Colorado Wildfires 2012
Inter-Agency Communication

Introduction
Natural disasters have been around since the beginning of time. Every day, natural processes are taking place that can disrupt the equilibrium in our lives which can cause natural disasters. Learning from the past has caused better communications, and technological advancements have helped in predicting many events, but never can man actually predict the exact catastrophe. With the global population expanding, we become more vulnerable to these threats, and our only means of protection is through better planning.
One particular natural disaster that has become a complex danger over time is the wildland fire. Wildfires have occurred on every continent except Antarctica. Wildfires are a natural phenomenon caused by topography, fuels, and weather that man has had to deal with since the cave man era. History reveals the progression of wildfires but not until the 20th century have wildfires caused so much destruction. The wide spread population growth along the wildland-urban areas of Colorado and other natural prone fire habitats have cause for huge concern as wildfires get harder to control.
The year 2002, which was previously the worst wildfire season recorded in Colorado’s history prior to this year, caused state and federal land management agencies to increase their efforts to work with communities and private land owners about risk assessment, addressing wildfire prevention, and mitigation.ii It all lead to other concerns of how to effectively coordinate among all affected agencies involved.
Those changes over the years have not been enough to control the wildfires that continue to get bigger and more destructive. The summer of 2012 became the worst wildfire season in the history of Colorado. After a continuous string of fires that raged through Colorado, and as what seemed to be the last resort, the USFS finally activated MAFFS units to help control fires that became the most destructive fires in Colorado’s history. Prior to activating the MAFFS units, the USFS said repeatedly it had enough air power to fight the fires in Colorado and elsewhere in the United States without the help of the MAFFS.
Background
In general, planned management insights for disaster organizations responding to a major disaster over an extended geographical area such as a city, county, regions, or states or region can be very complex, and no two situations are ever the same. Major disasters have a low probability of occurring, but when they do, they have devastating consequences. Designing response structures for such events is a difficult task.
Generally, a disaster occurs when the local emergency response system's means for managing and coordinating a response are overwhelmed and require outside intervention to succeed. There for state, federal, local government and private response agencies must become involved in the relief effort. Major disasters involve a multitude of different organizations that provide a broad range of resources and services. Unfortunately, the effort to organize a disaster response structure involving multiple public, private, and non-profit agencies is disrupted in a number of unpredictable ways.
Millions of acres in the United States are affected by wildfires annually. Hundreds of homes and businesses are destroyed by wildfires each year as well as the destruction of wildlife and the ecosystem, and the challenge of wildland fire management is growing. An average of 83,894 wildfires have burned during the past 10 years, an average of 7.4 million acres annually, and more than 74,000 wildfires burned more than 8.7 million acres in the United States in 2011 alone.iv
History has shown that each fire season has become longer and more severe with the changing climate. Causes for this are cumulative drought, extensive insect kill in western forests, and regional shifts of population into the wildland urban interface. Each of these factors has resulted in an increased level of wildfire activity that is expected to continue into the future. On average, the wildfire season is 78 days longer than in the mid-1980s. The trend for the number of acres burned annually by wildfire indicates a doubling of acres burned since 1960.
Although fire activity has increased, the Forest Service’s airtanker fleet has been reduced as a result of regulation issues, decommissioning of airplanes, and crashes. This has resulted in a decrease of 43 airtankers in 2000 to 8 airtankers in 2012. As a result, the Forest Service has had to employ more than 40 additional heavy and medium helicopters, single engine airtankers, Modular Airborne Firefighting Systems (MAAFS), and cooperator aircraft since 2011. These changes in the fire season and increased pressure from additional populated areas will result in more demand for firefighting response from the Federal Government.v
Over the last ten years, the Forest Service’s airtanker fleet has flown an annual average of 4500 flight hours, dropping almost 20 million gallons of retardant in response to the overwhelming wildfire activity. Of these total hours, individual airtankers have flown an average of 210 hours annually to meet initial attack and fire response requirements. The cost of wildfire suppression and restoration amounts to billions of dollars each year, and the challenge of managing wildfires continues to grow more complex.v
Airtankers play a key role in the successful initial attack of a wildfire, which is one of the most difficult and critical components of wildfire management for today and in the future. Airtankers are used to deliver fire retardant to wildfires, thereby reducing fire intensity and rate of spread until ground personnel can reach the fire. Successful initial attack of new and emerging fires that qualify for suppression is a critical part of keeping unwanted wildfires small and less costly. While airtankers are obviously only one part of a multi-faceted interagency wildfire response effort, they are important to the Federal, state, and local wildland firefighting missions of protecting communities and natural resources from wildfires and to successfully managing wildfires in this country.v
Mitigation
There are common themes to consider in wildfire mitigation. Wildfires will continue to happen. Wildfire does not respect political boundaries. No single jurisdiction or agency can suppress all wildfires in their jurisdiction by themselves. Mitigation actions are required before a wildfire starts to maximize response to keep fires small and minimize damage and mitigation actions are required after a wildfire to minimize impacts resulting from wildfire.
