any transaction will be set forth in the definitive Offering Circular.
Capitalized terms but not defined herein shall have the meanings set forth in the definitive Offering Circular.

Table of Contents
Disclaimer and Risk Factors

Exhibit
I.

Transaction Overview

II.

Portfolio Selection Agent Overview

III.

Structure Overview

Appendix
A.

Initial Reference Portfolio

B.

Selected ACA Biographies

C.

Goldman Sachs Contact Information

1

Disclaimer
The information contained herein is confidential information regarding securities that may in the future be offered by ABACUS 2007-AC1, Ltd. (the “Issuer”). The information is being delivered to a limited number of sophisticated prospective institutional investors in order to assist them in determining whether they have an interest in the type of securities described herein and is solely for their internal use. By accepting this information, the recipient agrees that it will use and it will cause its directors, partners, officers, employees and representatives to use the information only to evaluate its potential interest in the securities described herein and for no other purpose and will not divulge any such information to any other party. Any reproduction of this information, in whole or in part, is prohibited.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, each recipient (and each employee, representative, or other agent of such recipient) may disclose to any and all other persons, without limitation of any kind, the tax treatment and tax structure of the Issuer, the securities described herein and any future offering thereof and the ownership and disposition of such securities and all materials of any kind (including opinions or other tax analyses) that are provided to such recipient relating to such tax treatment and tax structure. However, any such information relating to such tax treatment or tax structure is required to be kept confidential to the extent reasonably necessary to comply with any applicable securities laws. For this purpose, the tax treatment of a transaction is the purported or claimed U.S. federal income tax treatment of the transaction, and the tax structure of a transaction is any fact that may be relevant to understanding the purported or claimed U.S. federal income tax treatment of the transaction.
The information contained herein has been prepared solely for informational purposes and is not an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy or sell any security or instrument or to participate in any trading strategy. The information contained herein is preliminary and material changes to the proposed terms of the securities described herein may be made at any time. If any offer of securities is made, it shall be made pursuant to a definitive offering circular (the “Offering
Circular”) prepared by or on behalf of the Issuer, which would contain material information not contained herein and which shall supersede, amend and supplement this information in its entirety. Any decision to invest in the securities described herein should be made after reviewing the Offering Circular, conducting such investigations as the investor deems necessary or appropriate and consulting the investor’s own legal, accounting, tax, and other advisors in order to make an independent determination of the suitability and consequences of an investment in the securities.
The securities described herein (the “Notes”) will not be registered under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the securities laws of any other jurisdiction and neither the Issuer nor the pool of securities held by the Issuer will be registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended. The securities offered herein will not be recommended by any United States federal or state securities commission or any other regulatory authority. Furthermore, the foregoing authorities have not confirmed the accuracy or determined the adequacy of this document. Any representation to the contrary is a criminal offense. The securities described herein will be subject to certain restrictions on transfers as described in the Offering Circular.

2

Disclaimer
None of the Issuer, Goldman Sachs (as used herein, such term shall include Goldman, Sachs & Co. and all of its affiliates), the Portfolio Selection Agent or any of their respective affiliates makes any representation or warranty, express or implied, as to the accuracy or completeness of the information contained herein and nothing contained herein shall be relied upon as a promise or representation whether as to the past or future performance. The information includes hypothetical illustrations and involves modeling components and assumptions that are required for purposes of such hypothetical illustrations. No representations are made as to the accuracy of such hypothetical illustrations or that all assumptions relating to such hypothetical illustrations have been considered or stated or that such hypothetical illustrations will be realized. The information contained herein does not purport to contain all of the information that may be required to evaluate such securities, and each recipient is encouraged to read the Offering Circular and should conduct its own independent analysis of the data referred to herein. The
Issuer, Goldman Sachs, the Portfolio Selection Agent and their respective affiliates disclaim any and all liability relating to this information, including, without limitation, any express or implied representation or warranty for statements contained in and omissions from this information. None of the Issuer, Goldman Sachs or any of their respective affiliates expects to update or otherwise revise the information contained herein except by means of the Offering Circular. Additional information may be available on request. The securities are obligations of the Issuer and are not issued by, obligations of, or guaranteed by Goldman Sachs, the
Portfolio Selection Agent or their respective affiliates, or other organizations. The obligations of the Issuer are not deposit obligations of any financial institution.
The securities described herein are complex, structured securities and there is no assurance that a secondary market for such securities will exist at any time.
Accordingly, prospective investors should be prepared, and have the ability, to hold such securities until their respective stated maturities or stated redemption dates. The Portfolio Selection Agent’s participation in the transaction is subject to review and approval of its credit committee, senior management and counsel. No credit or other approval is implied, or shall be construed, by delivery of the information contained herein.

3

Disclaimer
HYPOTHETICAL ILLUSTRATIONS AND PRO FORMA INFORMATION
These materials contain statements that are not purely historical in nature. These include, among other things, hypothetical illustrations, sample or pro forma portfolio structures or portfolio composition, scenario analysis of returns and proposed or pro forma levels of diversification or sector investment. These hypothetical illustrations of returns illustrate a range of potential outcomes based upon certain assumptions. Such potential outcomes are not a prediction by the
Issuer, Goldman Sachs, the Portfolio Selection Agent or their respective affiliates of the performance of the securities described herein. Actual events are difficult to predict and are beyond the control of the Issuer, Goldman Sachs, the Portfolio Selection Agent or their respective affiliates. Actual events may differ from those assumed and such differences may be material. There can be no assurance that illustrated returns will be realized or materialized or that actual returns or results will not be materially lower than those presented. All statements included are based on information available on the date hereof, and none of the Issuer,
Goldman Sachs, the Portfolio Selection Agent or their respective affiliates assumes any duty to update any such statement. Some important factors which could cause actual results to differ materially from those in any statements contained herein include the actual composition of the reference portfolio, any Credit Events on the reference portfolio, the timing of any Credit Events and subsequent reimbursements, changes in interest rates, any weakening of the specific credits included in the reference portfolio, among others. The Offering Circular will contain other risk factors, which an investor should also consider in connection with an investment in the securities described herein.

PRIOR INVESTMENT RESULTS
Any prior investment results or returns are presented for illustrative purposes only and are not indicative of the future returns on the securities and obligations of the Issuer. The Reference Portfolio selected by the Portfolio Selection Agent on behalf of the Issuer may differ substantially from investments made by the
Portfolio Selection Agent on behalf of collateralized debt obligation funds managed by it. Meaningful comparisons between the Transaction and any prior transaction managed by the Portfolio Selection Agent (including those described herein) may be difficult. The Issuer has no operating history.
In addition, there can be no assurance that any member of the senior management team of the Portfolio Selection Agent will remain with the Portfolio Selection
Agent for the duration of the Transaction.

4

Disclaimer
Under no circumstances is this presentation to be used or considered as an offer to sell, or a solicitation of any offer to buy, any security. Any such offering may be made only by the Offering Circular. The information contained herein is in summary form for convenience of presentation. It is not complete and it should not be relied upon as such.

No person has been authorized to give any information or to make any representations other than those to be contained in the Offering Circular regarding the offering of any securities described herein. An investment in the securities described herein, when and if offered, will involve substantial risk. Prior to investing, prospective investors should carefully consider the risks, which will be described in the Offering Circular, and should consult their own investment advisors, and tax, legal, accounting and other regulatory advisors. Due to the risks involved in the securities described herein, investors should be prepared to suffer a loss of their entire investment.

IRS Circular 230 Disclosure: The Issuer, Goldman Sachs and their respective affiliates do not provide legal, tax or accounting advice. Any statement contained in this communication (including any attachments) concerning U.S. tax matters was not intended or written to be used, and cannot be used, for the purpose of avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue Code, and was written to support the promotion or marketing of the transaction(s) or matter(s) addressed. The recipient should obtain its own independent tax advice based on its particular circumstances. However, you should be aware that any proposed transaction could have accounting, tax, legal or other implications that should be discussed with your advisors and or counsel. The materials should not be relied upon for the maintenance of your books and records or for any tax, accounting, legal or other purposes.

5

Risk Factors
PROSPECTIVE INVESTORS SHOULD READ THE OFFERING CIRCULAR FOR A MORE COMPLETE DESCRIPTION OF RISK FACTORS RELEVANT TO
A PARTICULAR INVESTMENT
Purchasing the Notes involves certain risks. Prospective investors should carefully consider the following factors, as well as the risk factors included in the final Offering Circular, prior to purchasing the Notes. The following is not intended to be an exhaustive list of the risks involved in the Transaction.
The final Offering Circular will include more complete descriptions of the risks described below as well as additional risks. Any decision to invest in the Notes described herein should be made after reviewing the Offering Circular, conducting such investigations as the investor deems necessary and consulting the investor’s own legal, accounting and tax advisors in order to make an independent determination of the suitability and consequences of an investment in the
Notes.
Leveraged Credit Exposure to Reference Entities
Investors will have leveraged exposure to the credit of a number of Reference Entities because the notional amount of the Reference Portfolio is significantly larger than the principal amount of the Notes. Following the delivery of a Credit Event Notice by Goldman Sachs in relation to a Credit Event with respect to a Reference Entity and the satisfaction of the other Conditions to Settlement, the outstanding principal amount of the investment may be reduced. Investors in the Notes may suffer significant reductions in their outstanding principal amounts. The maximum loss for investors is the full principal amount.
No Legal or Beneficial Interest in Obligations of Reference Entities
Participation in the Transaction does not constitute a purchase or other acquisition or assignment of any interest in any obligation of any Reference Entity.
Neither the Issuer nor investors will have recourse against any Reference Entities. Neither the investors nor any other entity will have any rights to acquire from Goldman Sachs any interest in any obligation of any Reference Entity, notwithstanding any reduction in the principal of the relevant class with respect to such Reference Entity. Neither the Issuer nor any investor will have the benefit of any collateral delivered by any Reference Entity nor any right to enforce any remedies against any Reference Entity.
Tax/Regulatory Impact
There may be a tax or regulatory impact of investing in the Notes. Goldman Sachs does not provide any opinion on these issues. Any investor should consult with its own advisors prior to investing in the Notes.

