...In 1968, the Ford Motor Company, based upon a recommendation by then vice president Lee Iacocca, decided to launch a subcompact car which is Ford Pinto. In order to gain a large market share, the Ford Motor Company plans for the project was the 2000/2000 rule. The car’s designer was designed and developed Pinto could weigh no more than 2000 pounds and it could cost no more than 2000 dollar. The Product Planning Committee instituted this rule because of the extreme competition between all of the automotive companies at the time (Daniel Boyce, n.d). Due to the Ford Motor Company was implemented the 2000/2000 rule, the car’s designers had to cut corners and restricted their ability to design a car the way it should be designed. Therefore, the Ford Pinto is known to be one of the most dangerous cars produced in automotive history due to several serious design flaws. Daniel Boyce wrote an article titled “Ford Pinto Case Information”. In his article, he claimed that “Pinto’s problems originated with the placement of the gas tank. At that time of automobile production, it was customary to place the gas tank between the rear axle and the bumper, which would give the vehicle more trunk space. The only other place the gas tank would be mounted was above the rear axle, but that eliminated trunk space, and the developers of the Pinto wanted the most practical car they could produce. The gas tank was nine inches away from the rear axle. This might not seem like a big deal, but there were...
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...Ford Pinto Case In the late 1960s Ford Motor Company developed the idea of the Ford Pinto. Foreign automobile such as Germans and Japanese manufactures dominated the small car market. Ford Motor Company did not want to stay behind in production. Chief Executive Officer, Henry Ford II and Lee Iococca’s rushed building new compact cars out in the market within two and half years which, was the Ford Pinto and the shortest production planning. Production and distribution of the 1970s Ford Pinto stirred controversy regarding safety concerns. Ford’s desire to compete with the foreign manufacturers led Ford to overlook known design flaws and their own ethics while in search of higher profits. Ford assigned a team of engineers to work on nothing but the Pinto. This team was required to stick to Iacocca’s goal of “the limits 2000”; this meant that the car could not weigh more than 2000 pounds. This became a challenge for the engineers and created concerns regarding the placement of the fuel tank. Because of the accelerated production the testing was not done thoroughly. Out of 11 Pintos subjected to rear end collisions, eight failed the test. Only the three with baffles between the tank and bumper and a special interior tank lining met safety standards. The project was almost complete, and it was not possible to make redesign revisions and meet the deadline for the release of the Pinto. The car met the requirements for the American public. It was not long before...
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...Identify the relevant facts of the Ford Pinto case: In 1970 Ford introduced the Pinto, a small car that was intended to compete with the then current challenge from European cars and the ominous presence on the horizon of Japanese manufacturers. The Pinto was brought from inception to production in the record time of approximately 25 months, where a normal car usually takes 43 months. This showed an expedited time frame for the Pinto. On top of time pressure the team was also required to follow a limit of 2000, that meaning it could not exceed $2000 in cost and it could not weight more than 2000lbs. When it came to routine crash testing of the Pinto, it was revealed that the Pinto’s fuel tank often ruptured when struck from the rear at a relatively low speed. This was because the fuel tank was positioned between the rear bumper and the rear axle, and when impact was made studs from the axle would puncture the fuel tank, spilling gasoline that could be ignited by the sparks. In crash testing 11 vehicles, 8 of the cars suffered potentially catastrophic gas tank ruptures. There were several possibilities for fixing the problem, but given the restrictions of limit of 2000, they made no changes. The most controversial reason for rejecting the production change was because of Ford’s cost-benefit analysis. Ford believed that the cost of rebuilding the Pinto to make it safer were far more expensive than the cost of life for each fatality. Due to schema, the Pinto was found okay to sell on the...
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...1970’s, Ford had been criticized by the public due to a defective fuel system design. Although Ford had access to a new design which would decrease the possibility of the Ford Pinto from exploring, the company chose not to redesign the system, which would have cost $11 per car, even though the analysis showed that the new system would result in 180 less deaths (1999, The Valuation of Life As It Applies To the Negligence-Efficiency Argument). The company defended itself by using the accepted risk/benefit analysis to indicate that costs of making the change were higher than the fatality costs. This analysis was based on Judge Learned Hand’s BPL formula, where if the expected harm exceeded the redesign costs, then Ford must make the change, whereas if the redesign costs were higher than fatality costs, then it didn’t have to. Ford legally chose not to make the fuel system changes which would have reduced the fatality rate. However, it was legal doesn’t mean that it was ethical to the society. It is hard to accept how companies can put price tag on a human life. To me, it is unethical to determine that people should die or be injured because it would cost too much money to prevent it. Some things just can’t be measured in price, and that includes human life. Christopher Leggett stated in his case analysis: “Ford adopted a policy of allowing a certain number of people to die or be seriously injured even though they would have avoided it. From a human rights perspective, Ford disregarded...
