“More of a problem of internal weaknesses than colonial repression.” Is this an accurate reflection of the Southeast Asian nationalist movements during the inter-war period?

WAS IT BECAUSE COLONIAL POWERS TOO SUPRESSIVE THAT LED TO FAILURE OF NATIONALIST ACTIVITIES? NO, IT WAS BECAUSE COLONIAL POWERS WERE NOT SUPRESSIVE THAT ALSO LED TO THE WEAK NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS!!
Identified time-frame: 1919-1942
1st Point- Yes, this is true
2nd Point- No, colonial repression did some damage too
3rd Point- List third factor, failure of nationalist movements due to LACK of colonial repression, ultimately leading to weaker/no nationalist movements Both internal weaknesses and colonial repression were the main factors that held back the emergence of nationalism and hampered its transformation into modern nationalism in Southeast Asia before 1914. However, by comparing the strengths of nationalist movements across the various countries, this essay will show the failure of the Southeast Asian nationalist movements were more of a problem of internal weaknesses than colonial repression. Firstly, internal weaknesses was prevalent across all South-east Asian countries in the inter-war period and manifested inside in many forms, namely between and within parties (ideological divides), between elites and masses, moderates and radicals, majority and minority groups (ethnicity, religion) and even between individual nationalist leaders. Internal weaknesses posed a great obstacle to the development of nationalism as it prevented the different nationalist groups from coordinating their efforts and generating mass support for initiated movements, all of which diminished the force of nationalism. In Indonesia, the ideological in-fighting between the religion-based Sarekat Islam and socialist ISDV (which later infiltrated the SI), divided the nationalist movement and caused the SI to lose its earlier prominence after 1914. In Burma, splits between the radical Thakins and moderate, Western-educated politicians over independence led the latter to clamp down hard on the former, thereby limiting further radical nationalist activity. Even in the Philippines, where nationalism was relatively weak, the inherent disconnect between the elite ilustrados and the masses alienated the peasantry mainstream nationalism. Clearly, internal weaknesses which dogged the region was a major stumbling block to nationalist activities within parties and movements, and limited broad-based support which are essential for the development of nationalism. The negative effects of internal weaknesses are particularly evident when we consider the strengths of various nationalist movements between and within the Southeast Asian countries. Strong nationalist movements that emerged were usually those that were able to transcend nationalist disunity by bridging ideological, cultural, religious and ethnic differences. For example, Sukarno managed to gain mass support for the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI) by adopting an inclusive approach of a collective Indonesian identity, through using unifying symbols such as national slogan, flag, anthem and language. Similarly, in Burma, the Thakins also realized the importance of bridging divide between Western ideology and traditional religion in order to gain mass support and welcomed both Communists and Buddhists as allies in the struggle for independence, eventually bringing Burmese nationalism to its apex in the 1930s with their organization of well-supported countrywide strikes. As shown, both the PNI and Dobama Asiayone were therefore relatively successful because they sought to overcome disunity and established a sense of collective identity that strengthened the development of nationalism overall. In contrast, weaker nationalist movements that were organized along lines of religion and ethnicity in these countries, such as early religio-cultural movements led by Budi Utomo and Young Man Buddhist Association (YMBA) was largely constrained by their cultural elitism and strong religious attachments. In fact, internal weaknesses was such a strong deterrent to the nationalist developments that even the strongest nationalist movements were unable to reach out to the minority due to inherent ethnic and cultural diversity. Just as Surkano did not extend his appeal to the Acehnese, Aung San failed in incorporating the hill tribes in Burman-dominated mainstream nationalism. In the most extreme case of pre-war Malaysia, the absence of a collective sense of national identity in an ethnically-fragmented, plural society prevented even the emergence of a nationalist movement that evolved around the “modern concept of nationhood, rooted in the mass of the population”. Therefore, due to the inherent geographic, cultural and ethnic conditions, internal weaknesses were apparent and was a strong hindrance in the development of nationalism. In contrast to the common pervasiveness of internal weaknesses in SEA, colonial repression of nationalist movements was not present in all SEA countries as a result of the varying natures of the colonial masters. It is undoubted however, that colonial suppression did pose obstacles