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Final Peace Agreement

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MNLF Position on the Status of the 1996
MNLF-GPH Final Peace Agreement
By: Rltr. John R. Petalcorin (MNLF)
7 June 2013
THE MNLF-GPH DISPUTE.
We, Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), disputes the claim of the Government of the Philippines (GPH) that they have already completely and fully implemented the 1996 MNLF-GPH Final Peace Agreement (FPA). The major issue that MNLF will dispute is on Section 20(a) of the 1996 MNLF-GPH FPA that says:
"There shall be a special socioeconomic, cultural and educational program to cater to MNLF

forces not absorbed into the AFP, PNP and the SRSF to prepare them and their families for productive endeavors, provide for educational, technical skills and livelihood training and give them priority for hiring in development projects."
WHAT IS THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION?
The GPH's position is that they believe that they have already completed the implementation of the MNLF-GPH
FPA Sec 20(a) through the ordinary GPH projects in what they perceive as "MNLF communities". These ordinary projects include giving direct dole-out Pantawid Pamilya cash allowances, direct dole-out Philhealth cards, direct dole-out housing assistance, and the regular infrastructure projects (say farm-to-market road and fish port) that the community members have free access.

WHAT IS MNLF'S ARGUMENT DISPUTING THE GPH POSITION?
MNLF believes that GPH giving direct dole-out Pantawid Pamilya cash allowances, dole-out Philhealth cards, dole-out housing assistance are not part of the MNLF-GPH FPA Sec 20(a) because these projects are implemented for the general public to enjoy. These projects are nothing special for the MNLF. These are ordinary economic development projects that can be benefited by the general citizenry, whether MNLF or not.
Besides, there is no such thing as an "MNLF Community"; no such thing as "MNLF Village"; no such thing as
"MNLF Barangay"; no such thing as "MNLF Town"; no such thing as "MNLF Municipality"; no such thing as
"MNLF Province"; no such thing as "MNLF Region"; not even such a thing as "MNLF Camp". The MNLFs are scattered all over Mindanao, Sulu (incl Sabah), Palawan and there are also MNLFs outside these named areas.
We, MNLFs, cannot be residing in one location such as a community because we are scared we might be massacred by the GPH Military, one community all at once.
In order to for an economic development project to be counted as compliance to the MNLF-GPH FPA Sec

20(a), it has to be "special" for MNLFs. For it to be special, we have to go back to the layman's interpretation
MNLF-GPH FPA Sec 20(a) that specifies the following special benefits for the MNLF Forces and their families:

(1) provide educational skills training,
(2) provide technical skills training,
(3) provide livelihood training, and
(4) give priority hiring in development projects.
THE MNLF: SHORT PROFILE
GROUP NAME: Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) can also be referred to as Mindanao National Liberation
Front (MNLF). Founded est 1969.
IDEOLOGY: Egalitarian, a principled belief in the equality of all people in the political, economic, social, and civil rights regardless of differences in political ideology, religion, race, ethnic origin, age, and gender.
LEADER: UN Peace Prize Awardee Prof. Dr. Nur Misuari.
SOCIAL MISSION: Peace and equitable development.
ORGANIZATIONAL OBJECTIVE: Education and substantially gainful livelihood and employment for its members
(over 100,000) and their families.
POLITICAL OBJECTIVE: Secession from Philippines.
AREA OF SUBSTANTIAL PRESENCE: Mindanao, Sulu (incl Sabah), Palawan.
ADVOCACY METHODOLOGY: Peaceful approach.
AFFILIATION: Observer member (since 1977) of Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), a 57-member state cluster of the United Nations.
ARMED CONFLICT: All-out-war with Govt of the Philippines (GPH) in 1974-1976 (200,000 dead). Sporadic gunbattle with GPH from 1976-1996.
LEGAL STATUS: Signed Peace Accord with GPH in 1976, known as Tripoli Agreement. Signed Final Peace agreement with GPH in 1996, known as 1996 MNLF-GPH Final Peace Agreement.
NATIONAL SECURITY STATUS: No more armed conflict but still at propaganda war with GPH due to government's non-delivery of obligation in the Agreements signed.
STRONG MEMBERS: Count 50,000 in 1996 minus 5,000 integrated in the PH Govt Police and PH Govt Armed
Forces. Last count, stopped counting at point of 100,000 in 2013, could possibly be something between
120,000-150,000 strong.