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...21 June 2013 The Ford Pinto Case The big question which needs an answer in this case is if Ford should have installed a device to prevent the Ford Pinto from exploding into a fiery ball upon impact for the safety of its occupants. Before an answer can be determined, let’s look at the facts of this case. “In the late 1960s, American automobiles were losing market share to smaller Japanese imports (DeGeorge 298).” Ford felt the need to compete to keep ahead domestically so it developed the subcompact care, the Ford Pinto. Lee Iacocca, the CEO at the time ordered Ford to produce a car for 1971 that weighed less than 2,000 pounds and priced at less than $2,000. The engineers of Ford came out with the Ford Pinto. It took 25 months to design and produce the Ford Pinto. The industry norm it should take is 43 months. Due to the shorter production period, Ford tested the Pinto for rear-impact safety after production. The Pinto failed the test with 37 out of 40 attempts. The crash test revealed a serious defect in the gas tank. The gas tank would rupture by four sharp bolts on the rear axle with an impact of over 25 mph spilling fuel on the ground. The engineers designed the Pinto so the gas tank would set behind the rear axle to allow for more trunk space. The Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 301 required vehicles to withstand rear-end collisions of 28 mph. The three times the Pinto passed was in cars equipped with three different modifications to the fuel tank. Installing a plastic...
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...The Ford Pinto Case Back in the 1970s the Ford Pinto was debuted without regard to proper safety features and concern for proper ethics while producing this automobile. Buyers wanted lower pricing and bigger trunk space more than the consideration for safety. Lee Iacocca, president of Ford, ran the business striving for higher profits and cutting costs. His lack of interest for human life initiated many lawsuits against Ford and, in the end, was a far bigger cost than installing safety features in the Pinto in the beginning. The biggest concern regarding the role people played in the Ford Pinto case was the concern for cutting costs and making the biggest profits over the concern for human life. Severally jeopardized in this case were proper corporate morals and ethics. This started when Lee Iacocca acquired the position of president from the former President Semon Knudson. Lee Iacocca celebrated much success with the Mustang and wanted to market small cars to compete with the foreign car markets. Lee Iacocca drove to promote the Ford Pinto by 1971. Because it typically takes three and one-half years for the production of an automobile, to have the Ford Pinto to the showrooms by 1971, only left two years to launch the Ford Pinto. During the production process, crash tests revealed safety issues with the gas tank in the rear of the car. If the car were struck from behind even at a slow speed, the gas tank would rupture, and explode upon impact. Lee Iacocca’s decisions...
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...FORD PINTO CASE The Ford management has chosen to be unethical and morally unworthy to be trusted with the lives of its customers. Can you just imagine the number of individuals riding every day in the cars that they produced, who are unaware that they could be in an injury any moment? Ford management has chosen not to follow the safety guidelines and standards in producing such products because at that time, the government is still not that strict in implementing such rules. And because of their eagerness to meet the production schedule, they have reduced the time allotted for the rear-end impact testing just to introduce such product on the market on time. They disregarded their customer’s safety and the possibility of injury or death just for the sake of small profit or share in the market. Ford with its utilitarian perspective, which the decision not to recall such products or even warn its customers, served the greater amount of good to those who are affected, hose who will benefit from the profit it will get. It has also regarded its decision as to having no instinctive value even when it is showing obvious consequences. The cost-benefit analysis that was used by Ford was also to blame. The cost amounting to $137M versus the $49.5M estimated for the cost of injuries, deaths, and car damages has been the deciding factor for Ford not to implement the design changes that would have made the cars safer. Ford used the formula so as not to legally implement the changes. However...
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...Appendix 2: Ford Pinto Case and Cost Benefit Analysis Edited by Richard Brooks In 1968 in response to strong foreign competition, Ford decided to build a subcompact car — the Pinto — on a 2×2×2 plan (2,000 pounds, $2,000, in 2 years). In pre-launch tests, Ford discovered that rear end collisions propelled the gas tank onto the real axle, which had protrusions that ruptured the tank and caused the car to catch fire. Yet Ford did Figure 1: Ford Pinto not modify the Pinto’s rear axle. Nor did it follow through on an idea to place a rubber bladder in the fuel tank. Why? The reason seems to have been that these changes would have increased the price, lowered sales and reduced profit. That reason is given credence in a cost/benefit study done on modifying the Pinto. So the Ford Pinto went on sale with dangerous design faults in the position of the fuel tank and nearby bolts, and the tendency for the fuel valve to leak in rollover accidents. Design and production was rushed and cost of the vehicle kept down to sell it at $2000. It sold well, until 1972 when four people died and one young boy was horrendously burned and disfigured; these are only a few of the incidents that resulted from the Pinto’s flaws, many more followed, costing Ford millions in compensation. The engineers were fully aware of the flaws, yet the company continued to sell the car as it was, without safety modifications. Ford applied a generic cost/benefit analysis to accidents based on National Highway Traffic...
