Table of Contents

General IP Policy/theory 1

Trademarks 2

Foreign Treaties 4 Types of Marks 4 Infringement (Polaroid Test) 9 Defenses 10 Internet/UDRP 12 Dilution 13 Remedies 14

Copyrights 16 Derivative Works 19 Moral Rights 21 Renewal/Termination 23 Infringement (tests) 24 Fair Use/Defenses 15 DMCA 27 Remedies 29 Publicity/Misappropriation 32

Patents 34 Patent Prosecution 36 Utlity/Novelty /Non-Obvious 38 Priority 39 Statutory Bars 40 Infringement 41 Defenses 43 Remedies 44

Trade Secrets 46
IP In General
I. Origins a. Patents began in Venice b. Copyright began in England - Publisher competition c. Trademarks - Guild System would mark the bottom of product so that people would know from whom they were purchasing

II. Federal Authority a. Copyright/Patent Authority Article I Sec.1 cl. 8 i. “Progress of science and useful arts” 1. Science is copyright, and useful arts is patents 2. In the days of the Constitution means “knowledge.” ii. Utilitarian clause – not based on the moral rights iii. Most protection is pretty much on federal level. iv. Certain States with particular businesses adopted their own laws, which Congress eventually incorporated into federal law (e.g. CA sound recording)

b. Trademarks ( Commerce power – basis for federal system i. Prevents consumer confusion and protects information assets – tells people who is making the goods ii. Historically, there was only state TM law, but people starting producing things in different states causing consumer confusion iii. Most trademark cases are not federal courts

c. 2 Issues i. First Amendment problems – copyrights infringe on freedom of speech 1. How can Congress balance the interests? 2. How far can states go in adopting common law or legislative solutions? ii. Federalism ( there are common law and state protections that interact with federal laws. Does this disrupt the federalist balance d. International Agreements ( i. TRIPS, WIPO, Madrid Protocol ii. What was once a national issue has become worldwide

III. IP vs. Real Property a. Protection for Real Property – 5th Amendment i. Amend V says congress can’t deprive people of property ii. Real property is ex ante, IP is a creation of the Constitution b. IP is a public good, but Real property is excludable i. Tragedy of the anti-commons – if everybody owns a little piece of knowledge then putting it all together will become impossible ii. Tragedy of the Commons – need individual rights to utilize IP efficiently c. NOTE: IP creates transaction costs d. Reasons for IP i. Compensation for risks/investment: 1. second comer has few risks 2. First Mover Advantage: Period of exclusivity creates Sticky-ness ( eBay, Microsoft Windows (consumers invest heavily in an operating system) ii. Combat Free rider effect e. Argument Against IP: Monopoly creates deadweight social cost.

IV. Alternatives to IP a. Prizes - Ex post compensation, gets government involved b. Liability Rule - Pay a fee for use (relates to patent reform) c. Government Regulation – does this fit our economic system? d. Trade Secrecy i. Arrow’s disclosure paradox – nobody wants to buy a secret if they don’t know what it is, but once they know there’s no need to buy it ii. Trade Secrets ( tell people on a need to know basis, but people are liable of they steal iii. Advantages: ( Lower transaction costs; no application fees iv. Disadvantages: 1. Requires loyal employees, bankers, etc. 2. People might independently invent the secret 3. Most secrets eventually become public e. Commissions – people should commission products (e.g. textbooks). Problem: insufficient incentive on private side

Part I – Trademarks

Trademarks are available for words, symbols, devices, or other designations that serve to identify the source of goods or services, assuming a bona fide intent to use in commerce.

I. Purposes/Policy ( Consumer oriented a. Prevent consumer confusion ( help consumers identify the source of goods, ↓ shopping costs. b. Good Will ( Give producers an incentive to produce high quality goods by preventing free-riding on owner’s reputation c. Efficiency ( vesting right in author reduces the number of lawsuits by concentrating all claims into one lawsuit d. Downsides – people buy goods they cannot afford for name brand – violent theft

II. Requirements for Protection (Common Law) – You need not register. However, protection can be had only after active use of the mark in commerce in connection w/ the product or service. If two persons come up w/ the same mark, whoever made sufficient use of the mark first will get it and will be able to exclude the other.

a. The mark must be directed at the goods or services for which protection is sought. No longer an affixation standard. As long as you associate the mark w/ the goods in a way that will reasonably let consumers understand the association (advertisement, display, etc.) it’s enough.

b. While advertising alone, without actual use, can serve to gain protection, it must (1) be of sufficient clarity and repetition to create the required identification, and (2) it must have reached a substantial portion of the public that might be expected to purchase the good or service.

c. The type and scope of the use must be substantial and in the ordinary course of trade. Sham transactions can’t serve as use, while token transaction can.

Microstrategy Inc. v. Motorola Inc. (“Intelligence Everywhere”) – Microstrategy could not show that IE was used as an identifying mark. Had to look too closely to find IE on documents. “Limited, sporadic, and inconsistent use.” Dissent: Irreparable harm to MS if injunction not given. Mark featured on all of the business cards! Could be suggestive.

III. Federal Lanham Registration a. 3 ways to establish entitlement: Use (in interstate commerce), Bona fide intent to sue, foreign registration b. Benefits of Registration i. §1115(a) ( prima fascia evidence of a valid trade mark and ownership ii. Federal Jurisdiction iii. Constructive notice iv. basis for registration in foreign countries v. Registering with Customs vi. use of symbol ®

c. Use-based application per § 1051(a) – bona-fide use in the course of business. The use must be a use in interstate commerce. Process takes 9 months – 1 year i. File with PTO: identify goods/services on which mark will be used. Include: 1. date of first interstate use, manner of use (clothing, etc.), specimens 2. drawings 3. Declaration that mark doesn’t resemble any other marks currently in use ii. Filing Fee – currently $245 iii. Examination by PTO to verify that complies with §1052 (a)-(f) requirements iv. If application approved, published in Official Gazette v. Can oppose w/in 30 days of publication ( Time for opposition or concurrent use proceeding vi. If no opposition, will issue certificate of registration in 3 months vii. If rejected, can appeal to TTAB

d. Bona fide intent to use application per § 1051(b) – (1988 Amend. in response to Paris convention) applicant may file for protection provided he has a bona fide intent to use the mark in the future. Bona fide means a fair, objective determination of the applicant’s intent based on all the circumstances. Process: i. File with PTO: identify goods/services on which mark will be used, ii. Initial Examination by PTO and publish for opposition iii. Can oppose w/in 30 days of publication iv. Issue Notice of Allowance v. 6 months to begin actual use, but can get extension up to 30 months vi. Must file Statement of Use once you’ve begun actual use (or risk abandonment) vii. PTO examines again for §1052 a-f violations, ® registered, and constructive notice kicks in.

e. Supplemental Register ( If don’t qualify for Principal Register, may be registered on Supplemental, if mark is capable of acquiring secondary meaning. i. Advantages 1. Use of federal courts w/ respect to state rights 2. Limited benefits under trademark treaties 3. Actual notice ( can use ® symbol 4. After 5 years, mark may be transferred to Principal Register §1052(f) ii. Down sides: No constructive notice, No right to stop imports of infringing goods, No injunctions

f. Maintenance i. §1058 – During the sixth year of registration, must file an affidavit stating that the ® is still in use. Failure to do so = cancellation. ii. §1059 – Must renew every 10 years thereafter or risk cancellation

g. Opposition i. 30 day window for opposition once application is published ii. TTAB in PTO handles opposition iii. TTAB cases can be appealed to Federal Circuit (CAFC)

h. Incontestability ( After five years cannot challenge mark for lack of distinctiveness, confusingly similar i. Other challenges still stick: generic, functionality, discriminatory treatment, fraud ii. Problems with incontestability: Mark may be put on supplemental register under theory it was capable of acquiring secondary, moved to principle register and become incontestable, make other marks infringing.

i. Defending marks in Practice i. 9/10 cases of denied registration are about fact that mark is in use by somebody else. §1052(d) ( “mark which sole resembles mark which was previously registered or previously used.” ii. IP cases are litigated quickly ( harm is often assumed; case turns on merits. 1. Interlocutory appeal; injunction decides case 2. Information products can’t be squeezed back into the tube. Game over once product reaches public. i. Routes of appeal ( Goes to PTO ( appeals to TTAB ( Appeals to Federal Circuit Court of Appeals ii. Alternative Route ( start case de novo in District Court and appeal to regional circuit. Can introduce new evidence, but Slower and more expensive

a. Establishing Secondary meaning in Court i. Consumer surveys: methodological problems, expensive, whose opinion matters? ii. Dictionaries ( if it’s in dictionary, it could be generic iii. Trade Journals

IV. Foreign Treaties a. Under §1126 of the LA, foreign applicants may, relying on their home country registration, register in the US, notwithstanding their lack of use of the ® anywhere in the world.

b. Paris Convention formed in 1883, adopted by US in 1887, implemented through domestic legislation in 1903 i. Substantive protection against unauthorized marks/false designation of origin ii. Article II: National Treatment, Universal treatment Extends the national trademark protection iii. Article IV: Priority Rule 1. A filing applicant may use the same date when filing in another Paris Convention country as long as second filing occurs within 6 months at the first filing; and the first filing matures to registration (NOTE: European countries don’t require use ( intent to use applications) iv. Article VI: Reserving marks that become internationally known for the producers who made them famous.

c. GATT (TRIPS - 1994) i. Mirrors national treatment and priority system of Paris Convention ii. Most Favor Nation (MFN) treatment iii. Universal minimum standards ( Increase protection for geographic indications, particularly with respect to wines and spirits iv. Problem ( expenses of worldwide filing

d. Madrid Agreement (1891) i. Home registration followed by second international registration that applies in all 70 countries, International bureau, Twenty year renewal ii. “Central Attack” to home country registration will cause other country registrations to fail iii. Paperwork in French with fees (single fee, extra fee for more than 3 registrations, complimentary fee for extensions of application) iv. Problems: non-use registration, central attack makes US based marks weaker (more grounds for cancellation in US) administrative difficulties 1. 12 months waiting period not long enough for USPTO to review foreign marks 2. Fees wouldn’t cover workload

e. Madrid Protocol (1989 – US joins in 2002) i. Basic application + intent to use = faster international application ii. English as acceptable language for communication, Individual country fees iii. US still paying same amount as other applications for registration with limited protection. iv. Central attack still valid, but not fatal 1. If home country mark invalidated, 3 months to convert application into a series of national applications, each retaining original priority date

V. Types of Marks

a. Trademarks – To distinguish / indicate source of goods b. Service Marks – To distinguish / indicate source of services. Must demonstrate that source of service is sufficiently separate from the sale of goods (Greyhound Bus Service, Lexis, Westlaw). c. Collective Marks i. Collective Membership Marks -- Adopted for the purpose of indicating membership in an organization such as a union or professional society. No goods or services. (ABA, Girl Scouts). ii. Collective trademarks and services marks – Adopted by a collective organization to distinguish goods or services from those of non-members. No goods or services, but may advertise or promote. (Dairy Co-Op; Florida Orange Growers) d. Certification Marks – To certify that goods and services of others have certain characteristics. Must maintain control over mark, and may not discriminate, refuse to certify qualified appicants. (Kosher mark)

VI. Physical requirements:

a. Affixation – main requirement under Federal and state law i. Associated with the goods in such a way that it is a signal to consumers, who know what it signifies ii. § 1127 defines use of commerce and has affixation requirement b. Use ( § 1127 i. Old rules required Actual Use in interstate commerce, developed practice of Symbolic Use ii. TM must be used as a signal (See Motorola v. Microstrategyty) 1. repetitively 2. distinctive pattern or design 3. Apparent 4. Enable consumers to identify

§ 1127 Definition: The terms “trade name” and “commercial name” mean any name used by a person to identify his or her business or vocation.
The term “trademark” includes any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof— (1) used by a person, or (2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and applies to register on the principal register established by this chapter, to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown.

VII. Cognitive Requirement ( Distinctiveness

a. the chief requirement to qualify as a mark. When classifying the mark, look at it in relation to the product (Apple is arbitrary for computers, but not for fruit.)

b. Arbitrary and fanciful terms – automatically recognized as inherently distinctive. A brand new word that has no other meaning except as an identifying mark (Xerox, Exxon). No obvious connection between Tm and product/service.

c. Suggestive terms – automatically recognized as inherently distinctive. Title does not directly invoke the image of the product in the mid of the consumer – requires thought/imagination to make connection. (Coppertone, Roach Motel – get it?)

d. Descriptive terms (including surnames and geographically descriptive marks) – not recognized as inherently distinctive, but can be protected if the user of the mark demonstrates that the mark has achieved secondary meaning. i. Secondary meaning – Exists if in the minds of the public the primary significance of the symbol is to identify the source of the product rather than identifying the product itself. Shown usually by consumer surveys, length and manner of use, advertising expenditures, or volume of sales. Continuous use for five years will do it. (Remember it is the effectiveness of the marketing that enables in altering the meaning to the consuming public.) a. In this Case: Through the expenditure of over $400,000 for advertising during the period from 1976 through 1981, Zatarain’s has promoted its name and its product to the buying public. Sales of twelve-ounce boxes of “Fish-Fri” increased from 37,265 cases in 1969 to 59,439 cases in 1979. From 1964 through 1979, Zatarain’s sold a total of 916,385 cases of “Fish-Fri. ii. Family names can be used, but only if they have acquired secondary meaning. Note that some names might have a harder time b/c they are descriptive words (i.e. Baker, Carpenter, etc.) iii. Zatarain’s, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc: 1. Dictionary Definition: A suitable starting place is the dictionary, for “[t]he dictionary definition of the word is an appropriate and relevant indication ‘of the ordinary significance and meaning of words’ to the public. 2. The Imagination Test: The “imagination test” is a second standard used by the courts to identify descriptive terms. This test seeks to measure the relationship between the actual words of the mark and the product to which they are applied. i. In this Case: In this case, mere observation compels the conclusion that a product branded “Fish-Fri” is a prepackaged coating or batter mix applied to fish prior to cooking. The connection between this merchandise and its identifying terminology is so close and direct that even a consumer unfamiliar with the product would doubtless have an idea of its purpose or function. ii. It simply does not require an exercise of the imagination to deduce that “Fish-Fri” is used to fry fish. Accordingly, the term “Fish-Fri” must be considered descriptive when examined under the “imagination test.” 3. “whether competitors would be likely to need the terms used in the trademark in describing their products: A descriptive term generally relates so closely and directly to a product or service that other merchants marketing similar goods would find the term useful in identifying their own goods. i. In this Case: While Zatarain’s has argued strenuously that Visko’s and Oak Grove could have chosen from dozens of other possible terms in naming their coating mix, we find this position to be without merit. As this court has held, the fact that a term is not the only or even the most common name for a product is not determinative, for there is no legal foundation that a product can be described in only one fashion. 4. extent to which a term actually has been used by others marketing a similar service or product: This final test is closely related to the question whether competitors are likely to find a mark useful in describing their products. i. In this Case: As noted above, a number of companies other than Zatarain’s have chosen the word combination “fish fry” to identify their batter mixes. When companies from A to Z, from Arnaud to Zatarain’s, select the same term to describe their similar products, the term in question is most likely a descriptive one. ii. What the District court found in this case: found that Zatarain’s trade- mark “Fish-Fri” was descriptive of the function of the product being sold. Having applied the four prevailing tests of descriptiveness to the term “Fish-Fri,” we are convinced that the district court’s judgment in this matter is clearly correct.

e. Generic terms – unprotectable. The name of things (potato chips, cola, etc.) If a trademark becomes the name for the thing and no longer identifies its source, it becomes generic and is cancelled via 1064(3). Examples: escalator, yo-yo. More in Infringement Defenses section.

f. G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Anheuser-Busch (LA [low alcohol] Beer) – Presumption that initials mean the words they represent. Not going to let AB pre-empt the law alcohol beer market. LA is merely descriptive and unprotectable. Surveys should focus on average potential customer, not the uninformed public.

VIII. Protected Subject Matter a. Word Marks (Coca-Cola) b. Trade Dress ( Trade Dress -- the overall image of good or services (e.g. the look and feel of McDonald’s). i. The Two Pesos/Walmart Test for Protectable Trade Dress 1. Distinctive (only for product packaging like Two Pesos!) OR acquired secondary meaning; AND 2. Feature is non-functional; AND 3. Consumers are likely to confuse the P’s product with the D’s product

c. Lanham Act § 43(a)(3): i. In a civil action for trade dress infringement under this chapter for trade dress not registered on the principal register, the person who asserts trade dress protection has the burden of proving that the matter sought to be protected is not functional.

ii. Policy ideas ( Want to protect businesses that are unique, but don’t want to over-protect. Don’t want to put too much burden on starter companies. 1. Some types of trade dress could be functional as well as aesthetic. See Trafix Devices v. Marketing Displays; Road signs Dual Spring Design can’t be trade dress, because it’s functional (Expired patents are dispositive) 2. Tests for functionality lead to different results: a. Does it put a competitor at a distinct disadvantage, because feature is “essential” b. Does it effect the cost or quality? 3. Solutions to trade dress problem a. Pre-emption ( Most trade dress was protected under state law instead of federal b. Limit IP protection i. You either get a TM or Copyright, or Patent, ( See TraFix ii. Doesn’t work in every case – Lots of functional designs are never patented ( Vornado Fans and crescent wrenches 4. Protecting packaging: How do we tell difference between configuration and packaging? (Tiffany Box?) 5. Design protection creates problems for the following: a. Auto Parts Makers: They say that if Ford or Chevy gets design protection for the grill on your car, you won’t be able to buy a generic grill. b. Insurance companies: more expensive to buy parts from Chevy than other companies c. Appliance companies ( need to have dishwasher that fits into same slot for old dishwasher d. Consumer interests

d. Trade Dress Cases: i. Two Pesos v. Taco Cabana (restaurant décor) – Restaurant trade dress was inherently distinctive; no need to show secondary meaning. Don’t want start-up businesses to create cool trade dress, only to have it stolen by a competitor. Distinctiveness and non-functionality is all you need! ii. Qualitex v. Jacobson Products (Color ( green-gold dry-cleaning press pads) – USSC said that a color may satisfy trademark requirements if it acquires secondary meaning. “It is the source distinguishing ability of a mark, not it ontological status as color, shape, fragrance, word, or sign that permits it to serve these purposes.” Feature will not qualify for protection if functional (blue fertilizer in Nor-Am Chemical, black outboard motors) in Deere & Co. v. Farmhand). Policy issue ( color depletion; thus a stricter standard iii. Wal-mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc. (Samara sued Wal-Mart and its supplier for “knocking off” Samara’s dress designs - 1-piece seersucker jumpsuit) – Product design, (like color) can never be inherently distinctive, and requires showing of secondary meaning. Product packaging can be inherently distinctive. Distinguished from Two Pesos because restaurant décor is more like product packaging. iv. Mosler Safe v. Eli Norris ( safe had metal band with small bomb behind it, would explode if jimmied open. Issue: Is the band functional or aesthetic. Who are we trying to reach, consumer or thief

e. Slogans – Registrable on Supplemental Register, 23(c). The longer the slogan, the harder it is to understand when read casually, thereby diminishing the uniqueness and distinctiveness of the phrase which are essential to its identifying function. Must be distinctive or have acquired 2nd meaning.

f. Surnames -- Registrable on Supplemental Register, 23(c). Note that 1052(e)(4) prohibits registrations of Tms that are primarily a surname, but that’s not an absolute bar.

i. If surname acquires secondary meaning and registered, then second user with same last name acts in GF, his use will likely be granted. In order to prevent customer confusion, may have to modify name a bit – add initial or something.

g. Sound – Can be granted protection if distinctive, not merely functional. (Intel Inside or NBC chimes) i. EMI Catalouge Partnership v. Hill (musical composition) – Granting a music composition ® status “would stretch the definition” of a trademark and extend trademark law into an area already protect by ©. ii. Cf. Oliveira v. Frito-Lay (same court said that a musical composition could act as a trademark even though protected by a ©, but a performer cannot get a TM signifying herself in a recording or her own famous performance.)

h. Scent -- Can be granted protection if distinctive, not merely functional like a perfume.

i. Composite Marks – Can be registered even if not all elements could be granted protection individually. Evaluated as a whole i. In re Dial-A-Mattreee Operation Corporation ( court allows Dial-a-mattress wanted to register 1-888-MATTRESS. Although PTO doesn’t allow registration of numbers, regards entire unit in evaluating status.

