Contents
Title Page ………………………………………………..……………………………………………………………………………………. I
Introduction …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… III
Fault Tree One ……………………………………………….…………………………………………………………………………...... III
Discussion of Fault Tree One …………………………………………….………………………………………………. III
Fault Tree Two ………………………………………………….…………………………………………………………………………… V
Discussion of Fault Tree Two …………………………………………………………………………………………… V
Conclusion ………………………………………………….…………………………………………………………………………………. VII
Works cited ……………………………………………….………………………………………………………………………………….. VIII

Introduction
“To design systems that work correctly we often need to understand and correct how they can go wrong” ( Dan Goldin, NASA Administrator, 2000).
This paper illustrates the mechanical failures that occur with the manufacturing of the Boeing 787 Dreamliner. The risk shows possible adverse impact on the two-fault tree analysis presented. Fault tree one looks at risk concerning on boarding flight controls and fault tree two looks at the filtration system aboard the 787 Dreamliner.
Fault Tree 1-Onboard Flight Control Failure

Boeing, based out of Everett, Washington, has contracted with an outside company by the name of Green Hills Software of Santa Barbara. Green Hills assignment, for all of the 787’s is to “write the operating system for the onboard flight-control computers” (Hisey, 2007). The company prides its self on creating operating systems that never crash.
This part of manufacturing the Dreamliner was outsourced from Honeywell, the company that performs a major portion of software configuration for Boeing, because Honeywell does no specialize in airplane operating systems. The intermediate event is the onboard flight control failure. The basic event of failure in a system creates a series of event and possible risk. If the controls are not compatible with the