WHAT MNLF WANTS?
In this Position Paper, the MNLF wants the Government of the Philippines (GPH) to shift its policy from

stigmatic approach to integrative approach. Specifically, MNLF urges the GPH to implement the 1996 MNLFGPH FPA Sec 20(a) by means of an MNLF SCHOOLING AND LIVELIHOOD ECONOMIC PROGRAM , or MNLF Economic Program for short.

HOW DOES THIS MNLF ECONOMIC PROGRAM OPERATIONALIZE?
First, MNLF and GPH must have at least a monthly Formal Talks. Each time there is a Formal Talk, the
GPH must bring in official representatives of what I call Institutional Peace Partners (IPP), and present them to MNLF. Altogether, the MNLF, GPH, IPP and Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) will sign a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) wherein these IPPs commit to accommodate, with preferential attention, any MNLF who hand-carries Recommendation Letter from MNLF Leader Nur Misuari. We shall call these MNLF recommendation letters to the IPPs as "MNLF Vouchers".
Part of the implementation of the Sec 20(a) 1996 MNLF-GPH FPA means GPH must deliver its obligation to identify, communicate, and invite companies and institutions to sign-up as IPPs in the MNLF Economic
Program.
WHAT SORT OF INSTITUTIONS ARE QUALIFIED TO BECOME IPP's?
IPPs could be (a) civilian government agencies, (b) educational institutions, (c) large private business companies, (d) government contractor firms, and (e) foreign aid NGOs that are operating in places where most MNLF forces are located.
EXAMPLES OF HOW THE MNLF ECONOMIC PROGRAM OPERATES

Providing educational skills training. For example, if Ateneo de Davao signs up as IPP. Misuari can issue

an MNLF Voucher to an MNLF who wants to study Business Administration in Ateneo de Davao. The person will take the exam to qualify, and if he passes the exam he will be given full scholarship by virtue of this MNLF Voucher. After finishing his studies, he can go back to Misuari and get another MNLF
Voucher so he can work in any IPP.

Providing technical skills training. Another example, if TESDA signs up as IPP. Misuari can issue an MNLF
Voucher to an MNLF who wants to study any Salesmanship Training, and the person will take the exam to qualify, and if he passes the exam he will be given full scholarship. After finishing his training, he can go back to Misuari and get another MNLF Voucher so he can work in any IPP.

Provide livelihood training. Another example, let's say another big typhoon came, major disaster in say

Negros Island, disaster bigger than Yolanda. PNP and AFP, again, won't move into the site quickly because they are "scared". Foreign AID NGO come in, they want to help in the housing rebuild aspect, they need hands in the disaster area. Foreign NGO comes to attend emergency meeting of MNLF-GPH
Formal talks, signs up an IPP MOA. Misuari will then call for an MNLF Summit to distribute MNLF
Vouchers. The Voucher holders report to the Foreign AID NGO for deployment to the disaster site. With standard compensation budgetted by the AID, the MNLFs can do house construction work cum construction training as a form of livelihood training, and other work such as debris clearing work, cooking for the humanitarian workers, distributing relief goods, and transporting supplies.

Priority hiring in development projects. Another example, a Government Engineering and Construction

company signs up as IPP. The company is awarded a government contract to build some length of road and bridge. MNLFs in the project site area can come to Misuari to get MNLF Voucher. The MNLF will present his/her voucher to the Contractor Firm and he/she will get preferential hiring in the construction of this development project.