IX. Subject Matter Not Protected: a. Generic Marks – does not distinguish origin (aspirin, thermos, etc.). More in Defenses Section. b. Immoral or Scandalous Marks – §1052(a): i. No trademark . . . shall be refused registration on the principal register on account of its nature unless it 1. Consists of or comprises immoral. . . scandalous matter; or matter which may disparage

ii. Scandalous 1. Look at seriousness of purpose (message conveyed) 2. No vulgarity, swear words, feces, or naked body parts. 3. In re Old Glory Condom (condom that looked like an American flag denied protection as scandalous and likely to offend.); In re Mavety Media Group (“Black Tail”) – Not scandalous. Must evaluate based on composite of general public, context of relevant marketplace, and/or contemporary attitudes.

iii. Improper Associations with persons, institutions, etc. 1. False Connection Test – (See 105(2)(a) a. Mark is the same or a close approximation of the person’s previously used name or ID b. Would be recognized as such c. Person in question is not connected with the goods or services of the applicant d. Name of sufficient fame that connection likely to be made by potential purchaser

c. Deceptive (§1052(a)) and Deceptively Misdescriptive (§1052(e)) i. Distinguigh 1. Deceptive – Leads the consumer to think the product is what it is not. Complete bar. 2. Deceptively Misdescriptive – Product misdescribed, but does not influence buying decision and does not hurt market. Not barred if can show secondary meaning. (Turtle Wax). ii. Test 1. Is the term misdescriptive of the character/function/composition/use of goods? 2. If so, are prospective purchasers likely to believe the misdescription? 3. Is the misdescription likely to influence purchase (inducement)? 4. Gold Seal v. Weeks (“Glass Wax”) – Deceptively misdescriptive because consumer might think product contains wax, but this will not deceive consumers to purchase. Must show 2nd meaning for registration. d. Geographic Terms: i. Primarily Geographically Descriptive: product connotes geographic origin and goods actually come from that location. Registerable only with 2nd meaning. §1052(e)(2). ii. Deceptively Misdescriptive: If goods do NOT come from that location, but people reasonably believe that they do (goods-place link), only registerable if 2nd meaning obtained prior to 12/8/1993. If deceptive, never registerable. iii. Notes: TRIPS & Wine 1. Congress never amended 1052(e) to comport with TRIPS. 2. However, 1052(a) has been amended to provide special wine protection. It now bars registration of all wine and spirit ® that contain a geographic term, which is not representative of the product’s origin, even if the designation is not misleading. e. Confusion §1052(d) – not protected. More later. f. Prior Use § 1052(d) -- marks may not be registered if confusingly similar to another Tm that is in use and has not been abandoned. More later.

g. Functionality – Do not want to give Tm protection where patent law is denied i. Tests of Functionality: 1) Is it essential to the use or purpose of the article; 2) Affects the cost or quality of the article; or 3) If exclusive use of the feature would put competitors at a significant non-reputational disadvantage.

ii. TrafFix Devices v. Marketing Displays (After MDI’s patent for wind-resistant standing street sign expired, Traffix started to sell similar ones) – For trade dress to be protected under 1125(a)(3) the party must establish that the element of the trade dress are non-functional (non-essential/does not impact quality or cost). Court said that prior patent was critical evidence of utility. Dual-spring feature was functional – end of the inquiry. Feature is functional if it: (1) affects cost and/or quality, (2) puts competitors at a significant non-reputation related disadvantage iii. Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop (crescent wrench) – Wrench shape was essential to the proper operation of a wrench in tight place, and thus functional and unprotectable. iv. AOL v. AT & T Corp ( 4th Circuit upheld Dist court ruling that AOL could not trademark phrase “You Have Mail.” v. Also see Owens Corning (pink insulation) – Color served no utilitarian purpose and did not deprive competitors of any reasonable right or competitive need. Black engine parts might be another story. Whether color is functional hinges on availability of reasonable alternative colors in order to avoid fettering of competition. h. Foreign Words ( PTO will translate foreign words to English to determine where they fit on the meaning spectrum. See Weiss Noodle Co v. Golden Cracknel Specialty Co. (denied TM “Ha-Lusk-Ka,” which literally means noodles in Hungarian. Rationale: Usually targeted to ethnic audiences that know the meaning -- it’s generic to them! And larger society may acquire the culture (e.g. tortilla, not corn pancake). i. Other (random) Bars to Registration: i. Goods consisting of the flags or coat of arms of the US, states or foreign nation. §1052(b) ii. Mark which consists of the name, portrait, or signature of living individual without the individuals consent, or in the name, signature, or portrait of a deceased President during the life of his widow, unless she has given consent. §1052(c)

X. Trademark Rights a. Ownership of Marks Refresher ( Timing (first to use; creation has nothing to do with it!), Bona fide usage, Exhibit control over trademark. Use has to be open. If not trying to enter market, won’t get protection. b. General Lanham Act Rights/Benefits i. Prima facie evidence of the registered mark’s validity ii. Nationwide constructive notice (§1072) of the mark iii. Registration can be used as a basis for obtaining rights in other countries. iv. Protection against the importation of offending goods and against counterfeit goods v. Only federally registered marks may use “®”. vi. Incontestability after five years c. Geographic Limitations – The TM doesn’t confer rights outside the market in which it is actually used. GF junior users in remote locations (like Hart’s Foods) may use the mark subject to ® holder’s proper showing of an intent to use in that region.

i. Limited Area Defense -- 1115(b)(5): a. Prior User w/ Continuous Use – ® holder cannot acquire rights over merchants who used the mark prior to the other party’s federal registration. b. Rights Frozen – Registration will freeze the prior user’s rights, confining him to the location where he was using the mark at the time it was registered + a modest zone of expansion. c. Thrifty Rent-a-Car System v. Thrift Cars (Thrift opens rental business after Thrifty applied, but before registration. NOTE: Thrift not protect by Lanham b/c no federal register and not involved in interstate commerce) – Thrift entitled to remain, but cannot expand business. Limited advertising outside area not deemed sufficient to establish market presence. Mere desire to expand not enough. Thrifty estopped from entering Thrift’s market. d. Dawn Donuts v. Hart’s Food (Hart foods using Dawn’ registered mark on baked goods; selling 60 miles apart) – Dawn only allowed to enjoin concurrent uses which are likely to create confusion. There was infringement, but because uses confined to separate trading areas (60 miles apart & people likely to buy baked goods close to home), there was no confusion and no need for injunction or damages. Hart Foods allowed to use ® until Dawn Donut begins use or shows concrete plans to expand to region. Dissent (within majority opinion): Dissent would remand to see if adequate policing of ®. How regular/thorough were the inspections? Was the inspector trained to perform the task? Limited cancellation possible via §1119 (“in whole or in part”).

XI. Infringement §1114 & §1125: a. Basic elements i. Use in commerce of… ii. a reproduction/counterfeit/copy of a registered mark that… iii. is likely to cause confusion, or cause mistake to deceive.

b. Two Kinds of Infringement i. Diversion of sales -- D’s use of ® causes consumers to buy D’s goods when they meant to buy P’s ii. Damage to goodwill – non-competing goods, but D’s has a confusingly similar mark that suggests an affiliation where there is none

c. Likelihood of Confusion Test (The Polaroid Factors) i. Strength of P’s TM ( The stronger the mark, the more likely that consumer’s seeing the allegedly similar mark will be confused ii. Degree of similarity between P’s and D’s mark 1. Similarity of Appearance – overall appearance 2. Similarity of Sound – sounds of words, for example S.O. and Esso 3. Similarity of Meaning – Mental image evoked by TM may overpower any differences between them (e.g. Cyclone vs. Tornado; Cat vs. Gato) iii. Proximity of goods or services ( Goods likely to be sold in the same or same kind of store/area iv. Likelihood that P will bridge the gap ( How likely P is to begin selling the stuff that D is trying to sell. Even if no immediate plans, the court might still consider P’s right to reserve that option in the future. v. Actual confusion ( Not necessary, but highly persuasive. vi. D’s good faith in adopting the TM ( Did D intentionally copy just to cash in on P’s goodwill? vii. Quality of D’s product or services / channels ( If use their ®s in same or related services, then there is a greater likelihood of confusion. viii. Sophistication of the buyers ( The more sophisticated, and the more costly the services, the more careful and exacting the purchasers will be, and less likely to be confused.

Lois Sportswear v. Levi Strauss & Co. (Lois imports virtually identical jeans from Spain) – Uses Polaroid Factors. Levi’s very strong mark. Virtually identical within ¾”. Both jeans. Protect Levi’s interests to enter high-end jean market. Limited harm in US so far, but Ct. not willing to penalizing Levi’s for acting to protect brand. Lois didn’t do it on purpose, but intent doesn’t matter. Lois is a good quality product, but that might actually confuse consumers more!! Sophisticated buyers likely to be affected in the post-sale context – more affected by sight of stitching pattern.

Experience Hendrix:

a. Consumer confusion, the plaintiff is concerned about the fact that they would think that one is the actual Hendrix company

i. Affiliation of the family? No

ii. Reverse Confusion: mentioned in the notes when consumers think that the plaintiffs good are produced by the defendant company

1. Small time player plaintiff, the defendant is a large company

a. Consumers believe that the plaintiff is infringing on the defendant’s mark

b. Both actionable

iii. “Sleekcraft” factors the eight factors to be considered

1. Tend to see that have collapsed two of them into one

b. Strength of the Mark:

i. Exception, if the name is historical as long as consumers would not think the person is connected to the goods and services

ii. Court says this could be inherently distinctive

iii. You could have an incontestable

1. Arbitrary mark more protection than a distinctive mark

iv. Third party use, others are using a similar mark does not stand out quite as strong

c. Proximity or Relatedness of Goods:

i. The more related the more infringing

ii. Plaintiff has vowed to never sell vodka

1. Looking at what the consumers associate

2. Lens of the consumer

d. Similarity of Marks:

i. Not just looking at how they look, sight sound and meaning when comparing the two marks

1. Side by side comparison the actual mark through the consumer’s eyes

2. What consumers are concerned about

a. Both have the musical expression of Hendrix

3. The fact that, courts do this likelihood of confusion, they look very closely at these similarities

e. Evidence of Actual Confusion:

i. Carries weight, proof is difficult to acquire

ii. Associated contractor

f. Marketing Channels:

i. Internet similar marketing channel, NO!

g. Degree of Consumer Care:

i. Degree of care does not care much weight

h. Intent of Defendant:

i. In reality if I trying to free ride, I may not be great at it, if I tried to do it

ii. It may not be crazy that I actually will succeed at it

1. One factor among many

McDonald’s v. Druck and Gerner, DDS. (McDental) – McDonald’s owns very strong family of marks. 30% of those surveyed were confused, and that’s substantial. Similarity “obvious.” Proximity b/w eating and dentistry, but McDonalds did not bridge the gap. Bad Faith dentists trying to capitalize on McDonald’s fame.

[pic]

d. Initial interest Confusion (metatags)( Brookfield Communications v. West Coast Entertainment ( WC used Brook’s TM “Movie Buff” as a metatag for movie site) – There is no source confusion – the sites are very clear – but by diverting customers like that, WC improperly benefits from Brook’s goodwill. Issue of search costs on the Internet. i. Disclaimers – sign/statement stating that the site is not associated with the TM (Welles – dilution) 1. Courts tend to disfavor them because they don’t believe that customers read/understand them. 2. Seen as too late to dissipate initial interest confusion 3. However, might be the only solution sometimes (e.g. two Budweiser beers)

e. Secondary Confusion/Post-Sale ( consumer knows he’s buying a fake, but those who see the goods in the consumer’s possession are confused about their source. Could lead to injury of producer’s goodwill. We care about subsequent viewers b/c they are potential buyers (Lois Sportswear) i. Ferrari v. Roberts (body shells in the shape of the Dodge Spyder) -- Buyers knew it was just a shell, but observers had no idea. f. Reverse Confusion ( public assumes that the senior user’s products are really the junior user’s or that the former user has become somehow associated to the latter. Banff Ltd v. Federated Dept Stores (Banff’s “Bee Wear” vs. Bloomie’s “B Wear”) – Court found reverse confusion because although Banff was the senior user, Bloomie’s was the bigger entity. Consumers who were initially aware of Bloomie’s may believe that Banff’s Bee Wear is infringing Bloomie’s B Wear. Bloomie’s use of the ® deprives Banff of fair competition/reputation.

g. Contributory Infringement – Vicarious liability if i. Induced Infringement. ( Coke distributor tells restaurant manager to give his customers Coke every time they order Pepsi without telling them. Manager is infringer. Distributor is contributory ii. Knowingly aided infringement ( distributor continues to supply raw materials to someone he knows is going to use them for infringement purposes. iii. No duty to look for infringing activities, but once known, affirmative duty to correct/prevent iv. Inwood Laboratories v. Ives Labs (generic drug maker vicariously liable for pharmacists dispensing drug); Lockheed Martin v. Network Solutions (NSI lacked the requisite control over the means of infringement)

1. Trademark Counterfeiting: a. Costs trademark owners money b. Health and safety threats to consumers i. Created criminal and civil penalties c. Other than this is a big problem, counterfeiting is not the same as trademark infringement i. Use of the counterfeit mark, need the registered mark and the focus is on the high degree of similarity between the marks ii. Quite a bit of counterfeiting that takes place internationally 1. Interesting and frustrating cases iii. Reason: 1. Generally dealing with different court systems and their law will govern 2. Especially with trying to stop the imports from coming in a. Dealing with legal systems iv. Many political and legal issues

XII. Other §43(a) Claims a. False Endorsements – look-alikes (Woody Allen, Vanna White robot) or sound-alikes (Waits) b. Reverse Passing Off – when D sells P’s goods, representing their source as from D (plagiarism-ish). Test for passing off varies from “bodily appropriation” to mere “consumer confusion” depending on the Circuit c. False Representations in Advertising – representations that D’s goods have qualities that they do not have. i. Elements for a §43(a)(1)(B) claim (injunctive relief only) 1. D uses false or misleading statements of fact in advertising about its own product 2. Statement actually deceived or had the capacity to deceive a substantial segment of the target audience 3. Deception was material in that it was likely to influence the purchasing decision 4. D caused its goods to enter interstate commerce 5. P has been or is likely to be injured as a result ii. Falsity and Materiality 1. Must demonstrate either a. advertisement is literally false; or b. advertisement, though literally true, is likely to mislead and confuse 2. Unnecessary to demonstrate intent iii. Burden of Proof is costly 1. If D simply claims its products are superior to P: P must show D’s product = or inferior 2. If D claims tests or studies indicate its products are superior, P satisfies burden simply by showing that tests did not establish the proposition for which they were cited

Avon Products v. S.C. Johnson & Son (Johnson ran ad that said Off! Skintastic was 100x better than Skin-So-Soft; 4 out of 5 users preferred Off!) – Avon could not disprove the “4 out of 5” language, and the “100x” language was dismissed as Puffery ( Round numbers are understood as exaggeration. Avon needed to show surveys proving confusion but did not.

XIII. Defenses to Infringement a. Genericty i. Association between goods and category. Look to see if the primary significance of the TM to the public is the common name of the product or service. Does everyone need to use the word to compete? ii. Factors: 1. Competitor’s use of the mark 2. Plaintiff’s use of the mark 3. Dictionary definitions 4. Media usage 5. Testimony or persons in the trade 6. Consumer surveys ( Look at how many people identify TM vs. how many of those folks can identify the source (or at least know that it’s from one source) iii. A finding of genericty isn’t necessarily the end of the line. Might still have a passing off claim! May be subject to labeling remedies.

In re Dial–A–Mattress Operating Corp. (1-888-Mattress, and derivatives) – The Ginn two-part test: 1) Genus of the word & 2) Public understanding. For compound words (e.g. “Screenwipe”), can evaluate each of root words individually. But with a phrase (like the compound letters/numbers here), must look at meaning as a whole. Shoppers do not refer to class as “1-888-Mattres”; not generic. Competition still free to use other pneumonics and can still use the word mattress in other respects.

America Online Inc. v. AT&T Corp. (AOL’s “You’ve Got Mail” and “Buddy List” marks) -- Declared generic and functional too! Repeated use of ordinary words functioning within their ordinary meaning. Cannot give AOL rights to those words even if association develops.

Quality Inns International, Inc. v. McDonald’s (McSleep Inns; an economy hotel concept) –Genericity. Linguist’s analysis considered. Mc + word is coined & novel to each article; always an allusion to McDonald’s, and no single independent meaning of “Mc”. The prefix “Mc” has not become part of the English language nor is it beyond McDonald’s control. Abandonment. No evidence that signaling strength of McD’s family of marks has diminished b/c of 3rd party uses. No abandonment because of delay or lack of enforcement of ® in this case.

b. Abandonment §1127 – Mark is assumed abandoned if not use for 3 years. i. Discontinued Use – with no intent to resume. 3 year hiatus = prima facie abandonment. TM holder can rebut presumption by offering evidence of intent to resume. Silverman v. CBS, Inc. (Silverman wanted to make Amos and Andy play) – Court said A&A TM was abandoned: CBS had not used since 1966. Although CBS had good reason for keeping it off the air (racism), must intend to resume within “reasonably foreseeable future” (to prevent warehousing of marks). CBS’ bare assertion of possible future use is not enough. Ferrari v. McBurnie Coachcraft (model of Ferrari had not been made in 13 years) -- No abandonment even though Ferrari had no intention of resuming production. Ferrari showed goodwill associated with the vehicle and “evidence of ongoing parts support for vehicle”.

c. Loss of Distinctiveness – protects public because it assures that marks send consistent messages i. Naked Licensing (without goodwill attached) ( License TM without adequate supervision – no assurances that product/services will retain original characteristics, and risk consumer confusion. To protect against this, assignor must make routine inspections or have some other quality control system in place. Dawn Donut. 1. Use of mark by related companies (where original mark holder exerts some control) is OK. §1055. 2. Unlike ©, trademarks require an ongoing enterprise. So, if buyer of bankrupt business decides not to continue it, anyone is free to use TM. This rule reduces value of marks as instruments for raising capital.

d. Laches ( Π knew ∆ was using the mark but didn’t do anything about it. This created reliance interests

e. Comparative Use Defense: i. Smith v. Chanel ii. a company can recreate another company’s product and claim it to be the “same as” the others, so long as no patent is filed AND copying party does NOT represent their item as the others 1. Rule- Absent a patent, anyone can recreate another’s product and sell it claiming that the product is “as good as the others”…so long as the copier is NOT representing their product as the other’s a. Rationale- While the copycat’s actions may be disapproved at first, the public was well-served by his actions because he was able to give the public a comparable good for a lower price i. Copying is the life blood of businesses…it is OK for businesses to sell comparable goods at a lower price. ii. POLICY: This selling at a lower price benefits the public by saving them money iii. By taking his “free ride”, he has served an important public interest iv. You can ONLY patent something that’s new, you can NOT patent something that you previously invented v. In the U.S., you can make ANY comparative statements you want

f. Fair use / Nominative Use – use of a mark that is used fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods or services of the owner of the mark. Often found in Parody, Comparative Advertisement, etc. i. Descriptive Fair Use, The 3 Factor Test - § 1115(b)(4) . ∆ must prove 1. Used in non-TM capacity 2. Descriptive of goods or services 3. Fairly and in good faith only

Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty (scented face powders; used TMs of the perfumes used on its labels) – As long as it’s not used to deceive the public, such use of TMs was OK!