6

Risk Factors
Limited Liquidity of the Transaction
There is currently no market for the Notes. There can be no assurance that a secondary market for the Notes will develop or, if a secondary market does develop, that it will provide the holder of the Notes with liquidity, or that it will continue for the life of the Notes. Moreover, the limited scope of information available to the investors regarding the Reference Entities and the nature of any Credit Event, including uncertainty as to the extent of any reduction to be applied to the notional amount of each class if a Credit Event has occurred but the amount of the relevant reduction in the notional amount has not been determined, may further affect the liquidity of the Notes. Consequently, any investor in the Notes must be prepared to hold such Notes for an indefinite period of time or until final maturity.
Mark-to-Market Risk
Investors are exposed to considerable mark-to-market volatility following changes in any of the following: spreads of the credits in the Reference Portfolio, comparable CDO spreads, ratings migration in the reference portfolio, ratings migration of the Notes, ratings migration of the Collateral or issuers or providers thereof, and Credit Events in the Reference Portfolio (and hence reduction of subordination). These will be reflected in mark-to-market valuations which are likely to be more volatile than an equivalently rated unleveraged investment.
Credit Events may vary from Defaults
Historical default statistics may not capture events that would trigger a Credit Event affecting the Notes. All Credit Event definitions will be defined in the final legal documents and will be governed by the 2003 ISDA Credit Derivatives Definitions and any amendment or supplement thereto.
Credit Ratings
Credit ratings represent the rating agencies’ opinions regarding credit quality and are not a guarantee of quality. Rating agencies attempt to evaluate the safety of principal and/or interest payments and do not evaluate the risks of fluctuations in market value. Accordingly, the credit ratings may not fully reflect the true risks of the Transaction. Also, rating agencies may fail to make timely changes in credit ratings in response to subsequent events, so that an issuer’s current financial condition may be better or worse than its rating indicates.
Rating Volatility
Rating agencies may from time to time change the ratings of the Notes (or the Reference Obligations in the Reference Portfolio) even if no losses have been incurred under the Notes due to changes in rating methodology or rating migration of the Reference Obligations in the Reference Portfolio. Due to the leveraged nature of the Transaction, the rating may be significantly more volatile than corporate debt with an equivalent credit rating.

7

Risk Factors
Certain conflicts of interest relating to Goldman Sachs and its Affiliates; No reliance
Goldman Sachs does not provide investment, accounting, tax or legal advice and shall not have a fiduciary relationship with any investor. In particular,
Goldman Sachs does not make any representations as to (a) the suitability of purchasing Notes, (b) the appropriate accounting treatment or possible tax consequences of the Transaction or (c) the future performance of the Transaction either in absolute terms or relative to competing investments. Potential investors should obtain their own independent accounting, tax and legal advice and should consult their own professional investment advisor to ascertain the suitability of the Transaction, including such independent investigation and analysis regarding the risks, security arrangements and cash-flows associated with the Transaction as they deem appropriate to evaluate the merits and risks of the Transaction.
Goldman Sachs may, by virtue of its status as an underwriter, advisor or otherwise, possess or have access to non-publicly available information relating to the Reference Obligations, the Reference Entities and/or other obligations of the Reference Entities and has not undertaken, and does not intend, to disclose, such status or non-public information in connection with the Transaction. Accordingly, this presentation may not contain all information that would be material to the evaluation of the merits and risks of purchasing the Notes.
Goldman Sachs does not make any representation, recommendation or warranty, express or implied, regarding the accuracy, adequacy, reasonableness or completeness of the information contained herein or in any further information, notice or other document which may at any time be supplied in connection with the Transaction and accepts no responsibility or liability therefore. Goldman Sachs is currently and may be from time to time in the future an active participant on both sides of the market and have long or short positions in, or buy and sell, securities, commodities, futures, options or other derivatives identical or related to those mentioned herein. Goldman Sachs may have potential conflicts of interest due to present or future relationships between
Goldman Sachs and any Collateral, the issuer thereof, any Reference Entity or any obligation of any Reference Entity.
Goldman Sachs & Co. will act as the initial purchaser for all classes of Notes, and affiliates of Goldman Sachs & Co. will act as the Protection Buyer, the
Basis Swap Counterparty, the Collateral Put Provider and the Collateral Disposal Agent.

8

Risk Factors
Reliance on Creditworthiness of the Collateral
The ability of the Issuer of the Notes to meet its obligations under the Notes will depend on, amongst other things, the receipt by it of payments of interest and principal from the Collateral. Consequently, investors are exposed not only to the occurrence of Credit Events in relation to any of the Reference
Obligations, but also to the ability of the Collateral or the issuer or provider thereof, to perform its obligations to make payments to the Issuer of the Notes.
Although at the time of purchase, such Collateral will be highly rated, there is no assurance that such rating will not be reduced or withdrawn in the future, nor is a rating a guarantee of future performance.
Creditworthiness of Goldman Sachs
Premium payments will be required to be made by Goldman Sachs to the Issuer throughout the life of the Transaction. Consequently, investors are exposed not only to the occurrence of Credit Events in relation to any of the Reference Obligations, but also to the ability of Goldman Sachs to perform its obligations to make payments to the Issuer of the Notes, amongst other secured parties.
Historical Performance does not Predict Future Performance of Transaction
Individual Reference Entities may not perform as indicated by historical performance for similarly rated credits. Furthermore, even if future credit performance is similar to that of historic performance for the entire market, investors must make their own determination as to whether the Reference Portfolio will reflect the experience of the universe of rated credits. The frequency of Credit Events experienced under the Notes may be higher than that of historical rates, and/or that of future rates for the market as a whole.
Projections, Forecasts and Estimates
Any projections, forecasts and estimates contained herein are forward looking statements and are based upon certain assumptions that the Issuer considers reasonable. Projections are necessarily speculative in nature, and it can be expected that some or all of the assumptions underlying the projections will not materialize or will vary significantly from actual results. Accordingly, the projections are only estimates. Actual results may vary from the projections, and the variations may be material.

9

I.

Transaction Overview

Transaction Overview
Executive Summary
ABACUS 2007-AC1 is a $2 billion notional synthetic CDO (the “Transaction”) referencing a portfolio
(the “Reference Portfolio”) consisting of RMBS obligations.
ACA Management, LLC (“ACA”) will be acting as Portfolio Selection Agent in this Transaction.
ACA currently manages 22 outstanding CDOs with underlying portfolios consisting of $15.7 billion of assets (1)..
The 360 WARF target Reference Portfolio selected by ACA consists of 90 Baa2-rated mid-prime and subprime RMBS bonds issued over the past 18 months.
The CDO tranches amortize principal using a full sequential amortization sequence, avoiding any reduction in the relative subordination of the CDO tranches.
The CDO tranches will have a projected average life(2) of 3.9 to 4.9 years, which is shorter than the average life of most traditional ABS CDOs executed in the current market environment.
The CDO tranches do not bear any available funds cap risk and other related interest shortfall risks.
Goldman Sachs’ market-leading ABACUS program currently has $5.1 billion in outstanding CLNs with strong secondary trading desk support.

(1) Source: ACA as of December 31, 2006
(2) Based upon Modeling Assumptions described in the “Summary-Notes” section of the Offering Circular

11

Transaction Overview
The Reference Portfolio(1)
The Portfolio Selection Agent has selected a target granular Reference Portfolio containing 90 equally-sized (by notional amount) Reference Obligations fully disclosed to investors.
− Each Reference Obligation is issued by a distinct issuer
− Each Reference Obligation has an actual rating of Baa2 by Moody’s.
• Reference Portfolio WARF of 360, which represents a higher rating quality than mezzanine

ABS CDOs sold in the current market environment.
− The Reference Portfolio includes a wide cross-section of shelves and servicers
• 30 different shelves represented, with the largest shelf (FFML) representing 10% of the

Reference Portfolio
• 24 different servicers represented, with the largest servicer (Wells Fargo) representing 29% of

the Reference Portfolio
The Reference Portfolio is static, with no substitutions, discretionary removals, notional reinvestments or discretionary trading of Reference Obligations permitted.
The Reference Portfolio is focused on the subprime and midprime RMBS sector and will not contain any exposure to CDOs or Option ARMs.
4.2-year projected Reference Portfolio weighted average life.

(1) As of February 26, 2007. Goldman Sachs. neither represents nor provides any assurances that the actual Reference Portfolio on the Closing Date or any future date will have the same characteristics as represented above.

12

ACA Sponsorship
ABACUS 2007-AC1 will be the 25th CDO sponsored by ACA and the 5th utilizing synthetic RMBS.
ACA will earn portfolio selection fees accrued on the principal amount of the Notes, and not on the super senior tranche or the first loss tranche
The portfolio selection fee rate for each tranche is set forth under “Structure Overview–Capital
Structure”.
− Portfolio selection fee rates are higher on the lower-rated Notes.
− The upward-sloping fee structure increases ACA’s incentives to avoid losses relative to a standard

flat fee accrued on the overall reference portfolio notional amount.

(1) Source: ACA as of February 26, 2007

13

Structure Overview
Capital Structure(1)
Tranche

Initial Tranche
Notional
Amount
(US$)

Rating
(Moody’s /
S&P)

Tranche
Size
(%)(2)

Tranche
Attach
(%)(2)

Tranche
Exhaust
(%)(2)

Projected
WAL
(yrs)(3)

Legal
Final

Portfolio
Selection
Fee Rate

Coupon

Super
Senior

$[1,100,000,000]

N/A

[55.00]%

[45.00]%

[100.00]%

[3.9]

2037

NA

[

Class A

$[480,000,000]

[Aaa]/[AAA]

[24.00]%

[21.00]%

[45.00]%

[4.4]

2037

[0.25]%

1mL+[

]%

Class B

$[60,000,000]

[Aa2]/[AA]

[3.00]%

[18.00]%

[21.00]%

[4.6]

2037

[0.50]%

1mL+[

]%

Class C

$[100,000,000]

[Aa3]/[AA-]

[5.00]%

[13.00]%

[18.00]%

[4.7]

2037

[0.50]%

1mL+[

]%

Class D

$[60,000,000]

[A2]/[A]

[3.00]%

[10.00]%

[13.00]%

[4.9]

2037

[1.00]%

1mL+[

]%

First Loss

$[200,000,000]

NA

[10.00]%

[0.00]%

[10.00]%

[5.2]

2037

NA

]%

Not Offered

(1) As of February 26, 2007. Goldman Sachs does not represent or provide any assurances that the actual capital structure on the Closing Date or any future date will have the same characteristics as represented above. See the final Offering Circular for the final capital structure.
(2) As a percentage of the Initial Reference Portfolio Notional Amount
(3) Based upon Modeling Assumptions described in the “Summary-Notes” section of the Offering Circular

14

Structure Overview
Structural Features of Offered Tranches
Large benchmark CDO transaction with tranches offered from the super senior tranche to the “A2/A”rated tranche.
CDO tranches can be offered in credit linked note format or in unfunded swap format.
All Notes offered at par and may be issued in all major currencies.
Interest payments on the Notes are non-deferrable
− Goldman Sachs bears the WAC and/or available funds cap risk on the Reference Portfolio.