Another example, if Bank of Philippine Islands (BPI) signs up as IPP. Assuming we have an MNLF member who wants to put up his own small family-run Bakery Shop. He/she can go to Misuari, and
Misuari can give him/her an MNLF Voucher to attend TESDA Training in Bakery Operation. After the seminar, he/she can go back to Misuari and ask for access to loan to start-up the business. Misuari can give him another MNLF Voucher to be presented to BPI so he can apply for loan and be given preferential approval. It will not be difficult for him to gain knowledge in bakery operation and realize his/her dream of starting up the bakery business that can provide livelihood for the family.
MNLF's GUN CONTROL ADVOCACY
MNLF per se, as an organization, does not have an army and does not issue guns to its members. MNLF members acquire their own guns. There are a lot of MNLF members and sympathizers who have firearms, specially small arms and automatic rifles. Although we (MNLF) do advise them to have their guns licensed from the PNP, many MNLFs prefer to keep silent about their guns because they can feel the
GPH's stigma against the MNLF. Silent means not registering in the PNP -- they don't want to be in the
PNP's gun search list or gun confiscation list.
If PNP will sign up as IPP in the MNLF Economic Program, we will come up with an advocacy mechanism that will encourage (even more) our members to have their firearms licensed. We can even use the MNLF
Voucher as a medium of exchange -- heart-to-heart give and take at the individual level. It will be as simple as saying: "you register your gun as proof of commitment to peace, we help you get those guns licensed without any fee on your part, I'll approve your application for MNLF Voucher".
In line with gun control advocacy, the link to the MNLF-published Gun Control Policy counter-proposal is at https://www.facebook.com/notes/moro-national-liberation-front-mnlf/gun-controlpolicy/614405628615402
FRAUD PREVENTION FEATURE OF THE MNLF ECONOMIC PROGRAM
We, MNLFs, don't want this proposed MNLF Economic Program to be used for personal political mileage purposes. Once this mechanism is implemented, we will have an internal policy in the MNLF wherein no one in the MNLF who is responsible in granting this MNLF Voucher shall be allowed to run in public office in GPH. This rule will include Nur Misuari (the main signatory), myself (the second signatory), the appeals council responsible in adjudicating all denied applications, and all staff and consultants in the MNLF
Voucher office.
We, MNLFs, don't want fraud in reporting. We don't want this MNLF Voucher to end in the hands of nonMNLFs. We don't want this MNLF Voucher to end up in the hands of peace saboteurs who will just implant terrorist beneficiaries that will destroy the reputation, good intention, and integrity of the MNLF
Schooling and Livelihood Economic Program.
To prevent fraud, we (MNLF) will centralize the accountability of this MNLF Voucher Program. MNLF only has one leader, that is Nur Misuari, and he is the only one who can certify that an individual is a MNLF member. In order to avail of the MNLF Voucher, Misuari and myself have to be able to assure the public that the beneficiary is a believer and committed to the One MNLF Doctrine -- specifically on the person's commitment to peace. Any MNLF who benefits from this MNLF Voucher who gets himself into trouble
(such as rebellion and armed conflict and whatever crimes) shall be expelled from the MNLF and will no longer qualify to benefit from this MNLF Voucher.
DOES THIS PROGRAM HAVE AN MNLF IN-HOUSE TRAINING COMPONENT?
Yes. In as much as we are serious to make this program succeed, our would be office will have a facility

for the in-house training of the beneficiaries before we give them the MNLF Voucher. During this training, we will try our best to replace any apprehensions with positive mind-set about the program. A one-week stay-in training would cover lecture and sharing of thoughts on the following:
Day
Day
Day
Day
Day
Day
Day

1. General Principles of the One MNLF Doctrine.
2. Understanding the MNLF Schooling and Livelihood Economic Program.
3. Elements of a Good Student or Employee.
4. Awareness to Disruptive Behaviors at Work.
5. Gun Control Advocacy.
6. Team Building Games.
7. Graduation and socials.

WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF THIS PROGRAM ON ANTI-TERROR CAMPAIGN?
Terrorists infiltrate almost any organization. There are terrorist elements who have successfully infiltrated the
MNLF, MILF, NPA, and even in Government of the Philippines (GPH), religious institutions, and the academe.
Terrorists infiltrate vital organizations to recruit new terrorists from within the organization, to instigate the vulnerable members (desperate spirits) of these organizations over religious and political disputes, and influence the decisions from within so that there will be act of terror, armed conflict, combat, and war.
The MNLF has always maintained an anti-terrorism position. MNLF Leader Nur Misuari said many times that our anti-terrorism stance is non-negotiable. This MNLF Voucher Program will provide a strong foundation of hope and faith in the goodness of society for our MNLF members that will prevent them from becoming vulnerable to terrorist recruitment. This Program is a strong and deep-penetrating psychological reinforcement to the anti-terror campaign.

ATTRACTING FOREIGN INVESTMENT
This MNLF Economic Program has a mechanism of attracting foreign investment. Since 1977, the MNLF is an observer member of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). OIC is a United Nations subcluster that is composed of 57 States. MNLF Leader Nur Misuari is always invited during OIC conferences, summits, and meetings. This OIC gives the MNLF very high potential linkage to the leaders of the international community. Whenever there is an OIC event, we (MNLFs) would like to always attend and tell our colleagues in the OIC member-states to invest in Philippines by putting in money into the IPPs. In short, we will encourage them to buy stocks in the IPPs. So, you see, a synergy of give-and-take will take place between the MNLF and the IPP. Everyone helps forward to progress.
HOW MUCH IS THE FUND NEEDED FOR THIS MNLF ECONOMIC PROGRAM?
Funding this program will not be too much of a hassle because this is definitely not a program that intends to give out direct dole-outs to MNLFs. The only fund that is needed to start-up and sustain the Program is the linkage expense. It is only around 100 Million Pesos worth of administrative and logistics per year. This is the same fund that MNLF wants to get from 1/4th of the OPAPP Annual Budget to finance the MNLF's participation in the MNLF-GPH peace process-related activities such as negotiations, consultations, formal talks, coordination, and dialogues where our respective think-tanks can freely share their ideas.

We will try our best to be austere in our spending so we can save money to finance the construction of our permanent Program headquarters and training facility. We will also try to get sponsors to augment our budget. With the given budget, this MNLF Economic Program will try its best to deliver the following targets each year:

1. MNLF attendance to 12 MNLF-GPH Formal Talks (signing of MOAs with IPPs);
2. MNLF attendance to 12 MNLF-GPH Joint Press Conference;
3. MNLF attendance to 12 MNLF-GPH Community-level Consultation with MNLF members in the grounds;
4. MNLF conduct of 12 Integration Seminars to be attended by a total of some 2,400 MNLF participants
(estimated at 100 participants per week-long Seminar, two batches per month);
5. MNLF attendance to four (4) MNLF Peace Summits cum distribution of MNLF Economic Vouchers to preapproved applicants;
6. MNLF attendance to two (2) conferences of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC);
7. MNLF attendance to one (1) conference of the Parliamentary Union of Islamic Cooperation (PUIC);
8. Production of 400,000 pcs of MNLF Economic Program Brochures (communication and advocacy information and instruction printed material);
9. Production of Annual Report of the MNLF Economic Program;
10. MNLF attendance to the MNLF Annual Report (a formal evening event of high-level delegates of MNLF,
GPH, OIC, and IPPs for the presentation of the MNLF Economic Program Annual Report and Program Success
Stories).

