Discussing the History, Training and Methodology of the Rhodesian Selous Scouts in Counterterrorist Operations during the Rhodesian Bush War

Discussing the History, Training and Methodology of the Rhodesian Selous Scouts in Counterterrorist Operations during the Rhodesian Bush War When discussing the effectiveness and impact of properly trained, motivated and supported counterterrorist units, one must look to the Rhodesian Selous Scouts. Although the Rhodesian government did not survive, the name of the Selous Scouts did. Through this paper you will learn some of the methods and tactics that led them to be considered by many as the best Counterterrorist unit in the world. First, a differentiation must be made between the terms of antiterrorism and counterterrorism. While both of these strategies attempt to prevent terrorist activities, antiterrorism is a defensive strategy and counterterrorism is offensive. Antiterrorism tactics focus on limiting the terrorist’s abilities of attacking specific areas. This would entail erecting barriers around critical buildings and increasing security at airports. These are attempts to make specific areas more difficult for terrorists to attack them. Counterterrorism is an offensive tactic with the goal of eliminating the terrorists themselves. The Rhodesian military’s focus was almost strictly on counterterrorism.
The Rhodesian Selous Scouts (named after the famous British hunter Frederick Courtney Selous) origins started with the British Special Air Service (SAS) and derived much of their tactics from the lessons learned during the Malayan insurgency that lasted from 1948 to 1960. In 1948, Malaya, a colony of Britain, was attempting to break away from British rule and was being supported by the Chinese Communist government. Britain and the Allied powers had just fought and won WWII in a conventional warfare method. The conflict in Malaya was a completely different type of war. The British military now had to learn how to fight this kind of guerrilla warfare. During the course of the Malayan insurgency, the British government and military, particularly the SAS, proved to be extremely flexible in its methods. This enabled them to quickly adapt to this new kind of war. The government allowed the military to break away from conventional methods that would prove to be counterproductive in a guerrilla war and instituted a doctrine of “Limited war with Limited Goals”. This method involved small unit tactics and a heavy reliance on Human Intelligence (HUMINT) rather than maneuver warfare tactics. “Human intelligence was absolutely the most supreme requirement” (Nagle, 2002). As a British colony, the Rhodesian military was called into action to support the British in fighting the communist led insurgency In 1958 one hundred Rhodesian soldiers were trained in jungle warfare by British SAS soldiers and incorporated into the SAS as a sub-unit named C Squadron 22 SAS (Malayan Scouts). The sole purpose of this unit was to “deploy for continual harassment and disruption of Communist terrorist activity” (Spindlove, 2007). These troops would deploy for weeks on end setting up ambushes and conducting guerrilla warfare against the insurgents. According to General Gerald Templer, they would “go into the jungle …and stay there for a week, two weeks, a month if need be; and if anybody is going to be ambushed, it is probably the bandits” (Nagle, 2002). In 1960, at the end of the insurgency, with Britain remaining in control of Malaya, the C Squadron 22 SAS unit was disbanded and the soldiers returned to their homeland. Upon returning home the Rhodesian army incorporated what was learned and established its own SAS teams under the tutelage of the British SAS. During this time, Britain was decolonizing most of its African Empire but refused to grant independence to Rhodesia until it changed its governmental policy of Minority Rule. Britain maintained its stance of “No independence before majority rule”. Many other areas in Africa had been already decolonized by Britain often resulting in anarchy and acts of genocide in its wake. Old tribal rivalries and land disputes claimed an unknown number of lives. “Kenya…erupted into anti-settler violence when gangs known as Mau Mau from the indigenous Kikuyu tribe attacked farms and homesteads of blacks and whites alike with acts of unspeakable violence in an attempt to challenge the colonial government and impose majority rule” (Scott-Donelan). The consequences were terrible, leaving thousands of Africans dead or injured. Pulitzer Prize winner Caroline Elkins claims it (the number of dead) is probably at least as high as 70,000 but more realistically in the hundreds of thousands (Elkins, 2006). White Rhodesians saw what was happening around Africa