However, one of the first things to determine on wildland fires is ownership of the land where the fire is occurring: who responds to the fire, how the fire is handled, and who has the financial responsibility of the fire operations. The history of dealing of wildland fires has led to many changes over the years of different strategies, planning, and coordination from local to national levels.vi

To support these efforts, new legislation laws have been passed over the years. Of the most recent and probably most important, two of these bills passed specifically encompass Community wildfire protection plans (CWPPs). These plans were developed with input from local, state, and federal government bodies, and other interested parties for identifying and mitigating fire hazards.vi

Senate Bill 09-001 requires the state forester to collaborate with representatives of the U.S. Forest Service, the Colorado Department of Natural Resources, county governments, municipal governments, local fire departments or fire protection districts, electric, gas, water utility providers, and state and local law enforcement agencies in order to establish guidelines for CWPPs by November 15, 2009. Counties developing their own CWPPs must consider the guidelines and criteria established by the state forester determine whether there are fire hazard areas within the unincorporated portion of the county by January 1, 2011. Counties must develop a CWPP within 180 days of identifying fire hazard areas.iv

Senate Bill 09-020 establishes a unified command structure for the management of wildland fires in the state and the primary responsibilities of local and state entities. The bill urges cooperation between the sheriff, the fire chiefs, and the board of county commissioners should a county choose to adopt a county wildfire preparedness plan for the unincorporated area of the county. The bill also requires that the first emergency response agency to arrive at the scene of a wildland fire must act as incident command and be responsible for the initial emergency action necessary to control the wildland fire or to protect life or property until the emergency response agency that has jurisdiction over the incident site arrives. Fire department chiefs in each fire protection district in the state have the authority to supervise all fires within their district and to utilize mutual aid agreements with neighboring districts to suppress and control fires that cross or threaten to cross the district boundaries.iv
Fire Mitigation-Interagency communication
In general, the first incident report is sent to the local dispatch. Engines, ground crews, smokejumpers, firefighters, helicopters with water buckets, and airtankers carrying retardant maybe used for initial suppression. One dispatch in Colorado is FTC (Fort Collins). It is one of the ten interagency dispatch centers in the Rocky Mountain area. It manages wildland fires and mobilization of wildland firefighting resources in the Northern Front Range and NE Colorado. If a wildland fire cannot be contained by the local dispatch, then further assistance is needed, and the next step is to communicate with GACC.
GACC, Geographic Area Coordination Center locates and dispatches additional firefighters and support personnel, including incident management teams, engines, bulldozers, other aircraft, and supplies. As often the case, during a busy fire season, the supply of state, local, and other personnel and equipment have been exhausted. If this happens, the GACC contacts NICC, National Interagency Coordination Center at NIFC and relays requests. NIFC then locates and mobilizes the closest resources throughout the nation that are available.vii
The NIFC, National Interagency Fire Center, is located in Boise, Idaho, and coordinates and supports operations for managing wildland fires and other natural disasters throughout the United States. The following agencies share the operating costs and responsibilities and work together to exchange support, protection responsibilities, information , and training to protect lives, property, and natural resources: U.S. Department of Agriculture (Forest Service-USFS), U.S. Department of the Interior (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service-FWS), U.S. Department of the Interior (National Park Service-NPS), U.S. Department of Interior (Bureau of Land Management-BLM), U.S. Department of Interior (Bureau of Indian Affairs-BIA), National Association of State Foresters-NASF, U.S. Department of Commerce (National Weather Service-NWS), U.S. Department of the Interior (Office of Aircraft Services-OAS), and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (U.S. Fire Administration-USFA).vii
NIFC also works the Department of Homeland Security, FEMA, and provides the following: Aerial imagery, airtanker base, equipment and supply cache, equipment development, infrared mapping, national contracting, national fire information/news, national policy and guidelines, telecommunications, remote automatic weather stations, research and education, a smokejumper base, technical and scientific expertise, training and consultation, and transport aircraft for crews and equipment.vii
NIFC also hosts and facilitates two groups: The National Interagency Coordination Center (NICC) which is tasked to quickly locate and mobilize emergency personnel, equipment, supplies, and aircraft nationwide, and the National Multi-Agency Coordination group (NMAC). They include fire directors from BLM, FWS, NPS, BIA, USFS, NASF, and USFA. Their purpose becomes strategic in a severe fire situation in which it is their responsibility to identify national or interagency issues and set priorities for allocating resources. With a formal request sent to the Department of Defense and an approval from the Secretary of Defense, they can utilize military aircraft (C-130) which are then sent to the geographical location (Command Centers).vii A military liaison will then closely coordinate with the NIFC the resources that maybe needed such as aerial and / or ground support.