WHAT'S STOPPING THIS MNLF ECONOMIC PROGRAM?
Misguided public opinion is prompting the government to turn a deaf ear and blind eye against the MNLF
Economic Program.
There are two schools of thoughts in achieving peace. One school believes integration is the key to peace.
The other thought believes elimination of the opponent is the key to peace. These two schools of thoughts interact in the open market of ideas, competes in the mileage of publication of mainstream and informal mass media, and influences the direction of GPH.
During Ramos presidency, the integration school of thought prevailed, hence, the signing of the The 1996
MNLF-GPH FPA. The 1996 MNLF-GPH FPA was founded on the common principle of integration. Ramos integrated the MNLF into mainstream society, and one of the political decision he did was to install Nur Misuari as ARMM Regional Governor. During Misuari's term as ARMM Governor (1996-2001), the Philippine National
Statistics Office reported that ARMM was the most peaceful region in the Philippines.
People usually had this general idea that peace is the key to prosperity. They thought that prosperity will follow when Mindanao becomes peaceful. But during Misuari's term as ARMM Regional Governor, the much expected prosperity of the people did not came, and they blame it on Misuari. Misuari was swarmed with tons of hearsay and allegation of graft and corruption. In fairness, the prosecutor (Department of Justice) of these charges found no evidence of the allegation while they investigated Misuari. While investigation was ongoing, Misuari was in jail from 2001-2009. Misuari was acquitted of all these charges and hearsay, including the charges of rebellion, because the prosecutors found no single evidence to present in court. The prosecutors attempted to present the tons of negative publicity against Misuari but the court rejected all these invalid evidences because they are only hearsay. It is just frustrating for us (MNLF) whenever these hearsay are recycled even nowadays. People should realize that economic prosperity does not necessarily follow when there is peace. Batanes for example, which is at the Northern end of Philippines outside Mindanao, is a province up at the tip of Northern
Luzon. Batanes is very peaceful, only chickens dwell in their jail. But the place is not prosperous, in fact, it is one of the poorest provinces of the Philippines. Very few people in in Batanes have livelihood. Mindanao is home to seven (7) out of ten (10) poorest provinces among the 80-province Philippines. The extraordinary high poverty incidence in Mindanao is brought about by many factors, but the primary and laden reason are government neglect and distance from the national metropolis.
You see, in peace, people will just skip the chance of gunshot-related mortality, but it will not give them the

