Eli GreenspanGVPT409HKastner05-10-2012Can India and China Rise Peacefully?India and China are two of the world’s oldest civilization-states and are now aspiring superpowers engaged in the global economy and possess expanding military capabilities.1Cultural and economic ties date back to Ancient times when the Silk Road was used as a major trade route between the two great countries. Over the course of the 20th century, relations between the two ranged from allying and friendship, to intense conflicts over border disputes.2Despite these crisis’s, the two nations have developed close economic ties that are mutually beneficial. Trade has increased dramatically over the past decade and companies form joint ventures to further ties. History shows that this has not always been the case, and the competitivenature between the two states stems from border disputes from the early 1950s to the late 1980s.3Despite gestures towards a peaceful partnership throughout the 1950s, those gestures were challenged by actions in the disputed territories. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, signed in 1954, is an example of such cooperation. However, China nor India 1Malik, Mohan. "India-China Relations: Giants Stir, Cooperate and Compete." Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (2004).2Malik, Mohan. 3 Malik, Mohan.1 followed these closely and still lead to major conflict following these meetings. Nevertheless, this agreement stated the principles as:1.Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty2.Mutual non-aggression3.Mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs4.Equality and mutual benefit5.Peaceful co-existence The 1956-1957 construction of a Chinese military highway in the disputed territory of Aksai Chin, just west of Tibet, was viewed as a major threat to India’s territorial claims. After years of attempting a diplomatic resolution to no avail, relations suffered a major setback when Indian Prime Minister Nehru welcomed the Dalai Lama into India in 1959 after a failed uprising againstChinese rule in Tibet. In 1961, India’s forward policy was also at the root of Chinese motives to launch the offensive, as it certainly lead to Chinese military buildup along the disputed border. This program created both skirmishes and deteriorating relations between India and China.4Numerous small Indian army posts had been set up in Chinese claimed and controlled territory, and all had been closely confronted by the PLA, always in superior force. Armed clashes had occurred, the Chinese suffered casualties. Beijing’s protests and warning that China’s forces would be forced to retaliate had become angry and explicit.54 Calvin, 19845 Maxwell, Neville. “Sino-Indian Border Dispute Reconsidered.” Economic and Political Weely. Vol. 34, No. 15. 905-918. 1999.2
Months of posturing and movements of troops along the border only escalated the situation. China feared that an Indian-Soviet Union-United States alliance would encircle China and challenge its territorial claim and suffocate its ambitions. China insisted that India intended to seize Tibet and make it a protectorate, or return it to its pre-1949 status.6 This idea was supportedin China by India’s aggressive actions in the region, specifically sending the army into the small Portuguese territory of Goa.7In October, 1962, China launched its offensive as the intensity of the Cuban Missile Crisis occupied the USSR and United States in Cuba. China feared that either side would aid India in a war, so having both preoccupied with the other would decrease the likelihood of their involvement. China’s gains were securing the border and retaining control of Aksai Chin, but they had deep affects on the Indian psyche. “The experience of 1962 made Indiadeeply skepticalof Chinese professions of friendship and more wary of the expansion ofChinese security ties with South Asian countries neighboring India” (Garver 62).8 Other incidents, such as the Chola incident,9 occurred between the nations after the 1962 war and created a deep sense of mistrust still felt today.6 Calvin, 19847 Garver, James8 Garver, James9 Maxwell, Neville. “Sino-Indian Border Dispute Reconsidered.” Economic and Political Weely. Vol. 34, No. 15. 905-918. 1999.3
The 1987 Sino-Indian skirmish was the last major military border dispute to occur between the two countries. The Indian army was probing areas along the border, areas north of the McMahon Line, and setting up positions threatening the Chinese outposts. The two sides were only meters from each other, but China, unlike the 1962 conflict, was not going be provoked into retaliation.10 The conflict subsided at the end of 1987 after both the United States and Soviet Union took steps to find a resolution. Disengagement followed in some areas, but India’s intentions were clear. The Indian army felt rejuvenated by China’s passive response and found victory in the skirmish. Over twenty years after the first major conflict, India needed to find a way to get over the humiliation that came in defeat during the ’62 conflict. It is clear that India is in large part responsible for the trivial border disputes over the pastfifty years. Their irrational policy-making, like the forward policy, had detrimental consequenceson relations between the two states. Plus, India’s refusal to hold sit-down negotiations with Chinaonly exacerbated the situation. Beijing openly declared in 1963 its willingness to negotiate with New Delhi, with the intention of jointly demarcating the border and easing tension along it. The move was considered “unthinkable” in New Delhi, which policymakers would view as further humiliation.11 It was not until 2005 that the two countries made a pledge to establish an “India-China strategic and cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity” (Kang 92). Even this announcement has not lead to any major resolutions. 10 Maxwell, Neville. 199911 Maxwell, Neville. “Sino-Indian Border Dispute Reconsidered.” Economic and Political Weely. Vol. 34, No. 15. 905-918. 1999.4