Playboy v. Welles (Terri Welles, PMOY) – Can use TM simply to ID as long as no implication of sponsorship. Welles’ use of PEI’s TMs were all nominative uses (Except for use of PEI’s mark in the wallpaper of her site). Should would be unable to ID herself as a past “Playmate of the Year” if she couldn’t use the phrase. Simply descriptive of past sponsorship, not current. And she had a disclaimer on there. Nominative uses do not dilute.

KP Permanent Makeup ( ∆ claimed need to use term “microcolor” to describe make-up products. Whether the defendant had the burden to show a likelihood of confusion, burden is on the plaintiff to provide that infringement occurred. It does tolerate some level of confusion, but her the mark is descriptive, to avoid this fair use argument should have picked a suggestive, fanciful or arbitrary mark.

ii. The NKOTB Nominative Use Test: defendant using the mark to describe plaintiff’s mark in connection with one’s own company 1. The product/service in question must be one not readily identifiable without the use of the TM 2. Only so much of the TM may be used as is reasonably necessary to ID the good/service 3. The user must do nothing that would in conjunction with the mark suggest sponsorship or endorsement. a. Century 21: do not get rid of the likelihood of confusion test, the more the defendant needs to use the plaintiff’s mark the more it looks like infringement i. They had the image of century 21 on the for sale sign ii. Were the uses of the mark necessary, trying to say we have this

iii. Parody: needs to bring up the original mark and at the same time we are not that trademark but making fun of it. 1. Through the parody lens: a. Compare the products i. Louis Vuitton: Hand bags are not dog toys, less likely to have blurring the focus is the same for both marks

g. First Sale Doctrine ( Authorized initial sale exhausts right to maintain control over resale, and thus exhausts protections of the Lanham Act. Origin has not changed, and customers should not be confused. i. Policy ( consumer will benefit by lower pricing. ii. Material Difference Exception. unauthorized sale of a materially different product constitutes infringement. Material difference is one that consumers consider relevant to the decision to buy. Low threshold. Theory grounded in customer confusion.

Davidoff & Cie, S.A v. PLD International Corp. (Cool Water fragrance batch codes removed and sold to discount US retailers) – Obvious etching degrade the appearance of the bottle and may lead the consumer to think that the bottle has been tampered with. THE MATH: Alternation affects goodwill → Creates confusion → Satisfies Material Diff Exception = TM Infringment. Contrast to the hair care cases where court did not find removal of codes would affect buying decision. Unlike hair care, the fragrance bottle is a big part of the “experience” you are buying. Original Appalachian Artworks (applying Material Diff Exception where Cabbage Patch Dolls had adoption papers in Spanish).

h. Incontestability § 1115(b) – After five years of registration, must assure PTO of current use (§8 affadavit) and continuous use (§15 affadavit) to get incontestable status. If don’t file §8 affadavit in year 5, PTO will consider mark abandoned: Incontestability give TM presumption of validity. i. Challenging an Incontestable Mark 1. Can’t get cancellation based on: lack of distinctiveness or secondary meaning, confusing similar, or functionality 2. Available grounds for cancellation : Genericity, Abandonment, Obtained through fraud, Deceptive, scandalous, etc.

ii. Defenses to Incontestability -- § 1115(b): Fraud, Abandonment, Use of TM to misrepresent source, Fair use, Limited territory defense, Prior registration by D, Use of TM to violate antitrust laws, Equity

Park ‘N Fly v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc. ( Denied Dollar’s challenge to P&F’s TM, because incontestable mark cannot be challenged as descriptive. Dissent: P should not be able to enforce a TM as incontestable that should not have been a TM in the first place due to lack of 2nd meaning.

XIV. The Internet and Trademark Law a. Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) -- §1125(d) i. Allows suit if one can show: 1. Infringer had Bad Faith intent in using TM with the hope to benefit AND 2. The infringer registers, trafficd, or uses a domain name that: i. Is identical or similar to TM; ii. Dilutes the TM; or iii. Is a TM, word, or name protected by 18 USC 703 ii. Bad Faith Factors 1. IP rights of the domain name (“DN”) registrant 2. Whether the DN is the legal name of the registrant 3. Whether the DN had prior lawful uses with goods/services 4. Registrant’s intent to divert customers from lawful TM owner’s site 5. Registration of multiple and identical or confusingly similar DNs 6. Offer to sell or transfer DN for $$ without a prior use or intent to use 7. Supplying BS information when applying for registration iii. Available remedies: Injunctive relief, Actual damages, Statutory Damages ($1K - $100K per DN) iv. In rem action available when ∆ cannot be found 1. In the judicial district in which the domain name authority that registered the DN is located 2. Remedy limited to the loss of the domain name, unless bad faith shown

b. Internet Corporation of Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) i. Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP, §43(d)) 1. Commence proceedings by filing a complaint with either the WIPO, NAF, DeC, or the CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution. Must Prove: a. The DN at issue is identical or confusingly similar to its TM b. The registrant has no rights or interest in the DN c. Bad Faith 2. Bad Faith Factors a. Acquired DN for purposes of sale of transfer b. Registered it to prevent someone else from using it c. Registered DN to disrupt competitor’s business d. Used domain name to intentionally cause likelihood of confusion 3. Defenses to Bad Faith a. bona fide use in connection with product offering b. registrant is known by DN, even though it does not own TM c. Legitimate fair use or non-commercial use 4. Remedies ( Cancelling DN or transfer of DN to claimant; NO $$ damages 5. UDRP does not preclude litigation.

Wal-Mart Stores, inc. v. Wallmartcanadasucks.com (cybersquatting) – Uses Bally (“Bally sucks”) factors for likelihood of confusion: (1) similarity of the marks, (2) evidence of actual confusion, (3) marketing channels used, (4) degree of care likely to be exercised, and (5) D’s intent in selecting mark. ∆ allowed to keep domain name: No mistaking source ( Walmart was clearly not a sponsor. Criticsim/parody, not promoting goods. Nominative use ( Need to mention Walmart in order to critique it. Quality of criticism is immaterial – just knowledge of parodic nature is enough. No demand for payment.

Barcelona.com v. Excelentismo Ayuntamiento De Barcelona (Under UDRP, WIPO concluded site was confusingly similar / BF effort to extort $$; ordered transfer of domain name to City. Bcom then filed action in VA seeking restoration of rights) -- Since the City Council had not registered its marks in the US, Bcom was held to have done nothing unlawful. In short, only US trademark rights are protectable, even though the domain name system is international and foreign ® holders can be hailed into US Courts.

XV. Dilution -- The lessening of the capacity of a mark to identify and distinguish good or services regardless whether consumer confusion exists. Dilution is all about TM preservations, NOT about the consumer. a. TDRA Dilution i. Blurring ( 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B). Typically Π has very strong marks, and ∆ uses the same or highly similar mark on different goods or services. Blurs the distinctiveness of a mark by trying to disconnect association between product and source. Based on property law (value of association). ii. Factors include: (i) The degree of similarity between the mark or trade name and the famous mark. (ii) The degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the famous mark. (iii) The extent to which the owner of the famous mark is engaging in substantially exclusive use of the mark. (iv) The degree of recognition of the famous mark. (v) Whether the user of the mark or trade name intended to create an association with the famous mark. (vi) Any actual association between the mark or trade name and the famous mark.

iii. Tarnishment (Disparagement) ( Creates negative image of TM through an association with unsavory, unrelated goods. No need to show confusion. May be a way to prevent people from parodying your stuff! (Debbie does Dallas, Enjoy Cocaine).

b. Federal TM Dilution Act 1995 – created §43(c) of the Lanham Act i. Requirements -- Owner of a famous TM can enjoin another’s commercial use if: 1. Use begins after TM became famous 2. Use causes dilution to the distinctive quality of the mark (actual harm) ii. “Famous” factors -- §43(c)(1) “A mark is famous if it is widely recognized by the general consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of the goods or services of the mark’s owner.” 1. Degree of inherent distinctiveness 2. Duration and extent of use of TM in connection with goods/services 3. The duration and extent of advertising and publicity 4. Geographical extent of the trading area 5. Channels for trade used 6. The degree of recognition of the TM in the channels of trade 7. Nature and extent of use of similar TM’s by 3rd parties 8. Whether the TM was federally registered NOTE: can bring state dilution claims against non-federally registered TM iii. Times Mirror Magazines v. Las Vegas Sports (The Sporting News) – How “famous” is to be judged within niche market, not the general public. iv. Texas Longhorn Case, niche market is not general public market

c. Other limitations -- §43(c)(1) Three uses of a mark are exempt from a dilution charge: i. Fair use including comparative advertisement ii. Non-commercial use (Mattel) iii. News reporting and commentary. d. Cases i. Ringling Brothers v. Utah Division of Travel Development (“Greatest Snow on Earth” on license plates) – To prove dilution, must show: 1) Famous mark, 2) Adoption of mark after it was famous, and 3) D diluted P’s mark by blurring it. In addition to proving mental association, court said that need to show economic harm. Ringling did not do this. Overruled by Victoria’s Secret ii. Deere v. MTD Products, Inc (John Deere logo being chased by MTD’s tractor) -- Injunction granted. Competitors can use each other’s products in comparative commercials as long as it is: 1) Truthful, 2) TM is not altered, and 3) the purpose is too compare the merits of competing products. iii. L.L. Bean, Inc. Drake Publishers (LL Beam’s Back-To-School-Sex-Catalog) – Parody privilege vs. the 1st Amendment. TM rights only extend to injurious, unauthorized commercial use. Here, use was non-commercial (editorial), parody, small part of the magazine, not on the cover (non-ID), and not promoting goods. Cf. Original Appalachian Artworks v. Topps Chewing Gum (Garbage Pail Kids). iv. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc (Victor’s Little Secret, which is only 5% lingerie sales!) – Purpose of §43(c) is to protect famous marks from subsequent uses that blur and tarnish, whether there’s confusion or not. Unlike Ringling, no actual loss in sales needed (shouldn’t require Π to wait until mark tarnished), but mere association is not enough. Army guy made association with Victoria’s, but no evidence of any lessening of the capacity of the Victoria TM to identify and distinguish goods. Officer may have been offended, but concept of Victoria’s did not change. Need to show actual dilution. v. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc. (Barbie Girl song) – A parody that involved the normative use of the name Barbie. Barbie not just a toy but a cultural icon. Used Barbie name to sell records, but song social commentary on Barbie image. Court concluded that it was not purely commercial speech, and therefore fully protected. Relief limited to injunction.

XVI. Remedies a. Injunctions – the typical answer to preserve status quo and protect against consumer confusion. Should be no broader than necessary. i. 1114 (1&2) preclude monetary damages for many instances where BF not involved ii. Remedies for dilution are restricted to injunctive relief unless willfulness b. Damages – possible damages listed under §1117(a). Typically, must show willful intent to trade on owner’s reputation or to cause dilution of trademark (Basch (yes); Sands (no)). i. The actual damages suffered by the P. Must show that “but-for” infringement, he would have made specific sales that he didn’t. Hard to meet. OR ii. The defendant’s profits. Plaintiff must only prove amount of defendant’s sales, then burden shifts to defendant to prove its costs or deductions. No double recovery – can’t get D’s profits and P’s loss of profits! iii. Attorney’s Fees awarded only in exceptional cases. For P to get fees, must show D’s BF. For D to get fees, he must show P’s lack of merit in the case or an intent to harass. c. Other Options i. Treble damages under §1117(a) -- not exceeding 3x ii. Cancellation/restoration of registrations iii. Destruction of material iv. Prejudgment Interest – Completely within court’s discretion v. Corrective advertising (does this ever happen?) vi. Anti-Counterfeiting Consumer Protection Act (ACCPA) 1117(c) – Increased penalties and statutory damages available.

d. Government Immunity i. §1122 nullifies the Federal government’s immunity from suit, as well as the States’ immunity via the 11th Amend. ii. But, unclear whether states can be sued for ® infringement after Florida Prepaid.

e. Standing i. Registration: Opposer must have a legitimate personal interest in the opposition, and he or she must reasonably believe in the claim of potential injury. Ritchie v. Simpson (Ritchie challenged OJ’s registration of O.J., THE JUICE, etc. because the “marks damaged his values.” This was enough to create standing even if lots of people shared those views.) ii. Infringement: Some courts say §43(a) only applies to commercial parties, and thus excludes consumers. Others say competition not required, but “discernible interest” required in false advertising actions. f. Cases i. George Basch & Co. v. Blue Coral (NEVR-DULL (CAN) & EVER BRITE (USA)) -- In order to justify an award of profits, Π must establish that ∆ engaged in willful deception. Basch never showed confusion nor sales diversion. No Bad Faith. Likelihood of confusion was low, and only minimal aesthetic remedies necessary. Injunction should be no broader than necessary! Here, court required that EVER BRITE change color of the can in the US, and allowed it to sell existing stock w/out penalty. Dissent: Blue Coral intentionally copied mark with Secondary meaning, created confusion, and scored $200K. Profits are reasonable in such cases of unjust enrichment. 1. In order to receive damages Π must prove: actual confusion OR bad faith 2. Policy behind damages: Unjust enrichment, compensation for actual damages, deterrence

ii. Sands, Taylor & Wood v. Quaker Oats Co. (Gatorade’s use of STW’s TM “Thirst Aid” (TA)) – Quaker acted in reliance on their lawyer’s belief that TA was used descriptively, not as TM. TA was not currently used on retail products, just in advertisement. Quaker developed Thirst Aid independently, and $24M award way too much of a windfall for Π. A reasonable royalty would have been better. Remanded for award determination. NOTE: Damages OKed here even though no Bad faith Concurring: Royalty might not be enough -- emphasis on deterrence. Dissent: $24M is only 10% of profit realized. Why not? Focus on causation (of profits). 1. Follow-up: On remand, Court awarded $20M. 2x the hypothetical base royalty. Deterrence rationale.

iii. Lever Bros. Co. v. United States (British affiliate’s soap imports; Lever wants to keep it out of the US) –No evidence that Congress wanted to let 3rd parties import “materially” different TM goods that are manufactured and sold abroad by a foreign affiliate. Mere affiliation will not cure the confusion brought on by the physically different goods. Court limits decision to just Lever’s two products b/c Lever never asked for global relief specifically. The “affiliate exemption” does not apply to imported, physically different products, bearing foreign trademarks similar to U.S. trademarks (NOTE: decision uses Chevron analysis)
Part II - Copyrights

Copyrights are available to original works of authorship that are fixed in tangible form.

I. General a. Current state of law: i. Protection begins automatically upon the fixing of the work. ii. Registration is optional, but is a prerequisite for filing an infringement suit. iii. Generally, © protection extends for life of the author plus 70 years. b. Purposes/Policy i. Focus on the benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors ii. Incentive to create new products iii. Limited monopoly provides time for adequate ROI c. Legal Basis and Terms: i. Art I, Clause 8: “progress of science.” ( Originally used as protection for the making of maps ii. 1909 act ( still governs works created before January 1, 1978. 1. Term: 28 years from time of publication plus 28 extension 2. Formalitites, protection from moment of publication 3. State common law protected unpublished works iii. 1976 Act ( No more formalities 1. Term: life of author plus 50 years (now life + 70 – See below) 2. Protection from Time of creation 3. Abolished state common laws iv. 1998 Sonny Bono Act - 20 year extension ( life + 70 1. If the work fell into the public domain b/f 1998, this doesn’t revive the copyright. See Eldred v. Ashcroft v. DMCA

d. Current formalities: i. Registration – not mandatory. Advantages 1. prima facie evidence that the copyright is valid and that the info on the certificate is true. 2. bring infringement action 3. statutory damages + attorneys fees 4. 90 day grace period to register (from publication) 5. burden of proof (prima facie case) ii. deposit – fine if you don’t deposit 2 copies iii. Notice § 401(b) ( psychological comfort to creator 1. © symbol 2. Name of author 3. Year of publication – can omit on pictographic, sculptural works e. Application process i. Inspector 1. Subject matter Within scope of act (assignment 8) 2. 2 requirements: Originality, Authorship ii. guidelines: compendium of copyright office practice, circular 37 C.F.R §202 iii. “rule of doubt” ( examiner should give it registration if court could reasonably find eligibility iv. Jurisdiction is federal district court – can get protection even if court refused registration v. When work is registered w/in 5 years of publication, the certificate of registration is prima facie evidence that the copyright is valid and that the info on the certificate is true. Constructive notice. f. International i. Universal Copyright Convention -1955 -Lost importance since America adhered to Bern ii. Bern convention- 1893 (US joined in 1998) ( Binds 90 Countries to a unitary copyright law system administered by the WIPO; Not self-executing – still gotta go through the Copyright Act 1. Lack of formalities ( Permissive notice 2. Dual system whereby registration is a prerequisite for bringing a claim for works originating in the US, but not for foreign works!!! 3. Eliminate the requirement of recording transfers (but it’s still a good idea if you want to provide constructive notice . . . and you do . 4. statutory priority to party who first records iii. TRIPS agreement ( Section 104A – copyright automatically restored to certain foreign works thatare still under foreign copyright protection, but which had fallen in US public domain due to lack of formalities

II. Protectable Subject Matter (§ 102) – Requirements: a. Originality – A work of authorship must be original to the person claiming protection. Copyright does not protect mere facts. i. The author must not have copied from another ii. Must demonstrate a minimal degree of creativity.

iii. Blaistein v. Donaldson Lithography (circus poster case) -- Very little creativity required for poste iv. Hearn v. Meyer( ∆’s book had reportuctions of Π’s reproductions of original illustrations from Wizard of Oz book (now in public domain). Reproduction does NOT satisfy originality; slight variations are not enough. NOTE: originality may be met by changing medium of expression a. Bell - BritishMezzotint engraving of oil paintings; Change in medium requires judgment about showing details, creativity b. Milworth Converting: 3D work converted into emobroiderty c. Alva ( scale reproductions of Rodin sculptures, urns on treatment of the rear side of the base v. Gracen v. Bradford (Wizard of Oz plates). Bradford hires Aukland to make a painting for commemorative plate based on Gracen’s painting. Gracen sues for. Court rules that her painting is not copyrightable: Higher originality standard for derivative works

b. Fixation – § 102(a) – A work must be fixed in any tangible medium of expression. Doesn’t matter how as long, as long as it’s in stable form that is readable by man or machine. Live transmissions are protected if they are simultaneously fixed (on videotape, for example).

17 U.S.C. § 101, definition of fixed: A work is “fixed” in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration. A work consisting of sounds, images, or both, that are being transmitted, is “fixed” for purposes of this title if a fixation of the work is being made simultaneously with its transmission.

c. Facts and Ideas NOT protected – § 102 (b) – Protects the expression of an idea, but not the idea itself. Once work is revealed, idea in public domain. Creator controls only the form in which the idea is expressed. i. Merger doctrine – in some cases there may be so few ways to express an idea that the mode of expression merges w/ the idea. Often found in utilitarian objects and games rules, etc. ii. Blank form doctrine ( a form that conveys no information and serves only to provide blank space for recording information contains no expression or section of information that could possibly warrant copyright protection iii. Creativity is a way to escape both blank form and merger iv. Cases: 1. Baker v. Seldon (bookkeeping ledger) – Ledger sheets were “necessary incidents to” the system of accounting. In order to use system, it was necessary to copy author’s expression. Merger. a. NOTE: This was a revolutionary advance; Court was trying to keep method in public domain 2. Cf. Kregos v. Associated Press (pitching form) -- Not a system for predicting outcome of games, but simply a selection of facts that people might want to consider. Many variations possible. No merger, but only “thin protection” ( AP’s form was non-infringing because of slight differences 3. Feist (see below) ( compilations of facts are protected if arrangement shows minimal creativity. 4. West v. Lexis ( West spent time putting reporters together. Lexis provides online service of all the opinions. West sued Lexis over the pin cites to West reporters. West pagination is the standard for courts to refer to cases. In some states (e.g., Texas), West codified and numbered statutes. Court concluded that West put in the creativity, but Case settled. 5. Matthew Bender case ( When something becomes a de facto standard, it becomes too valuable to be taken out of the public domain v. Scenes a Faire doctrine – situations in which there is essentially no other way to express a particular idea except by using standard elements. 1. Hoehling v. Univesal Studios (use of standard German scene, songs, phrases) -- Impossible to describe era without them.

d. Policy: Regulating control in other ways besides denial of copyright i. Laches ( Why wasn’t West guilty of Laches in allowing jump sites to become standard? ii. Copyright misuse (or anti-trust liability) ( if you refuse to deal, it’s a misues 1. When Thompson bought West, they had to have merger approved by DOJ 2. refused to approve merger until they divested ownership of pages numbers 3. good for dealing with problem of holdouts 4. easier to show than TM misuse iii. §107-122 ( compulsory licensings 1. Fair use provision 2. Architectural works: used to be blue prints were illegal to copy, but could copy buildings. After Byrne convention had to protect architectural works 3. § 120 - specific compulsory license to allow people to show pictures of copyrighted building 4. must let owner alter or destroy building iv. Database Protection (Sui generic protection, not yet in U.S.