This flow of interagency communications would not be possible without the help of the NWCG, the National Wildfire Coordinating Group. This group provides a formalized system to agree upon standards of training, equipment, and qualifications. It is made up of the USDA Forest Service, Department of the Interior agencies, State forestry agencies, U.S. Fire Administration of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the Intertribal Timber Council.vii
REPORT
Not any one agency can fight all the wildfires that occur in any one state. Fire management is an interagency partnership among federal, state, and local entities across the nation. Communication as well as decisions can be very complex and complicated when a wildfire starts because there are many unpredictable factors such as weather (wind speed and direction, temperature, humidity, etc.) that can quickly make an already bad situation into an uncontrollable catastrophe. This was seen in the latest Colorado Wildfires in June 2012 as local and state resources were quickly overwhelmed and depleted due to the size and strength of wildfires, and even when national help came to the scene, it took weeks to contain the last of the string of fires which was in Waldo Canyon, making this the most destructive and expensive fire in the history of Colorado State.
For this project, we researched the different levels of interagency communications to uncover any short comings, miscommunications, or decisions that could have been made to inactivate these fires at an earlier stage. While exploring the hierarchy of communication and investigating the highs and lows of those communications as numerous departments decide when, where, and how to combat wide spread fires, we discovered that there may have been a lack in response time due to the complicated internal communication structure as well as the different communication culture between military and civilian workers (USFS / BLM). This lack of response time brought up the debate over the activation steps of the MAFFS (Modular Airborne Firefighting System), which we found to be necessary for a successful firefighting mission.
Controversy over the use of MAFFS
In order to appreciate why early activation of MAFFS is a life-saving strategy, one must understand its extraordinary capabilities. MAFFS units fit inside a C-130 airplane without requiring structural modification. Within two hours, the aircraft is ready to go. The C-130 can discharge 3,000 gallons of flame retardant or water in less than five seconds, covering an area one quarter of a mile long by 60 feet wide. Once the load is discharged and returns back to its base, it can be refilled and airborne again in less than 20 min.
The MAFFS units themselves are owned by the U.S. Forest Service. The military aircraft, pilots, and maintenance and support personnel are operated under the DOD. In this 40 year-long joint effort, it has been outlined that MAFFS is to provide a surge capability to boost wildfire suppression only when commercial airtankers are fully committed or not available. However, they are not activated immediately as they are considered a "24-hour resource". This means that when activated, it is expected that it will take 24 hours for the aircraft to arrive on the scene.ix
Since being activated on June 25, 2012, the MAFFS fleet has released more than 1,479,372 gallons of fire retardant during 624 drops on fires in nine states in the Rocky Mountain area. The 302nd Airlift Wing performed the millionth drop on August 5, 2012, and the 500th drop was made on August 8, 2012 by the same unit. This year's MAFFS operations have dropped more gallons of fire retardant this year than they have in the last nine fire seasons.
When such capabilities are at hand, why would the USFS have a "wait and see" approach when historically the fires in Colorado have become more unpredictable, more dangerous, and require greater resources? With mounting concern at the rising frequency and severity of natural hazards and disasters, in part due to factors related to climate change and population density, there is increased impetus to put in place policy, legal, technical, financial, and institutional measures that will reduce the destructive effects on the lives and livelihoods of individuals.