While economic ties are the closest in the region today, it is clear that the two nations are still in a competitive state rather than a complementary one. Both believe the other is encircling it with the help of its neighbors, and are taking steps to improve relations in the region. China’s need for energy opened the door for closer ties with Pakistan, and a large investment in Afghanistan ensures China will play a role in its development. Furthermore, China’s ties to Pakistan opens diplomatic channels to other Islamic nations in the Gulf. It has also taken major steps to improve relations with its neighbors, like it did with India in 2005 even though the dispute is unresolved. It is clear that neighboring countries in Southeast Asia are more aligning militarily with Beijing than balancing its military might. Yet, India continues to improve relations with Japan, who seeks to balance the power in the region.12 China is well aware of this, and to India’s disappointment, deepening economic ties have not led to posture changes on the Chinese side. China has a long list of demands for India and is doing what it can to keep India from achieving status in several key international organizations, such as the UN Security Council. That being said, China does not pose a threat to India but is rather taking the appropriate steps as an emerging global power to protect its growing interests at home and abroad. India’s response has been in large part a response to Chinese developments, but as we will see India faces strong domestic and international pressure to remain tough on China. The essay will be divided into five parts. Part I will discuss China’s National Security andits security goals, as well as how its climb to the international stage through consistent economic 12 Japan courts India to counter China. The Economic Times. 2007.5 growth calls for military modernization. Part two will discuss China’s economic role in the region and the world, and steps it is taking to supplant itself as global leader. The economies of China and India will also be compared to show that China tops India in numerous categories, anduses that to apply pressure on India. Part three will discuss China’s modernization and the steps ithas taken over the past twenty years to bring its military and navy into the 21st century. Whether the move is hegemonic or a natural progression for an emerging power will also be explored. Part four will discuss India’s responses to China’s modernization and whether its actions are in direct response to China, other international concerns, or domestic political pressure. Part five will explore what kind of factor U.S. involvement in the region plays and whether it will increaseor decrease over the next decade as both India and China assert themselves into the region. I. China National Defense Strategy China sees its future more closely connected with the international community in the 21stcentury than it has ever before. Through its development and economical initiatives around the globe, China sees itself playing an important role in global affairs, and is reaffirming its commitment to “mutual trust, mutual benefit, and win-win cooperation with its neighbors and theWest.”13 The white paper discusses China’s expanding military capabilities and efforts taken by the military to boost modernization and informatization.14 The efforts come on the heels of adapting security challenges such as: terrorism, economic insecurity, nuclear proliferation, insecurity of information, and natural disasters. While this edition of the white paper is 13 China National Defense 2010. 14 China National Defense 2010.6 particularly significant, it still has ambiguity with regards to the military, making it difficult to judge its true capabilities.15That being said, China lays out its goals of national defense in the new era and defined them thoroughly. First and foremost, safeguarding national sovereignty, security, and interests of national development. China’s national defense is tasked to guard against and resist aggression, defend the security of China’s territory and maritime borders, as well as maintain security interests in space and cyber space.16 “National defense is both subordinate to and in service of thecountry's development and security strategies” (China white paper, 2010). In identifying its first goal, China makes it clear that its economic rise and increased global involvement call for improved defense strategies in the form of military modernization. The next goal is maintaining social harmony and stability. China relies on its armed forces to actively contribute to social development, as well as civilian infrastructure and engineering projects. China praises its military for undertaking emergency rescue and disaster relief, furthering the military’s involvement with civilians. China holds social stability as its utmost priority, to a level that has drawn international attention and condemnation. What this does show is the diverse use of the military during peacetime, and the role it can play in disaster relief, nation building, UN peacekeeping, and activities in the South China Sea, Gulf of Aden, and off the coast of Somalia.1715 Hwang, Jaeho. China’s National Defense in 2010. Geopolitcial Monitor. Pacific Forum, 2011. 16 China National Defense 2010.7
