ADDITIONAL NOTE ON PROGRESSIVE CASE (TO BE CONSIDERED FOR CASE ANALYSIS)
In March 2000 Progressive began to offer a new product: homeowners insurance. Made available first in an Arizona pilot, the program was extended to Michigan in October 2000, Maryland in January 2001, and Illinois in September 2001. Marketed initially through specially selected and trained independent insurance agents, Progressive’s homeowners policies were eventually to be\ offered, along with its primary product, auto insurance, through the company’s two direct channels, its 800-number and web site. Many consumers sought the convenience of bundling auto and homeowners insurance rather than dealing with separate companies for each policy. Some insurers even offered discounts to customers who consolidated their coverage. Progressive executives thus viewed homeowners insurance as a natural extension of the company’s auto-insurance product suite. In 1997 Progressive ran a trial partnership in Ohio with Travellers Casualty, a major player in homeowners insurance, whereby consumers were offered homeowners quotes when they called for auto insurance. By 2000, Progressive had decided to offer its own homeowners product. 2 The product was launched slowly in select states. The move into homeowners seemed an obvious choice for Progressive. The data-driven company had success in providing auto insurance rates that more accurately (and less expensively) reflected individual consumers’ coverage needs. Cross-selling to these satisfied customers would be a snap. What could they lose?

Auto and Homeowners Markets Contrasted
Homeowners and auto insurance constituted more than half of all property and casualty (P/C) insurance sold in the United States (Exhibit 1). Larger competitors such as State Farm devoted substantial parts of their business to homeowners insurance (Exhibit 2 orders top-ten homeowners’