The High Park Fire located near Fort Collins was detected on the morning of June 9, 2012. This fire destroyed about 259 homes and burned over 87,250 acres. It became the new record-holding fire, that is, until another fire was sighted on June 23, 2012 in Waldo Canyon, one mile from a neighborhood and about 4 miles from Colorado Springs. With national efforts, it was finally contained on July 10, 2012. The fire caused a total of over 32,000 residents of surrounding areas to evacuate while destroying over 346 homes in its path covering 18,247 acres.vii
Lt. Col. David Condit, 302nd Airlift Wing Chief of Safety at Peterson Air Force Base, Col., stated that he received official notification of activation for four MAFFS for the Waldo Canyon Fire at 9pm on Saturday June 23, 2012 but to be available NO earlier than 12:00 pm Monday, June 25,2012. The first visible smoke was reported approximately on Friday June 23, 1pm.
From the start of the Waldo Fire on June 23, 2012 until approximately Sunday June 24, 8pm, 3600 acres were burning, 11,000 people evacuated, Type I incident team takes command, and Sheriff Maketa states, "probably the greatest natural threat seen in the community". The city and county issue joint disaster declarations, paving way for federal and state assistance. This then begs the question as to why, when the resources are available, would the immediate activation of the MAFFS not be made immediately available to save lives and property. Has the need for specialty departments aided in an interagency communication system to become so complicated and specialized that it paralyses a quick and efficient response?
This is not a new debate, but an old debate that is now being looked at more closely and seriously. In 1979, a very similar situation happened in Washington State as did this summer in Colorado and the Rocky Mountain areas. While expensive aerial tankers sat on the ground, wildfires burned out of control, destroying everything in sight, despite the ongoing complaints that not enough was being done to battle the flames. Protests heard during and after this summer’s wildfire rampages have raised concerns that the portable tankers have been relegated to "a secondary role" and are not being used extensively to battle national fires.xiv
"The bureaucratic tangle and frustration a requesting agency must face to activate MAFFS has served only to distract from the overall value of this unique firefighting system," said U.S. Rep. Elton Gallegly, who has been trying for years to overturn the federal law that often keeps the tankers grounded. On June 19, 2012, Gallegly introduced a bill that would require the USFS to activate unused MAFFS units to help alleviate the shortage of airtankers to fight wildfires.xiv
This new bill, if passed, would require the following: 1. Require the USFS to re-activate the eight MAFFS 1 units that are sitting in storage. 2. Require USFS to make available the nighth MAFFS II system ready for use. 3. Prohibit the USFS from attaining foreign government airtankers unless the chief of the USFS certifies to Congress that MAFFS units are being fully utilized or are not sufficient to address current wildfires. 4. Require the USFS to report to Congress within 30 days of enactment on how they intend to make the ninth MAFFS II and MAFFS I units available.
On July 18th, 2012, U.S. Representative Gallegly also added an amendment to the DOD Appropriations Act, 2013, that would reactivate four first-generation MAFFS units and add two new aerial dispersal units to the USFS’s firefighting arsenal. This means that the C-130’s would be equipped and available for immediate call-up by the USFS for initial attack at the outset of a fire.xiv
The American Helicopter Services & Aerial Firefighting Association is opposing this legislation. By law, a Federal agency cannot contract with another Federal entity for goods or services, unless it can be shown that they cannot be provided by a commercial enterprise as conveniently or economically as the other Federal agency. This bill would effectively put the government in a position of competing with independently-owned airtanker and helicopter operators and companies under USFS contract. It could also discourage airtanker operators to invest in the number of next generation airtankers, and discourage other entrepreneurs from entering the airtanker business with modern equipment.