The Transaction has no over-collateralization (“O/C”) or interest coverage (“I/C”) cashflow diversion triggers The tranches will be allocated principal sequentially, avoiding any leakage of principal to subordinated tranches
Each Class of Notes is callable by the Issuer at par plus accrued interest on the outstanding principal amount of such Class of Notes on any Payment Date on or after March 2009.

15

Reference Portfolio Summary
Broad Cross-Section of Issuance Shelves(1), (2), (3)

FHLT
2.2%

ACE
2.2%

Other
12.2%

ABFC
2.2%

FFML
10.0%
MSAC
8.9%
LBMLT
7.8%

FMIC
2.2%

OOMLT
2.2%

SVHE
6.7%

ABSHE
3.3%
JPMAC
3.3%
MABS
3.3%

HEAT
6.7%
MLMI
3.3%

NHELI
3.3%

SABR
3.3%

SASC
3.3%

CARR
6.7%

CMLTI
6.7%

Reference Portfolio includes 30 distinct issuing shelves, with the top 19 comprising 88% of the
Reference Portfolio notional amount.
Issuance shelves that have the highest concentration in the ABACUS 2007-AC1 portfolio are
FFML(10.0%), MSAC(8.9%), and LBLMT(7.8%).

(1) As of February 26, 2007. Goldman Sachs. neither represents nor provides any assurances that the actual Reference Portfolio on the Closing Date or any future date will have the same characteristics as represented above.
(2) Source: Bloomberg
(3) Percentages are based on notional amounts

16

Reference Portfolio Summary
Servicer Diversification(1), (2), (3)

NCMC
2.2%

FREM
2.2%

Other
12.2%

AQMC
2.2%

WFB
28.9%

HSC
3.3%
JPM
3.3%

WCC
3.3%
ALS
4.4%

AURA
4.4%

OOMC
13.3%
CWHL
5.6%

WMB
6.7%

SPS
7.8%

Reference Obligations in the Reference Portfolio are serviced by 24 different servicers.
Wells Fargo is the most represented servicer in the ABACUS 2007-AC1 Reference Portfolio, servicing 28.9% of the Reference Obligations.

(1) As of February 26, 2007. Goldman Sachs neither represents nor provides any assurances that the actual Reference Portfolio on the Closing Date or any future date will have the same characteristics as represented above.
(2) Source: Bloomberg
(3) Percentages are based on notional amounts

17

Credit Events
Overview and Settlement Mechanics
Credit Events applicable to Reference Obligations will include:
− Writedown, a writedown or applied loss, forgiveness of principal or an Implied Writedown; and
− Failure to Pay Principal at the legal final maturity of the reference obligation or earlier if the

assets securing the reference obligation are liquidated in full.
Credit Events adhere to the current (as of the Closing Date) ISDA Standard Terms Supplement for a
Credit Derivative Transaction on Mortgage-Backed Security with Pay-As-You-Go or Physical
Settlement (Form I) (Dealer Form) and Form of Confirmation (“ISDA Dealer Form”) definitions.
Interest Shortfall shall not constitute a floating amount event under the Transaction: ABACUS 2007AC1 noteholders will not bear either (a) the WAC risk (b) the available funds cap risk on the
Reference Portfolio.
Credit Events will be settled on a Pay-As-You-Go basis.
A Reference Obligation will not be removed from the Reference Portfolio upon the occurrence of a
Credit Event. Following a Writedown, further Credit Events are possible in respect of such
Reference Obligation.
Physical settlement will not apply to any Credit Event.

(1) These terms are for illustrative purposes only and may not represent the final structure. Refer to the final Offering Circular for the final structure and terms.

18

Transaction Overview
Key Transaction Terms
Issuer:

ABACUS 2007-AC1, Ltd., incorporated with limited liability in the Cayman Islands

Co-Issuer:

ABACUS 2007-AC1, Inc., a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Delaware

Portfolio Selection Agent:

ACA Management, L.L.C. (“ACA”)

Initial Purchaser:

Goldman, Sachs & Co. (sole)

Protection Buyer:

Goldman Sachs Capital Markets, L.P. (“GSCM”), an affiliate of the Initial Purchaser

Portfolio Advisor:

None

Closing Date:

[ ], 2007

Legal Final Maturity Date:

[ ] 2037

Offering Type:

Reg S (Non-US Persons only), Rule 144A
Rule 144A purchasers must be qualified purchasers under the Investment Company Act of 1940

Debt Minimum Denominations:

$250,000 for each Class of Notes under Rule 144A and $100,000 for each Class of Notes under Reg S, in each case in increments of $1 thereafter

Control:

Majority of the Notes voting together in the aggregate

Trustee/Issuing & Paying Agent:

LaSalle Bank NA (Trustee for the Class A through Class [C] Notes; Issuing & Paying Agent for the Class
[D] Notes)

Notional Ramp-Up Period:

None. 100% of the Reference Obligations will be identified on the Closing Date.

Discretionary Reference Obligation
Substitution, Reinvestment or Removals:

None. There will be no substitutions, notional reinvestments or discretionary removals in respect of the
Reference Portfolio at any time subsequent to the Closing Date.

Non-Call Period:

Approximately two years from the Closing Date, ending on the Payment Date in [ ] 2009

Interest on the Notes:

Accrued daily on the Outstanding Principal Amount of the Notes and payable in arrears on an actual/360 basis on the 28th of each month or following Business Day commencing [ ] 2007

Listing, Clearing & Settlement:

Application will be made to list the Notes on an exchange of the Issuer’s choice, if practicable. There can be no assurance that such admission will be granted. The Notes will settle through
Euroclear/Clearstream/DTC.

Tax Treatment:

It is expected that the Class A through Class [C] Notes will be treated as debt.

ERISA Eligibility:

The Class A Notes through Class [C] Notes are expected to be ERISA eligible, assuming that the purchase is not a prohibited transaction for the purchaser.

Governing Law:

The Class A through Class [C] Notes will be governed by, and construed in accordance with, the law of the State of New York. The Class [D] Notes will be governed by, and construed in accordance with, the laws of the Cayman Islands.

These terms are for illustrative purposes only and may not represent the final structure. Refer to the final Offering Circular for the final terms and structure.

19

II. Portfolio Selection Agent Overview(1)

(1) All information concerning ACA Capital, its prior experience and its personnel contained herein has been provided by ACA Capital as of February 19,
2007 (unless otherwise specified herein) and no such data has been independently verified by Goldman Sachs.

ACA - Business Strategy
Specialty financial services company
− Assume, manage and trade credit risk

Three principal operating divisions
− Municipal Finance
• Financial guaranty insurance company
• Only “A” (S&P) rated financial guarantor in business
− CDO Asset Management
• Asset (collateral) management platform
− Structured Credit
• Diversified credit selection and trading platform
• Alternative executions (principally synthetic)

21

ACA - Equity and Ownership Structure (1)

Investor

Ownership %

Board Seats

BSMB

28%

2

Public Ownership

20%

0

Stephens Group

13%

1

Third Avenue Trust

13%

1

Chestnut Hill ACA

11%

1

Management & Others

15%

4

Source: ACA Capital
(1) As of November 9, 2006

22

ACA Capital Strategy
Financial guaranty subsidiary ‘A’ rated by S&P
Commitment to long-term bondholder and counterparty security
− Durability and stability emphasized

Philosophy is to maintain insurance company capital at close to “AA” margin of safety while pursuing an “A” rated business strategy

23

ACA - Business Mix as of December 31, 2006
Contribution to Net Operating Income

Other, 3%

Municipal, 18%

Structured Credit,
43%

CDO Asset
Management, 36%

24

ACA - Senior Management Team
Name and Title

Experience

Alan Roseman

Ambac, Capital Re, ACE

Chief Executive Officer

25 Years of Industry Experience

Edward Gilpin

MBIA, Prudential

Executive Vice President & Chief Financial Officer

22 Years of Industry Experience

James Rothman

GE Capital, Deutsche Bank, Paine Webber

Senior Managing Director & Head of Structured Credit

13 Years of Industry Experience

Peter Hill

JPMorgan

Executive Vice President & Head of Public Finance

20 Years of Industry Experience

Joseph Pimbley

Sumitomo Mitsui, FGIC, Moody’s, Citigroup

Executive Vice President & Head of Institutional Risk Management

13 Years of Industry Experience

Laura Schwartz

Merrill Lynch, New York Life

Senior Managing Director & Head of CDO Asset Management

22 Years of Industry Experience

25

ACA - Investment Philosophy
Focus primarily on ABS and Corporate markets to identify attractive opportunities in several ways
Asset selection and asset management premised on credit fundamentals and then optimized for relative value
ACA Management will utilize proprietary models to stress and confirm the adequacy of cash flows
30 professionals are dedicated to the CDO asset management business representing a combination of skills and experience relating to credit underwriting and capital markets analysis and execution
Preserve capital
Willing to use excess spread to hedge or sell deteriorated credits
Defensive trading
Minimize real market value exposure
Minimize maturity and interest rate risk through asset/liability matching and hedging

