Martina Korpue
Introduction to Ethics
Professor Fumerton
November 30, 2012
“Ethical judgments are social instruments” In his essay “The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms”, Charles Leslie Stevenson (C.L. Stevenson), a professor of philosophy who taught at the University of Michigan, theorizes that the function of ethical statements is not to describe, but is rather to prescribe. He claims that language carries a type of meaning which he calls ‘emotive meaning’, rather than descriptive meaning and uses many examples of the term ‘good’ to establish his belief. He aims at showing that the notion of ‘good’ is equivalent to taking favor of something (“X is good”= “I like X”). Stevenson’s in-depth analysis of the concept of ‘good’ ultimately shows his readers the reality that the disagreement over whether something is good or not is just simply a disagreement in attitude. The first method used in determining the emotive meaning of ethical statements is to first address ethical questions in answering the question ‘Is X good?’ by what Stevenson calls ‘substitution’. He explains that in order to help understand this concept, the question must be substituted by a question that is free from ambiguity and confusion (Stevenson 370). It would not make sense to substitute this question with one that is irrelevant or with one that is the same as the question being assessed. He uses an example of substitution with the statement ‘Is X pink with yellow trimmings?’ This statement clearly has no relation to the original question and would cause confusion. The substituted question should not be identical to the original question as well. It should be somewhat different and “identical only in the sense that a child is identical with the man he later becomes” (370). Stevenson also discusses how the substituted question must be related to the original. His answer to this matter is that it must be relevant. He claims that there are certain conditions under which relevance of the defined meaning fall: “Those who have understood the definition must be able to say all that they then want to say by using the term in the defined way…and must never have occasion to use the term in the old, unclear sense” (371). The word is used so ambiguously that we must give it several defined meanings, rather than one. A look at what others have attempted at giving a relevant definition of good is also examined. He explains that ‘good’ is defined in terms of approval or other psychological attitudes. For example, ‘X is good’ is equivalent to ‘I like X’ or ‘My community likes X’ which includes the speaker. Another equivalency is ‘Most people like X’ and it does not include the speaker. He refers to these definitions as ‘interest theories’. He questions if definitions of this sort are relevant and comes to the conclusion that it is partially relevant. In regards to an adequate analysis of the term ‘good’, Stevenson claims that there are three criteria that it must fall under. The first standard is that we must be able to sensibly disagree about whether something is ‘good’. The argument ‘This is good’. ‘That isn’t so; it’s not good’ becomes ‘I like this.’ ‘That isn’t so, I don’t like it.” He claims that the definition ‘good’ means desired by my community and is also excluded because people from different communities cannot disagree. Another criterion that the term ‘good’ must comply to is magnetism. A person who recognizes X to be ‘good’ must ipso facto acquire a stronger tendency to act in its favor than he otherwise would have (371). For example, a man may recognize that most people like ketchup without liking ketchup himself. This requirement eliminates any attempt to define ‘good’ in terms of the interest of people other than the speaker. The last condition the ‘vital’ sense of good should comply is that it must not be determined solely through the scientific method. For example, if a poll was taken to verify whether most people like pleasure and ‘Pleasure is good’ meant ‘Pleasure is liked by most people’ it would be considered scientifically verifiable. Stevenson claims that this method used is highly far-flung from what is usually accepted as proof and manifests on the importance of the definitions of which it suggests.
Stevenson claims that there is some one sense of ‘good’ which satisfies all three requirements and that no interest theory satisfies them all. The problem of interest theories is that they “hold that ethical statements are descriptive of the existing sate of interest-that they simply give information about interests.” He claims that there is of course always some degree of description in ethical statements, but not entirely. Their major use is not to indicate facts, but to create an influence and they recommend an interest in an object, rather than state that the interest already exists (373). He gives an example that when you tell someone that they ought not to steal, your intention is not merely to let him know that people disapprove of stealing. You are attempting to get him to disapprove of it. Your ethical judgment does not merely describe interests to him, it directs his very interests. He then states “the difference between the traditional interest theories and my view is like the difference between describing a desert and irrigating it” (373). Another example is that a Nazi soldier declares that war is a good thing. He is not merely describing his approval of war; he is showing his attitude of this subject matter. Consequently ethical statements are means used in interaction and reformation of human interests. He observes that this can be seen generally. People from widely separated communities have different moral attitudes because they have been exposed to different social influences. Stevenson also clarifies his notion of the prominence of moral language by the fact that people praise one another, encourage certain inclinations, blame one another, and discourage others (373). This helps to explain how ethical judgments grow amongst a community. He gives an example that one man says ‘This is good’; this may influence the approval of another person, who then makes the same ethical judgment, which in turn influences another person, and so on (373). Eventually people influence one another and hold the same beliefs and attitudes. Stevenson also declares that there are two different purposes which lead us to use language. He terms words we use to record and clarify descriptive. Words used to show feelings are termed dynamic. The distinction depends solely upon the purpose of the speaker: “When a person says ‘Hydrogen is the lightest known gas’, his purpose may be simply to lead the hearer to believe this. In that case the words are used descriptively. When a person cuts himself and says, ‘Damn,’ his purpose is not ordinarily to record, clarify, or communicate any belief. The word is used dynamically” (374). Sometimes it is observed that ethical statements are too complex and can both be both descriptive and dynamic. Stevenson uses the example of saying ‘I want you to close the door,’ part of his purpose, ordinarily, is to lead the hearer to believe that he has this want and the major part of one’s purpose is to lead the hearer to satisfy the want (374). From these examples it is clear that we cannot determine whether words are used dynamically or not, merely by statement. To know whether a person is using a word dynamically we must note his tone of voice, gestures, situation and so on. There are many underlying issues behind taking a stand and saying ‘I like X’ that gets overlooked. Sometimes we fail to realize that our attitude shapes who we are and what we believe, and even influences our ethical statements. Stevenson takes a stand and verifies his point that there is more to description, and it is called emotive meaning.

Works Cited
1937, “The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms,” reprinted in Stevenson 1963a, pp. 10–31.