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...Ford Pinto Case Solution The Ford Pinto was a disaster waiting to happen. The damage that the Lee Iacocca and Ford executives allow to happen was not only tragic but they were preventable. Because of Lee Iacoccas hurry and pressure of the creation of the auto was high, and this lead to the unfortunate dilemma. The Ford Pinto study has shown that Iacocca put to high of a demand on the team that was responsible for the creation of the Pinto. Fist the Pinto should never gone into production before some very important tests were completed, one of which was a complete crash study. Its known that Ford engineers knew that rear collision tests needed to be done but ignored until after the auto was put in to production. This one test could have saved hundreds of lives. Solution to dilemma In the late 1960s, the standard time to spend in development of a car was roughly 4 years. The engineers of the pinto only had 2. There would have been more testing for the safety of the passengers through a when it came to the placement of the gas tank or the bumper. Once the Testing was done the engineers would have known that with “A rear-end collision of about twenty-eight miles per hour or more would crush the car's rear end, driving the fuel tank against the differential housing and causing it to split and the filler pipe to break loose” thus resulting in fatal accidents. Because of the results of the tests a baffle would have been placed between the gas tanks for protection...
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...Case Review #1: Ford Pinto 1.) FACTS • Ford was aware of gas tank defects on their Pinto model • Ford ignored the safety concerns, positing “safety doesn’t sell” (p. 66) • Ford based their decision off a cost-benefit analysis o Determined the “cost” of trunk alterations outweighed the “cost” of enhanced safety • There were over 40 incidents involving Pinto passengers dying or being severely maimed 2.) ETHICAL ISSUES • Is it morally right to sell a car with known, potentially fatal, defects? 3.) PARTIES • Ford Motor Company • Ford Management • Ford Design Team • Ford Quality Control • Ford Pinto Drivers 4.) CONSEQUENCES • Utilitarian Principle: Ford’s decision should have maximized the benefits and minimized the harm for consumers. • The standard implicit in their decision was that since it was only a minority being injured, and they would reap a significant profit (with a majority of consumers being unaffected) their decision was permissible. • Potential Consequences by party: o Ford Motor Company – potential public backlash/potential legal action/potential monetary penalties/potential loss of credibility with the public o Ford Management – potential loss of profits to rival manufacturers/potential jail time/potential loss of position/potential loss of credibility o Ford Design Team- potential job loss/potential compensation penalties/potential jail time o Ford Quality Control – potential loss of credibility/potential loss of jobs o Ford Pinto Drivers...
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...The Ford Pinto Case The Ford Pinto Case was a very controversial moment in Ford’s history. They were struggling to keep up with the ever rising imports of Japanese auto manufacturers that were being produced and sold at a rate that was light years ahead of the industry. Ford had to come up with a solution and they had to do it fast. Their answer, the Ford Pinto, a car that was great on gas, easy to produce, and could be sold at an astonishingly low price. Ford’s answer to the car market demands relied heavily on the success of the Ford Pinto. They had very little time to produce a car that was both good on gas and even better on the wallet. This is illustrated when they speak of the fact that they only had “25 months rather than the usual 43 months for a new car line” (DeGeorge 298). We often find ourselves in a pinch each and every day, with decisions that can only hang in limbo for a matter of moments. What happens when we do this, we often force ourselves to take shortcuts to reach the end result. I believe this holds true more often than not if we reflect upon these moments in our lives. This was no different than the case of Ford’s production of the Pinto. During the production of vehicles, they go through a series of steps beginning with prototype development. After prototype development and before the car is able to be released on the market, they must sustain a range of test to make sure the vehicle meets and is in accordance with all motor safety guidelines. Ford...