26

Why ACA Management LLC?
Alignment of Economic Interest
− ACA has invested over $200 million in internally managed CDOs
− A portion of management fees are subordinated and performance based

Investment Philosophy
− Investment decisions are credit driven and conducted by industry specialists
− Every investment is approved by a heavily experienced investment committee

Deep Expertise
− 30 dedicated credit and portfolio management professionals with an average of 13 years relevant

experience
− Committee members have industry experience across several credit cycles

Asset Management Scale
− Approximately $15.7 billion of assets in 22 CDOs under management as of 12/31/2006.
− Supported by a large infrastructure including an IT group, a legal team and a risk management

department
− Significant resources invested in systems and databases

Track Record
− No rated notes in any of ACA’s CDOs have ever been downgraded
27

ACA Capital – Overview
Core Competencies in Analyzing Credit Risk
ACA Capital’s CDO Asset Management Platform has extensive capabilities in analyzing credit risk in a variety of areas including:
− Corporate Securities
• Credit Default Swaps
• High Grade Bonds
• Crossover Bonds
− Leveraged Loans (U.S. and Europe)
• Traditional as well as middle market loans
− Asset Backed Securities
• Residential Mortgages
• CLOs, CBOs, CSOs
• Commercial Mortgages
• Consumer Assets and Receivables
• Corporate Assets and Receivables

Source: ACA Capital

28

ACA - CDO Asset Management Organization Chart
Alan Roseman
CEO
ACA Capital

Ted Gilpin
Chief Financial Officer
ACA Capital

John Haltmaier
Managing Director
Head of Corporate Credit

Laura Schwartz
Chief Operating Officer
ACA Management

Dennis Kraft
Managing Director
Head of ABS Credit

Jonathan Bakker
Director
Corporate Credit

Jeff Wyner
Vice President
CMBS Credit

David Lee
Vice President
Corporate Credit

Barbara Johnston
Vice President
Execution & Operations

Keith Gorman
Director
Portfolio Manager
ABS

Vincent Ingato
Managing Director
Portfolio Manager
CDS & Leveraged Loans

Terry McCabe
Managing Director
Portfolio Manager
Eur. Leveraged Loans

Ava Regal
Director
ABS Portfolio Mgmnt.

Jong (PJ) Woo
Director
Trader/Asst CDS & LL PM

Brian Percival
Senior Director

Tracy Portnoy
Vice President
RMBS Credit

Lucas Westreich
Vice President
Trader/Asst ABS PM

Adriana Marianella
Asst LL PM

Ian Feinson
Senior Director

Sally Morse
Vice President
Corporate Credit

Ritu Chachra
Associate

Sarah Dunn
Asst ABS PM

Jay Shankar
Vice President
Corporate Credit

Thomas Latronica
Analyst

John Veidis
Director
Corporate Credit

Gregory Hackett
Analyst

Ben Xiao
Vice President
Corporate Credit

Yumi Ishida
Administrative Assistant

Systems, Legal and
Quantitative Support
Rodanthy Tzani
Risk Management

Igor Grinberg
Asst LL PM

Catherine Jones
Associate General
Counsel

Gerard Nealon
Application Developer

Paul Robbins
Associate Director

Hao Wu
Risk Management

Eugene Grinberg
Application Designer

Christina Iancu
Asst LL PM

Eduardo Robinovich
Risk Management

29

Assets Under Management
ACA Management, L.L.C.
18,000

$15,700
16,000

14,000

12,000

$ in Millions

$9,920
10,000

$7,998
8,000

$5,830
6,000

4,000

$2,400
2,000

$0
0
2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

FYE December 31st
Corporate CDS

ABS High Grade

ABS Mezz

Leveraged Loans

Note: Euro amounts converted at the rate on 12/31/2006, 1.31 dollars/euro

30

ACA - 22 Proprietary CDOs Originated to Date(1)
Corporate Transactions
ACA CDS
2001-1

ACA CDS
2002-1

ACA CDS
2002-2

Argon 49

ACA CLO
2005-1

Argon 57

Tribune/
Sentinel

ACA CLO
2006-1

ACA CLO
2006-2

CDS

CDS

CDS

CDS

LL

CDS

CDS

LL

LL

01/25/02

06/26/02

04/09/03

05/25/05

08/17/05

04/29/06

06/30/06

07/27/06

12/07/06

$1,000

$1,000

$1,000

€ 50

$300

€ 50

$330

$341

$300

BBB/BBB+

BBB/BBB+

BBB/BBB+

BBB/BBB-

B+/B

BBB/BBB-

A/A-

B+/B

B+/B

Asset Quality

$22.5

$22.0

$25.0

N.A.

$5.0

N.A.

N.A.

N.A.

$2.4

ACA Equity (millions)

Commerz-bank

UBS Inv. Bank

WestLB

Merrill Lynch

Bear Stearns

Merrill Lynch

RBC

UBS Inv. Bank

RBS Greenwich
Capital

Type
Date Closed
Notional Portfolio (millions)

Investment Bank

ABS Transactions
ACA ABS
2002-1

ACA ABS
2003-1

Grenadier
Funding

ACA ABS
2003-2

ACA ABS
2004-1

Zenith
Funding

ACA ABS
2005-1

Khaleej II

ACA ABS
2005-2

Lancer
Funding

ACA ABS
2006-1

Aquarius

ACA ABS
2006-2

ABS

ABS

ABS

ABS

ABS

ABS

ABS

Syn ABS

ABS

ABS

ABS

ABS

ABS

07/29/02

05/20/03

07/21/03

11/16/03

04/27/04

12/21/04

03/02/05

09/22/05

08/30/05

03/14/06

04/27/06

09/12/06

11/29/06

$400

$400

$1,500

$725

$450

$1,500

$452

$750

$450

$1,500

$750

$2,000

$750

BBB/BBB-

BBB/BBB+

AA

BBB/BBB+

BBB/BBB+

AA-

BBB/BBB+

BBB/BBB+

BBB/BBB-

AA-/A+

BBB/BBB-

BBB/BBB-

BBB/BBB-

$18.0

$18.0

$22.5

$33.5

$10.0

$13.0

$4.4

$5.6

$2.25

$1.5

$1.965

N.A.

$4.2

CSFB

Banc of
America

Citigroup

UBS Inv. Bank

Merrill Lynch

Citigroup

RBS
Greenwich
Capital

Merrill Lynch

UBS Inv. Bank

UBS Inv. Bank

Bear Stearns

UBS Inv. Bank

Bear Stearns

(1) As of 12/31/06, ACA Capital is the manager on $15.7bn of CDOs and has invested over $200 million in the equity of the CDOs it manages.

31

ACA Capital – Overview
Investor Relations - ACA Website

Source: ACA Capital

32

ACA - ABS CDO Process

Legal Review
Quantitative Modeling/
Portfolio Analytics

Nora Dahlman
Catherine Jones

Credit Analysis/
Surveillance

Joe Pimbley
Hao Wu
Rodanthy Tzani
Eduardo Robinovich

SARA Systems
Development
Eli Boyajian
Eugene Grinberg
Gerard Nealon
Safi Parvez

Collateral
Committee/Approvals
Trade Execution

Dennis Kraft
Ava Regal
Keith Gorman
Jeff Wyner
Tracy Portnoy
Tom Latronica
Lucas Westreich
Ritu Chachra
Greg Hackett

Laura Schwartz
James Rothman
Hao Wu
Dennis Kraft
Keith Gorman
Shelby Carvalho

Lucas Westreich
Sarah Dunn

ACA CDO

Portfolio Strategy

CDO Administration &
Operations

Laura Schwartz
Keith Gorman
Joe Pimbley

Barbara Johnston

33

ACA Capital: ABS Credit Process
ABS Credit Selection Process
− Asset Class Analysis
− Seller/Servicer Analysis
• On-Site Visit
• Performance Review
− Deal Analysis
• Collateral Analysis
• Structural Analysis

34

ACA - ABS Credit Selection Process

Ongoing Seller/Servicer and Collateral Monitoring
Collateral Committee

Collateral Selection Process
•Survey deals in the primary market •On a selective basis consider deals in the secondary market

•Evaluate recommendations adhering to the firm’s targeted investment objectives while balancing the portfolio risks

Trade Execution

Formal Presentation

•Execute trades based upon
Market conditions, levels and intelligence •Asset class review
•Seller/servicer review
•Transaction analysis
CDO Portfolio Monitoring

35

ACA - ABS Credit Selection Process (Cont.)
Collateral Committee
− Written credit report distributed to all committee members.
− Analyst presents investment opportunity to committee.
− 6 voting members.
− Majority vote required for all decisions.
− Credits approved by the committee are eligible to be included in the portfolio.