economic prosperity until "special" attention is given to them, plus of course, they have to not only cooperate but must have this strong desire to prosper.
During Estrada's presidency, the GPH was kind of double minded. It was continuing the integration of the
MNLF in one hand while declaring all-out-war against MILF on the other hand. Places where MNLF and MILF members live are overlapping, so it was very chaotic, we were uncertain about the government's direction.
During the Arroyo and Aquino administration, the elimination school of thought prevailed. During these two administrations, instead of formally integrating the MNLF to participate in productive projects, the GPH have used its military to conduct false flag operations to smear a dirty paint on the MNLF and informally influence the mass media companies to create a stigma against the MNLF, all for the purpose of eliminating the MNLF.
The GPH Arroyo Administration politically persecuted MNLF Leader Nur Misuari in 2001, jailed him as political prisoner for 8 years (2001-2009) for alleged crimes that he did not commit. Again in 2013, the GPH Aquino administration conducted a false flag operation in Zamboanga City and implicated MNLF Leader Nur Misuari, and accused him again for crimes he did not commit. Despite all these persecutions, MNLF remained peaceful and abiding on the 1996 MNLF-GPH FPA. When it comes to being sober, it is the GPH that is problematic, not the MNLF.
The stigma has caused the MNLF to alienate from mainstream society, push further the revolutionary organizing for national secession, and even prompted many of our leaders to go back to underground revolutionary movement.
Aquino Administration's anti-integration activities against the MNLF is anti-peace, and is an opposite of the good principles of integration upon which the 1996 MNLF-GPH FPA is founded upon. These anti-peace actions of the Aquino administration are not only acts of provocation but already considered by MNLF as already acts of war against the MNLF, even without the GPH explicitly declaring it.
MNLF Officially denies participation in that infamous chaos in Zamboanga City of September 2013. Please be informed that MNLF Cmdr Habier Malik, MNLF Leader Nur Misuari, and all members of the Genuine MNLF are not participants in that chaos in Zamboanga City of September 2013. This denial is based on the result of
MNLF's internal affairs field investigation. That chaos was just a false flag operation of the AFP/GPH and squatter demolition of the LGU/GPH. Please read the declassified report at http://bangsamoromnlf.blogspot.com/2013/11/mnlf-right-of-reply-re-zamboanga-crisis.html
It appears to us (MNLF) that Aquino administration did not understand the principle of integration because we can see that its publicities in the mainstream media; and the actions of its armed forces intend to destroy, persecute, stigmatize, eradicate, and annihilate the MNLF.
GPH's strategy of creating a stigma against the MNLF and the increasing number of impoverished people in
Mindanao and has increase of the number of MNLF forces because the marginalized people found "sense of belongingness" with the oppressed MNLF. In 1996, there were around 50,000 MNLF Forces. At present, the number of MNLF forces have doubled to over 100,000, carrying with it some over one million able-bodied
MNLF family members, all waiting for the implementation of 1996 MNLF-GPH FPA Sec 20(a).
WHAT IS MNLF'S POSITION ON THE OTHER PEACE SOLUTIONS OF GPH, SUCH AS MILF
BANGSAMORO DEAL?
We, MNLFs, despite our egalitarian ideology, don't believe in one magic pill of solution that is applicable to all people with different political wing, religion, ethnic origin, and gender. Our solutions may be good only for
MNLF members, but others may have their own solutions. In the same way, the solution that other want may not be acceptable to us. The ultimate solution is not selecting which is which, but accommodating all solutions.
Give the MILF what they want, give the MNLF what we want; and avoid cross-over, avoid overlapping, and

avoid squabbling. A good solution elevates one without stepping on the other. We prefer a buffet-type mindset where all groups can get whatever they want, instead of a competitive mindset that squabbles over one piece of burger.
MNLF maintains a hands-off policy on GPH's peace solutions for other groups in Mindanao. We (MNLFs) have experienced so much stigma, marginalization, and oppression from the GPH -- as a result, we have virtually lost all of our confidence and self-esteem to compete with the great number of people squabbling for employment, dole-out benefits, attention, political concession, and favors.
Sometime in 2008, GPH under the Arroyo Administration had "Memorandum of Agreement for Ancestral
Domain" (MOA-AD) deal with MILF that was disapproved by Supreme Court of the Philippines -- we (MNLF) were hands-off on that. In 2010, GPH had "Bangsamoro Sub-State" deal with MILF that just evaporated for unknown reason, perhaps it was overtaken by the new PNoy Administration -- we (MNLF) were hands-off on that. Now recently, in 2012 the GPH have "Framework Agreement for Bangsamoro" with MILF that became
"Comprehensive Agreement for Bangsamoro", and subsequently now being developed into "Bangsamoro Basic
Law" -- we (MNLF) are maintaining a hands-off policy on that.
A partially successful Peace Process produces three-legged commitment: (1) peace pact, (2) economic concession, and (3) political concession. Among the three, only the peace pact that is always the win-win result, hence everyone must laud it by default. The economic concession would have to be justifiable as it requires a prioritized budget at the cost of some other priorities of government. The political concession would have to be reasonable because the favor granted to one will always cost society's normal democratic process of a fair elections. A fully successful Peace Process is one that completes the fulfillment of these commitments in a speedy manner. Nevertheless, prolonging the fulfillment of obligation is similar to failure to deliver the commitment. We, MNLF, laud the peace pact aspect of the MILF-GPH Deal, but wo are hands-off on the political concession aspect because it intends to replace the ARMM. In our opinion, a good political concession should produce an added happiness that is not at the expense of somebody else current happiness. In this scenario of
Bangsamoro Deal that is aggressive and stigmatic against the ARMM, we prefer to support the defensive side because we, MNLFs, have a reputation to protect that we are defenders of the weak. As we, MNFL, sit on the lighter side of the seesaw, we hope to promote considerable balance in the political arena. The people must not be deprived of their political rights, hence, let the MILF campaign for public support to their political concession in a fair-and-square plebiscite; let the MILF leaders file their candidacy and campaign for votes in a fair-and-square elections.
Although we expect MILF have their own Economic Program, we would not care if they will replicate this proposed MNLF Economic Program. They can have their own exclusive economic concession that is totally separate from our exclusive economic concession.
This recent MILF-GPH Bangsamoro Deal have a slogan that says: "No one – Muslim, Christian, Lumad or of