Then there is the question of expanding the primary mission of the Air National Guard into the wildland firefighting business. In a report issued in 2010 by DOD, it stated that given the costs, training, and certification issues, the firefighting mission was not viable in other than a secondary role, and because Air National Guard assets are often stretched thin due to global defense commitments, aerial firefighting should not be amongst one of its highest priorities.xiii
During a recent review, Gallegly recalls standing on the tarmac in the mid-1990s in Camarillo, CA watching flames in the distance spread up the mountainside. Nearby sat two of the MAFFS tankers, stationed with the California Air National Guard's 146th Airlift Wing, grounded and unable to join the firefight because of the federal law's restrictions.xiv
"I'm a private-sector guy," Gallegly said, "but when I sat out on the tarmac watching houses burn in Ventura County and saw the airplanes ready to go and not be able to use them, I got very frustrated." Others have felt the same frustration over the Colorado wildfires this summer.xiv
Work to develop an aerial firefighting system began in early 1971 after a series of raging brush and forest fires destroyed government and private property. The following September, a working prototype of the tankers was dispatched to help the Forest Service fight the Romero fire burning out of control in Los Padres National Forest near Santa Barbara. Within a year, the Forest Service had acquired eight of the MAFFS units.xiv
The federal restrictions on when and how the MAFFS can be mobilized were put in place not long after the tankers appeared on the scene. Commercial pilots and owners of private airtanker companies complained the government had no business getting involved in the firefighting business.xiv
In 1975, an agreement was reached stipulating that the MAFFS could not be mobilized unless all available or suitable civilian resources had been committed and the MAFFS support would not compete with private enterprise. The agreement essentially reiterated the Economy Act of 1932, which prohibits the military from performing a job that could be accomplished by private industry.xiv
During California's disastrous Agoura-Malibu fire that destroyed more than 200 homes in 1978, the county fire boss asked for tanker support but was given only two private airtankers to fight the blaze. Afterward, Col. Russell A. Penland, air commander for the 146th Airlift Wing, argued that if MAFFS could have been brought to the scene, a number of private homes could have been saved.xivxiv
More than two decades later, with the fleet aging, Gallegly has helped secure federal funding to replace the original eight units with newer models that cost about $2 million each. According to Lt. Col. Bryan Allen, the MAFFS program manager for the 146th Airlift Wing at the Channel Islands Air National Guard Station, MAFFS can actually stop the fire which allows ground personnel to put it out.xiv
Many have long argued that the law prevents the Forest Service from putting all of its available resources into firefights, often resulting in the unnecessary loss of property and, sometimes, lives. The debate got especially heated this summer as the wildfires raged across the West, consuming thousands of acres, destroying hundreds of homes and claiming six lives in Colorado alone.xiv
After repeatedly saying it had enough air power to fight the fires in Colorado and elsewhere, the USFS finally activated four MAFFS on June 25, 2012. According to Gallegly, the legal criteria to activate these MAFFS were met long ago, and in late June, after pressures from Gallegly who reported, "The enemy is not the fire. It's the Forest Service," the USFS mobilized all eight of its MAFFS units to help fight the fires.iv
The Forest Service says the MAFFS tankers were never intended for use in all fires but were meant to be deployed when a "surge" capability is needed to help crews on the ground. Other experts say aerial tankers such as the MAFFS units are most effective when mobilized early.v
"The philosophy in fire management is if you are going to suppress a fire, you hit it hard and you hit it fast," said Mike Flannigan, a wildland-fire professor at the University of Alberta in Canada. "If you detect a fire right away and you send crews or aircraft to it right away, that is when you are going to have your success." Once a fire spreads across a wider area, an aerial attack becomes about as effective as spitting on a campfire," Flannigan said.xiv
Historically, MAFFS units have not be activated until the fires are huge, "and then you're at a disadvantage," said Ed Bellion, a retired vice commander of the 146th Airlift Wing who lives in Camarillo. "We always felt like we could be out there using this, and we're sitting on the ground. It can be very frustrating. It would be like being a fireman, and they just don't call your truck out of the firehouse. You think, 'Good God, we have this asset. We're available, and nobody wants us.'xiv
U.S. Rep. Elton Gallegly states that the need for the MAFFS units has grown more pressing as commercial firefighting equipment has dwindled and budget cuts are inevitable. In 2003, the Forest Service had 44 fixed-wing commercial planes at its disposal. Now it has eight. There are only a total of 8 MAFFS systems ready for operational use. They are owned by the U.S. Forest Service and are available for use in military C-130 aircraft by flight crews trained in this mission. Military installations in Wyoming, North Carolina, California, and Colorado provide C-130s to fly MAFFS missions. Specifically, the 153rd Airlift Wing, Wyoming Air National Guard, Cheyenne; the 145th Airlift Wing, North Carolina Air National Guard, Charlotte; the 146th Airlift Wing, California Air National Guard, Port Hueneme; and the 302nd Airlift Wing, Air Force Reserve, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado. xiv
Some of the aging commercial planes have crashed while in service, and others have been grounded. Currently airtankers are borrowed from Canada and Alaska to make up for the shortfall. Gallegly’s bill would also prohibit the Forest Service to procure airtankers from a foreign government. "They've know this day was coming for decades, and they should have planned for it," said Bill Gabbert, who worked for 33 years as a federal wildland firefighter and now writes the blog Wildfire Today. "Apparently, it's only important in fire season," he said. "Because as soon as the fires go out, everything dies."