36

ACA - ABS Credit Analysis Criteria
Seller/Servicer Tiering
ACA Capital will rank each seller/servicer according to a tiering system with the following criteria:=
− Tier One – Strong companies with established track records and proven performance
− Tier Two – Below investment grade, un-rated or private companies with established track records

and proven performance
− Tier Three – Companies with material issues relating to financial strength, performance or

capabilities

37

ACA - Servicer Tiering Criteria
Criteria for Tiering (not in order of importance):

ACA Exposure by Tier (as of 12/31/06)

− Corporate Status
Tier 3
1%

− Operations Due Diligence
− Historical Performance
− Portfolio Growth
− Servicer Ratings
Tier 2
47%

Tier 1
52%

38

ACA - ABS Credit Analysis Criteria
Collateral Analysis
− Loan Level Analysis
− Historical Static Pool Data: Delinquencies, loss, recoveries, prepayments
− Set expected net losses and loss curve

39

ACA - Structural and Stress Analysis
Structural Analysis
− Credit Enhancement
− Interest Rate Hedges
− Triggers
− Available Funds Cap Risk
− Deal Comparison

Stress Analysis
− Break-even using ACA default ramp
− Sensitivity analysis using issuer-specific delinquency curve

40

ACA - ABS Collateral

Table is a hypothetical example and is used for illustration purposes only

41

ACA Capital – Overview
External Information Sources and Tools
Credit Analysis
Standard & Poor’s
Moody’s Investors Services
Fitch
Value Line
Capital IQ
Credit Sights
Sector Research Reports

Trade Publications
Credit Investment News
S&P/ Leveraged Commentary & Data
Gold Sheets real-time
Bondweek
Morningstar, Hoovers
Securitization News
Real Estate Alert

Collateral Data and Other
INTEX
Bloomberg
Loan Connector
SMi
IntraLinks
ACBS SyndTrak Online
ClearPar
Trade Settlement, Inc.
Realpoint
TREPP
Loan Performance

Pricing Services
Loan Pricing Corporation
Markit Partners

Source: ACA Capital

42

ACA - Internal Information Sources and Tools
Portfolio Management and Surveillance
SARA – Surveillance and Reporting Analytics
− Internally developed collateral database monitoring systems
CDO Portfolio Evaluator
− Internal CDO compliance application
ACA Wizard
− Internal risk management and pricing application for CDO’s
− Internally developed application which generates projected cash flows

43

ACA - ABS CDO Experience
ACA ABS 2002-1
$400 million, multi sector ABS CDO

Trigger

Effective Date
10/11/2002

Current
12/31/2006

Moody’s Weighted Average Rating Factor

Max

400

347

707

Moody’s Diversity Score

Min

20

25

31.62

S&P Minimum Average Recovery Rate

Min

30.0%

36.9%

34.5%

Pass/Fail

Pass

Pass

Pass

Min

101.5%

104.0%

102.93%

S&P CDO Monitor
Overcollateralization Test (Class C)

2

Number of Positions Experiencing Writedowns
ACA ABS 2003-1
$400 million, multi sector ABS CDO

Trigger

Effective Date
05/20/2003

Current
12/04/2006

Moody’s Weighted Average Rating Factor

Max

400

289

408

Moody’s Diversity Score

Min

18

20

19.18

S&P Minimum Average Recovery Rate

Min

30%

35%

35.4%

Pass/Fail

Pass

Pass

Pass

Min

100.0%

104.5%

105.16%

S&P CDO Monitor
Overcollateralization Test (Class D)

0

Number of Positions Experiencing Writedowns

ACA ABS 2003-2
$725 million, multi sector ABS CDO

Trigger

Effective Date
11/06/2003

Current
12/29/2006

Moody’s Weighted Average Rating Factor

Max

350

277

349

Moody’s Diversity Score

Min

19

19

23.22

S&P Minimum Average Recovery Rate

Min

34%

38%

37.3%

Pass/Fail

Pass

Pass

Pass

Overcollateralization Test (Class C)

Min

101.6%

105.1%

105.15%

Number of Positions Experiencing Writedowns

Max

S&P CDO Monitor

0

Source: ACA ABS 2002-1 from Trustee Report dated 12/31/2006; ACA ABS 2003-1 from Trustee Report dated 12/04/2006; ACA ABS 2003-2 from Trustee Report dated
12/29/2006.

44

ACA - ABS CDO Experience
ACA ABS 2004-1
$450 million, multi sector ABS CDO

Trigger

Effective Date
10/11/2002

Current
01/02/2007

Moody’s Weighted Average Rating Factor

Max

350

346

332

Moody’s Diversity Score

Min

15

15

25

S&P Minimum Average Recovery Rate

Min

33.75%

37.2%

38.6%

Pass/Fail

Pass

Pass

Pass

Min

101.0%

104.0%

105.12%

S&P CDO Monitor
Overcollateralization Test (Class C)
Number of Positions Experiencing Writedowns

0

ACA ABS 2005-1
$452 million, multi sector ABS CDO

Trigger

Effective Date
05/20/2003

Current
12/28/2006

Moody’s Weighted Average Rating Factor

Max

340

338

330

Moody’s Diversity Score

Min

15

15

23

S&P Minimum Average Recovery Rate

Min

53.00%

53.60%

54.50%

Pass/Fail

Pass

Pass

Pass

Min

101.70%

103.70%

104.07%

S&P CDO Monitor
Overcollateralization Test (Class C)

0

Number of Positions Experiencing Writedowns
ACA ABS 2005-2
$450 million, multi sector ABS CDO

Trigger

Effective Date
11/06/2003

Current
12/29/2006

Moody’s Weighted Average Rating Factor

Max

585

542

540

Moody’s Diversity Score

Min

N/A

N/A

N/A

S&P Minimum Average Recovery Rate

Min

30.0%

32.40%

32.5%

Pass/Fail

Pass

Pass

Pass

Min

103.0%

105.56%

105.85%

S&P CDO Monitor
Overcollateralization Test (Class B)
Number of Positions Experiencing Writedowns

0

Source: ACA ABS 2004-1 from Trustee Report dated 01/02/2007; ACA ABS 2005-1 from Trustee Report dated 12/28/2006; ACA ABS 2005-2 from Trustee Report dated
12/29/2006.

45

ACA - ABS CDO Experience
Khaleej II
$750 million, multi sector Synthetic ABS CDO
S&P Minimum Average Recovery Rate
S&P CDO Monitor

Trigger
Min
Pass/Fail

49.5%
Pass

Effective Date
10/11/2002

Current
12/15/2006

Pass

Pass

Pass

Pass

Number of Positions Experiencing Writedowns

0

ACA Aquarius
$2 billion, multi sector ABS CDO
S&P Minimum Average Recovery Rate
S&P CDO Monitor

Trigger
Min
Pass/Fail

Effective Date
11/03/2006

Current
01/03/2007

44%

46.56%

46.56%

Pass

Pass

Pass

Number of Positions Experiencing Writedowns

0

ACA ABS 2006-1
$750 million, multi sector ABS CDO

Trigger

Effective Date
05/31/2006

Current
12/04/2006

Moody's Weighted Average Rating Factor

Max

540

514

514

Moddy’s Asset Correlation

Min

22.5

21.3

21.3

Moody’s Minimum Average Recovery Rate

Min

22.75%

24.29

23.5%

Pass/Fail

Pass

Pass

Pass

Min

110.0%

118.11%

118.05%

S&P CDO Monitor
Overcollateralization Test (Class B-1L)
Number of Defaulted Positions

0

Khaleej II from Trustee Report dated 12/15/2006; ACA Aquarius from Trustee Report dated 01/03/2007; ACA ABS 2006-1 from Trustee Report dated 12/04/2006.

46

ACA - CDS CDO Experience
ACA CDS 2001-1
$1 billion, 5-year synthetic investment grade corporate credits

Trigger

Effective Date
02/14/2002

Current
11/10/2006

Moody's Weighted Average Rating Factor

Max

260

219

694

Diversity Score

Min

54

55

55

Overcollateralization Test

Min

113.2%

121.4%

122.35%
1

Number of Defaulted Positions

ACA CDS 2002-1
$1 billion, 5-year synthetic investment grade corporate credits

Trigger

Effective Date
08/22/2002

Current
12/29/2006

Moody's Weighted Average Rating Factor

Max

260

215

498

Diversity Score

Min

54

55.41

56.13

Pass/Fail

Pass

Pass

Pass

Min

112%

121.89%

118.75%

S&P CDO Monitor
Overcollateralization Test
Number of Defaulted Positions

1

ACA CDS 2002-2
$1 billion, 5-year synthetic investment grade corporate credits

Trigger

Effective Date
05/09/2003

Current
11/30/2006

Moody's Weighted Average Rating Factor

Max

260

216

455

Diversity Score

Min

54

58

59

Overcollateralization Test

Min

112.50%

120.80%

121.96%

Number of Defaulted Positions

0

ACA CDS 2001-1 from Trustee Report dated 11/10/2006; ACA CDS 2002-1 from Trustee Report dated 12/29/2006; ACA CDS 2002-2 from Trustee Report dated 11/30/2006.

47

ACA - High Grade ABS CDO Experience
Grenadier Funding, Limited
$1.5 billion, high grade multi sector ABS CDO

Trigger

Effective Date
01/20/2004

Current
12/29/2006

Moody's Weighted Average Rating Factor

Max

30

9

18

Moody’s Diversity Score

Min

25

46.1

48.3

Pass/Fail

Pass

Pass

Pass

S&P Minimum Average Recovery Rate
Number of Defaulted Positions

0

Zenith Funding, Limited
$1.5 billion, high grade multi sector ABS CDO

Trigger

Effective Date
06/15/2005

Current
12/29/2006

Moody's Weighted Average Rating Factor

Max

40

40

41

Moody’s Diversity Score

Min

15

23

34

Pass/Fail

Pass

Pass

Pass

S&P Minimum Average Recovery Rate
Number of Defaulted Positions

0

Lancer Funding, Limited
$1.5 billion, high grade multi sector ABS CDO

Trigger

Effective Date
03/14/2006

Current
10/31/2006

Moody's Weighted Average Rating Factor

Max

59

57

58

Moody’s Asset Correlation Test

Min

23

21

21.47

Pass/Fail

Pass

Pass

Pass

0

0

S&P Minimum Average Recovery Rate
Number of Defaulted Positions

Source: Grenadier Funding, Limited from Trustee Report dated 12/29/2006; Zenith Funding, Limited from Trustee Report dated 12/29/2006; Lancer Funding, Limited from
Trustee Report dated 10/31/2006.

48

III.

Structure Overview

Credit-Linked Note Structure
Structural Diagram

Put

Put
Premium
Put
Agreement

Collateral
Put Provider
(GSI)

LIBOR flat Basis Swap

Collateral
Interest

Basis Swap
Counterparty
(GSCM)

Super Senior
Amount

Cash
Settlements
Reference
Portfolio

Protection Buyer
(GSCM)

90 Ref Obs
CDS
Premium

360 Moody’s
WARF
(Baa2)

Class A Notes

Credit
Default
Swap

[Aaa]/[AAA]

Proceeds

ABACUS 2007-AC1
(Cayman SPV)

Class B Notes
[Aa2]/[AA]

Class C Notes
[Aa3]/[AA-]

Proceeds
Indenture Investors

Class D Notes
Principal
and
Note
Interest

First Loss
Amount

Principal and Note
Interest

Collateral
Interest

Principal

Proceeds

Credit
Events

[A2]/[A]

Collateral
Securities
These terms are for illustrative purposes only and may not represent the final structure. Refer to the final Offering Circular for the final terms and structure.