Categories of Authorship - § 102(a) – categories listed in statute (not limiting): Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of authorship include the following categories:
III.
a. Literary works – “Literary” implies no literary content. Includes computer programs (code, GUI, and commands), catalogs, databases, or a poem written on paper or recorded on tape. b. Musical works – “Fairly settled meaning.” Include both the instrumental component of the work and any accompanying words. c. Dramatic works -- “Fairly settled meaning.” d. Pantomimes and choreographic works -- “Fairly settled meaning.” Must contain original routines. e. Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works – 2-D and 3-D works including maps, charts, diagrams, models, and technical drawings. i. Separability – § 101 – The design of a useful article can be protected only to the extent that pictorial, graphic, or sculptural elements of the article can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article. If not, maybe can get a design patent? 1. Physical separability – if the sole function of the item is utilitarian, then you can’t protect the way it looks. But if a utilitarian object has artistic elements that can exist independent of the utilitarian function, those parts can be protected. a. Maizer v. Stein (statuettes of Balinese dancers for base of lamp) -- Copyright protects the artistic expression, not the utilitarian value. You can protect the useful article, but only to the extent that you can exclude exact copies, not the style. So, anyone can make lamps w/ a woman at the base, just not the same Balinese dancer as the plaintiff’s. 2. Conceptual separability – Ability of artistic features to exist conceptually separate from utility a. Brandir International , Inc. (bike rack) -- Aesthetic form too intertwined with function. Adopts “Denicola Test” with emphasis on design process. Final form was a product of industrial design. It seems clear that the form of the rack is influenced in significant measure by utilitarian concerns and thus any aesthetic elements cannot be said to be conceptually separable from the utilitarian elements. This is true even though the sculptures which inspired the RIBBON Rack may well have been—the issue of originality aside— copyrightable. i. Concurrence adopts “newman test” ( ordinary reasonable observer b. Cf. Kieselstein-Cord (belt buckles copyrightable; ornamented surfaces not required for utilitarian function c. Carol Barnhard (mannequin torsos form not independent of their purpose of displaying clothes; dissent proposes separability in-the-eye-of-the-beholder test);

ii. Motion pictures and other audiovisual works – 1) A series of images, 2) the capability of showing the images in successive order; and 3) impression of motion. Soundtracks somehow included here. iii. Sound recordings – Works that result from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds on a material object. Note that in recorded music, there is also the copyright of the musical work itself (the score and lyrics).

iv. Architectural works – Protected in 1990 by AWCPA (additions to §102, 102 and 120). The design of a building as embodied in any tangible medium of expression, including a building, architectural plan, or drawing. Includes the form and arrangement of space and elements, but not individual features. 1. Limitations by §120 a. May make/display photos or other recording if the building is ordinarily visible, etc. b. Owners of building may make alterations or destroy it w/o permission of copyright owner 2. Cases: Hunt v. Pasternack (building need not have been constructed yet); Leicester v. Warner Brothers (street wall was part of easily visible bank building and subject to being photographed in Batman)

IV. Compilations and Derivative Works, Characters - § 103 a. Compilation – the collection and assembly of pre-existing material that are arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship (i.e. directories and databases). i. Protection for Compilations: 1. Collection or assembly of preexisting materials, facts or data; 2. Selection, coordination or arrangement; 3. The creation thereby of an original work of authorship.

ii. Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Svc. (Feist copied 1,300 name from Rural’s phone book) – Protection of a factual work extends only to its original selection or arrangement. An alphabetical listing of telephone subscribers and numbers not nearly original enough. Court rejected the ‘sweat of the brow’ doctrine (expenditure of resources entitles to protection). 1. Originality: a. independently created AND b. possesses a minimal degree of creativity

2. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (def. of “collective work”) A “collective work” is a work, such as a periodical issue, anthology, or encyclopedia, in which a number of contributions, constituting separate and independent works in themselves, are assembled into a collective whole.

iii. Cf. Second Cir in Key Publications vs. Chinatown Today Publishing Enterprises (originality in arrangement and selection of business listings targeted to Chinese American New Yorkers). iv. NYT Co. vs. Jonathan Tasini (freelancer’s article on Lexis) -- Newspaper not permitted to publish freelancer’s article in Lexis database b/c each article appeared as separate item, rather than as part of either the original edition or a revision thereof. See § 201(c). 1. NOTE: Times now just requires license from author before publication

b. Derivative Works – work based upon one or more original works (i.e. translation, motion picture version, or abridgement). Derivative works are protected as long as the underlying work was (1) used w/ copyright holder’s permission, or (2) was in the public domain. Only the new/original parts of the derivative work are eligible for protection. i. Hearn v. Meyer (see above) ( slavish copy of Wiz of Oz reproduction – Higher standard of originality for derivative works. ii. Author’s use may be subject to renewal of original owner’s copyright. See Stewart v. Abend

c. Protection of Characters ( Are works featuring characters from other copyrighted works derivative works that must be licensed? What is the standard for protection of characters i. Anderson v. Stallone (Anderson created Rocky IV script based on Stallone’s comments) Court holds that Stallone’s characters are delineated so extensively/so essential to story that they are protected from bodily appropriation into a sequel by another author. No part of this derivative work copyrightable b/c pre-existing work pervades derivative work – could not be separated. 1. Warner Bros. v. CBS ( Sam Spade was not copyrightable Character is not copyrightable unless it constitutes the story being told. 2. Olson v. NBC ( “character delineation test” Anderson Court seems to favor this test, but they evaluate the Rocky under both tests ii. MGM v. Honda Motor Corp ( James Bond and his traits are copyrightable under either story being told or character delineation test. iii. Walt Disney v Air Pirates( Disney characters are protected by copyright (animated characters). Ambiguous how this affects doctrine iv. Cf. Silverman v. CBS (Amos and Andy on Broadway) -- Broadway producer could use aspects of characters that had fallen into public domain (from radio scripts), but could not use further delineated aspsects from works still protected by copyright v. Policy Issues ( 1. Arrow’s disclosure paradox. Would giving each author a copyright in his material (“blocking rights”) facilitate bargaining (Stallone) 2. Merchandising 3. Should there be a more lenient standard for animated characters 4. How does this affect fan fiction ( stories fans right about their favorite characters on internet? 5. What about hanging posters of characters in school classrooms?

V. Initial Ownership – § 201: a. Typically, copyright vests initially in the author, unless: b. 17 U.S.C. § 101 Joint works – work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contribution be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole. 1. Two or more authors. 2. Intent that contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole. 3. Copyrightable contribution. 4. Intent to be joint authors. i. Childress v. Taylor (Moms Mabley play) – Taylor contributed research and made incidental suggestions, but no evidence that her role ever involved into anything more than helpful advice giver. Lack of intent by both parties. Fact that Childress rejected co-author K not dispositive. Childress won summary judgment against Taylor for performing new version of play (modified by another playwright) w/o crediting Childress. ii. Thomson vs. Larson (Rent; NYU professor not considered co-author) 1. The Court emphasized the significance of decision-making authority in co-authorship claims. Here, Larson retained sole decision-making authority in RENT’s book and libretto. The Court relied on Thomson’s statement that she was “flattered that Larson was asking her to contribute actual language to the text.” The Court stated this demonstrated Thomson knew any contribution she may make to the RENT script or libretto was completely within Larson’s discretion. c. Works for hire – § 101 – The author is the employer and is vested w/ copyright. There are only two ways a work for hire may come into being: i. Employee (EE) vs. Independent Contractor (IC) Test. When a work is prepared by an EE in the course of his employment, it’s a work for hire under §101(a)(1). EE status determined by party’s right to control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished: 1. Level of skill 2. Source of tools 3. Location of the work 4. Duration of relationship between parties 5. Whether hiring party can assign additional assignments 6. Extent of worker’s discretion 7. Method of payment 8. Workers role in hiring and paying assistance 9. Is work part of regular business of hiring party 10. Whether the hiring party is in business 11. Provision of employee benefits 12. Tax treatment of worker.

ii. §102(a)(2) ( If made by IC, work for hire must fall into one of these nine statutory categories and be prepared subject to a written agreement indicating that it would be a work for hire.: 1. contribution to collective work, 2. part of a motion picture 3. translation 4. supplementary work 5. compilation 6. instructional text 7. test 8. an answers to a test 9. an atlas

iii. Within Scope of Employment: 1. within the kind the employee is employed to perform; 2. occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits; and 3. actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master.

iv. Community for Creative Nonviolence v. Reid (Reid creates nativity sculpture for CCNV) –Reid was independent contractor: used his own office, under no daily supervision, retained for less than two months, freedom to determine his own schedule, compensated like contractor, had discretion re: assistants, etc. NOT work for hire because not one of 9 categories of §101(a)(2). NOTE: On remand decided that they were joint authors.

VI. Exclusive Rights granted to owner by 17 USC § 106 – Copyright owner may exclude others from doing any of the following w/o his permission: a. To reproduce by making copies or phonorecords – Such copies (and derivative works) must be “actual reproductions,” not merely similar. § 114. b. To prepare derivative works – only copyright owner may make a transformed version of the original work (or license rights to do so to others) i. See Stewart v. Abend ( (Rear Window Case)

c. To distribute copies or phonorecords of work – includes sales, rental, lease, or lending. i. Limited by the First Sale Doctrine (§ 109) ( Once a particular copy or phonorecord of a work has been sold, the buyer can dispose of it as he wishes; does not apply to licenses. ii. Imports. Copyright does not bar the unauthorized importation of domestically made goods back into the US. 1. Quality King Distributors v. L’anza Research (importation) – CA manufacturer of hair care products unsuccessfully challenged ability of foreign company to import domestically produced hair care products back into US for resale at discount retailers. If products were made abroad, might fall under 602(a) – Court has not resolved latter issue.

d. To perform the work under certain circumstances – i. Traditional public performance right – Only the copyright owner may perform the protected work publicly. Public transmissions are also considered public performances. ii. This right does not extend to sound recordings. The owner of a phonorecord may display or play it publicly w/o violating the rights of the owner of the copyright to the sound recording but still must get permission from owner of copyright to the musical composition underlying the sound recording. § 114. 1. §110 Exceptions for Musical Works (including underlying composition) a. Charitable, religious, and other performances. b. Home Style Exception. Not a violation to play publicly on a single receiving apparatus of the type typical in private homes so long as there is no charge and the performance is not further transmitted. This allows radio and TV in restaurants and bars, etc. Fairness in Music Licensing Act: §110(5)(b) “home-style” exemption now sets square foot and device regulations that are pretty specific. i. Columbia Pictures v. Redd Horne, Inc. (videos rented for in-store booth viewing controlled by employee) – “Public place” because store was open to the public. The relevant place was the whole store, not the individual booths. What if patrons could have operated video by themselves?

2. Public Performance Via Digital Transmissions – § 106 (6) – Exception which allows the right of public performance of high-quality, on-demand sound recordings, but subject to qualifications in § 114(d) – which creates exemptions and compulsory licenses for non-traditional broadcasters (Internet radio) and background music in businesses, etc.

e. To display the work – The showing of a copy of the work either directly or by means of a film, slide, television image, or any other device or process, etc. 1. This right does not extend to sound recordings. 2. Owner of a copy may display it to people present at the place were the copy is. 109(b). 3. Exemptions for charitable, religious, educational, and other non-profit uses. §110.

VII. Moral Rights a. Berne Convention (joined 1989) § 6 – Independent of the author’s economic rights, and even after the transfer of such rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation, or any other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the same work which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation. i. Duration is same as copyright (Germany, Netherlands) ii. France ( Moral rights are perpetual

b. VARA Act of 1990 (§ 106A) – Adds the rights of attribution and integrity (and in some cases to prevent destruction) to copyright in certain “works of visual art” only: paintings, drawings, prints, sculptures, and certain photographic images that exist in 200 or fewer copies signed and numbered by the artist (does NOT include movies, charts, technical drawings, maps). Works for hire not included. These rights can’t be transferred, but can be waived. i. Attribution grants rights to (1) claim authorship of the work, (2) prevent his name from being attached to a work he did not create, and (3) prevent use of his name if the work has been modified in such a way that would prejudice his honor or reputation. 1. Unlike integrity right below, alterations need not be intentional 2. Does NOT include negative rights to anonymity or pseudonymity a. DMCA creates a de facto right of attribution in the Internet Environment.

ii. Integrity grants rights to (1) prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or any other modification that would prejudice his honor or reputation, and (2) prevent the destruction of a work of recognized stature by an intentional or grossly negligent act. 1. NOTE: NO definitions for “prejudice,” “honor,” or “reputation.”

iii. Exceptions 1. No coverage if modification is the result of the passage of time or inherent nature of materials 2. Integrity right not violated if modification is the result of conservation efforts or of public presentation, unless gross negligence involved 3. Integrity and Attribution rights do not apply to reproductions 106A(c) 4. No coverage if work cannot be removed from a building without being mutilated and artist consented to installation before June 1991

iv. VARA Duration 1. work created after June 1991 (effective date) ( life of artist. 2. created on or before June 1991 (and artist still holds title) ( same duration as copyright 3. work created before effective date and no title, no rights at all under 106A. 4. Joint works ( life of last surviving author 5. All terms run to end of calendar year in which they would expire

v. Preemption – VARA preempts equivalent rights at state law (301(f)), unless 1. actions stem from undertaking that started before effective date 2. violation of rights that are not equivalent to those in 106A 3. violation of rights that will extend beyond the life of the author a. NOTE: States free to protect posthumous moral rights.

c. NOTE: Professor Kwall presents argument that there is potential for moral rights under Copyright Act of 1976 i. 106(2) derivative rights may be used to control works “based on” author’s work ii. 506(b) ( “beneficial owner” who gave up title in exchange for royalties may bring infringement actions. Since all creators retain potential economic interest in their works (see termination provisions), may be able to extend moral rights to all authors.

d. Gilliam v. ABC ( Monty Python granted relief when ABC edited their skits so as to put commercials in the middle. Right to edit did not exist in original BBC license (ABC was sublicense). Court relied heavily on BBC licensing terms. Limited implications for moral rights w/o contract, but silent contract limits licensee from extensive editing. Could this be relied on by an author who gives studio rights to make a movie “based on” her book?

e. Cf. Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. (Eisenhower WWI memoirs TV series)Eisenhower’s WW II memoirs book gets renewed copyright, but Fox TV Series in public domain. Fox reacquires TV rights to distribute Crusade TV series, but Dastar takes material from old series (changes voiceovers, etc.) and markets without attribution/permission form Fox or book owners.

i. Court holds Dastar did not violate Lanham Act §43(a) – “origins” means ingredients that go into the box; Would have to go too far back in the past to figure out the origins and associate too many names with work ii. Catch 22 ( If Dastar had put Fox’s name on this, Fox would have sued under 43(a) for false sponsorship! iii. Bottom line ( moral rights not well-protected in US

VIII. Duration of Copyright a. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (1998) – Added 20 years to the copyright term then in effect. Went from life plus 50 to life plus 70. Doesn’t revive copyrights already expired in 1998. b. The 1976 Act (including Sonny Bono) – For works created on or after Jan. 1, 1978, effectively eliminated renewal concept in favor of single term for life of author plus 70 years. i. joint authorship ( life of the longest surviving author is used. ii. work for hire, written anonymously or pseudonymously, then the lesser of either (1) 95 years from the date of publication, or (2) 120 years from the date the work was created (§302 (c)). c. The 1909 Act – Protection began at the time the work was published. Copyright was for a term of 28 years, renewable for another 28 years. Even if the author assigned the copyright during the first term, he was entitled to the benefit of the second term, unless he assigned that too. But if the author died during the first term, even if he had assigned the renewal term, it accrued to his heirs. i. Transition terms of the 1976 Act – Works published before 1923 are in the public domain. Works published b/t 1923 and 1963 are entitled to 28 years plus renewal term of 67 years (effectively adding 39 more years than before), but only if certain renewal procedures are followed. Works published b/t 1964 and 1977 get 28 years plus automatic renewable term of 67 years with no formal procedures, but there are advantages to formally renewing. See more on renewal below ↓.

IX. Renewal and Termination a. Copyright Renewal Act of 1992 i. Permissive Renewal – If © secured b/w 1964-1977, Renewal Act confers renewal automatically for 67 additional years when first term ends. §304(a). 1. Pre-1964 works not affected. Renewal right inapplicable to post-1977 works. ii. Clarifying vesting date – If file renewal application in 28th year, renewal term will vest in author, even if he dies that year. If no application made, renewal term vests in author’s successors. iii. Incentives to register – 1. If file in the 28th year, the author’s first term grants of renewal rights to exploit derivative works are nullified if the author dies before the renewal term. 2. If no renewal, derivative works from first term can be freely exploited, but no new derivative work made after new term begins 3. Prima facie evidence as to validity. Failure to file a timely renewal registration limits remedies.

Stewart v. Abend (Hitchcock film) -- Assignment of renewal rights by author does not defeat the right of the successors to those rights if the author dies before the renewal rights vest. In this case, Court would not grant injunction, but would award monetary damages ( compulsory license. NOTE: In this case, successors renewed in 28th year, but if NO timely registration filed, a derivative work made pursuant to the grant can still be exploited, but no new derivative work can be made after the new term begins; see 203(b)(1) & 304(C)(6)(A).

b. Termination of Transfer of Copyright: i. Termination under §203 (Applies to transfers made post-1/1/1978) 1. Can renegotiate with assignee after 35 Years -- §203(a)(3) provides that a grant may be terminated by qualified person at any time within a 5-year “termination window” opening 35 years after the transfer is executed. a. Publication Exception: 35 years from date of publication or 40 years from date of execution, whichever term ends earlier b. Must give notice between 2 and 10 years prior to date within the window 2. Use of Derivative Work under original grant -- §203(b)(1) mirrors §304(C)(6)(A). Owner of a derivative work prepared under a grant of the underlying work may continue to utilize the derivative work after termination, but the owner of the derivative work cannot prepare new DW once initial grant terminated. 3. 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a)(5): Termination of the grant may be effected notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, including an agreement to make a will or to make any future grant.

4. Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder (assignment of song rights for royalties; §304 protects authors and public accessibility to derivative works; production Co. got to keep their share of the royalties)

ii. [pic]

X. Infringement: a. In general: Must show 1. Ownership of a valid copyright 2. Unauthorized exercise of a § 106 right a. Copying in fact i. Direct evidence OR ii. Circumstantial evidence 1. access AND 2. similarity b. Improper appropriation i. To prove illicit copy, need copying and improper appropriation. Arnstein v. Porter; Michael Stillman v. Leo Burnett Co. (silent commercial; provides the rule).

b. Copying – copying requires a showing of: 1. Access to the work – requires the reasonable opportunity to view and/or know about the plaintiff’s work. However, mere probability of access, based on mere conjecture or speculation, is not enough. Access is often proven by inference. Note that infringement requires no intent and can be accidental. a. Chain of Events b. Widely Disseminated 2. Substantial similarity – Purely factual issue of whether the defendant used the plaintiff’s work as a starting point for his own. “Compared in their entirety” including ideas, procedures, or techniques. Arnstein says you can use experts here too. a. striking similarity ( If you can’t prove access, you may have to prove a higher level of similarity that precludes any other explanation but copying – i. Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs (the My Sweet Lord case) – Unquestionable access to hit song, and virtually identity of music compelled a finding of subconscious copying; ii. Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton (Bolton song substantially similar to that of Eisley Brothers, but weaker access argument) 1. -Substantial evidence of copying based on access and substantial similarity was such that a reasonable juror could reject this defense 2. -Bolton infringed the copyright 3. -Must prove the work was widely distributed and Bolton had access and then get into substantial similarity test (extrinsic/intrinsic) and let the reasonable person decide whether intrinsically there is substantial similarity 3. Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures (the “Moscow on the Hudson” poster case) – here there was copying of the overall style of the work.

c. Improper appropriation – improper appropriation requires a showing of: i. Copied material was protected – copied facts, scenes-a-fair, clichéd language, common themes and metaphors are not protected. ii. New work is substantially similar to protected work – Here, substantially similar refers to the ultimate legal issue of whether the defendant violated the copyright laws by reproducing protectible expression. 1. Export Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc.: There is one substantial respect in which the creator of the Heriz made distinctly idiosyncratic and particular design decisions— decisions whose effect permeates the entire field of the Heriz—and in this respect the Bromley is a virtually exact copy of the Heriz. The plaintiff not only cropped and elongated the Battillossi half-field, he also selectively eliminated numerous design motifs, creating a more open, less busy aesthetic.

d. Tests for substantial similarity: i. “Abstractions test” ( early 2nd Circuit test, Learned Hand compares the items taken as a whole and decides whether or not protected elements are really substantially similar 1. Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton (Bolton song substantially similar to that of Eisley Brothers, but weaker access argument) a. Look at the works themselves: both songs shared the same title hook phrase, shifted cadence, instrumental figures, verse/chorus relationship, and fade ending.

2. Arnstein v. Porter (2nd Cir. 1946) ( seminal case for copyright infringement in 2nd Cir. Uses standard of “ordinary lay hearer” – analytic dissection and expert witnesses are irrelevant. 3. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp. (2nd Cir. 1930) ( Abie’s Irish Rose – mixes up a few facts. Court: Stock characters float into the public domain. Less developed the characters, the less they get protection NOTE: Dicta on experts ( experts just confuse the issue on things like this

ii. Refined 2nd circuit test ( break it down by the steps. In Computer Assocaites v. Altai ( (programmer comes over to Altai and brings code. Figured it out and rewrite the code from a clean slate). Applied abstraction test to find: NOT sufficient similarity 1. Abstraction ( dissection of copyrighted program structure to isolate each level 2. Filtration ( Use merger doctrine to filter out a number of things: a. elements of progam that were dictated by efficiency (merger) b. elements dictated by external factors, e.g. Mechanical specs of computers, compatibility, c. Demands of industry ( Accepted programming practice d. stock/standard devices ( (Scenes a Fair) e. elements taken from public domain 3. Comparison ( compare remaining elements to determine infringement a. Was protected expression copied? b. Assess relative importance of what was copied to overall program 4. Policy considerations: Is this a more formal version of previous version? Should the test be different for computer programs? 5. NOTE: This time expert witnesses are relevant

iii. 7th and 9th Circuit Test ( Extrinsic/Intrinsic ( Dreyfus doesn’t understand it herself 1. Subtractive approach (Extrinsic) – Dissection. Determine which idea/expression features of work are protected and ignore those that are not. Then, determine whether there are substantial similarities b/w what’s left. Can use expert testimony. 2. Total concept and feel approach (Intrinsic) – Don’t separate protected from unprotected (well…maybe a little), but generally, look at the whole. Test for similarity of expression from standpoint of ordinary reasonable observer. 3. Some Courts seem to mix the two. First do dissection (Extrinsic portion), then compare (intrinsic part) 4. Apple Computer v. Microsoft (9th Cir. 1995): Apple licenses GUI out to Microsoft, who release new version of its GUI. Merger concerns lead to thin copyright: Only so many ways to use an icon metaphor; Tiled or overlapping windows are only two options. a. Extrinsic/intrinsic test i. Extrinsic ( objective prong: determine what’s protected and ignore what isn’t, consult experts ii. intrinsic ( subjective prong ( standpoint of ordinary reasonable observer b. Holding ( extrinsic filtering test works for this case c. Sometimes referred to as more lenient “virtual identity” test

5. Stillman v. Burnett (N.D. IL, 1989) ( Designer of Silent Eastern Airlines commercial pitches idea to United who later does their own silent commercial. Holding: whole greater than sum or its parts!! a. Slices it all up – none of it is protectable b. Put back together, it might be protectable (creative arrangement and interaction may be protectable). Reasonable person could conclude that United commercial evokes similary response 6. See Kohus v. Mariol (6th Cir 2003) (playground lock) ( Seems to employ both intrinsic and extrinsic tests. Focus on perspective of intended audience. Expert testimony may be necessary when end purchaser possesses specialized knowledge. Employs 2 step test: a. Filter out unprotected elements; b. Deteremine if protected tests are infringing ( ordinary reasonable person is designed for lay audiences who purchase the product. When target audience possesses specialized expertise, consider similarity from specialist perspective

e. Interim Infringement (Reverse Engineering) ( permissible when it’s the only way to get to unprotected elements that would allow compatability. i. Clean room defense ( should there be infringement when programmer other than intermediate copier writes new program using intermediate copier’s specification but never sees original code. ii. Sega v. Accollade (9th cir. 1992) – Accolade reversed engineered the Sega system so they could make game cartridges to work on Sega systems. First had to decomplie source code, then created manual with functional descriptions of interface requirements. In order to achieve compatibility copied portion of code into its own games so that they displayed Sega TM. 1. “Intermediate copying” of code could constitute copyright infringement, but that’s not the issue here 2. Court finds Fair Use ( disassembly was the only means through which Accolade could gain access to unprotected aspects of the program. iii. See also Sony Computer Entertainment v. Connectix (9th Cir. 2000) ( intermediate copying was fair use for ∆’s copying software program that operates Playstation in order to make console that users could use to play Sony games on computer instead of TV. iv. WI v. WIREdata ( ∆ was multiple listing service seeking to obtain Π’s data for specificl properties for use by brokers. Sega would protect them if they needed to make a copy of entire protected compilation in which raw data was contained.

XI. Fair Use

a. affirmative defense that allows otherwise infringing uses of protected works, usually for educational purposes, reviews, comments, criticisms, etc. In effect, provides subsidy to consumer at author’s expense!! b. 4 categories of Fair dealing, based on British Cases (pure judge-made law) and Alan Landman article i. Incidental use ( music isn’t there for itself; it’s there to set a scene (e.g., 1940’s music opening Brighton Beach Memoirs) ii. Criticism ( Critics often quote from books. Courts say take the good with the bad iii. Parody ( Mad Magazine exception; Mad never lost a case iv. Productive Uses ( works may have high social value, but copyright holder won’t sell

c. Four Factor Test found in § 107 i. The purpose and character of the use – Private, non-commercial use is more likely fair use than commercial use. Not whether the sole motivation is monetary gain, but whether user stands to profit from exploiting copyright without paying for it. ii. The second statutory factor, “the nature of the copyrighted work,” § 107(2) . . . calls for recognition that some works are closer to the core of intended copyright protection than others, with the consequence that fair use is more difficult to establish when the former works are copied. iii. The amount and substantiality of the portion used – The less that’s copied w/o permission, the more likely it’s fair use. Need not be a % analysis; taking the heart of work will not be fair use (unless it’s a parody). iv. The market effect on the copyrighted work – If market value is destroyed by fulfilling demand, etc. then no fair use. Seemingly Most important factor. 1. "Whether unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the D would result in a substantially adverse impact on the potential market" for the original in the aggregate?

v. Harper & Row v. The Nation (the Ford autobiography; Time purchased prepublication rights, but Nation scoops Time, and Time cancelled agreement) – 1. Author’s right to control first public appearance of unpublished work outweighs fair use. 2. No legitimate necessity to pre-empt first publication rights. Lack of good faith. 3. Nation’s use exceeded that necessary to convey facts – small %, but heart of the book (Ford’s distinctive expression!). 4. Actual harm of contract cancellation ( effect on market for book preview was destroyed

vi. American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc. (scientific journal copies made by 400 person corporation – not fair use); vii. Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document Services, Inc. (copyshop’s failure to obtain permission for excerpts in coursepacks). Use was commercial even though ultimate users were students/ because not getting permission gave copyshop a competitive edge over other shops that paid royalties. Damages enhanced for willfulness. Want to give publishers incentive to print scholarly pieces.

d. Fair Use, Contributory and Vicarious Liability i. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (Using betamax to tape TV; time-shifting) – 1. Analogy to patent law: to avoid liability, there must be substantial non-infringing use. 2. Only two factor analysis used: (1) Commercial character of activity and (2) Effect on market. 3. Court says viewers were invited to watch free of charge – noncommercial, private home use. 4. Universal’s harms claims (FF commercial, video rental) purely speculative. 5. Time-shifting enlarges TV audience, and extending public access to free TV is societal benefit. Further, Sony not in a position to control use, nor did it encourage copying 6. Dissent: Where proposed work is unproductive, only need reasonable possibility of future harm. Very original programming copied, and in its entirety! Studios entitled to share benefits of new time-shifting market – consumer should not be given subsidy at author’s expense ii. A&M Records v. Napster, Inc. P2P system for file sharing is NOT fair use 1. Commerical use ( even if copies not offered for sale (citing Worldwide Church (religious texts)); Received financial benefits from an ever-increasing user base that was dependent on the availability of infringing material. 2. Files not transformed, merely copied in their entirety. Not sampling. Not Space-shifting. 3. Harm to market: CD sales, licensing agreements, and adverse affect on digital download market. iii. Contributory Infringement.: Does defendant have knowledge of the 1. infringing activity? AND 2. Has defendant induced, caused, or materially contributed to the infringing conduct of another?

a. Napster actually knew that users were committing copyright infringement and did nothing to block access/remove material, and materially assisted users because they could not share the files without the Napster web site and software.

iv. Vicarious Liability. Right and ability to supervise the 1. infringing activity? AND 2. Direct financial interest in such activity? a. Napster acted in a supervisory capacity by terminating users when it received complaints. Police power limited by system acrchitecture (didn’t read content of files), BUT for system to work, titles had to be reasonably correct. Napster could done something!! v. MGM v. Grokster ( contributory infringement and NOT fair use. P2P network was outside of Grokster’s control, and thus the court found no vicarious liability. Grokster could shut down their doors and people would still being copying away – acting independently.

e. Parodies (Fair Use continued) – satirical use of work. Central purpose: whether the new work merely “supersedes the objects” of the original creation (Folsom v. Marsh), or instead add something new with a further purpose or different character. “Transformative inquiry.” Look at four Fair Use factors and big picture. i. The Folsom/Acuff Parody Test 1. Can we reasonably perceive parodic character? a. How much is necessary for parody to “conjure up” original? May only take what is necessary so that audience knows what you are parodying. 2. What is the value of materials used? (Acuff virtually ignored this portion 3. Are the “quantity and value of materials used” more than necessary for parody? a. How substantial was copying? Verbatim? Parodic works must be able to take heart of original to make its point. ii. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music (2 Live Crew “Big Hairy Woman”) – 2LC took first line of orig. and then used different lyrics. Not a case of mere duplication for commercial purposes; transformative. Harm unlikely when parody and original serve different market functions – Overturn summary judgment and remand to determine if there was market for rap version of “Pretty Woman.” Distinguish between criticism that suppresses market demand and a market substitute which usurps it. iii. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Company (The Wind Done Gone critiques the GWTW’s depiction of slavery) – A commercial product, but a “highly transformative” critical statement. Didn’t take anything that wasn’t for parodic purposes. No extra latitude for important works. TWDG will not act as a market substitute…maybe even complement!

XII. Other Defenses a. Laches – where Π unreasonably delayed bringing suit and ∆ was prejudiced by the delay. b. Estoppel – Π aided ∆ in committing infringing acts, or induced or caused their performance c. Unclean hands – Π either participated in infringing acts or committed some other fraud or transgression which result in harm to ∆ d. Copyright Misuse – A more policy based decision. Typically, could only be used as defense after antitrust violation has been shown, but new life breathed into it lately.

XIII. Public Access and First Sale Doctrine a. §109(a) – First Sale doctrine ( once lawfully made copy of copyrighted work is sold, right holder has no control over subsequent sales or dispositions of that particular copy i. License v. Sale ( software manufacturers set up agreements as licenses, rather than sales agreements. ii. digital first sale right – not specifically in 109(a), but unless enacted doctrine will become obsolete in environment where contents of copyrighted work are being disseminated electronically. (DMCA-commissioned study rejected need for this) b. §109(b) – Record Rental Amend Act (1984) and Computer Software Rental Amend Act (1990) i. Record rental ( exception to first sale doctrine; precludes rental, lease, or sending of records for direct or indirect commercial advantage ii. Computer rental ( rental of software w/o copyright owner permission is infringement. c. §117 ( make second generation copy of computer program ONLY if essetnail step in utilization of computer w/ machine, or for archival purposes only d. Audio Home Recording Act ( requires inclusion of Serial Copy Management System (SCMS) in digital audio tape recorders (DATs) ( SCMS allows digitial-digital copies of CD’s by DATs, but predcludes digital-to-digital copies of copies. Unlimited first generation copies, but outlaws second-generation copies. DAT technology not a significanto portion of electronics marketplace. e. 602(a) ( unauthorized importation of copies acquired outside US infringes copyright owner’s exclusive right of distribution under §106. Doesn’t count for re-importation of domestic-made goods (See Quality King)

XIV. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 – Exchanges service provider liability protections for safeguards and other actions to protect copyrighted material and prevent ongoing infringement. Copyright owners in better negotiating position to extract value/promises from users – if users can afford it. [Policy issue ( If consumers can’t afford to pay more, are we reducing public access too much?] a. Title I: WIPO Treaties Implementation ( Chapter 12: i. Public access 1. §1201(a) ( basic prohibition on access circumvention (“breaking into the castle”), as well as povisiion prohibiting trafficking that facilitates access circumvention. 2. §1201(b) ( “additional violations” subsection ( those who facilitate conduct amounting to cirucumventing technological measures used by owner (Elcom) a. Only trafficking is illegal; not personal use. (Elcom) b. DMCA doesn’t apply to prohibited use of work once in lawful possession (normal infringement) c. But if you aid/abet infringer by offering services to circumvent, DMCA kicks in 3. 1201 (d): Exemptions for nonprofit libraries and educational institutions 4. 1201 (f): Exemptions for Reverse engineering ii. Universal City Studios v. Corley (DVD decryption) -- Fair use did not apply where defendant violated 1201(a)(2) by offering program designed to circumvent technological measures protecting copyrighted works. ∆ trafficked in device that defendant claimed would allow Linux users to decrypt DVDs to view them on their own computers. Court assumed that access circumvention was a completely separate violation from copyright infringement. iii. 1201 (g): exception for Decryption Research 1. Edward Felten (Princeton professor) won contest to break digital watermark code on CDs (SDMI) and wanted to share findings at conference, but RIAA threatened to sue under DMCA. Professor’s Constitutional claim dismissed for lack of standing. iv. 1203 ( civil penalties are expensive $500K v. 1204 ( criminal penalties are steep, but less so than Convention on Cybercrime, which makes it a crime just th=o possess devices designed or adapted primarily for illegal access.

b. Title II: Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act: vicarious liability for ISPs i. § 512 creates safe harbors, which limits liability for service providers for: 1. Transitory communications – providers act as mere data conduits (512(a)) a. Ellison v. Robertson (AOL’s liability limited because storage of copyrighted work was transient; not maintained for longer than necessary) 2. System caching – storing copies of material made available online(512(b)) 3. Information residing on systems or networks at direction of users, as long as provider shave no actual knowledge, and act immediately to remove infringing material when notified (512(c)) 4. Information Location Tools (hyperlinks to other sites) – same knowledge limitation as above (512(d)) 5. Nonprofit educational Institutions (512(e))

ii. To qualify for any of these exemptions, under 512(i), the service provider must 1. Adopt and reasonably implement a policy of terminating the accounts of repeat infringers 2. Accommodate and not obstruct “standard technical measures” c. Title III: Computer Maintenance or Repair Copyright Exemption d. Title IV: Miscellaneous Provisions e. Title V: Protection of Certain Original Designs – sui generis protection for boat hulls f. Criticisms i. Permits encryption of factual works that don’t meet the Feist Test ii. Prevents copying works in the public domain iii. Chilling decryption research efforts iv. Prevents decryption of stuff that could be fairly used. 1. But note that Librarian of Congress has defined 4 fair use exceptions to DCMA: lists of sites blocked by internet filters, computer programs protected by hardware dongles preventing access due to damage or oboscolescence, programs using obsolete formats/hardware, e books dist. in format preventing handicap access from functioning (read aloud, etc.) v. Extraction of promises ( DMCA may enable owners to extract promises from users not to resell the work, not to make fair use of work, or not to use information to manufacture competing products 1. Some say facilitates price discrimination 2. Those who engage in fair use may not fully capture benefits of the use, and may be unable to pay for it. 3. May reduce the number of cheaper second-hand copies available to marginal users 4. Do fair use and first sale preempt such agreements in general? g. Cases: i. USA v. Elcom Ltd. (Elcom made AEBPR that broke down Adobe restrictions leaving naked PDF. Such use would allow one to use for non-infringing uses [such as reading on another computer, printing, etc,] as well as the infringing use of unlawful distribution.) -- 1201(b) imposes blanket bans on trafficking in or the marketing of any device that bypasses or circumvents a restriction on copying work. Can’t distinguish by use. 1. Fair use still allowed, but it’s going to be tough without the tools!! 2. cquitted on criminal charges here, but now, Convention on Cyber-crime makes it crime to simply possess devices. ii. A&M Records v. Napster, Inc. ( Napster argued it was within safe harbor provisions of DMCA. No! Files transferred through Internet and not NAP website. Even if NAP met service provider requirement of DCMA, it did not provide written notice that infringers would be terminated nor take measures to prevent repeated infringement.