Communication Barriers
Even if the legislation bill H.R. 5965 enacted by Rep. Gallegly is approved, other changes need to be made that are affecting the efficiency of the MAFFS unit.
As mentioned previously, fighting wildfires is a collaborate effort of numerous departments. It is the co-existing of two worlds; the civilian aspect (e.g.BLM) and the military aspect (Air Force / National Guard). According to Lt. Col. Condit some of the challenges are also the different communication cultures within. He points out that while the MAFFS crews who are military and are familiar with a very directive style of communication, the USFS and BLM have a different professional cooperative communication style. This leads to frequent misunderstanding. "For example, military aircrew often provides direct and pointed feedback/criticism to each other in debriefs. However, interagency air crew rarely provides pointed feedback / criticism. This has led to military receiving what they would interpret as neutral or even positive feedback when the actual feedback was meant to be negative".
He goes further to point out that in his opinion the MAFFS would be more effective if the decision to use it was made sooner. According to experts in the USFS, the MAFFS is especially well suited to initial attack (containing smaller fires before they become a crisis). He points out that MAFFS is rarely activated until a crisis is already present. In the Waldo fire, the military crew and equipment were prepared to fly on the fire 24 hours sooner. Could an earlier engagement using more resources have made an impact that would have prevented some of the losses? Again one must point out that the culture of the DOD is a strategic, proactive and predictive organization whose plans are based on contingency and anticipation of needs. However, this may not be the case with other agencies. Some federal agencies may tend to be more reactive, addressing the most pressing needs at the moment, rather than trying to anticipate the needs ahead.
Effects of Budget Cuts and Costs
Budget cuts are always an issue, especially when the previous years’ disasters have gone well above and beyond the budgets that were set for those years. However, any budget cuts could dramatically affect and change how efficiently wildfires can be controlled. One then may argue that lives are at stake with the proposed Sequestration Transparency Act (STA) of 2012. Should Congress approve the federal wildland fire programs, budgets will be cut by $218 million as of January 2013. * US Forest Service Wildland Fire Management: $172 million * Department of Interior Wildland Fire Management: $46 million
As we lose the ability to aggressively attack new fires with overwhelming force, more fires become an expensive burden. The upfront expense for ground and air resources arriving early can be very cost effective when the fire is put out early. In fact, it could be key. A 1.5% drop in initial attack success rate is estimated to represent approximately 300 to 400 million dollars to suppress. This is nil compared to the billions of dollars that a fire causes on top of the cost to rebuild. The drop is estimated to represent approximately 150 fires that could escape initial attack.vii
"A person has to wonder. Is this going to be the new norm; frequent record-setting fires, while the number of federal firefighters and airtankers continue to shrink?" wrote Bill Gabbert, a former fire management officer in the Black Hills of South Dakota.
As previously mentioned , the number of active airtankers fell from 44 to 14 over the last decade, prompting a group of western Senators to demand the government update the fleet for the coming fire season.
"Concerns have increasingly been raised that the federal agencies responsible for responding to wildland fires, the Forest Service and four agencies in the department of interior, do not have the appropriate number and mix of aircraft that will be needed for wildland fire suppression operations."
Fire agency budget resources; federal, tribal, state or local, will be strained by increased demands and rising costs during a period where government budget revenues will be very tight or falling. The current budget environment for federal and partner fire management is at best uncertain and difficult. Recession and very volatile energy costs are already putting pressure on all fire management budgets. Federal suppression costs have already outstripped budgeted costs five consecutive years. Many states are seeing their reserve funds overwhelmed when they have significant wildfires. Coupled with the rising pressure over this past decade to find ways to control wildfire costs, budget stress at all levels is likely to further intensify over the next 2-3 years and even after the economy recovers.
