The Moladi model clearly presents quite a radical departure from conventional building technology. Perhaps its main advantage is that it seems able to combine a high level of quality with cost-effectiveness, a crucial asset for any type of building, but particularly in the context of affordable housing. Moladi has enormous potential in this regard, and there is little doubt that if scaled up, it could make a very significant contribution to improving lives at the base of the socio-economic pyramid. The challenges are important but they are not insurmountable. So why, one might ask, has Moladi not made more headway so far, after over two decades in operation?
One of the possible answers is that there seems to be a fundamental contradiction between its stated ambition to “house the whole world” and the channels Moladi has chosen so far to expand its model. It is true that it may be hindered by resistance to change, vested interests and the entrenched scepticism of policy-makers, but a truly cost-effective and efficient model is always likely to attract investors and catch on if the right partners are recruited.
Understandably, like many other family firms, Moladi seeks to strike the right balance between keeping control of the firm within the family while allowing outside investors and managers to take the business to the next level.
Another dimension of the Moladi model, which has been a source of strength but also perhaps a hidden weakness, and could help explain the relative lack of scale so far, is the firm’s reliance on agents and licensees in its key markets. In the current model, the business is a construction technology firm rather than a construction firm, and it depends to a large degree on the quality of its partners / licensees to obtain contracts. There are, arguably, a number of steps Moladi could take without