XV. Remedies – the 500 series in the Act a. Injunctions – § 502 preliminary and permanent injunctions b. §§ 502-503 ( Book burning, Press smashing, Impounding infringing articles c. Damages – § 504 – you can choose either: i. Actual damages plus profits 1. Lost profits + any profits attributed to the infringer not taken into account in computing actual damages; no double recovery a. NOTE: Damages involve counterfactual inquiry, hard to monetize reputation interests 2. Π must only show reasonably related revenues gained, and then Burden of Proof on ∆ to show what portion of total profits attributable to deductible expenses and any non-infringing elements.

ii. Lost Profits Valuation Options – remember to take into account future damages 1. “But for” the infringement (On Davis) 2. Compare sales of infringed item to average sales of all of P’s similar goods, if any 3. Compare P’s “infringed revenue” to avg. total revenue during non-infringing period 4. Measure D’s sales to customers who purchased from both P and D 5. Difficulties in calculating lost profits a. Bootleg DVDs as loss leaders b. ∆ might be inefficient producer – price is high, but so are ∆’s production costs c. Profits may be attributable to ∆’s ability as a merchant, not Π’s product d. Profits can’t be disaggregated from ∆’s other profits e. Π’s may have losses from collateral sales

iii. Statutory damages; §504(c) (received in place of actual damages/lost profits 1. To qualify, owner must have registered work before infringement. a. Statutory damages available only for infringements that occur after registration b. exception can collect for damages if you register w/in 90 days of publication 2. Three Ahmed factors (bootleg Jurassic Park DVD case) a. Expenses saved/profit to ∆ b. Revenues lost by Π c. Willful vs. Innocent determination (most important) 3. Not less than $500, and no greater than $20,000 for each work that is infringed, not the number of infringements a. Willful infringement (knowledge and reckless disregard) – court has discretion to bump up award to max of $100K b. Innocent Infringement – discretion to decrease minimum to $200 4. 7th Amendment requires jury assessment of statutory damages

iv. Problems w/ damages – or why courts prefer injunctions. 1. Big gap between minimum an dmaximum 2. Multiplier ( “for each work.” Logically can read as for each copy? 3. Willfulness ( What is it? Hard to prove

d. Cost and Attorney’s Fees – awarded to prevailing party at court’s discretion. Mostly follow the American rule – each side pays its own fees. Private attorney general argument often rejected; strong interest in access.

e. Declaratory judgment Action i. People have a right to go to court and get validation that their actions are valid, patent is invalid, or actions are infringement ii. This comes up more often in patent ( expensive to engage in infringing action (build factories, hire workers, etc.). Want a decision by the court to protect investments

f. Government Immunity i. Copyright Remedy Clarification Act (1990) expressly eliminated state immunity, but unclear if unconstitutional. Florida Prepaid. ii. For infringements by federal government, 28 USC 1498(b) says copyright owner can only sue in the Claims Court for damages. Theoretical basis: 5th Amend. Just Compensation Clause. iii. Works by gov’t are not copyrightable iv. Government right to use copyrighted and patented works 1. Government must pay licensing fees 2. Just compensation – fair market compensation v. The States ( don’t get benefit of §1498, Originally silent statute 1. Specific provision that waived state government immunity overruled a. Congress lacks power to waive immunity for patent infringement b. lower courts have applied rule to copyright (No USSC Case) 2. Right holders Can still get injunctions ( 11th Amendment only bars damages 3. Congress has power to waive state immunity but must make a good showing that states systematically engage in commercially significant amounts of infringement ( No such showing was made in IP acts

g. Criminal Liability i. Piracy, Counterfeiting, Bootlegging, mail fraud, wire fraud, performance ri 1. §506(a)(1)(B) ( producing $500,000 worth of copies in any 180 day period regardless of profits ( Meant to get Napster 2. § 2318 counterfeiting: Bootleg phonorecords and movies, CD’s and DVDs with counterfeit ii. Liability Exception: Family Entertainment Act ( Can remove offensive sections of movies iii. No Electronic Theft Act via DMCA 1. Criminal Infringement defined: reproduction during 180-day period of 1 or more copies of 1 or more works, with a total retail value of more than $1,000. § 506 2. §506(c) ( fraudulently putting notice on non-copyrightable work

h. Remedies across IP i. In TM law, injunction is most important because of confusion. Hard to get money damages in TM cases outside contexts of harm to identity ii. Copyright seems to be opposite ( easier to get money damages. iii. Patent cases ( Reputational interests are stripped out, only about money iv. Injunctions are only about deterrence – otherwise people would always infringe

i. Case Law i. Ahmed v. Universal Studios (pirated Jurassic Park videos) – Willful knowledge may be inferred. Three factors for statutory infringement listed above. Statutory damages need not correlate with profits won/lost – it’s all about deterrence. Must focus on number of works infringed, not the # of infringements; no penalty for each tape. ii. On Davis v. The Gap (Guy wearing Davis’ sunglasses in Gap ad) – Davis needed to show “gross revenues” related to the infringement, not unrelated revenues. Amount of damages may not be based on undue speculation (e.g. Davis $2.5M claim here). Entitlement limited to profits “attributable to the infringement.” No statutory relief because infringement occurred after first publication of glasses, but before registration. No punitive damages generally in copyright. iii. Abend v. MCA, Inc. (exploitation of Rear Window film) – Court considered fact that D invested lots of time and money. Where great public injury would result from injunction, go with award or continuing royalty. Abend didn’t show irreparable injury. Court suggested awarding actual damages + “reasonable and just” apportionment of profits based on the amount of infringement (copulsorylicense). iv. A&M Records v. Napster (P2P system) – No great public injury here. Not a situation for compulsory royalties. v. Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc. (Fogerty sold rights to “Jungle” and then recorded very similar song) –Prevailing Πs and ∆s to be treated alike with respect to awarding attorney’s fees, awarded at court’s discretion.
XVI. Compulsory Licensing a. § 111(c) - cable television license; § 114 – digital subscription transmissions, including webcasting (per DMCA); § 116 – jukeboxes; § 118 – public broadcasting license, § 119 satellite retransmission licenses b. § 115 Mechanical license – for the reproduction and distribution of non-dramatic musical works. Allows cover versions and original owners get royalties set by Copyright Office. Second comer must send letter to original author asking for license.

XVII. Federal Preemption of Rights Equivalent to Copyright – a. Basic §301 Preemption Test ( 3 questions – if the answer to any one is “no”, then NO pre-emption i. Is the work Fixed? ii. Is it §102 subject matter already covered by copyright act? iii. Is it a right already covered in §106. b. Nature of the work (Subject Matter) ( States are free to regulate all works that fall within scope of copyrights but are left unprotected because of their nature or form of expression (i.e. if they’re not “fixed.”) c. Nature of the Rights State Wants to Protect (General Scope/equivalency) ( If state seeks to protect rights that are “not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright,” the state’s law will not be preempted by Section 301. i. §301(b)(3) ( examples of “non-equivalent” right states could protect under CL or statute: breach of contract, breache of trust, invations of privacy, defamation, deceptive trade practices. ii. Extra Element Test: If other elements outside of the federal Copyright Act are required to constitute an infringement of State law, then no preemption will occur. . iii. Objectives Test: A state law will not be preempted if it serves different interests from copyright law. iv. Conflict Preemption: Whether compliance with both the federal and the state law is physically impossible or if the state law poses an obstacle to fulfilling the goals of Congress. d. Arguments for a single Federal System: i. Promote national uniformity ii. Help give a clear interpretation of “publication” iii. 301 will implement the “limited times” provision of the Constitution; no extensions iv. Need for effective international copyright relations e. Policy note ( If you can make a claim under 43(a), then you don’t have to worry about pre-emption. f. NBA v. Motorola – (SportsTrax pager); Court overturns NY law goes beyond “hot news” claims like those in INS v. AP. Once game fixed via broadcast, both broadcast and game itself satisfy subject matter requirement. For general scope, see if “extra-element test” is met. i. Central elements of “hot-news”claim: (1) Cost of gather info; (2) Time-sensitivity of info; (3) Free-riding on plaintiff; (4) Is competition direct; (5) If free-riding, would it create disincentive to continue service. Elements 1&4 are covered by fed copyright laws, but 2, 3 & 5 are extra elements that allow hot-news claim to survive preemption. ii. Court determined that in this instance, there is no direct competition, Motorola was NOT free riding, and can’t make act illegal on basis of possible future competition: iii. INS was not intended to prevent lack of product or service because of anticipated free-riding iv. Court didn’t want States regulating games that Congress had deliberately placed into the public domain.

g. Medical College v. Carey (MCAT questions) -- Relied on conflict preemption to conclude that a state law requiring disclosure of MCAT Q&As was preempted b/c it denied P who owned the copyright the benefits he would have received under the Copy Act. h. Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software -- Preempted state License Enforcement Law relating to the adaptation of computer programs via decomplilation, because it clearly “touched upon an are of federal copyright law. i. Bowers v. Baystate & ProCD v. Zeidenberg (Shrinkwrap licensing) – These licenses have recently been upheld because 1) a private contractual agreement supported by mutual consent and consideration and 2) the contract affected only the rights to the agreement and not the world at large. Thus, its “rights” were not equivalent to copyright, and therefore not preempted under 301(a). Shrinkwrap licenses can be used to restrict licenses in ways that are not contemplated by the Copy Act (i.e. could prohibit fair use or compulsory license; could prohibit resale.) i. NOTE: See text p. 563 for controversiy surrounding UCITA (Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act) – only adopted by MD and VA (originally part of UCC art. 2B, but ALI pulled out of project)

XVIII. Misappropriation a. Unfair competition ( common law doctrines to punish culpable behavior in the marketplace – equitable remedy that shouldn’t be read too broadly. b. Misappropriation – the intellectual property version of unjust enrichment. i. Π made a substantial effort to gather info w/ the expectation of commercial profits ii. ∆ has appropriated that info at comparatively little effort and made commercial use of it iii. Π has suffered economic harm – entitled to equitable relief c. NBA v. Motorola – (SportsTrax pager) 1976 © Act gave protection to simultaneously recorded broadcasts, but not the underlying games themselves. Since each party bearing own costs for collection and transmission, limited competition concerns, and NBA couldn’t show damage off free-riding, NBA’s claim for misappropriation was dismissed. d. International News Service v. Assoc. Press – ∆ would read AP’s WWI reports from the front, reword them and distribute on East Coast. AP didn’t claim copyright infringement, but relied on misappropriation and got injunction. Supreme Court found unfair competition – quasi-property right as between competitors. Holmes dissented, not recognizing any property right, but would have made INS disclose the AP as its source. e. Chicago Board of Trade v. Dow Jones – CBT had come up w/ its own index, but regulators made them use a well-known index. DJ offered them a license, but they refused and simply used a relabeled DJIA. The Ill. SC said this was misappropriation. DJ had spent time and effort coming up w/ its index and CBOT was reaping. Notice there isn’t direct competition here.

XIX. Right of Publicity a. State cause of action allowing a celebrity to enjoin the unauthorized commercial use of their personal attributes in a way that causes commercial damage to them. Personal attributes may include name, voice, signature, appearance, likeness, and personality. An economic right based upon unjust enrichment. b. Rights of publicity are transferable like property rights, may survive the life of the celebrity c. 1999 Astaire Celebrity Image Protection Act extended rights for deceased celebs in CA – concerns re: new digital technology (e.g. “morphing”). Will the statute stifle creativity? d. Clear first Amendment issues leads to balancing test. Right of publicity can only be maintined “if the proprietary interests at issue clearly outweigh value of free expression in this context” (Guglielmi). Draws upon fair use factor – “purpose and character of the use” i. Defendant’s use of the celebrity likeness: 1. Transformative character of the work: has it become the∆’s own expression? a. requires more than a trivial variation; must create something “his own.” b. Works of parody/distortions are protected 2. Was celebrity likeness raw material or sum & substance of the work? ii. Appropriation of plaintiff’s personal attributes to defendant’s commercial advantage 1. Was it a purely commercial speech or was it “inextricably entwined” with other expressive elements? 2. Does the marketability and economic value of the challenged work derive primarily from the fame of the celebrity depicted? Is the work likely to interfere with the economic interests of the celebrity? iii. Lack of consent by plaintiff iv. Injury to the plaintiff v. Exceptions that typically do not require consent: 1. News 2. Public Affairs 3. Sports broadcasts 4. Political campaigns e. Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc. (charcoal drawing; Three Stooges shirt) – A balancing test between the 1st Amendment and the right of publicity based on whether the work in question is transformed into something more than a mere celebrity likeness. No transformative elements here. Primary objective to create/exploit literal depiction of 3 Stooges and value derived from their fame. Court notes that not all reproductions are unprotected by 1st Amend (i.e. Warhol’s presentation of celebs as a social commentary. Awards profits plus attorneys fees. Cf. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing (painting of Tiger at the Master’was a collage and conveyed a message) f. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting (TV station had videotaped and broadcast entire human cannonball performance without consent). Station was liable because they had taken entire act. Cf. Cardtoons v. MLB (caricature cards; social commentary on public figures and non-interference with interests of celebrity). g. Dustin Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. ( Tootsie photo redone in LAM magazine featuring Hoffman’s head with body double dressed in new fashion; article featured similar shots of other celebs i. Commercial speech gets some 1st Amend. protection, but not as much as non-commercial. ii. Print article meant to draw attention nto for-profit magazine is not outside of First Amendment because it may sell copies. iii. Hoffman argues that ad used to sell clothing iv. Court says it’s not “pure commercial speech” – commercial aspects are “inextricably entwined” with expressive elements. 1. LAM did not receive consideration for featuring clothing in article 2. article didn’t advance a commercial message 3. article is a combination of photography, humor, and editorial comment

h. Other Commercial Uses of celebrity likenesses: i. Midler v. Ford Motor (use in television car commercial of sound-alike rendition of her song); distinctive and widely recognized voice of professional singer is protected attribute in right to publicity. ii. Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets (use of phrase “Here’s Johnny” in conjunction with “world’s foremost commodian). celebrity’s right to publicity is invaded whenever identity is intentionally appropriated for commercial purposes. iii. White v. Samsung (Vanna White robot case) 9th Circuit ruled that Vanna had common law right – robot attired to look like her next to game board recognizable as Wheel of Fortune set. iv. Wendt v. Host Int’l (Cheers robots). District court dismissed, but 9th circuit held likeness determination is an issue for jury. NOTE: actors didn’t have right to Cheers characters themselves, but they argued it was the physical likeness to actors that created value. Court also rejectd ∆’s argument that Π’s can’t claim right of publicity by relying on idncia of Cheers bar (property of Paramount). v. Courts have applied this doctrine to nicknames, professional statistical information, and distinctive racing cars.
Part IV - Patents

I. In General a. Patents available for inventions of applied technology, including machines, processes, and compositions of matter. b. Shorter term: Endure for 20 years following the date of application (since 6/8/95) i. NOTE: Used to be longer of: 17 years from issuance, or 20 years from application c. Grant the user the right to exclude others from making, using, selling, offering to sell, or importing the patented invention. d. Hardest form of IP protection to get. i. More than author ii. New – not already there iii. Non-obvious (something that somebody with ordinary skill in the art couldn’t have done) e. Protection is stronger ( Every use is infringement (including innocent infringer) i. No showing of confusion like TIM ii. No showing of copying like Copyright f. Patent Purposes i. Induce Innovation – 1. limited monopoly period for ROI 2. creates incentives design around patented technology ii. Induce Disclosure – exclusivity is costly to society; avoid deadweight loss problems 1. Innovator may be able to keep process secret, but Patent law requires disclosure 2. Quid pro Quo ( in exchange for disclosure you get protection 3. Solution to Arrow’s Paradox iii. Induce Commercialization – get it out to market before exclusivity expires iv. Creating incentives to bargain. A patent on an improvement is distinct from right to the technology that is being improved upon. If both underlying technology and improvement are patented by different people, need to get permission from both parties to use the improved version. Issues of blocking rights and cross licenses. Hopefully, this all leads to negotiations that lead to proper allocation of profits. Yeah, right. g. Social Costs of Patents: i. Copyright holds down costs – can make something functionally equivalent but doesn’t violate ii. Patent work is patented as to entire world – so there is limited monopoly iii. The only thing that will keep down prices is demand, completely different invention

II. The Application, Disclosure Requirements: § 112 – a. Requirements – PTO regs control what an app looks like, but statute requires three things be included (may be used as a defense to infringement if not included or poorly done). Contains basic information like name of the inventor and description of invention (including background information on field) i. Enablement - § 112 – the specification must enable anyone skilled in the art to make and use the claimed invention. ii. Best Mode – the app must set forth the best mode of achieving the invention known to the inventor. Don’t want inventor to conceal preferred embodiments of their inventions. iii. Written Description – distinct from enablement. Pinpoints exactly when applicant was “in possession of the invention.” Includes: (1) the claims, (2) specification (i.e. the dictionary), (3) the drawing, and (4) other stuff.

1. The Anatomy of a Claim 3 parts:

a. Preamble

b. Transition

i. Comprising (open)

ii. Consisting of (closed) iii. Consisting Essentially of (in between) 1. Body a. Central Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp. (no infringement because written description specification failed to show that the Π invented the sofa with the fold-down table). b. The Claims – Claims define the invention and it’s what you look at when you’re considering infringement - § 112. The patent application must close with one or more claims. i. Distinctiveness -- the claims must distinctly claim the subject matter the applicant regards as his invention.

ii. Independent vs. Dependent Claims 1. Dependent claims incorporate independent claims by reference, and then contain language which usually serves to limit it. 2. Independent claims inherently more risky because more broad and may be challenged for lack of novelty. iii. Core vs. Peripheral Claiming 1. Core: lays out the central insight of the invention, deferring the determination of which extensions of that insight infringe to the time when such a determination is necessary. 2. Peripheral: metes and bounds of invention are delineated. 3. Manifestation of tension between broad claiming and core protection ( NOTE: For infringement, an accused product must duplicate every structure in the specification, or use an equivalent of that exact structure. iv. Means + Function Claiming 1. Elements in a claim for combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a function. Extends reach of Patent to literally cover other embodiments, but it’s been read pretty narrowly. 2. Example: “Roller means for movement” covers more than wheels v. Terminology is technical 1. “comprising” is an open term ( anything with these features is infringing 2. “consisting of” is closed term ( this exact combination itself vi. Claim Survival ( No Blue Penciling. If the claim is invalidated, it is struck in its entirety, even if it could have been edited. However, remaining claims will survive even if one claim is struck. vii. Patent re-issue ( within first two years, you can get a broader claim if you realized you claimed too narrowly 1. People who started practicing invention during interim can continue the scope of what they are doing viii. Policy issue ( Claiming Difficulties: Operating at Inventive Edge 1. Might not know exactly why invention does what it does ( difficult to claim in useful way 2. Might not be vocabulary to deal with what the patent is doing ( Patentee can be her own lexicographer, but sometimes won’t do it accurately 3. Lots of play with dictionaries – NOT perfect notice; a. different dictionaries, and b. Dictionaries change. What is the time? Registration? Application? Time of the case? ix. Wand Factors: a. Quantity of experimentation

b. Amount of direction and guidance

c. Presence/absence of working examples

d. Nature of the invention

e. State of the prior art

f. Relative skill in those arts

g. Breadth of the claims

h. Predictability and the art

i. This is very important

ii. In general mechanical or electrical tended to be predictable

1. Usually less disclosure is necessary

iii. Other hand: biological or chemical more unpredictable small change can have a large impact on the properties function

iv. Wyeth: Here routine experimentation or the specification “provides a reasonable amount of guidance” regarding the direction of experimentation. Yet routine experimentation is not within the bounds. Here, the specification similarly discloses only a starting point for further iterative research in an unpredictable and poorly understood field. Synthesizing candidate com- pounds derived from sirolimus could, itself, require a complicated and lengthy series of experiments in synthetic organic chemistry.

1. PTO initially bears the burden of production, persuasion

III. Patent Prosecution – the process of getting a patent a. Inventorship – may be sole or joint under § 116. i. Bayh-Dole Act allows federally funded researchers to retain control over the patent rights to their inventions, but in exceptional circumstances government keeps them ii. Agencies can get “march-in” (licensing) rights when patentee not aggressively hunting for uses. b. Search of the prior art – to figure out if you should file c. Application is Classified according to its technical art, and assigned to an examining group. i. Examiner conducts search of prior art, then examines the app. ii. Office action sent to applicant explaining issuance or rejection. iii. Applicant may respond or may amend. iv. If unconvinced, a second office action (final rejection) may issue. v. Applicant can then abandoned or appealed. d. Publication - §122 – After 18 months’ pending, applications are to be promptly published. Disappointed patent applicants can no longer keep inventions as a trade secrets. i. if applying abroad, you CAN request secrecy . . . or at least a redacted version! e. Interference - §135 – Examiner finds that the application claims an invention that is the subject of another application or subject of a patent currently in force. If that happens, both parties must appear before the BPAI. Must prove dates of invention. Burden of Proof on applicant who filed later. Settlements filed with PTO. i. Strategy -- If you don’t win, next best outcome would be to prove that the invention isn’t Patentable at all, so that you (the loser) don’t become an automatic infringer. ii. Private Negotiations – Efficient, but can work contra the public interest. May eliminate incentive to put all the info on the table, which might invalidate the patent. Beware anti-competitive conduct. Must put private negotiations on the public record. iii. Use Pending Appeal -- Losing party can use while Patent pending or on appeal, but will have to pay royalties once PT issues. f. Amendment – File to amend for basic changes under §132. If more fundamental changes necessary, applicant may be required to split up the application and file separately under §121. Don’t have to give up the initial filing date if file a “divisional application”, §120. g. Reissue - § 251 & 252 – allows inventors to correct problems in issued patents. i. Reissue cannot enlarge the scope of the original patent unless it is applied for within 2 years of issuance. ii. Those who began to practice that new invention enjoy “intervening rights” – the right to continue usages that began before the reissue took place. iii. Post Waner-Jenkins, if you don’t reissue, you don’t get DoE. h. Reexamination - § 301 – 307 – third parties (Trolls) can request a reexamination by pointing to prior art that was not before the PTO during prosecution. If it finds this is valid prior art, the PTO will reopen the prosecution.