any other faith – will be left behind" (GPH Sec. Deles who is now the PR point-person of the MILF). Our

MNLF response to this would be we are happy to have spread the doctrine of Egalitarian Ideology and influenced the GPH program. But where is the special schooling and livelihood for the MNLF? The MNLF's special benefit that we are expecting is not only an Administration's promise, but an obligation of the GPH. We are not kids that you can just divert our attention to some clowns and lollipops.
If we benefit from those generic GPH programs, good. Nevertheless, enjoying generic programs does not, in whole or in part, diminish our right to expect GPH to implement their obligation, specially the Sec 20(a) of the
1996 MNLF-GPH FPA.

STABILITY OF MNLF INTERNAL AFFAIRS

The two opposing school of thoughts (Integration Team vs Elimination Team) also play in the individual mind of the MNLF members.
There are MNLF commanders who believe that integration is the solution, and they continue to hope and pray for the implementation of the 1996 MNLF-GPH FPA.
On the other hand, there are also MNLF commanders who believe that armed uprising is the solution. You can't blame them because they've been waiting since 1996, and some of them were waiting since 1976 during the MNLF-GPH Tripoli Agreement.
Despite eternal debate among these two conflicting school of thoughts and numerous attempts of leadership take-overs, Misuari stood on his ground that MNLF will be peaceful. Each time the MNLF felt being threatened by government provocations, I can feel the tension in the MNLF that felt like MNLF becomes a bunch of
100,000 loaded guns on the verge of exploding, but Misuari played the role as the safety mechanism of the gun. Whether Misuari is free, or in jail, or exile, or whereabouts unknown, the MNLF will never explode as long as Misuari is the leader of the MNLF.

MNLF MUST GO OUT AND SPEAK TO INFLUENCE PUBLIC OPINION
We believe that the degree of fear of the public determines the seesaw of the two opposing school of thoughts
-- the Integration Team vs the Elimination Team.
MNLF must go out and speak to influence public opinion. We have to drill into the mind of public opinion the fact that Nur Misuari is a U.N. Peace Price Awardee and a Nobel Peace Price Nominee. We have to drill into the mind of the public the fact that through the decades, since the signing of the 1996 MNLF-GPH FPA, the MNLF never used its power, influence, and movement to weaken the plans, programs, and projects of the GPH. We have never attacked any GPH troops. We have never closed our ears from the call of the GPH to support its anti-corruption advocacy. The MNLF has always supported the advocacy for good governance of GPH. The
MNLF did not abuse the supposed political concession that the MNLF expects from the 1996 MNLF-GPH FPA -in fact, the MNLF Leader Nur Misuari had ran for governor in the ARMM, got defeated by the GPH candidates in the elections, and MNLF is still peaceful.