50

Credit-Linked Note Structure1
Issuance and Use of Proceeds
ABACUS 2007-AC1, Ltd. (the “Issuer”) a Cayman Islands SPV, will issue the Notes on the closing date. Goldman Sachs will not be paid any structuring, underwriting or placement fees by the Issuer.
The proceeds of the issuance of the Notes will be invested in senior, floating-rate, triple-A structured product securities (the “Collateral Securities”).
− Collateral Securities will be selected by Goldman Sachs, subject to the limitations set forth in the

Offering Circular.
− Any proceeds not invested in Collateral Securities on or after the closing date will be held in cash

or cash equivalents (“Eligible Investments”) pending investment in eligible Collateral Securities.
− There will be no trading or substitution of Collateral Securities by Goldman Sachs; only

reinvestment of principal paydowns into new eligible Collateral Securities will be permitted.
Goldman Sachs will enter into a CDS with the Issuer to buy protection on Reference Portfolio losses related to the Class A through Class D Notes.
− The Collateral Securities and/or Eligible Investments will be available to make payments to

Goldman Sachs in the case of writedowns or other Credit Events occurring on the Reference
Portfolio, which in each case incur writedowns on the Class A through Class D Notes.
Goldman Sachs will cover all upfront expenses of the Issuer through an upfront payment under the
CDS.
Goldman Sachs will cover all ongoing expenses of the Issuer through periodic payments under the
CDS.
(1) These terms are for illustrative purposes only and may not represent the final structure. Refer to the final Offering Circular for the final structure and terms.

51

Credit-Linked Note Structure(1)
Interest Payments on the Notes
The Notes will pay interest monthly at the applicable Series Interest Rate, accrued actual/360 on the daily Outstanding Principal Amount of the Notes.
Goldman Sachs will pay the applicable spread over LIBOR(2) on the Notes to the Issuer via the CDS premium. Goldman Sachs will pay the applicable LIBOR2 index on the Notes to the Issuer via the Basis Swap, versus receiving from the Issuer the interest collections in the relevant period paid on the Collateral
Securities and/or Eligible Investments.

(1) These terms are for illustrative purposes only and may not represent the final structure. Refer to the final Offering Circular for the final structure and terms.
(2) USD LIBOR, or for any Notes issued in Approved Currencies other than USD, the Applicable Index for such Notes.

52

Credit-Linked Note Structure(1)
Principal Payments on the Notes
Any notional principal amortization on Credit Events are applied to amortize the Transaction sequentially. If notional principal is allocated to a Class of Notes, a like par amount of Collateral Securities and/or
Eligible Investments will be liquidated to fund a payment of principal to such Notes.
Goldman Sachs writes a par put (the “Collateral Put”) to the Issuer if Collateral Securities are liquidated in order to fund:
− Cash settlements to Goldman Sachs under the CDS;
− Principal amortization of the Notes reflecting principal amortization of the Reference Portfolio; and
− Optional Redemption of one or more Classes of Notes.

The Collateral Put will not be exercisable upon the occurrence of a Mandatory Redemption of the
Notes.

(1) These terms are for illustrative purposes only and may not represent the final structure. Refer to the final Offering Circular for the final structure and terms.

53

A.

Initial Reference Portfolio

Reference Portfolio
Security
ABFC 2006-OPT1 M8
ABFC 2006-OPT2 M8
ABSHE 2006-HE3 M7
ABSHE 2006-HE4 M7
ACE 2006-FM2 M8
ACE 2006-OP2 M9
ARSI 2006-W1 M8
CARR 2006-FRE1 M9
CARR 2006-FRE2 M8
CARR 2006-NC1 M8
CARR 2006-NC2 M8
CARR 2006-NC3 M9
CARR 2006-OPT1 M8
CMLTI 2006-AMC1 M8
CMLTI 2006-NC1 M8
CMLTI 2006-WFH2 M9
CMLTI 2006-WMC1 M8
CMLTI 2007-WFH1 M9
CWL 2006-24 M8
FFML 2006-FF11 M8
FFML 2006-FF12 M8
FFML 2006-FF14 M8
FFML 2006-FF15 M8
FFML 2006-FF16 M8
FFML 2006-FF17 M8
FFML 2006-FF7 M8
FFML 2006-FF9 M8
FHLT 2006-A M7
FHLT 2006-B M8
FMIC 2006-2 M8
FMIC 2006-3 M8
GSAMP 2006-FM2 M8
HEAT 2006-3 M8
HEAT 2006-5 M8
HEAT 2006-6 M8
HEAT 2006-7 M8
HEAT 2006-8 M8
IXIS 2006-HE3 B2
JPMAC 2006-CW2 MV8
JPMAC 2006-FRE1 M8
JPMAC 2006-WMC3 M8
LBMLT 2006-11 M8
LBMLT 2006-4 M8
LBMLT 2006-6 M8
LBMLT 2006-7 M8

Type
Subprime
Subprime
Subprime
Subprime
Midprime
Subprime
Subprime
Subprime
Subprime
Midprime
Subprime
Subprime
Subprime
Subprime
Subprime
Subprime
Midprime
Subprime
Subprime
Midprime
Midprime
Midprime
Midprime
Midprime
Midprime
Midprime
Midprime
Subprime
Midprime
Midprime
Midprime
Midprime
Midprime
Midprime
Midprime
Midprime
Midprime
Midprime
Midprime
Midprime
Midprime
Midprime
Midprime
Midprime
Midprime

Notional
Amount
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222

CUSIP
00075QAM4
00075XAP2
04541GXK3
04544GAP4
00442CAN9
00441YAP7
040104RQ6
144538AN5
14454AAN9
144531FF2
14453FAM1
144528AN6
144531FV7
17309PAL0
172983AN8
17309MAN3
17307G2F4
17311CAM3
23243HAN1
32028PAP0
32027GAN6
32027LAP0
32028GAP0
320275AN0
32028KAP1
320277AP1
320276AP3
35729RAN6
35729QAN8
31659EAM0
316599AN9
36245DAN0
437084UZ7
437096AQ3
437097AP3
43709NAP8
43709QAP1
46602UAM0
46629BBA6
46626LFV7
46629KAP4
542512AN8
54251MAN4
54251RAN3
54251TAN9

Fitch
BBB
BBB
BBB
BBB

BBB+
BBB+
BBB
BBB
BBBBBB+

A-

BBB
BBB
BBB
BBB
BBB
BBB
BBB+
BBB+
BBB+

BBB+
BBB+
ABBB+
BBB
BBB
BBB
BBB
BBB

BBB+
BBB+

Moody's
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2

S&P
BBB
BBB
BBB
BBB
BBB
BBBBBB+
A
BBB+
BBB+
BBB
BBBABBB
BBB
BBBBBB+
BBBBBB
BBB
BBB
BBB
BBB
BBB+
BBB
BBB
BBB+
BBB
BBB
BBB+
BBB
BBB+
BBB+
BBB+
ABBB+
BBB+
BBB
BBB
BBB
BBB
BBB
ABBB+
A-

Base WAL (yrs)
3.9
4.1
3.8
3.8
4.5
4.3
3.8
3.8
4.2
3.6
3.8
4.0
3.6
4.1
3.8
4.0
3.7
4.5
4.9
3.9
4.2
4.2
4.3
4.3
4.4
3.6
3.7
3.9
4.4
4.1
4.4
4.0
3.5
3.8
4.0
4.2
4.4
4.8
4.3
3.6
4.3
4.7
3.9
4.2
4.2

Dated Date
8/10/2006
10/12/2006
4/17/2006
4/28/2006
10/30/2006
10/30/2006
2/7/2006
6/28/2006
10/18/2006
2/8/2006
6/21/2006
8/10/2006
3/14/2006
9/28/2006
6/29/2006
8/30/2006
1/31/2006
2/9/2007
12/29/2006
9/6/2006
8/25/2006
9/25/2006
10/25/2006
11/30/2006
11/25/2006
5/31/2006
7/7/2006
5/10/2006
8/3/2006
7/6/2006
10/27/2006
9/29/2006
3/30/2006
6/25/2006
8/1/2006
10/3/2006
12/1/2006
9/29/2006
8/8/2006
1/27/2006
9/14/2006
12/14/2006
5/9/2006
7/26/2006
8/30/2006

Legal Final
9/25/2036
10/25/2036
3/25/2036
5/25/2036
8/25/2036
8/25/2036
3/25/2036
7/25/2036
10/25/2036
1/25/2036
6/25/2036
8/25/2036
2/25/2036
9/25/2036
8/25/2036
8/25/2036
12/25/2035
1/25/2037
5/25/2037
8/25/2036
9/25/2036
10/25/2036
11/25/2036
12/25/2036
12/25/2036
5/25/2036
6/25/2036
5/25/2036
8/25/2036
7/25/2036
11/25/2036
9/25/2036
7/25/2036
10/25/2036
11/25/2036
1/25/2037
3/25/2037
1/25/2037
8/25/2036
5/25/2035
8/25/2036
12/25/2036
5/25/2036
7/25/2036
8/25/2036

Servicer
OOMC
OOMC
OOMC
SPS
WFB
WFB
AQMC
FREM
FREM
NCMC
CARR
NCMC
OOMC
AQMC
WFB
WFB
WFB
WFB
CHLS
WFB
ALS
AURA
AURA
NCHL
ALS
WFB
WFB
WFB
WFB
WFB
WFB
WFB
SPS
WFB
SPS
SPS
SPS
WFB
CWHL
JPM
JPM
WMB
WMB
WMB
WMB

As of February 26, 2007. Goldman Sachs neither represents nor provides any assurances that the actual Reference Portfolio on the Closing Date or any future date will have the same characteristics as represented above. See the final Offering Circular for the Initial Reference Portfolio.
Reference Obligations are designated as “Midprime” herein if the weighted average FICO score of the underlying collateral that secures such Reference Obligation is greater than
625. All other Reference Obligations are designated as “Subprime” herein.