IV. The International Stage a. In most other countries, the first to file is always the first in right. That means no interference, no need to proves any dates, no need to corroborate, etc. b. The Paris Convention i. National Treatment Provision ii. Priority Right 1. Original filing date maintained as long as no more than 12 months have elapsed between the foreign and US filings. 2. foreign activities may be used to establish patent rights, but cannot be used to defeat the patent rights of another. See §102, especially, §102(g). But note §102(f) exception. c. GATT / TRIPS i. National Treatment Provision & Priority Right like the Paris Convention ii. Most-favored-nation treatment (MFN) ( Any time one member of the GATT enters into an agreement related to intellectual property with any other member, the advantages of the agreement are generalized to apply to all other signatories. iii. Universal Minimum Standards d. The Patent Cooperation Treaty (1970) ( crated International Application option

V. Patentable Subject Matter - § 101 a. Basic subject matter ( Any new and useful processes (method patents), machines, manufacture, or composition of matter. “Anything under the sun made by man,” i. NOTE laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas ii. Diamond v. Chakrabarty(new oil eating bacteria patentable if not in nature). iii. Funk Bros. (613n. 4a) ( no patent for culture of nitrogen fixing bacteria; no patent for artificially enhanced naturally occurring materials. 1. Cf. Merck v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. ( 613, n. 4a allowed patent on B12 isolated from cow liver. b. Processe Patents ( §102 definition is not helpful. “Something that promotes a physical change in nature” ( how farecan you take this in context of computer science i. Can you patent a new use for a known substance? Need incentives for medical testsing ii. Process vs. product ( Most people would rather have patent on product. Process can be used in secret. Harder to monitor uses. iii. Medical procedures ( amendment (§287(c)) says performing a medical procedure can’t be basis for monetary or injunctive relief against medical practitioner or health related care entity 1. Supreme Court has granted cert. in Labcorp v. Metabolite: Should Method to detect B12 deficiency be patentable? c. “utility patents” are described in §101 d. Design patents: §171 ( New, original, ornamental designs i. Not much used – requires examination ii. Design is usually “so over” by the time you get the patent iii. Commonly used for lab equipment, rarely for consumer goods e. Plant patents i. §161 – asexually produced plants ( originally only these could be patented ii. 7 U.S.C. §2321 – sexually reproduced plans (came after 161), administered by PTO f. Policy question ( Does patent pick up where copyright ends? i. Some copyright cases seem to think so ii. Is it conceivable for patent to do that? g. Policy Question ( How far up the pipeline should patents extend? i. Principles of nature don’t lie around – people must figure them out; Still problem of getting right level of incentives ii. Things vary from field to field iii. Subject matter has come back in a huge way in biotech and computer science industries h. Ideas vs. Embodiments ( Bell and Morse (606, n.1) i. Morse invented the telegraph ( Claim 8 (broadest claim: use of motor power of electromagnetism for marking character at any distance) is unpatentable; can’t patent principle of using electromagnetism ii. Bell telephones ( Claim 5 (transmitting vocal sounds through electrical formations) was patentable Embodiment, not principle iii. Difference was mostly linguistinc 1. Morse was an idiot – “I do not propose to limit myself” 2. Bell disguised it – electrical undulations iv. Scope of invention ( Morse didn’t invent telegraph – he invented the “repeater circuit,” but Bell actually invented the clear telephone by using direct current (direct undulation). Without Claim 5, Bell would have nothing

i. Utility § 101( must be operable & useful; non-speculative. The invention doesn’t have to be better than anything existing, just different. Forces inventor to wait to apply until can articulate concrete use – but it’s a pretty low standard. a. Operable: does the invention work

i. If it violates basic scientific principals it will be denied

ii. The PTO has burdened to doubt that the invention works

1. Applicant must come forward that it works

2. Operability usually does not come up

iii. Other tools out there could protect the public

1. FDA

2. FCC

a. Agencies

b. Beneficial: is the invention socially harmful

i. Courts and the PTO no longer want to determine morality

ii. Allow the agencies to fix that and states to regulate it

c. Practical: is the invention useful enough:

i. With this the situation typically arises when there is a race between two patents

1. Biological

2. Chemical

3. Whether the inventor came up with something that can be used by the public

a. Or something that will be licensed out

4. Maximize, by not requiring a use the public is not getting much

5. Harm to the public, others will not be able to do that experimentation

i. Fraud: Other agencies, such as the Federal Trade Commission and the Food and Drug Administration, are assigned the task of protecting consumers from fraud and deception in the sale of food products.

i. An invention is “useful” under section 101 if it is capable of providing some identifiable benefit.

j. 35 U.S. Code § 101: i. Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title. ii. In Diehr: the application was a previously unknown method for “molding raw, uncured synthetic rubber into cured precision products,” using a mathematical formula to complete some of its several steps by way of a computer. Here the application concerned itself with the law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection. The Court concluded that because the claim was not “an attempt to patent a mathematical formula, but rather [was] an industrial process for the molding of rubber products,” it fell within § 101’s patentable subject matter. iii. Prometheus: If a law of nature is not patentable, then neither is a process reciting a law of nature, unless that process has additional features that provide practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the law of nature itself. A pa- tent, for example, could not simply recite a law of nature and then add the instruction “apply the law.”

iv. State Street Bank v. Signature Financial (hub and spoke financial data system) – Patentability hinges on practical utility. Use of mathematical system to get to final share price is practical application. Useful and relied upon by regulatory authorities and in subsequent trades. Fact that the useful result was expressed in numbers was irrelevant. This case is the originator of business method patents

v. Brenner v. Mason (homologue of Manson’s steroid proven effective in mice) – Patent protection inappropriate for intermediate products; no social utility. 1. Denying patent encourages others to find use (questionable). Until use is shown, scope of patent cannot be determined. “Patent not a hunting license.” 2. Dissent: If unpatentable, people likely to keep processes secret until find use. Intermediate products allow scientists to take bigger steps leading to useful item. vi. Juicy Whip v. Orange Bang (upholding a patent on a juice dispenser even though it was set up to mix water and syrup in a manner that makes it appear to be dispensing a constituted beverage) 1. It’s not the PTO’s place to address moral issues/detrimental utility in patent cases. vii. Intro of Legislation for a Moratorium on the Patenting of Genetically Engineered Animals – 1. Stresses need to protect economic interests of farmers / researchers; Moratorium no longer in place. 2. Ethical concerns: Suffering to animals themselves and unbalanced ecosystem. 3. Note that even without PT protection, testing won’t stop – will simply become trade secret. 4. Patent encourages publication of research results and allows public to monitor side effects

k. Novelty and Statutory Bars– defined in § 102 (a), (e), and parts of (g). i. A person shall be entitled to a patent unless— 1. (a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or SB 2. (b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States. ii. Generally: The invention must be new – something more than an obvious improvement. 1. Operability is not required by the statute, but the Courts have read it in there. 2. The real issue: “Does prior art anticipate the claimed invention?” Novelty provisions charge the inventor with knowledge of the entire universe of prior art! iii. Standard for knowledge: NOT a standard of absolute new-ness 1. Known or use by others in US 2. Printed publication or patent in US or abroad

iv. Enablement – A reference cannot be anticipating unless it is enables someone skilled in the art to make and practice the invention. Speculative fiction or futurist predictions cannot serve as anticipation. 1. Gayler v. Wilder (fire safe) – Those who inherited it did not know how to recreate it; no dissemination nor enablement. Some level of “publicity” necessary. If knowledge not accessible to the public, it’s as if it never existed. Rediscovery of this “lost art” is Patentable because inventor confers benefit on public. Law promotes dissemination. Also note that safe had never been tested (operability issue). 2. Coffin v. Ogden (door lock w/reverse latch) – Invention must be “complete and capable of working.” Priority of lock clearly shown. Lock was tested and method explained to others. Prior knowledge and use by a single person is sufficient.

v. Publicly Accessible Test: 1. the length of time the display was exhibited, 2. the expertise of the target audience, 3. the existence (or lack thereof) of reasonable expectations that the material displayed would not be copied, and 4. the simplicity or ease with which the material displayed could have been copied. a. Case In Re Klopfenstein: Only after considering and balancing these factors can we determine whether or not the Liu reference was sufficiently publicly accessible to be a “printed publication” under § 102(b). i. In this case, the appellants took no measures to protect the information they displayed—nor did the professional norms under which they were displaying their information entitle them to a reasonable expectation that their display would not be copied. There was no disclaimer discouraging copying, and any viewer was free to take notes from the Liu reference or even to photograph it outright.

vi. The Every Element Test -- requires that all of the elements and limitations of the claim are found within a single prior reference. “That which infringes, if later, would anticipate, if earlier.” 1. Ranges -- A range might not anticipate a precise determination; might be a non-obvious improvement. Search costs are too high. Range would not tell scientist about characteristics at different levels, so should not require scientists to read that reference first. a. Cf. Titanium Metals (titanium alloys containing 0.25% molybdenum and 0.75% nickel anticipates references which claimed alloys containing 0.2-0.4% moly and 0.6-0.9% nickel) i. Here, the Russian article was printed five years before the application and its "prior art" status is certain. An expert witness affidavit in the instant case shows without question that claims 1 and 2 were interpreted from the alloys revealed in the Russian article and are fully anticipated. The Court seems to have misinterpreted the law to permit a patent because the applicants disclosed many things that cannot be learned from reading the Russian article, such as the alloys' good corrosion resistance. 2. Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation v. Genetech, Inc. (clotting factor) – The 4 Corners Test. Harris’ dissertation alone did not appear to cover Scripps’ invention; needed to clarify with other sources. Summary judgment not appropriate.

vii. Inherency – Prior art will anticipate if it necessarily contain the inherent element. Mere probability not enough. 1. In re Cruciferous Sprout Litigation (growing and eating sprouts to decrease cancer) – Prior art may anticipate when the claim limitation not expressly found in that reference are nonetheless inherent in it. Bassica has simply recognized inherent characteristics of sprouts – they have not invented anything new. Seed selection process preempted by cookbooks (I don’t get this). 2. Elan Pharmaceuticals v. Mayo Foundation (recipe for mice w/ Alzheimer’s) – Prior art contained some “recipe” that could have been used to produce the same kind of mice, but did not recognize it. Court held that the reference was not anticipatory (but the decision was later vacated for other reasons). Criticisms: This would encourage new uses/features, but all of a sudden, prior art becomes infringing. Ramifications might screw up marketplace. Further, it allows an inventor to acquire successive periods of exclusivity – first on original and then on other inherent features.

. viii. Patent Novelty Concept vs. Copyright 1. Inventions are fungible – unlike ©, Coexistence won’t do. Two inventors would drive price down to marginal cost, and ROI would be limited. 2. Search Model – Ratio between the cost of searching prior art to learn a particular invention vs. cost of starting from scratch. Much easier to search Patent than ©; info better indexed. Because search costs lower, PT penalty for not searching is higher (complete exclusion).

VI. Non-Obviousness & Originality a. 35 U.S.C.§103(a) (pre-AIA): i. A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negative by the manner in which the invention was made. b. 35 U.S.C.§ 103(a) (current): i. A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.

c. Non-Obviousness - § 103(a) – The invention sought to be patented must not have been obvious to a Person having ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made. i. Much like novelty, references must be found and dated, adequacy of dissemination determined, and contents of the art scrutinized. ii. The patent examiner has the burden of showing a prima facie case of obviousness, and then the burden shift to the applicant to say otherwise.

d. The Graham Framework to determine Obviousness: i. Determine the scope and content of the prior art ii. Ascertain the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue iii. Determine the level of ordinary skill in the art iv. Determine obviousness, maybe using secondary considerations/objective factors 1. Commercial success 2. Long felt but unmet need 3. Failure of others a. Case St. Jude Medical: The court was not persuaded by the fact of ACI’s argument that by combining the teachings of Takayasu and Smiley. ACI points to Takayasu and Smiley, arguing that achieving hemostasis in blood vessels was a known problem in the art. But we note that Takayasu and Smiley both teach the same thing to overcome this problem: inserting an object into a wound to help achieve hemostasis. Here it would have been obvious of one with the ordinary skill and art in the area to do such a thing. But ACI failed to explain why it would have been obvious to do so. Certainly the balloon in Smiley is not used to position a plug as claimed, and ACI provides no evidence that a balloon had ever been so used. Nor does ACI explain why common sense would lead one of ordinary skill in the art to abandon the noninvasive x-ray and ultra- sound technology in favor of an invasive, inflatable balloon. e. Analogous Art: i. is the reference from the same field of endeavor? ii. if not, is the reference reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved? 1. Case In Re Clay: A reference is reasonably pertinent if, even though it may be in a different field from that of the inventor’s endeavor, it is one which, because of the matter with which it deals, logically would have commended itself to an inventor’s attention in considering his problem. a. If a reference disclosure has the same purpose as the claimed invention, the reference relates to the same problem, and that fact supports use of that reference in an obviousness rejection. An inventor may well have been motivated to consider the reference when making his invention. If it is directed to a different purpose, the inventor would accordingly have had less motivation or occasion to consider it.

f. Three Distinction between Non-Obviousness (§103) and Novel i. Multiple references may be used ii. No Inherency. Unlike novelty, element of interest must be specifically pointed out iii. Limited Field of Reference: “Within the field of the inventor’s endeavor” or “Reasonably pertinent to the particular problem.” 1. Secondary considerations – court has indicated that several secondary factors may indicate inventiveness. Be sure to consider whether there is a nexus between invention and these factors. a. Commercial success b. Unexpected Results c. Copying d. Failure of others e. Long-felt and unmet needs f. Praise from experts g. Acquiescence and licensing g. Teaching away – Less likely to be obvious when prior art actually discourages what the inventor has done. Adams (wet batteries). h. Motivation to Combine – In recent years, the Fed Circuit has required evidence of a teaching, motivation, or suggestion to select and combine the references as evidence of obviousness. However, PTO bears burden of showing why applicant would have combined; can’t simply say “common sense.” Lee (combined video display device and help program) i. Obvious-to-try – Has long been held not to constitute obviousness. Rather, the question is whether there was a reasonable expectation of success. If there were many approaches along the way (many pitfalls), the successful outcome will be deemed nonobvious.

j. Originality (aka Derivation) - § 102(f) – Prevents a patent from issuing to an applicant who did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented. If an individual derived the invention from another (secretly or not), it creates prior art for obviousness determinations, and no patent will result. i. Foreign Knowledge – can be used to defeat a patent under 102(f), but not under §102 (a) or (g)!! ii. Increased Litigation Costs – need more time and $$ to investigate both public and private sources of information iii. 102(f)/103 rejections ( Covers art communicated to inventor by another. Don’t’ have to communicate full substance; communicate enough to make it obvious! 1. §103(c) ( solves some problem by restricting 102(f) to information from stranger. Allows communication w/in same company iv. 102(e)/103 combination ( things in the pipeline (applications file but not released) 1. everything in the patent counts as prior art that can make another invention obvious 2. NOTE: 18 months until everything in applications becomes public v. 102(g)/103 combination ( trade secrets 1. even if trade secret is not the same thing, it makes later application obvious 2. this results in screwing the later inventor, but not really benefiting the prior inventor vi. Secret Arts Problems ( not in pipeline to ever becoming public, and Not in actual use 1. Costs to system ( if nobody can get patent, won’t bring forth invention 2. Destabilizing ( investor won’t know what researchers have been sold 3. “Chinese walls” w/o 103(c) Research groups would stop telling each other information

k. Graham v. John Deere (plow that doesn’t break) – Test: (1) Evaluate scope of claimed invention and prior art. (2) Determine if differences would be obvious to someone skilled in the art. (3) You then look at secondary indicia like commercial success, failure of others, long-felt need, etc. Here, Person of ordinary skill would have known to invert the shank and hinge plate.

l. Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc. (Water flush system to remove cow crap) – Technique has been around forever, just ask Hercules. Simply using old elements in the same way (gravity). No change in functions of the elements combined. Yes, it’s cheaper and faster, but not new or different!

m. In re Dillon (tetra-orthoester compounds in fuel to reduce soot emissions) – Structural similarities between tri- and tetra-orthoesters. Prior art created reasonable expectation that they would behave similarly in fuel -- motivation for creation. Relevant prior art is broad, either “within the field of the inventor’s endeavor” or “reasonably pertinent to the particular problem.” i. Court does not want P to remove from public an obvious variant of prior art. ii. Dissent: No prior art suggesting link between water stuff and soot reduction. Dillon takes nothing from the public domain, and court would rather err on the side of PT because they want to be sure this thing gets commercialized.

n. OddzOn Products v. Just Toys, Inc. (Vortex tossing ball) – 102(f) creates prior art for obviousness determinations. “Subject matter derived from another is unpatentable in itself, and when combined with other prior art, may make resulting obvious invention unpatentable to the party under combination of 102(f) and 103.”

VII. Priority of Invention

a. NOTE: Every other country gives priority on “first to file basis.” Policy ( US maintains it’s conception-driven model because of our respect for the small inventor. We don’t want to rush to public if not ready, but a strict first to invent rule might deter translation from idea to reality. Requiring diligence from the time another inventor enters the race is a good proxy for cost-effective diligence. b. Accessibility by Geography - § 102(a) – an invention known or used in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country before the invention date thereof by the applicant, may not be patented. c. Known or used. Requires some type of public knowledge of first invention before second is rejected. i. Could a reasonable researcher have found the publication? Was it indexed? Abstracted? Marked Confidential? Limited Distribution? ii. Not cost effective to search for all uses (Gayler v. Odgen) d. Dating Invention i. Step #1: Does the effective date (date the public received benefit of the prior art) of the reference precede the critical date (assumed from the outset of §102a to be the filing date). If prior art is found from an earlier time, must move to Step #2. ii. Step #2: To be anticipatory, must ask whether the effective date of the prior art predates the date of actual invention, not just the filing date! Applicant may be able to “swear behind” his filing date. Must either show reduction to practice on a date preceding the reference, or conception + due diligence. See § 102(g): 1. Conception – the mental act of invention; most valued. A definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention as it is to be applied in practice. Must include every feature of the invention, but need not be operable. Inventors must prove conception date w/ models, documentation, and third party testimony 2. Reduction to practice – Constructive: a determination that the invention would work for its intended purpose; filing an application with the PTO requires this. Actual reduction to practice is the construction of a working model. 3. Diligence – continuous and reasonable efforts toward the reduction to practice. An inventor who is first to conceive, but last to reduce to practice, will be entitled to priority by showing reasonable diligence. Only one party’s diligence matters: the inventor who was first to conceive, but last to reduce. iii. SUM: The first to reduce and practice wins, unless the second to reduce to practice can prove earlier conception AND diligence (constructive reduction to practice) iv. Acceptable reasons for delay in dilligence 1. “reasonable everyday problems and limitations” of inventor including: related applications, illness, responsibility to family, etc. 2. Neither Convenience nor commercial development are acceptable excuses for delay.

v. Griffith v. Kanamaru (Cornell Prof. waiting for graduate student & outside funding) – Reasonable diligence balances rewarding invention vs. public’s interest in earliest possible disclosure. 1. Cornell Prof. working on other stuff, grant writing, and waiting for grad students is not an excuse for 3-month gap in diligence over a summer 2. If universities want the benefits of the system – they must be players

e. Private Invention May be Prior Art Unless Abandoned / Suppressed - § 102(g) i. A completely private invention made in this country (ONLY) may serve as prior art to prevent a new patent under § 102(g) unless it has been suppressed, abandoned, etc. Note that a trade secret will serve as suppression. 1. Unlike §102(a), requires proof of continued use; not publicity. 2. Cf. Mason v. Hepburn (clip gun) – Mason built gun earlier but hid it away, only to reveal it after he heard Hepburn had come up with the same thing. Hepburn won because Mason had suppressed court hates folks who keep stuff secret. f. Secret knowledge in the Pipeline may also be Prior Art – § 102(e) i. The effective date of an issued patent is the filing date. If secret art (that will eventually result in a disclosed patent) has been placed into the pipeline prior to your application, your invention will be deemed to have been anticipated. ii. Most applications are published 18 months after filing – so you won’t know you’re in the clear until 18 months later. §102(e) expressly limited to US patent applications.

