Introduction

The purpose of this essay, based on the two articles concerning the mounting of the Dieppe Raid in 1942 is to compare and evaluate how each of the articles approaches the subject matter. Find out how the authors differ in their interpretation, and why do they arrive at different conclusions. This paper discusses the ways that war is portrayed in the articles. It specifically discusses and compares two article pieces that reflect the heavy weight of the Raid on Dieppe. Also, in my thesis, I will explain which interpretation I find the most persuasive.

Narrative In the planning of the Raid on Dieppe Peter Henshaw stated in his article that there was no denying that Canadian had no involvement in the planning and that the British were doing it all. Here is what Henshaw said: “the operation was conceived, planned, and launched under the direction of the British officers as part of a wider strategy that Canadians had played practically no part in formulating.”[1] This is what Brian Loring Villa stated in his article that “The stubborn fact remains that at every important stage of the planning process McNaughton personally reviewed the work product and registered his approval under the authority delegated to him by the Canadian Government”.[2]
It leads me to believe that the Canadians were very much involved in the planning of the raid as mentioned in Brian Villa’s book.

Who was responsible for the Raid on Dieppe? Peter Henshaw stated that he strongly believed that the Canadian commanders were primarily responsible for the Dieppe fiasco.[3] He wrote in his book that “their struggle for autonomy, and for a leading Canadian role in raids, interacted with British interservice rivalries in a way that was decisive for the progress of the planned raid”.[4] Here is what Brian Villa wrote in his book. “Strangely, when Mountbatten presented the rough outline to the Chiefs of Staff for their approval, he limited himself to remarking that there were many problematic aspects to the raid that would have to be worked out, but he did not then try to extract any substantial commitment of forces”.[5] This was a fundamental flaw in the whole operation. Mountbatten needed a successful large-scale raid to ingratiate himself to both the Americans and the COS committee. Since it was probable that the COS would reject Jubilee, he remounted the operation without their approval. Afterwards, the COS committee could not discipline
Mountbatten for fear of scandal and arousing Canadian anger. In any case, Churchill had some awareness of the effort to remount the raid yet made no effort to prevent it. Also Villa assigns British Chief of Combined Operations Lord Luis Mountbatten responsible for having ordered the raid. Villa quotes Canadian newspaper magnate “Lord Beaverbrook, who bitterly accused Mountbatten of having the blood of “thousands of my countrymen on your hands”.[6] But Brian Villa also notes that General McNaughton, commander of the Canadian forces in Britain, had delivered numerous bellicose statements. When at last, an opportunity to use Canadian troops presented itself, McNaughton could scarcely decline the offer”.[7]

As for the Power and Control of the raid here is what Peter Henshaw has to say. “In fact, McNaughton and Crerar were far from being powerless in the military and political machinations that led to the raid. Those two men had, by virtue of their autonomy both from civil and military authorities in Ottawa and from military authorities in Britain, carved out a remarkably powerful position for themselves in the complex bureaucracy that directed raiding operations from Britain”.[8] Here is what Brian Villa has to say. Villa in his article stated that “The overall Canadian Commander, General McNaughton, delegated responsibility to the Commander of the Corps, Lieutenant-General Crerar, who in turn delegated it to General Roberts, whose 2nd Canadian Division would be committed. This was constant with the above-cited British military doctrine”.[9] This leads me to believe that who had the overall power was General Roberts.

This is where I think that Brian Villa’s thesis is weak: Villa has built an alternative theory that fits the holes in the records and has succeeded in convincing some historians. His controversial thesis has attracted critics, although none has fully countered his well-documented views. The best counter arguments are provided by Peter Henshaw, who contends that, Mountbatten got the COS committee to change the way raids were approved, transferring the final decision to himself. Furthermore, the process for approving raids was not very precise and gave Mountbatten considerable leeway; in fact, no rules existed in regards to remounting previously approved raids. Villa contends that these changes did away with the requirement that the COS consent to the final plans of already authorized raids, but did not give him the authority to approve raids on his own. Henshaw proposes a fourth explanation, namely that the impetus for revival came largely from Canadian Generals Andrew McNaughton and Harry Crerar. They sought to establish control over the military side of raids involving Canadian troops, and managed to obtain a chain of command that eliminated any meaningful home forces oversight of the Canadian Army for Jubilee. Therefore, Canadian pressure was essential for the revival of the raid; as McNaughton managed to gain almost full military control of Jubilee. These explanations of the aims and origins of both Rutter and Jubilee are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The two authors base their views on multiple factors, but give some greater emphasis. The difficulty is linking these factors due to the almost complete lack of documentation on the origins and aims of the raid.

Also a major area of controversy in the Dieppe literature is the issue of responsibility. Villa clearly places the chief responsibility for the raid on Mountbatten,
Henshaw on the Canadians; and those who see political aims behind the raid, on
Churchill. Many others declare that many problems in the plan contributed to the defeat at Dieppe: lack of heavy naval fire support, poor intelligence, inflexibility, and dependence on surprise. Two aspects of the plan are particularly controversial: the decisions to launch a frontal assault and to cancel the preliminary air bombardment.
The frontal assaults on the main beaches. In retrospect, seemed to have had little chance of success.

Conclusion The purpose of this essay, was based on the two articles concerning the mounting of the Dieppe Raid in 1942 and to compare and evaluate how each of the articles approaches the subject matter. Find out how the authors differed in their interpretation, and why did they arrive at different conclusions. In conclusion, Villa and Henshaw were similar in some ways in their articles, however they had a lot more of different views and facts.

Bibliography

Brian Loring Villa. Unauthorized Action: Mountbatten and the Dieppe Raid. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1989).

Peter Henshaw. The Canadian Historical Review Vol. 77 No.2 (June 1996).

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[1] Peter Henshaw. The Canadian Historical Review Vol. 77 No.2 (June 1996):p.250.
[2] Brian Loring Villa. Unauthorized Action: Mountbatten and the Dieppe Raid. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1989).p.231.
[3] Peter Henshaw. “The Dieppe Raid: A Product of Misplaced Nationalism? ” Canadian Historical Review, 77 (1996):p.252.
[4] Ibid. p.429.
[5] Brian Loring Villa. Unauthorized Action: Mountbatten and the Dieppe Raid. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1989). p.11.
[6] Ibid, p.18.
[7] Peter Henshaw. “The Dieppe Raid: A Product of Misplaced Nationalism? ” Canadian Historical Review, 77 (1996):p.429.

[8] Peter Henshaw. “The Dieppe Raid: A Product of Misplaced Nationalism? ” Canadian Historical Review, 77 (1996):p.252.

[9] Brian Loring Villa. Unauthorized Action: Mountbatten and the Dieppe Raid. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1989). p. 10.