and feared that they would be next. This led Rhodesian President Ian Smith to declare independence on 11 November 1965. Britain, America and the UN refused to recognize this government and immediately established harsh sanctions on Rhodesia. Many communist nations such as the Soviet Union, Cuba and the People Republic of China saw this as an opportunity to establish a foothold in Africa and began a strong destabilization program. African Nationalist movements like the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) led by Robert Mugabe, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA, the military wing of ZANU) and Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) were the primary recipients of communist financial and military aid (Scott-Donelan). These Marxist organizations began what the Rhodesian government described as a terrorist campaign to overthrow the Rhodesian government. These Nationalist organizations did not see themselves as terrorists. They saw the war as a fight for equality and a fight to reclaim the land that was taken away from them at the start of the British Colonization in 1890. While living conditions for black Africans were generally better in Rhodesia than in most parts of Africa, the Apartheid government of Rhodesia prevented land ownership for blacks. This denial of rights had created resentment against the government and set the stage for a revolution against the Rhodesian government. Britain’s rejection of President Ian Smith declaration of independence represented a changing of the times for many black Africans and was the trigger necessary to start a revolution. Black Africans had no political representation and no army to compete with the Rhodesian military. The only method left for them to make a change is through a popular revolution and they would accept help from any nation, communist or not to achieve their goals. Even though ZANU and ZAPU carried out attacks on innocent civilians, from the Nationalist the point of view, the Selous Scouts would have been the terrorists.
Following communist guerrilla warfare doctrine, the primary targets of ZANU and ZAPU were the white farmers and civilians throughout the country (II, 1961, p. 21). Homes were bombed, civilians were kidnapped and murdered. The Rhodesian police force recognized the threat this posed and was unable to stop them on their own and in 1973 the Rhodesian SAS was called into action. After years of insurgency the Rhodesian Military realized that to protect the survival of their nation, they would need to establish a unit that specialized in this type of warfare. This unit would act much like the Rhodesian soldiers did in the Malayan conflict but would be required to expand on their roles considerably. This unit would be called the Selous Scouts.
Originally the Selous Scouts were an armored car division but over time their duties evolved into a clandestine counter terrorist organization. In order to be considered as a prospective Scout, all applicants must have volunteered on their own volition. The Selous Scouts were an all volunteer force. Although Rhodesia was an apartheid government, one of the requirements set by Commanding Officer, Lt. Colonel Ron Reid Daly was that the unit would be a completely integrated force. In fact, 80% of the Scouts were Black Africans. This included officers. Applicants were accepted from the police agencies through to the SAS soldiers. The requirements for acceptance into the Scouts were almost impossible. Upon arriving at the Wafa Wafa training camp the very first task was a 25 kilometer run to the training center. The rest of the training was geared to eliminate all but the toughest and most dedicated men and succeeded with an 85% washout rate. On average, only 14 of 126 trainees completed the course (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rhodesian_Bush_War, 2007). This number includes members had previously passed the grueling training regimen to be accepted to the SAS. In comparison the US Navy SEAL pass rate is 20%. Of all of the men who attempted to become a scout, fewer than 1,000 succeeded.
Once the initial screening was completed, the Selous Scouts were trained in guerrilla warfare. The scouts were set up as a Tracker Combat Unit. This training focused on tracking terrorists movements through the bush, close in on and destroy the enemy. In addition to this role, they were trained on pseudo terrorist operations. Building on the strategies learned during the Malayan conflict of staying in the jungles for months on end, they learned to dress, talk and act like the terrorists themselves. They would learn the dialects and customs of the local tribes, study the methodology of the local terrorist organizations and train with the same weaponry.