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...type of automobile, car manufacturers in United States of America started to manufacture their own subcompact cars. The current president of Ford at that time, Lee Iacocca, recognized the market potential for this design of vehicles; he then led the designing of Ford’s first subcompact model car, namely Pinto on the year 1968. Due to the competition from various domestic and international automobile companies, Ford was influenced to accelerate the production of their first subcompact car. After for only 25 months of designing and manufacturing of the vehicle instead of a typical time frame of 43 months, Ford Pinto first debuted into the automotive industry as a two-door sedan with the entry model price at $1850 and followed by a hatchback and wagon version of the car later in 1972. The short time frame of the car from being a conception to the production surely raised some doubt among the sceptical during that time. Nevertheless, Ford Motor Company was still eager to market the car since it was a trend at the time. During the first few years Ford Pinto was introduced to the world, the sales were remarkable. By January 1971, the Pinto had sold over 100,000 units and 352,402 for the entire 1971 production run. 1974 saw the most Pintos produced in a single model year with 544,209 units (“Ford Pinto,” 2015). However, during mid-1970’s, Ford Pinto was surrounded by numerous controversies due to several accidents involving the car. The first accident occurred in 1972 involving a Lily...
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...Pinto Case Study Ford Motor Company launched the Pinto in August of 1970. This car was intended to compete with Volkswagen in the small car market. A tragic accident happen on August 10, 1978 in which three girls were killed. Two of the girls were sisters and the third was their cousin. The 1973 Ford Pinto was traveling on a highway when their car was struck from behind. The car burst into flames and all three teenagers were burned to death. Elkhart County prosecutor, Michael A. Cosentino took his case to the Elkhart County grand jury charging criminal homicide charges against Ford Motor Company. The trial was the first of its kind. The question was “Did Ford knowingly and recklessly choose to profit over safety in the design and placement of the Pinto’s gas tank?” (1) Cosentino was a part-time prosecutor with a $20,000 budget, some consultants working gratis and a task force of fired-up law school volunteers. (2) Ford had a former Watergate prosecutor with a million dollars to spend and legal team of 80 and all Ford’s resources at their disposal. Prosecutor Cosentino was driven by the fact that big companies are rarely phased by paying damage rewards and at that point criminal law should step in. Cosentino has to prove that Ford intentionally put a design out that was very dangerous. That Ford had the knowledge of the faulty design and recklessly chose profit over safety. Ford maintained that the Ford Pinto met the current safety standards for rear end crashes. Many...
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...Ford Motor Company Pinto Case Karen Nollet, Alonso Miller, Michael Morra, Pamela Tenori MGT/216 Abstract In 1971, Ford Motor Company (FMC), on the advice of then vice-president Lee Iacocca, introduced the first subcompact vehicle, the Ford Pinto. After production, Ford discovered a defect in the design on the fuel system; the gas tank was placed in the rear of the vehicle. This error could cause the vehicle to explode on low speed rear end collisions. Ford conducted a risk/analysis to determine whether to recall the vehicles or leave the situation as is and suffer the consequences as they arise. After concluding that the vehicles could be modified for $11 per vehicle, Ford decided not to recall the vehicles. Based on their risk/analysis the cost to recall the vehicles sold would be $137 million, Ford determined that it would be more profitable to leave the vehicles as is and pay out costs in lawsuits because this figure adjusted to $49.5 million, substantially lower than the cost to recall the product. Ethics and morals would appear to be ignored for profit and gain. Ford Motor Company Pinto Case Ford Motor Company Mission Statement (1996), “We are a global family with a proud heritage passionately...
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...Ford Pinto: An Ethical Inferno Michael W. Daniels Excelsior College Introduction and Analysis “Pinto crashes caused the death and mutilation of 900 occupants after their cars burst into flames after rear-end collisions,” Robert Sherefkin explains in his article Lee Iacocca's Pinto: A fiery failure. The engineered design of the Ford Pintos resulted in the gas tank rupturing in low speed rear end collisions. The design flaw was recognized early in the Ford Pinto’s production. According to Dowie’s article Pinto Madness. Mother Jones, “Internal company documents in our possession show that Ford has crash-tested the Pinto at a top secret site more than 40 times and that every test made at over 25 mph without special structural alteration of the car has resulted in a ruptured fuel tank.” Dowie then explains how more than a quarter of those tests were performed prior to the initial release of the vehicle. It was estimated that just 11$ upgrade per vehicle would have remedied the problem (Dowie, 1977). On June 10, 1978, almost a decade after the first Pinto was built, Ford eventually agreed to recall the Pinto (Boyce, D, 2012). The decision was made after countless lawsuits over a span of eight years drained the Ford Motor Company of millions of dollars. The company’s President Lee Iacocca could have rectified the design flaw but deemed it too late in production to reconstruct the vehicle. His requirement of the car weighing less than 2000 pounds and cost of under...
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