When we explore China’s economic development, we will see that its growth is consistent with the modernization of the military and its goals for national defense. In fact, we will see that China has been contributing more to the global recovery than the United States. Until recently, China’s only legitimacy was providing consistent economic growth. It was not a military power nor did it project itself as one. “For that reason alone, China needs such growth in order to maintain regime stability, which has meant emphasizing not just stable political relations with other countries, but also stable and open economic relations around the world” (Kang 85). China has taken the step to improve both political and economic relations with its neighbors, who in large part do not view China as a military threat (Kang 59). However, it shouldbe noted that Kang makes no mention of India or its relations with China. II. Economic RiseIn 1998, amid Western speculation that China would be forced to devalue its currency amid the Asian financial crisis to protect the competitiveness of its exports, China chose to maintain the value of its currency.“[China] did so under huge pressure and at a big price. But it contributed considerably to the financial and economic stability and to the development in Asia in particular and the world at large.” China was seen as a savior of sorts to these countries, providing over $4 billion in aid through IMF-organized projects in wake of the crisis.18 China assumed the role of leader in the region and began forming strong ties with these developing nations. 17 China’s National Defense, 2010. 18 Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Pro-Active Policies by China in Response to Asian Financial Crisis.”2000.8
China is a growing nation and one that will soon be the largest economy on the planet, surpassing the United States. In the past fifteen years, China joined the World Trade Organization, which saw its global trade value rise from $324 billion in 1998 to $2.4 trillion in 2011. The United States is China’s largest trade partner, with 385.3 billion in total volume as of 2010.19 China has increased its trade within the region and globally, with Brazil coming in just ahead of India with 62.5 billion in trade in 2010. But China has also increased its global investment, from Afghanistan to Africa to South America.Since the fall of the Taliban and dismantling of Al-Qaeda, China has reestablished economic relations with Afghanistan as the U.S. and NATO troops fight to stabilize the country. In the past decade, Chinese products have taken over the market and China has started investing in Afghanistan’s mine fields as well. The majority of Afghans live on a low income, therefore do not mind low quality Chinese products that find their way to Afghan markets and vendors. Other countries that typically invested in Afghanistan have gone away for a variety of reasons, giving way to China securing itself as a fixture in its economy and development. China also makes it incredibly easier than countries like Pakistan, Iran, and Tajikistan to secure a visa to travel. “[Afghanis] have been profiled, delayed or rejected. Even now, it is not easy to get a visa for those countries, but every day hundreds of Afghan citizens acquire Chinese visas at a low fee andin a short time.”20 China is working in Afghanistan in a variety of ways, and if stability can be improved the country’s economy could boom over the course of the next decade. The role China 19 China’s Customs Statistics. 2010. 20 Nasim, Fekrat. 2011.9 plays reflects very well in the region, especially given to the intervention most Afghans have been subjected to for the previous ten years. China is also eager to invest in Africa and has taken steps to provide assistance to countries with diplomatic ties. In Nigeria, for example, Chinese engineering companies reported earning a total of $6.1 billion in revenues from projects between 2000 and 2008.21 China has onlygiven $220 million in official development assistance (ODA) in that same time period, showing it is focused more on economic cooperation than it is aid. Nevertheless, China’s involvement in other countries, along with its growing import and export totals, make it a priority to improve military capacities to better monitor activity where interests are at stake. Many countries welcome China’s growth and see it as beneficial for the region, even oneswith especially close ties to the United States.22 Common values and mutual respect have lead to channels of cooperation, along with reassurances of its intentions. “China and the Southeast Asian states place high value on respecting sovereignty and pursuing nation-building, and this similarity of perspectives has been a key reason why China and Southeast Asia have managed to adjust and learn to cooperate over numerous issues” (Kang 126). China’s growth and need to protect its investments give way to its modernization and informationization. The region is aligning itself with China, and the West is embracing China’s rise. Is India the only responsible nation in the region that could sustain growth to balance with China?21 Brautigam, Deborah. Chinese Development Aid in Africa. 2010 22 (Kang 126).10