Concepts
We use the term concepts to refer to things (both living and inanimate), to events
(things in action), and to relationships among things or events, as well as to their characteristics (Marx, 1963). “Dog” is a concept, as is “barking,” and so is
“obedience.” Concepts are the symbols by which we ordinarily communicate.
Clear, unambiguous communication of ideas requires that we clearly defi ne our concepts.
In everyday conversation we often get by without worrying too much about how we defi ne a concept. Many words, for instance, are commonly used and apparently understood even though neither party in the conversation knows exactly what the words mean. That is, people frequently communicate with one another without being fully aware of what they are talking about! This may sound ridiculous but, to illustrate our point, try the following.
Ask a few people whether they believe that intelligence is mostly inherited or mostly learned. You might try arguing a point of view opposite to theirs just for the fun of it. After discussing the roots of intelligence, ask them what they mean by “intelligence.” You will probably fi nd that most people have a diffi cult time defi ning this concept, even after debating its origins, and people will provide different defi nitions. That is, “intelligence” means one thing to one person and something else to another. Clearly, in order to attempt to answer the question of whether intelligence is mostly inherited or mostly learned, we need to have an exact defi nition that all parties involved can accept.
The study of “concepts” is so important in psychological science that researchers refer to concepts by a special name: constructs. A construct is a concept or idea; examples of psychological constructs include intelligence, depression, aggression, and memory. One way in which a scientist gives meaning to a construct is by defi ning it operationally. An operational definition explains a concept solely in terms of the observable procedures used to produce and measure it. Intelligence, for instance, can be defi ned operationally by using a paper-and-pencil test emphasizing understanding of logical relationships, short-term memory, and familiarity with the meaning of words. Some may not like this operational defi nition of intelligence, but once a particular test has been identifi ed, there can at least be no argument about what intelligence means according to this defi nition. Operational defi nitions facilitate communication, at least among those who know how and why they are used.
Although exact meaning is conveyed via operational defi nitions, this approach to communicating about constructs has not escaped criticism. One problem has been alluded to already. That is, if we don’t like one operational defi nition of intelligence, there is nothing to prevent us from giving intelligence another operational defi nition. Does this mean that there are as many kinds of intelligence as there are operational defi nitions? The answer, unfortunately, is that we don’t really know. To determine whether a different procedure or test yields a new defi nition of intelligence, we would have to seek additional evidence. For example, do people who score high on one test also score high on the second test?
If they do, the new test may be measuring the same construct as the old one.
Another criticism of using operational defi nitions is that the defi nitions are not always meaningful. This is particularly relevant in cross-cultural research where, for example, a paper-and-pencil test of intelligence may tap into knowledge that is specifi c to a particular cultural context. How do we decide whether a construct has been meaningfully defi ned? Once again, the solution is to appeal to other forms of evidence. How does performance on one test compare to performance on other tasks that are commonly accepted as measures of intelligence?
Scientists are generally aware of the limitations of operational defi nitions; however, a major strength of using operational defi nitions is that they help to clarify communication among scientists about their constructs. This strength is assumed to outweigh the limitations.