power. Even the United States, a nation with a long tradition opposing government participation in business, had considered buying part of the Saudi Arabian concession, developed originally by Chevron and Texaco, to guarantee access to strategic supplies of foreign oil. In the end, tradition and company preferences prevailed, and it was Exxon and Mobil rather than the US government which joined Chevron and Texaco to form Aramco after the war. Other countries, with fewer inhibitions about state participation in strategic industries, had long been involved in securing oil supplies for their strategic and economic needs. These states saw control of foreign oil as integral to their international power and prestige. Their activities, especially in the Middle East, also helped to bring down the old oil regime.
Serpents in Eden Economic theory tells us that an industry where firms make huge profits soon attracts new firms whose competitive behavior reduces profits for all. This is exactly what happened in the international oil industry. The success of even imperfect cartel arrangements made oil vastly profitable and oil companies among the world's largest and richest firms. As a result, the seven oil majors were increasingly faced with competition from small private firms like Occidental and Getty. These independents were politically active and willing to do whatever was necessary to protect their interests. For example, when NIOC was reorganized, a group of US independents demanded and received a share of the lucrative Iranian concession. Competition also came from state-owned firms. The French oil company, CFP, stepped up its aggressive quest for concessions after the ending of the Red Line Agreement in 1946. CFP expanded its efforts to find and develop oil in French colonies such as Algeria and also took six percent of the reorganized NIOC. The