55

Reference Portfolio
Security
LBMLT 2006-WL1 M8
MABS 2006-HE5 M9
MABS 2006-NC2 M9
MABS 2006-WMC4 M8
MLMI 2006-WMC1 B2A
MSAC 2006-HE7 B2
MSAC 2006-HE8 B2
MSAC 2006-NC4 B2
MSAC 2006-NC5 B3
MSAC 2006-WMC1 B2
MSAC 2006-WMC2 B2
MSAC 2007-NC1 B2
MSC 2006-HE2 B2
MSIX 2006-2 B2
NHEL 2006-5 M8
NHELI 2006-FM1 M8
NHELI 2006-FM2 M8
NHELI 2006-HE3 M8
OOMLT 2007-1 M8
SABR 2006-FR1 B2
SABR 2006-FR3 B2
SABR 2006-HE2 B2
SAIL 2006-4 M7
SASC 2006-EQ1A M8
SASC 2006-OPT1 M7
SURF 2007-BC1 B2
SVHE 2006-EQ2 M8
SVHE 2006-OPT1 M7
SVHE 2006-OPT2 M7
SVHE 2006-OPT3 M7
SVHE 2006-OPT5 M8
ABSHE 2006-HE7 M9
BSABS 2006-HE9 M9
CMLTI 2007-AMC1 M8
FFML 2007-FF1 B2
HASC 2006-HE2 M8
HEAT 2007-1 M8
LBMLT 2006-8 M8
LBMLT 2006-9 M8
MLMI 2006-HE6 B3
MLMI 2006-OPT1 B2
MSAC 2007-HE1 B2
OOMLT 2006-3 M9
SASC 2006-WF3 M9
SVHE 2006-OPT4 M7

Type
Midprime
Subprime
Subprime
Midprime
Midprime
Subprime
Midprime
Subprime
Midprime
Midprime
Midprime
Subprime
Midprime
Midprime
Subprime
Midprime
Midprime
Subprime
Subprime
Midprime
Subprime
Subprime
Subprime
Subprime
Subprime
Subprime
Midprime
Subprime
Subprime
Subprime
Subprime
Subprime
Subprime
Subprime
Midprime
Midprime
Midprime
Midprime
Midprime
Subprime
Subprime
Subprime
Subprime
Subprime
Subprime

Notional
Amount
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222
22,222,222

CUSIP
542514RD8
576455AN9
55275BAP2
57645MAP7
59020U4H5
61750MAP0
61750SAP7
61748LAN2
61749BAQ6
61744CXV3
61749KAP8
617505AN2
617451FD6
617463AM6
66988YAN2
65536HCF3
65537FAN1
65536QAN8
68400DAP9
81375WJY3
813765AH7
81377AAM4
86360WAM4
86360RAN3
86359UAN9
84752BAQ2
83611XAM6
83611MMF2
83611MMT2
83611MPR3
83612CAN9
04544QAP2
07389MAP2
17311BAL7
32028TAN7
44328BAP3
43710LAN4
54251UAN6
54251WAN2
59023XAN6
59022VAN1
617526AP3
68389BAM5
86361EAP6
83611YAM4

Fitch

BBB

BBB
BBB+
BBB
BBB

BBB+
BBB+
BBB+
BBB+
BBB+
BBB
BBB
BBB
BBB+

BBB-

BBB+
BBB

BBB-

Moody's
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2
Baa2

S&P
BBB
BBBBBBBBB+
BBB+
BBB
BBB
BBB
BBBABBB
BBB
BBB+
BBB
BBB+
BBB+
BBB+
BBB+
BBB
ABBB
BBB
BBB
BBB
BBB
BBB
BBB
BBB
ABBB
BBB
BBBBBBBBB
BBB
BBB+
BBB+
ABBB+
BBBBBB
BBB
BBBBBBBBB+

Base WAL (yrs)
3.1
4.5
4.2
4.6
3.6
4.9
5.1
4.5
5.3
4.2
4.7
5.3
4.5
5.0
4.0
3.3
4.1
4.0
4.3
4.6
5.0
4.1
4.1
5.2
3.7
4.9
4.6
3.6
3.6
3.7
4.2
4.4
4.4
4.6
4.8
4.3
4.5
4.4
4.4
4.6
3.9
5.2
4.0
4.3
3.6

Dated Date
2/8/2006
12/28/2006
9/28/2006
11/30/2006
2/14/2006
10/31/2006
11/29/2006
6/23/2006
11/28/2006
1/26/2006
6/28/2006
1/26/2007
4/28/2006
11/28/2006
9/28/2006
1/30/2006
10/31/2006
8/31/2006
1/24/2007
2/23/2006
8/3/2006
9/28/2006
6/25/2006
7/17/2006
4/25/2006
1/24/2007
12/28/2006
3/10/2006
4/7/2006
5/12/2006
6/19/2006
11/30/2006
11/30/2006
3/9/2007
1/26/2007
12/5/2006
2/1/2007
9/21/2006
10/12/2006
12/28/2006
9/26/2006
1/26/2007
10/27/2006
9/25/2006
5/26/2006

Legal Final
1/25/2036
11/25/2036
8/25/2036
10/25/2036
1/25/2037
9/25/2036
10/25/2036
6/25/2036
10/25/2036
12/25/2035
7/25/2036
11/25/2036
3/25/2036
11/25/2036
11/25/2036
11/25/2035
7/25/2036
7/25/2036
1/25/2037
11/25/2035
5/25/2036
7/25/2036
7/25/2036
7/25/2036
4/25/2036
1/25/2038
1/25/2037
3/25/2036
5/25/2036
6/25/2036
7/25/2036
11/25/2036
11/25/2036
12/25/2036
1/25/2038
12/25/2036
5/25/2037
9/25/2036
10/25/2036
11/25/2037
8/25/2037
11/25/2036
2/25/2037
9/25/2036
6/25/2036

Servicer
LBMC
WFB
WFB
WFB
WCC
CWHL
WFB
WFB
CWHL
JPM
WFB
CWHL
WFB
SAX
NOVA
WFB
WFB
WFB
OOMC
HSC
HSC
HSC
ALS
AURA
AURA
WCC
OLS
OOMC
OOMC
OOMC
OOMC
SPS
EMC
CWHL
HLS
CMB
SPS
WMB
WMB
WCC
OOMC
SM
OOMC
ALS
OOMC

As of February 26, 2007. Goldman Sachs neither represents nor provides any assurances that the actual Reference Portfolio on the Closing Date or any future date will have the same characteristics as represented above. See the final Offering Circular for the Initial Reference Portfolio.
Reference Obligations are designated as “Midprime” herein if the weighted average FICO score of the underlying collateral that secures such Reference Obligation is greater than
625. All other Reference Obligations are designated as “Subprime” herein.

56

B.

Selected ACA Biographies(1)

(1) All information concerning ACA Capital, its prior experience and its personnel contained herein has been provided by ACA Capital as of February
19, 2007 (unless otherwise specified herein) and no such data has been independently verified by Goldman Sachs.

Select ACA Biographies
ALAN ROSEMAN
President and Chief Executive Officer
Alan Roseman is President and Chief Executive Officer of ACA Capital which he joined in May 2004. He also serves as Deputy Chairman of the
Board of Directors. Prior to joining ACA Capital, Mr. Roseman was the Executive Vice President and Co-Chief Operating Officer, as well as a member of the Executive and Underwriting Committees of ACE Financial Solutions. Before joining ACE, he served for ten years as General
Counsel and as a member of the Executive Committee of Capital Re Corporation, a financial guaranty reinsurance company.
Mr. Roseman’s career in the financial guaranty industry began as a first vice president with Ambac Indemnity Corporation. From 1982-1984, he practiced law as an associate with Mordrall, Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk in Albuquerque, NM and then with Kirkland & Ellis in Denver, Colorado.
Mr. Roseman was admitted to the Bar of the State of New York in 1984 and is a member of the New York Bar Association.
Mr. Roseman received his Bachelor’s degree in Economics from the University of Rochester and his J.D. from Boston University School of Law.

LAURA SCHWARTZ
Senior Managing Director
Laura Schwartz is Senior Managing Director of ACA Capital and COO of ACA Management, responsible for the company’s CDO Asset
Management, platform, including overseeing all proprietary CDO business encompassing ABS, CMBS, corporate credits and leveraged loans.
Prior to joining ACA Capital, Ms. Schwartz was a director in the Asset Backed Finance Group at Merrill Lynch responsible for the origination and execution of U.S. sub-prime residential mortgage backed securities and whole loan mortgage pool purchases. Her clients included specialty finance companies, national and regional banks, international mortgage originators, money managers, and internet originators. Ms. Schwartz was previously a director in Merrill Lynch’s Global Real Estate Finance Group, responsible for origination and execution of commercial mortgage backed and residential mortgage backed securities outside of the United States with primary focus on Canada and Latin America. Transactions included single property, large loan securitization and seasoned loan portfolio securitizations including the use of derivative contracts such as interest rate, prepayment and credit default swaps. Ms. Schwartz began her career at New York Life Insurance Company as a senior analyst in the Commercial Mortgage Loans Group before becoming real estate vice president in the Mortgage Finance Group. Her last position there was as managing director in the Structured Finance Group, managing the public and private asset-backed and commercial mortgage backed securities portfolios of New York Life Insurance Company and its managed accounts.
Ms. Schwartz received her BA, cum laude, in Political Science from the University of Michigan and her MBA from New York University. She holds a CFA designation.

58

Select ACA Biographies
JAMES ROTHMAN
Senior Managing Director
James Rothman heads ACA’s Structured Credit group. Prior to his current role, Mr. Rothman developed ACA's senior structured credit business and also served as a credit analyst, covering mortgage and asset-backed securities and corporate credit.
From 2000-2001, Mr. Rothman was a Vice President at GE Capital Commercial Finance, responsible for the origination of trade accounts receivable securitization transactions. From 1998-2000, Mr. Rothman was a Director in the ABS Group of Deutsche Bank Securities, responsible for managing key customers and executing securitization transactions in the home equity and recreational vehicle sectors. From 1996-1998, he was a Vice President in PaineWebber’s Asset Finance Group, responsible for managing securitized and whole loan transactions in multiple asset classes, including mortgages, home equity loans, subprime auto loans and trade accounts receivable. Prior to joining PaineWebber, Mr. Rothman was Vice President for Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation, responsible for managing a variety of structured mortgage transactions involving performing and non-performing residential mortgages.
A graduate of the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton School with a Bachelor of Science in Economics, Mr. Rothman holds a Masters degree in
Public and Private Management from the Yale School of Management.

