Does God Exist? Descartes’ Arguments and Proofs

Rene Descartes considers what he can be sure to be true in his Meditations on First Philosophy. His meditations cover a vast variety of areas: the nature of the mind and body, the senses, the essence and existence of material things; but of all of these topics, one of his most thought-provoking and fascinating meditations is that on the existence of God. His argument is fairly well stated, but it is not flawless in its reasoning and logic. Through explanation and analysis of his position, this paper will set out his belief on the existence of God, the importance of this argument to his overall position, and to discuss several of the problems in his reasoning.
The first proof at which Descartes considers God is the in the third meditation. By this point, Descartes has already concluded that the only thing thus far that he can be sure of is that he exists as some sort of thinking thing. He has considered the existence of a malevolent spirit that has set out specifically to deceive him at every turn, which has the effect of rendering any other belief spurious at best. In the face of the possibility that something is deliberately setting out to deceive him, he is left only with the knowledge that he is a thinking thing. From there, we get into the third meditation, wherein Descartes considers the possibility of the existence of God, and what precisely that would entail. (Beyssade) Descartes starts by pointing out that in order for any effect to occur, its cause must be in possession of the effect itself or at least an equal amount of ‘reality’. From this he concludes that “It follows from this both that something cannot arise from nothing, and also that what is more perfect – that is, contains in itself more reality – cannot arise from what is less perfect.” (Baird and Kaufmann 32) His example here is that a rock cannot be created by anything that does not contain within it all of the characteristics of a rock, or come from a higher level of reality as one. Likewise, heat cannot be created by something that was not itself hot, or possessed of a comparable level of reality. Having decided upon that, Descartes then considers what comes to mind when he thinks of ‘god.’ His impression of God is of “a substance that is infinite, independent, supremely intelligent, supremely powerful, and which created both myself and everything else (if anything else there be) that exists.” (Baird and Kaufmann 34) Realising that any thought he has must have occurred either within him, or was put there by an outside force. According to his own logic, in order for the idea of something, for example, omnipotence, to occur from within himself, he must himself be in possession of omnipotence. Since he isn’t, he can only conclude that the thought originated from somewhere that –was- in possession of omnipotence…God. After having now concluded that God exists, Descartes ponders how it is that the idea of God came to be in his mind. He decides that since he cannot add anything to, or take anything away from the concept of a perfect being with no defects, than the idea is clearly not one that arrived to him through some sort of sensory input, instead it must be innate within him, in the way that he is created. And since the only being capable of instilling this innate knowledge of a perfect being with no defects within him is a being possessed of perfection with no defects, only God is capable of such a creation, ergo, God must exist. (Gewirth) This argument is central to Descartes’ position. His prime worry at the start of his meditations is that he could be under the depredations of a malevolent demon setting out to deceive him at every turn. By being able to prove in his own mind that there exists a God without defect, who has created him at least somewhat in His own image, and that said God is not a deceiver, Descartes is able to move forward in his quest to find knowledge that is without doubt. Were he unable to prove a perfect God, he would not be able to continue, since there would be no way to believe anything else whatsoever. The way Descartes goes about proving the existence of God is very similar to the proof of St Anselm, in that he deduces the existence of God from nothing but internal logic. The failing in that sort of proof is, obviously enough, that you can fall prey to faulty logic. His first assertion with regard to the necessity of any result having all of its characteristics within its cause seems rather silly on the surface. After all, if the qualities of something must be contained within its creator, how is it that humans can make devices that can fly, or are transparent, neither of which is a characteristic contained within humans? He covers for this by claiming that as an alternative, the cause can also come from “something of the same order (degree or kind) of perfection.” (Baird and Kaufmann 33) This only holds up while talking about the relationship between man and God. If one equates, say rock-ness and heat-ness as the same order of perfection, (which is implied by Descartes’ arguments) then heat should be able to create rocks, and vice-versa, which they clearly cannot. But given that Descartes needs to establish that it is impossible for something to be created by something of lesser perfection that still does not address his claiming the same for the ideas of things. While other proofs for God’s existence hinge on the idea that if you can conceive of a being of which there is no greater, than simply by assuming that to exist in fact is better than to exist as an idea, you must attribute existence to such a perfect being, Descartes instead concludes that since he can conceive of a being with characteristics that he does not himself posses, than the –idea- cannot have occurred originally within him. This is an unnecessary step in his proof, and had he followed the lead of Anselm, this blip of logic would have been avoided. (Sibajiban) The other fault of this sort of argument is that it really isn’t based on anything remotely confirmable. Descartes states that it is impossible for a thought to occur originally within him about something possessing characteristics with ‘more’ reality than he himself possesses. However, on what is he basing that fact? He starts off that claim with “Now it is manifest by the natural light [of reason]” (Baird and Kaufmann 32) But just what does that mean, ‘manifest’? Apparently it should be obvious to anybody that what he is saying is true, but there is no actual proof to his claim. I can conceive of things that fly, and things that are freezing cold, and things that can move through cracks under doors if I want to, while I possess none of those characteristics myself. Descartes would have me believe that this is because I have an equal or greater amount of ‘reality’ than those things do, but one could just as easily conclude that it is because sharing characteristics has nothing whatsoever to do with being able to hold an idea. Simply not being infinitely powerful, or knowledgeable doesn’t render you unable to conceive of something that is. Descartes, for someone who starts off by claiming that he is easily deceived, presents a very well thought out argument for the existence of God. For what he claims, he supports those claims quite well. While the ideas put forward by Descartes require you to believe on faith what he says, which runs directly contrary to his own claims about being completely certain before believing anything, one could claim that he intends his conclusions only for himself, and that we are under no obligation to agree with him.
Through the course of the meditations, Descartes deals with the foundation of knowledge in many forms. But it is through his thoughts on God that his philosophy truly receives a chance to shine. In spite of a few flaws inherent in his reasoning, Descartes presents a compelling proof for belief in a superior creator being, of the caliber to insist upon somber reflection and thought in all who read it.

Works Cited

Baird, Forrest E. , and Kaufmann, Walter. Modern Philosophy. 4th edition. 3. Prentice Hall, 2003. 32. print.

Beyssade, Jean-Marie. 1992. “The Idea of God and Proofs of His Existence,” in The Cambridge Companion to Descartes, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 174–199.

Gewirth, Alan. "Clearness and Distinctness in Descartes."Philosophy. 18.69 (1943): 17-36. Web. 24 Mar. 2014. <http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/3748353?uid=3739256&uid=2134&uid=2&uid=70&uid=4&sid=21103727164517>.

Sibajiban, . "Descartes' Doubt." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 24.1 (1963): 106-116. Web. 24 Mar. 2014. <http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2104497?uid=3739256&uid=2&uid=4&sid=21103727164517>.