With this training they were deployed to their area of responsibility and were able to rapidly establish relations with the local civilians. They were able to make contacts that would connect them with the terrorist organizations. Once they had established contact with terrorist groups they were eventually able to infiltrate them. Once they infiltrated, their options expanded exponentially. They could spread misinformation, perform assassinations or call in airstrikes that would wipe out the entire camp. As a result of their pseudo operations ZANLA were getting into firefights with other members of their terrorist organization assuming that they were the Selous Scouts. This invoked fear within the enemy and lead to their command and communication structure to be disrupted. “Additionally, this meant that groups entering into Rhodesia for the first time, found difficultly linking up with the other members of the group, this lead to a demoralization effect. Each and every terrorist had double think on every person who he met, was this a true freedom fighter or was it an imposer” (Reid-Daly, NP). The Scouts had other methods of operation that were extremely effective. One of these methods was the “Turning of Terrorists”. The primary mission of the scouts was to kill as many terrorists as possible but, when a terrorist was captured, often times the Scouts would “make them an offer they couldn’t refuse”. The offer was they could kill them on the spot or they could become paid informants for the Scouts, their families would be protected and if required, they would evacuate them to receive medical attention. Once the prisoner chose to work with the Scouts, a period of indoctrination began often used previously “turned” terrorists to continually talk about the difficulties of living in the bush and brainwashing them into becoming loyal to the Scouts. There were a series of tests designed to measure their loyalty and once the Scouts felt comfortable, they would be released back to their camps and act as informants (Reid-Daly, NP). This practice was met with a lot of skepticism but the Rhodesian government gave full support to the Selous Scouts and did not interfere at all with their methods. The Scouts used the informants with an amazing amount of success. This human intelligence became the cornerstone of the Scout’s effectiveness. Often times, the Scouts knew more about the terrorists operations than the terrorists themselves. This effectiveness is shown by the numbers of terrorists killed by the Scouts. The total number of Selous Scouts ranged from only 500 to 1000 members. From 1973 to 1980 68% of all Nationalist fatalities were the result of the actions of the Selous Scouts. The remaining 38% came from all of the Rhodesian forces combined (Scott-Donelan). Without accurate intelligence coupled with effective counterterrorist operations, this could not have been achieved. One of the most notable operations led by the Selous Scouts was the 1976 Nyadzonya raid in Mozambique. With the intelligence gathered from their “turned” terrorists, the Scouts discovered the location of one of ZANLA’s largest training camps. The camp was located in the town of Nyadzonya in Mozambique and was reported to have 5000 insurgents residing there. In addition to the HUMINT, the Selous Scouts were able to acquire approximately 70 ZANLA uniforms. Using ten vehicles painted the same as ZANLA vehicles and wearing ZANLA uniforms, the Scouts infiltrated the country of Mozambique and the training camp. Once inside the camp, they were mistaken by the camp residents to be returning ZANLA soldiers and were greeted by a cheering throng of ZANLA Nationals. During this greeting the order was given to open fire. With no air support or artillery, the Selous Scouts killed over 1000 insurgents in this single ambush with only four Scouts slightly wounded. The Nationalists stated that Nyadzonya was a refugee camp but according to ZANLA’s own commander Edgar Tekere, this was a legitimate target (Rhodesia at War online Video Clip, Downloaded from Website August 2010). Even with the overwhelming success of military operations, fighting against a revolution proved too much for the Rhodesian government Mao Tse-Tung wrote that a revolution is nearly impossible to defeat. “Historical experience suggests that there is very little hop of destroying a revolutionary guerrilla movement after it has survived the first phase and has acquired the sympathetic support of a significant segment of the population” (II, 1961). By nature, Revolution comes from the people. The very fact that this was a revolutionary type of war against a numerical minority, there was virtually no chance of success for the Rhodesian government. Barely a decade after the fall of Rhodesia, South Africa’s apartheid government (the sole supporter of Rhodesia) also fell. There is too much political pressure for these types of governments to succeed. Guerrilla action alone would not be the decisive action in determining the outcome of a war (II, 1961). Political efforts would be the final decisive measure of the success or failure of this kind of war.
The ability of only 1000, Rhodesian Selous Scouts to carry out devastating attacks against over 50,000 estimated communist supported troops while under extreme UN mandated Sanctions is proof of the effectiveness of this counterterrorist unit. While many of the methods used were terroristic in their own right, the Selous Scouts accomplished their goal time and time again with stunning efficiency. Their training was brutal and their concepts of how to fight a guerilla war changed the way wars are fought today. In fact, in 1994 the US Delta Force travelled to Zimbabwe to attend the same school where the Selous Scouts were trained and introduced the lessons learned into their own training (Scott-Donelan, Tactical Tracking Operations, 1998). The political pressure from the UN, Britain and the US was what eventually led to the demise of Rhodesia. There was nothing that could have been done militarily to save the country.

References
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