The forest service received $317m this year for programs to reduce dangerous forest growth. That was down from $350m in 2010, and also represents less than one-fifth of the budget for putting out fires.vii
Focusing on Solutions
Early and defined usage of MAFFS units: According to calculations, 3600 acres could have been successfully combated by the four MAFFS unit, which were activated on June 23rd, but not ordered to go to the Waldo County Fire until June 25th. It would have taken one unit approximately 7.5 hours to disperse 23 retardant drops covering an area of 5.62 sq miles. Even with the activation of 2 or 3 MAFFS units, the fire would have been under control much earlier and possibly lives and property could have been saved.
While early activation of the MAFFS is certainly one useful resource, finding new and updated mitigation solutions for the 21st Century which can adapt to the new landscape of wildfires is pertinent.
Examples of driving factors that need to be addressed: * Climate change: While climate change varies from region to region, research has shown that we are in warming climate which tend to increase wildfires. Wetter and warmer winters followed by faster snowmelt in the West have expanded the fire season horizon which lengthens the fire season.

* Urban population changes: Increased population due to increased attraction of owning property for recreational as well as for full time residency. The growth in rural areas has made fire management difficult.

* Budget stress: Looming sequestration and continued state budget cuts will impact the cost of fire management. It will be important in the future to account not just for suppression funding but the full range of fire management costs. A declining housing market (and decreasing property tax revenues) and reduced consumer spending (lower sales tax revenues) will put the majority of state budgets in a deficit condition for the next several years.
Devote more funds to prevent fires: Fire scientists and conservationists are demanding that the government use funds to prevent fires by reducing the dense forest growth that leads to the super-sized outbreaks of recent years. It has been proven that in areas where this is being enforced, fires have been controlled.vii More effort needs to be focused in prevention on many levels.
Realignment: Exchange suppression responsibilities to give responsibility to the party best suited to that area. Federal suppression would focus on wildland, and state or local agencies would be in charge of more populated areas. Realignment would likely entail some reallocation of the annual suppression/preparedness funding to finance these negotiated shifts in suppression or mitigation responsibility. Another option would be for federal lands immediately adjacent to communities to be managed by state or community entities via stewardship contract tied to clear and achievable objectives for fire behavior mitigation and land management plan guidelines. None of the steps above needed to create a new intergovernmental framework for wildfire policy will be easy.

Share Resources: While the commitment to cooperate and willingness to share resources during fire incidents within the fire community is legendary, there are real differences in land management objectives, fire management capabilities (and funding availability), and protection philosophies. Still, as the costs of annual wildfire suppression and fuels reduction programs soar, there is increasing recognition that the time has come for clarification and realignment as opposed to continued controversy and dispute about whose fire strategy dominates and who should bear the cost.

Interagency Workforce Adaptability: Relationships need to be enhanced among fire management, line officers/agency administrators and resource management personnel to provide more cohesive leadership and integrated planning. A multi-purpose taskforce which will create a workforce that is flexible and cross trained. Civil personnel and military personnel must speak the same language to create a cohesive management skill set.
Conclusion
While our focus for the purpose of this report was mostly on the MAFFS aerial support system and its challenges, we also acknowledge that fire management is more than engines and aircraft.
We outlined the hierarchy of agencies involved in firefighting and different communication styles within the departments. We discussed the political adversity involved in only one of the aspects of firefighting (such as aerial support), and we have given a few examples of the driving factors of increased fires.
As stated, aviation is just one part of the response to wildland fire. A more agile and modern aviation capability with a concentrated activation approach and an integrated approach on communication and activation is essential to meet today’s challenge of ever increasing wildfires.
Interagency cooperation, information exchange, and improving efficiency within the current dispatch system are essential in meeting the increased demand of fire agencies. It is an imperative and lifesaving strategy to fund and centralize those capabilities. When a ready–to-go- unit (such as MAFFS) depends on the approval of several segregated departments with segregated funding, it becomes apparent how frustrating the process can be.
Part of the main solution would be to establish a national interagency air program that is characterized by a highly mobile fleet that is centrally managed and capable of meeting the increasing need for rapid and wide ranging response for aerial supervision for all federal agency, state, tribal and local governments.
Throughout the research of this report we have found one continued and common thread that everybody seems to agree upon; faster containment of threat fires and better management of large fire events will result in reduced costs.