Cloning is paradigmatic because it signifies both a specific medical technique and the mode of operation of modern technique. As a specific technique it allows the reproduction of biological organisms, including humans. As a mode of operation it signifies the turning of given phenomena into human-induced processes, and in doing so seeks to control, if not outright eliminate, otherwise given differences. In the latter sense, cloning is equally applicable to biological organisms and cultural artifacts, including law. Seen from this perspective the homogenization of international law in the field of biotechnology is a telling case of the cloning of international law.
The essay will begin with a science fiction account of cloning through a brief discussion of Aldous Huxley’s novel Brave New World.17 I will then move to discuss two case studies of genetic regulation, which simultaneously address the problem of cloning and reproduce the problem on a different level. The first concerns human cloning and the 2005 United Nation Declaration on the Human Cloning.18 The second concerns stem-cell research and a more recent decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in the case of Brüstle v. Greenpeace (2011), to impose a blanket prohibition on patenting the outcome of stem-cell research. The two cases represent the growing international governance of biotechnologies. Both regulations set limits on the use of specific biotechnologies either by an outright prohibition of the practice, or by refusing to patent its outcome. In both cases, the underlying justification for the regulation is the concern that regulation on a national level is an insufficient response to the rise of these technologies. There are, however, as we shall
17 Aldous Huxley, Brave New World (N.Y., Garden City, 1946).
18 United Nations Declaration on Human Cloning, adopted by the General