LEADERSHIP
By Dr. John H. Clippinger
It is very true that I have said that I considered Napoleon’s presence in the field equal to forty thousand men in the balance. —Duke of Wellington
One bad general does better than two good ones. —Napoleon

Introduction
During the early nineteenth century, Wellington’s and Napoleon’s1 observations made sense. With the onset of battle, communications became muddled, artillery was immobilized, and a commander’s ability to control his forces was limited. Consequently, the leadership of a single general could prove decisive in battle by maintaining clarity of command and control.
We are now at a totally different stage of warfare. This not to say that the fog of war has completely lifted, but visibility and synchronized actions, and the speed, precision, and lethality of response is beyond comparison to anything that has preceded it. The battlefield success of the doctrine and technology of Network Centric Warfare was not based upon a single brilliant plan, or a single individual or group, but rather was a property of the network, both technologically and organizationally. As Operation Iraqi
Freedom so vividly illustrated,2 battle plans can now be changed very rapidly, affecting all aspects of operations—strategy, tactics, logistics and PSYOPs, operations, kinetics, and all types of forces. The competencies that make NCW a success are network properties; they are no longer solely the province of charismatic leaders or chance, but the result of diverse competencies and a new understanding of the role and growth of network leadership, and how it is learned and rewarded.

1

Roberts, Andrew. Napoleon and Wellington: Battle of Waterloo and the Great Commanders Who Fought
It. New York, NY: Simon and Schuster. 2001.
2
Hoagland, Jim. “The Franks Strategy: Fast and Flexible.” The Washington Post. Washington, D.C.