to the development of nationalism in countries with the harsh and inflexible colonial rule. The Vietnamese Nationalist Party (VNQDD) failed to stage a nationwide revolution as their premature uprising was easily suppressed by the intolerant, oppressive French. Aggressive Dutch crackdowns on the PNI, Partindo and PKKKI in 1931 were so effective that It fragmented and subdued the nationalist landscape after the party’s demise, forcing Indonesian nationalism to remain moderate until after WWII. Yet colonial repression was only in part a hindrance to the nationalist development; in some cases, such suppression and repression only stimulated further nationalist activity and contributed positively to the growth of nationalism. For one, the French managed to eliminate the threat of the VNQDD, but this only created a vacuum to the nationalist movement that would be filed by more radicalized Communist parties in the 1930s, such as the Indochina Communist Party (ICP). In fact, the Vietnamese nationalist movement became stronger and more united overtime in opposition in French rule. Likewise in Indonesia, although the most prominent anti-colonial leaders had been detained by 1934, Dutch repression also hardened nationalist sentiments, thereby strengthening the notion of “Indonesia” and motivating these nationalists to take Indonesian nationalism to greater heights after 1941. Even in Burma where British suppression was only directed at the more radical rebellions, resentment towards the British “divide and rule” tactic nevertheless inspired the rise of the Thakins, who, like the VNQDD, filled the political void with their inclusive nationalism. Therefore, colonial repression was a hindrance insofar as disbanding individual parties and displacing leaders, resulting in period of limited nationalist activities and preventing nationalists from achieving their aims in the short term, but in the long run only served to increase mass resentment and consequently, provide impetus for the revitalization of nationalist movements. Moreover, it is apparent that the general lack or absence of colonial repression in the Philippines, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Malaysia actually resulted in much weaker nationalist movements, when compared to the potent brands of nationalism in Vietnam, Indonesia and Burma. The Philippines experienced very little nationalist development after 1900 as progressive and benevolent US colonial rule and generous political concessions removed the need for nationalists to fight hard for independence on their own. The fact that the Philippines and Malaya both failed to produce any outstanding nationalist leaders, in contrast to the emergence of strong, iconic leaders such as Sukarno and Ho Chi Minh in Indonesia and Vietnam, effectively illustrates the importance of colonial suppression in fuelling the development of nationalism. In the same vein, the lack of a repressive colonial power in Thailand, Malaysia, Laos and Cambodia led to minimal nationalist developments before 1941. Although in the case of Malaysia, the Kesatuan Melayu Muda (KMM) was heavily repressed by the British, its inherent inability to bridge the disconnect with both the masses and elites suggests that their failure was ultimaltely more of a cause of internal weaknesses rather than effective colonial suppression. On the whole, the fundamental lack of anti-colonial sentiment eliminated the incentive to seek reform and establish modern nationhood on the part of the nationalists and this severely retarded the development of nationalism. In conclusion, internal weaknesses was a common feature in fundamentally heterogeneous South East Asia, plaguing all nationalist development within all countries, whereas colonial repression was more limited in its breadth and scope of influence. Appearing at all fronts and in multiple forms, internal weaknesses was present not only in countries whereby nationalist movements were intrinsically weak, but also impeded the most powerful nationalist movements, as seen in Vietnam and Indonesia. Disunity and competition among rival nationalist, in particular, were extremely damaging to nationalist developments as they created internal conflicts that led to nationalist ranks and movements collapsing within themselves without further need for external intervention in the form of colonial repression. Colonial repression, on the other hand, was confined to a few Southeast Asian countries, and essentially played the dual role of being both a hindrance and stimulant to nationalism. It is interesting to note that colonial repression in effect became a valuable means to overcome internal weaknesses as it produced the necessary unifying effect and collective resentment which rose above persistent loyalties and differences in aim and ideology. Colonial repression can thus be viewed as a key factor in promoting the development of nationalism and fostering nationalist unity- removing the anti-colonial motive instead become an obstacle to nationalist developments. All in all, internal weaknesses was more of a problem than colonial repression whilst assessing the nationalist movements in Southeast Asian countries during the pre-war period.