HAO WU
Managing Director
Hao Wu is Managing Director, Head of Structured Finance Risk and Modeling for ACA Capital. Mr. Wu is responsible for portfolio and credit risk management issues for ACA’s proprietary CDO business and the structured credit business.
Prior to joining ACA, Mr. Wu was Senior Vice President, Managing Director and Head of Global Structured Product – Financial Products for
Radian Asset Assurance Inc. His mandate was to develop and grow credit derivatives and synthetic products business. He was instrumental in building a book of business of single tranche CDOs, CDO^2, ABS CDOs and other Credit Default Swap products, and developing new products such as Options on Single Tranche CDOs and First to Default Basket of ABS. He also helped in establishing a U.K broker-dealer subsidiary based in London. Prior to Radian, he was senior financial analyst for American International Group, structuring and executing derivative transactions and analyzing portfolio risk and devising hedging strategies. He was a member of AIG Derivatives Committee.
Mr. Wu received both a Ph.D. in Electrical Engineering and an MBA in Finance from University of Southern California, Los Angeles. He also attended Executive Education Programs at Harvard Business School. Mr. Wu holds CFA designation.

59

Select ACA Biographies
DENNIS KRAFT
Managing Director
Dennis Kraft is Managing Director for ACA, responsible for ABS credit.
Prior to joining ACA, Mr. Kraft was director and head of consumer ABS research at Wachovia. Before joining Wachovia, he was head of credit research and trading at Conning Asset Management in Hartford, Connecticut. Mr. Kraft has an extensive background in structured finance. He spent eight years at The Hartford Financial Services Group. He was director of structured securities and sector manager, responsible for more than $10 billion of ABS and CMBS portfolios for Hartford. He spent five years at The Travelers Cos., as asset class manager for over $5 billion of mortgage-backed securities.
Mr. Kraft was head of mathematical and statistical applications at DRI/McGraw-Hill, and was an economist at the Federal Reserve Board and at
The President’s Council on Wage and Price Stability.
Mr. Kraft has a Ph.D. in economics from the University of California – San Diego.
KEITH GORMAN
Director
Keith Gorman is a Director in the CDO Asset Management and is the Portfolio Manager for the ABS CDOs. Mr. Gorman’s previous role at ACA
Capital was Senior Credit Analyst, responsible for overseeing the credit team and leading ACA’s RMBS credit analysis and originator and servicer reviews. Prior to joining ACA Capital in 2003, Mr. Gorman was an analyst in the RMBS group at Fitch Ratings. His primarily responsibilities were loan level analysis and structuring of sub-prime transactions, as well as surveillance of sub-prime mortgage, manufactured housing, and net interest margin transactions. He began his career as an analyst with Lewtan Technologies.
Mr. Gorman holds a B.S. as well as an M.A. in Economics from the University of Delaware.
AVA REGAL
Director
Ava Regal is Director in the CDO Asset Management Group of ACA Capital. She is responsible for the student loan and CDO asset classes as well as analysis and credit approval for ACA's asset management activities. Ms. Regal also participates in documentation and deal execution on the ABS CDOs.
Prior to joining ACA Capital, Ms. Regal worked in the Credit Structured Products Group at Gen Re Securities working to expand Gen Re’s capabilities into structured finance through proprietary and third party CDOs. Before joining Gen Re, she was an Investment Banking Analyst with
Prudential Securities in the CDO Group where her responsibilities included marketing presentations to clients as well as assistance in deal execution. Ms. Regal received her Bachelor’s degree in Finance from Boston University in 1999.

60

Select ACA Biographies
SHELBY CARVALHO
Director
Shelby Carvalho is a Director in ACA’s Structured Credit group. Mr. Carvalho leads the Structured Credit group’s investment efforts in the U.S. for risk related to ABS CDOs and other asset-backed products. Prior to joining the Structured Credit group in July 2004, he was responsible for structuring and documenting ACA’s proprietary ABS CDOs. From February 2003 to July 2004 and concurrent with his work on ACA’s CDOs, Mr.
Carvalho traded single-name credit default swaps for ACA’s corporate CDOs and served as a corporate credit analyst for various industries including airlines, aerospace and defense, cargo transportation and retailers. From July 2001 to February 2003, he was responsible for analyzing asset-backed credits for investment by ACA’s proprietary CDOs, covering various asset classes including business loans, equipment leases, aircraft, EETCs, and tobacco litigation receivables.
Prior to joining ACA in July 2001, Mr. Carvalho worked as an Associate in the Asset Backed Finance Group of Prudential Securities. At Prudential
Securities, he was involved in all aspects of asset securitization including relationship management, transaction execution and structuring interim loan facilities for securitization assets. Mr. Carvalho covered several asset sectors, including equipment leases, mortgage-related ABS, repackaged securities and pooled aircraft receivables. From 1996 – 1999, Mr. Carvalho served as an Analyst in Prudential’s Asset Backed
Finance Group.
Mr. Carvalho received a Bachelor of Arts in Economics from Yale University.

JEFFREY WYNER
Vice President

.

Jeffrey Wyner is a Vice President in the ABS Credit Group of ACA Capital. As ACA Capital’s commercial real estate specialist, he is responsible for assessment and investment in CMBS, REIT and other real estate related securities for ACA Capital. Prior to joining ACA Capital, Mr. Wyner advised companies acquiring and financing real estate assets and securities. Before forming his advisory firm, Mr. Wyner was a Vice President at
Lehman Brothers, Inc. where he provided CMBS deal management for the securitization of more than $15 billion of high yield and large loans.
Prior to Lehman Brothers, he was a commercial real estate asset manager with GE Capital and a Senior Financial Analyst for a company of real estate joint venture partnerships held by Olympia & York, Inc. (USA). Mr. Wyner began his career working in architecture/ engineering firms providing urban planning and land development services for projects in the US and overseas.
Mr. Wyner received his Bachelors degree in Natural Resources from the University of Michigan and his MBA from the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.

61

Select ACA Biographies
TRACY PORTNOY
Vice President
Tracy Portnoy is a Vice President in the ABS Credit Group of ACA Capital. Prior to joining ACA Capital, Ms. Portnoy worked at JPMorgan in CDO investor relations and more recently in US asset-backed research covering Home Equity, Autos, Student Loans, and Credit Cards.
Ms. Portnoy completed her B.S. at Cornell University in Applied Resource Managerial Economics.
LUCAS WESTREICH
Vice President
Lucas Westreich is a Vice President in the CDO Asset Management Group of ACA. He is responsible for Execution and Operation functions within the ABS areas.Prior to joining ACA, Mr. Westreich was an Economics Research Assistant at Boston University responsible for collecting data on international markets. Before joining the economics department, Mr.Westreich held an internship with a division of Carlin Equities. He was a trading floor assistant where his responsibilities included tracking equity positions and analyzing market trends.
Mr. Westreich received both his Bachelor’s and Master’s degree in Economics from Boston University. He graduated from the combined BA/MA program in four years.
SARAH DUNN
Assistant Portfolio Manager
Sarah Dunn is an Assistant Portfolio Manager in the CDO Asset Management Group at ACA. Prior to joining ACA, Ms. Dunn worked as an analyst in the CDO Global Trust Services Department of LaSalle Bank. Her duties included running trade compliance models and developing monthly investor reports.
Ms. Dunn earned her B.A. in Business Administration and English Literature from Trinity University

62

Select ACA Biographies
RITU B. CHACHRA
Associate
Ritu B. Chachra is an Associate in the ABS Credit Group of ACA Capital. Prior to joining ACA Capital, Ms. Chachra worked at JPMorgan Asset
Management where she was responsible for credit research and analytics relating to term asset-backed securities and asset-backed commercial paper investments. Prior to this role, she worked with Strategic Investment Advisory Group and performed specialized asset/liability and asset allocation analyses for pension funds and endowments.
Ms.Chachra holds a B.A. in Economics from Delhi University, India and an M.A. in Economics from University of Virginia. Ms. Chachra is a CFA charter holder.
GREG HACKETT
Analyst
Greg Hackett is an Analyst in ABS Credit Group of ACA Capital. Prior to joining ACA Capital, Mr. Hackett worked at Fitch Ratings, where he was an analyst in the RMBS group. While at Fitch, Mr. Hackett assigned ratings for deals from several issuers, including scratch-and-dent deals. In addition, he was responsible for cash flow modeling and structuring for NIM transactions for all issuers.
Mr. Hackett earned a B.S in Finance from Pace University.
THOMAS LATRONICA
Analyst
Thomas Latronica is an Analyst in the ABS Credit Group of ACA Capital. Prior to joining ACA Capital, Mr. Latronica held an internship with a
Connecticut based brokerage firm.
Mr. Latronica graduated from Sacred Heart University where he earned his B.S. in Business Administration.

63

C.

Goldman Sachs Contact Information

Goldman Sachs Contacts
Structured Product Global Syndicate
Asia
Omar Chaudhary

+81 (3) 6437 7198

Europe
Mitch Resnick
Tets Ishikawa

+44 (0)20 7774 3068
+44 (0)20 7774 1025

North America
Bunty Bohra
Scott Wisenbaker
Robert Black

+1 212 902 7645
+1 212 902 2858
+1 212 902-5359

Structured Product Correlation Trading & Structuring
Jonathan Egol
Fabrice Tourre
David Gerst
Jordan Kaufman
Darren Thomas
Geoff Williams
Shin Yukawa

+1 212 357 3349
+1 212 902 5891
+1 212 902 4311
+1 212 902 3550
+1 212 357 8650
+1 212 357 0818
+1 212 902 4370

Structured Credit Marketing
Shlomi Raz
Christopher Shin
Will Bruns

+1 212 902-2117
+1 212 357-3331
+1 212 357-5825
65

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