DOES MNLF GROUNDS (COMMUNITIES) SUPPORT SUPPORT THIS MNLF ECONOMIC
PROGRAM?
Yes. Definitely. This is consistent with the sentiment of over 100,000 MNLFs scattered all over Southern Islands
(Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan), Southern Mindanao (Davao, Cotabato, Saranggani), Western Mindanao
(Zamboanga), Central Mindanao (Maguindanao, Lanao), Northern Mindanao (Bukidnon, Misamis), Eastern
Mindanao (Agusan, Surigao) and Palawan.
In one instance, last 2 June 2014, OPAPP Peace Adviser Teresita Deles, along with eight foreign ambassadors of OIC-member states (Egypt, Turkey, Bangladesh, Iraq, and Malaysia) visited Bongao, Tawi-Tawi to open up a concrete fishport project of the GPH and consult the local MNLF leaders. According to Inquirer that covered such event, the group invited MNLF area commander Ambrodin "Amlo" Salahuddin who believes in the Misuari leadership. Inquirer reported that Commander Amlo "expressed concern about livelihood projects and

getting jobs for the people... What’s the use of having so many roads, bridges and ports if our people, former MNLF combatants and their children, have no livelihood? Inquirer added that the Commander was glad to see the OIC delegates coming here as “they can help us in investing projects where our people will be employed.” Read more: http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/608543/misuari-not-invited-to-oicmeeting#ixzz346axqOo5

DOES MNLF LEADERSHIP (NUR MISUARI) SUPPORT THIS MNLF ECONOMIC PROGRAM?
Yes. Misuari supports this Program. Rest assured, two generations of MNLF, Misuari and myself are in one page in this program. Misuari represents the past and present MNLF. I represent the future of MNLF. In fact, each time Misuari renders his speeches, he always complains about the long wait of implementation of the
1996 MNLF-GPH FPA. Many people, especially the GPH, can't figure out what he is complaining about -- and they brush him off as a "difficult personality". Actually, they are just insensitive. Misuari's complain is actually referring to Section 20(a).

ECONOMY-DRIVEN POLITICAL REFORM
Just let political change and reform take place naturally in a peaceful environment. Just let political change evolve naturally in a scenario where people are economically secured, people's stomach are full, and they are free to intelligently decide on their political destiny. Political solution is best borne by the mind when the stomach is full.
The good intention of this program must overpower our apprehensions, fears, and insecurities. There is One
MNLF Doctrine and it has to be respected. This program is not intended to eradicate the MNLF by means of guiding the MNLFs away from the One MNLF Doctrine.
We, MNLFs, should not be persecuted nor looked-down upon for a reason that we believe that we should be united instead of factionalized. We, MNLFs, should not be persecuted nor looked-down upon for a reason that we believe in the leadership of Nur Misuari. We, MNLFs, should not be persecuted nor looked-down upon for a reason that we believe in Egalitarian Ideology. We, MNLFs, should not be persecuted nor looked-down upon for a reason that we envision Mindanao independence. We, MNLFs, should not be persecuted nor looked-down upon for a reason that we prefer to do our struggle for freedom and prosperity in a peaceful way.
I am disclosing, presenting, and advocating this MNLF Schooling and Livelihood Economic Program because I believe it is easier to sell a canned good if its content is properly labelled. We are all tired of GPH-MNLF Talks on endless debate on "political solutions" to wars and armed conflict. Let's get away from all these political debate crap. Lets start working on the economics. Let's do this MNLF Economic Program and start talking
SUCCESS of the Program !!!

Rltr. John R. Petalcorin*
Director for Advocacy Communications
Director for Charity and Economic Projects
MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT
Cellphone Nos.: 0921-7172040
Email: JohnPetalcorin@Gmail.Com
Twitter: @OneMNLF
FB: #OneMNLF
*Permits the members of the Mass Media to publish this in print or electronically.

MNLF will answer questions via comment in https://www.facebook.com/notes/moro-national-liberation-frontmnlf/mnlf-position-on-the-status-of-the-1996-mnlf-gph-final-peace-agreement/654449711277660
To request for a Google Docs link to the free downloadable and printable .PDF file of this MNLF Position Paper, please request it by sending email to JohnPetalcorin@Gmail.Com

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