The One-Dimensional Voting Model allows for certain assumptions to hold that result in a Condorcet winner and no cycle. Voters choose among points on a line so that each voter prefers points on the line closest to his or her favorite point on the line. The point on the line that beats all of the other options, under the Majority Rule, is the point that the median voter favors the most. Although this model proves there can be a Condorcet winner under the Majority Rule of voting, it is a simplistic model, since it can only prove this result when certain assumptions are made, such as in a single regression rather than in multiple regressions. In the One-Dimensional Model, the outcome of voting depends on the default outcome and what is on the ballet. Since every voter prefers the majority closest to their first choice option, the median is the Condorcet winner. This is demonstrated in the model below: D L
Median
Median

≤1/2 # of voters ≤1/2 # of voters

In this model, the Legislation can vote yes or no, where the outcome will result in L or D. The yellow triangle represents the median; therefore, less than or equal to half the total number of voters are on either side of the triangle. The orange line represents one majority of voters, which includes all of the voters on the left side of the line and the median. The green line represents another majority of voters, which includes all of the voters on the right side of the line and the median. Therefore, in either case, the majority of voters prefer the median point on the line, even though this point may not be an option on the voting ballet. In this case, the outcome will be the option that is closest to the point on the line that the majority prefers. An example where the outcome will result based on the default option and based on the other option on the ballet can be seen in the vote on