VIII. Statutory Bars to Patents Issuing – § 102

a. Public use - § 102(b) – denies a patent where the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, or in public use or on sale in this country for more than one year prior to the date of application. Intended to encourage inventors to apply for patents and to punish them for enjoying exclusive benefits in the invention for more than the statutory term. Even a limited use that results in negligible exposure to the public counts. i. Policy: incentives them to publish then to file, in general incentives them to file faster

ii. Exceptions— 1. Disclosures made 1 year or less before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.— A disclosure made 1 year or less before the effective filing date of a claimed invention shall not be prior art to the claimed invention under subsection (a)(1) if— a. the disclosure was made by the inventor or joint inventor or by another who obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor; or b. the subject matter disclosed had, before such disclosure, been publicly disclosed by the inventor or a joint inventor or another who obtained the subject matter disclosed directly or indirectly from the inventor or a joint inventor. iii. Non-informing Public Uses – Patents were actually granted on methods that had been used for longer that the statutory period. How? Theory was that the products did not publicly reveal the process through which they were made. 1. Gillman (quilt puffing machine); W.L. Gore (method for stretching teflon). NOTE: odd b/c 102(b) usually ignores enablement issues. Those who were selling the products at the time all of a sudden became infringers. iv. Dating. Unlike novelty, the critical date for §102(b) is one year preceding the date of application. “swear behind” that one-year limit, or you’ll get bounced. v. Informing vs. Non-informing Distinction. If informing and inventor knows that information has begun to disseminate, he must apply for his patent within 1 year. If non-informing, inventor has not been warned, and will not be penalized for delaying his PTO application. vi. Egbert v. Lippman (Barnes presented corset as a gift to woman who eventually becomes his wife) 1. Not necessary that more than one article be publicly used, or more than 1 person know. 2. Need not be seen publicly if hidden part of a greater product in public use – some things are capable of being used only where they cannot be seen. 3. Complete, not being used for experimentation, imposed no restriction on its use. 4. He’d slept on his rights for 11 years, and had in effect abandoned the invention to the public.

vii. Experimental use defense to 102(b)( applicant could claim that he was experimenting 1. (1) the necessity for public testing, 2. (2) the amount of control over the experiment retained by the inventor, 3. (3) the nature of the invention, 4. (4) the length of the test period, 5. (5) whether payment was made, 6. (6) whether there was a secrecy obligation, 7. (7) whether records of the experiment were kept, 8. (8) who conducted the experiment, 9. (9) the degree of commercial exploitation during testing, 10. (10) whether the invention reasonably requires evaluation under actual conditions of use, 11. (11) whether testing was systematically performed, 12. (12) whether the inventor continually monitored the invention during testing, and 13. (13) the nature of contacts made with potential customers. a. Elizabeth vs. Nicholson ( invents new type of pavement. Lays it before a tollway for over a year. invention is in public, but he needed to have it out there to test durability

b. On sale Bar Test – § 102(b) – patent barred if invention is placed on sale in the U.S. by anyone more than one year before the patent application. Any sale or offer, even if private, and even if not eventually sold, will bar. i. Offers to sell the patent rights don’t count, only offers to sell the thing itself or commercial embodiments of the thing itself. ii. Pfaff v. Wells Electronics (Texas Instruments ask guy for invention) – does the on-sale bar apply to inventions that aren’t reduced to practice? Test: 1. Product must be the subject of a commercial offer for sale, and 2. the invention must be ready for patenting – (a) the invention is either already reduced to practice, or (b) there are drawings or other plans sufficiently detailed to allow someone skill in the art to make it.

c. Abandonment – § 102(c) – bars a patent where patentee has abandoned the patent. Only used when inventor intentionally surrender to the public. Rarely used because abandonment will typically trigger §102(b), and section (c) is more onerous provision because does not provide a grace period. NOTE: Section 102(c) is concerned with abandoning right to a patent; §102(g) is about abandoning the invention. i. MacBeth-Evan Glass vs. GE (glass making; employee quit and sold secret to GE) – MacBeth’s use of invention without the benefit of patent indicated intent to abandon to the public domain. You can choose either patent or trade secret, but not both!

d. Delayed U.S. filing – § 102(d) – bars when: (1) when an inventor files a foreign application more than 12 months before a U.S. application, and (2) a foreign issuance prior to the U.S. filing date. Want to encourage prompt US filing. Used infrequently because of patent office delays.

IX. Infringement – § 271(a) – a question of fact. a. If someone uses, sells, etc. any of the things that are specified in the claims of a patent, then there is infringement. b. Policy Question: should pioneer patents get broader protection against infringement? i. E.g., First guy to invent microwave gets broad range; Guy who invents turn table or defrost button gets narrow range ii. first inventor has hardest time drafting; doesn’t know range or impact of technology. Breadth helps to catch later inventions 1. Bell ( invented the phone, but not the particular phone everybody wanted to sue. W/o broad claim, he would have nothing iii. In support of narrower patents: encourage competitive devleopments 1. Don’t want somebody controlling the market 2. Concern about upstream patent 3. Give them nobel prizes, but not broad patents iv. Intermediate point ( give broad patent but develop strong defenses to infringement to allow utilization 1. In copyright: “thin copyrights” allow others to utilize creativity for particular purposes, compulsory licenses §107 – 122 (broadens “fair use”_ 2. Patents don’t have an equivalent of fair use; P. 831, note g ( attempts by Congress to enact some analogous patent laws 3. Common law limits to infringement have developed. Do they go far enough??

c. General Rule ( Infringement is analog of anticipation: i. Something that would b w/in equivalence later should anticipate if earlier ii. Something that would anticipate earlier is really in equivalence later

d. Broader definition of infringement than other IP i. Copyright – extrinsic evidence ii. TM – confusion, dilustion iii. Infringement is not so broad in patent

e. Literal infringement – when the accused technology embodies each and every limitation of the claim. Two steps: i. Interpret claims – Responsibility of Judge. 1. Markman (pre-trial) hearings may be necessary. 2. Use expert testimony to resolve ambiguous claims. 3. Examine docs and oral prosecution history to evaluate intent of Patentee. ii. Compare claims and “accused device” – Determine whether the accused device possesses every element of the claimed invention.

f. Direct Infringement: Accused infringer does one of the prohibitive events accused device or process meets the claimed invention i. All limitations rule: applies equally in infringement, assume we have the claim 1. Both types of infringement, the infringer must have intent or knowledge of the infringement in contrast to direct infringement, you are liable no matter the intent

g. Infringement under the doctrine of equivalents – prevents others from making similar inventions with narrow differences that exist simply to avoid the claims of other patents. If an accused infringement presents unsubstantial differences from the claimed invention, then infringement exists.

i. Limitations to doctrine of equivalence: 1. The every elements test – Each claim isn’t considered holistically, but element by element. a. for each element somebody could substitute an equivalent b. Must show that all elements are present A or A’ must be there c. If you get same result w/o all elements, then you’ve done something really new and are outside the patent d. See Pennwalt (court held that there was no infringement under DoE b/c the accused fruit sorting device did not have an equivalent to the patented invention’s progress tracker.)

2. All Limitations Rule: a. doctrine of equivalence must be applied to each element of the claim i. Purpose of this is to prove that each element in a claim, there could be a material part infringed upon, could be considered an equivalent ii. Invention of the whole problem is we run the risk of capturing too much infringing activity iii. Does the invention as a whole perform the same function, sure 1. Focus on each element it helps us not to run risk b. Did not want to assert it they may have invalidated themselves i. Devalues the patent and pushes people toward trade secret and lack of disclosure ii. Opt for trade secrecy iii. Other side is that, encourages inventors, where the limitation ends, create uncertainty

3. Disclosure Dedication rule: when a patent applicant discloses but decline to give the subject that declines subject matter is given to the public a. Claim narrow disclose broad i. Claims are trying to serve this notice function, here is what my rights are ii. Claim A, read the patent, talks about X Y and Z, only claims X, y and z are public iii. For the patent then you bring y and z back in even though 1. Issue: weak examination or a fraud on the public iv. Some claims are good results, no claim narrow disclose broadly approach

4. Prosecution history or “File Wrapper” estoppel ( Inventor held to what she said to PTO: a. If you claim something during prosecution for (almost) any reason, it’s yours! b. BUT Festo ( you’re still entitled to scope of equivalence after amendments; it’s just not that broad i. Warner-Jenkins seemed to only apply estoppel to required amendments to avoid prior art ii. every “non-cosmetic” amendment must now be examined to determine whether it bars use of the DoE no matter what its basis and irrespective of whether the amendment was required by the PTO or was purely voluntary. iii. Amendment does NOT surrender subject matter if: 1. equivalent was unforeseeable at time of application 2. rationale for amendment bears no more than a tangential relation to equivalent in question 3. some other reason to think patentee could not reasonable have been expected to describe insubstantial substitute in quesiton iv. Festo doctrine of equivalence ( limitations of language to describe technical materials v. No matter how much you knew about the future still wouldn’t be able to provide really good explanation of what you’re patenting; takes more than 20 min. to put together Ikea desk. c. Extent of territory yielded ( Nothing specifically relinquished can be recovered

d. Post-Festo Estoppel test i. Did amendment narrow the scope of claim? ii. If yes, was it substantially related to patentability? 1. presumption that it was related (If no reason found in prosecution) 2. opportunity to rebut presumption w/ expert testimony and extrinsic evidence that a. equivalent was unforeseeable b. bore tangential relationship to equivalent c. limits of language or “some other reason” for amendment 5. Non-obviousness – Patentee cannot use DoE to stretch the patent to encompass activity that would have been considered obvious at the time he made his invention. 6. Other factors – Substantiality of the differences. Inventive activity vs. Pure copying. ii. Policy Issues ( encouraging innovation 1. If you hold strictly, the patent becomes recipe for infringement. This will discourage innovation by increasing risk 2. If you make the line fuzzier, maybe people will take inventive resources to “leap frog” over the invention (more innovation) 3. Policy Goal #1 ( Attempt to find way to limit the extent to which you make doctrine of equivalence functionally equivalent to central claiming (Warner Jenkinson and Festo) 4. Policy goal #2 ( prevent inventor form losing out because of after-acquired technology – worried about substitutions that don’t go to heart of invention that patentee couldn’t claim in the first place iii. Warner-Jenkins v. Hilton Davis (dye impurity removal process in pH 6.0-9.0) – Initially claimed pH > 9.0, but altered to 6.0-9.0 during Patent prosecution to distinguish from anther Patent. Test of equivalence is one of insubstantial differences. Intent immaterial. 1. Doctrine must be applied to each element of Patent, not device as a whole. 2. Test for insubstantial differences: (1) getting the same function in the same way (Graver), (2) copying, (3) interchangeability, and (4) (non-)obviousness. 3. Prosecution history estoppel discussion. See defenses below.

h. Indirect Infringement – there must also always be a direct infringement by someone else i. Unlike direct infringement, which does not require knowledge of the patent or any intent to infringe, indirect infringement can only arise when the accused indirect infringer has at least some knowledge and intent regarding the patent and the infringement. 1. Active inducement – § 271(b) – when one knowingly encourages another to infringe or aids in that infringement. Usually selling components w/ instructions for making infringing combination 2. Contributory infringement – § 271 (c) – usually selling a material part of the invention to the direct infringer. Typically, the part is especially made for the invention and the maker knows of the patent and the infringer’s intended use. May not be a staple/commodity article. See Sony rationales from copyright..

X. Non-Statutory Defenses to Infringement – any of the requirements for patentability may be a defense – but there are others include:

a. Experimental use – is not a public use. If a use is not commercial and is intended to make sure the product works for its intended purpose, it is experimental. NOTE: courts have generally refused to give market research the benefit of this exception. i. Factors. Look at the totality of the circumstances, including: 1. Number of prototypes 2. Duration of testing 3. Attention to records during testing 4. Existence of confidentiality arrangement 5. Receipt of commercial advantage by patentee 6. Control over testing by inventor 7. Tailoring of testing to specific features of invention 8. Whether the testing could have been carried out privately ii. City of Elizabeth v. American Pavement Co. (wooden pavement) – Inventor granted PT even though installation occurred way before PT application submitted. Use was public, but necessary to test durability. Not voluntarily allowing others to generally reproduce/sell it. Invention kept under inventor’s control, and inventor retained title to patent. [NOTE: is this NOT an infringement case, but the concept is the same] iii. Madey v. Duke University (Madey moved laser (FEL) lab from Stanford to Duke then gets fired; Madey sole owner of 2 patents used by lab) – Distinction between experimenting “on” a PT invention (permissible) and experimenting “with” an invention (impermissible). Use is disqualified from the defense if it is in furtherance of the legitimate business of the alleged infringer, and not solely for philosophical interest. The profit/non-profit status of the user is not determinative. Duke’s research projects further University business: faculty participation, increase school status, and lures students/grants.

b. Inequitable conduct may lead to

i. Effect of rendering the patent unenforceable

ii. One single claim results from inequitable conduct

c. Exhaustion:

i. Once a patentee sells a patented item the buyer is allowed to make use and sell that item

ii. The patentee has exhausted those rights and can no longer enforce

iii. Though, the purchase product needs to be authorized

iv. Using the patented invention

d. Repair:

i. Allowed to repair and fine line repairing and remaking it

1. Line is not clear

2. Federal circuit,

3. Drill bits wearing down and they were re-tipped

4. Does not allow you to make another one

e. Drug Data Preparation Safe Harbor

i. 271e1: more general extends to new drugs as well

1. Type of experimental use, patent act provides that patented invention is reasonably related to gather data seeking FDA approval

2. Purpose to expedite generic drugs near the end of the patent term

3. Allowed people to get a head start

4. Statutory prior use defense it is broadly narrowed to pharmaceutical drug

f. Prior Use Rights:

i. Bilsky Case

ii. AIA changed this, applies to all fields of invention

1. AIA, greatly expanded it

2. More than one year the application was filed you are grandfathered in

3. Using more than one year

4. Obvious, answer is no

5. Secret prior use not invalidating, infringing

g. First Sale Doctrine – the article passes without monopoly i. Adams v. Burke (license for sale of patented coffin lid for 10-mile radius with Boston at center) – After sale, the patented object is open to the use of the purchaser without further restriction. Here, seller could only sell in Boston, but buyer could use coffin wherever he’d like! ii. NOTE: Common law exceptions that have swallowed the rule 1. Malincrot v. Medi-part, 24 uspq2d 1173 (1992) – patent apparatus for delivering aerosol mist to nose. Can said “for single use only” a. Federal Cir – health reason to not allow refills b. Patentees put limitations on the embodiments they sell and court upholds them (e.g., restrict reuse and resale) 2. Some circuits have stuck harder to first sale doctrine

h. Reverse Doctrine of Equivalents – Sometimes one can copy the claims exactly, but because the invention functions differently (or better!), there is no infringement. Used infrequently. Some say this would provide some incentive to make important improvements without having to wrestle with blocking rights. i. Boyden Power-Brake Co. v. Westinghouse (air brake for train) – Original device described well, but unable to execute – air not released fast enough. Accused device managed to pull it off, and the court said that it was patentable because it was utilizing different insight.

i. First Inventor Defense – also known as a prior user right. For business methods, if reduced to practice at least 1 year before the filing date (and can show commercial use), you’re home free. j. Inequitable conduct – If the applicant wasn’t candid (especially w/ known prior art) in the application. The intentional failure to disclose relevant prior art or other misdeeds will make a patent unenforceable. Need: i. material info, AND ii. intent to deceive

k. Double patenting – Filing duplicative applications as to the same invention, the app should be rejected. If application wasn’t rejected, ∆ in infringement suit can bring up issue. BUT blocking patents OK: i. Special Equipment v. Coe (patents portion of his pear-prep machine to prevent others from making similar stuff) – Court said “blocking” is OK. Grant of patent not conditioned upon use. That’s why we have limited patent terms, so public will get access to it after patent expires. 1. Dissent: Inconsistent with policy of promoting the progress of science. We don’t want inventors sitting on important inventions, especially good/important ones.

l. Prosecution History Estoppel – see Doctrine of Equivalents above. m. Estoppel – if the patentee lets the infringer believe that he won’t enforce, the infringer relies, and suffers from the reliance n. Shop rights – a right of the employer to a non-exclusive, royalty-free, nontransferable license to make and use the invention. Only applies when inventions are made by employees hired for other purposes, but who wind up developing stuff through the use of the employer’s facilities. o. Laches – when the patentee’s delay in bringing suit was unreasonable and the alleged infringer suffered material prejudice because of the delay. p. Patent Misuse – when the patent holder impermissibly broadens the scope of his patent with an anticompetitive effect. Typically seen with: i. tying to another product ii. post-patent royalties iii. package with licenses not to deal iv. price restraints.

XI. Extraterritoriality – A US patent provides exclusivity only within the US, but . . . a. Selling Abroad -- §271(f) – Recognizing the importance of foreign sales to the patentee’s overall ROI, §271(f) does not permit a manufacturer to sell a disassembled device overseas so that the purchaser can simply recreate it. b. Manufacture Abroad -- §271(g) – Products made with patented processes are considered infringing, even when manufacture occurs abroad ( prevents imports from infringers abroad

XII. Remedies – §284: “adequate to compensate”

a. Injunctions - § 283 – temporary and permanent injunctions; courts have become more sensitive to the public-interest side of things i. Problems: 1. Cant’s compensate for back damages 2. Increase social costs when patentee can’t keep up with demand or simply refuses to allow other to do so 3. Patent Trolls – Companies, not actively engaged in D’s business, whose business it is to look for patents that are arguably being infringed and then to file suits, mainly with the idea of securing settlements. Injunction gives troll bargaining power b/c injunction harms D without really benefiting troll. Litigation has been proposed to change this. b. Damages - § 284 – reasonable royalty is the minimum. Damages can be (up to) triple in the cases of willful infringement. No recovery before infringer had notice of PT (PT# is constructive notice) and no recovery for infringements that are more than 6 years old at the time of filing. i. Reasonable Royalty – courts look at what a person would be (or would have been) willing to pay for a license and still make a reasonable profit. Factors to Consider: (i) royalties currently received by PTee, (ii) rates paid by infringer for other similar patents, (iii) the owner’s licensing policy, (iv) commercial relationship b/t the owner and infringer, (v)duration of the patent and length of the license, (vi) the profitability and commercial success of the infringement, (vii) industry custom, (viii) expert testimony, (ix) the portion of the profit that should be credited to the invention alone, etc. Georgia Pacific v. US Plywood

ii. Lost Profits – owner must show (1) “but for” causation or (2) show causation by establishing that infringer should have reasonably foreseen how infringement would have caused the loss. Rite-Hite v. Kelley. Two schools of thought here: 1. Maximize patentee return. Put patentee in same position as if there was no infringement. Increase incentive to invent. 2. patentee can only recover in its current markets. Reduces flexibility but strong incentive to bring product to all possible markets. a. Should base include substitute technologies? Complementary products? Maybe only when patented invention and related item form “functional unit”? b. Pre-infringement data can be used, but must be adjusted for changes in the market, 3. NOTE: Rite-Hite v. Kelley Compan, Inc. ( Can get damages even for item you don’t use. patentee had invented new way to stabilize trucks when stopped and unloading, incorporated into manual truck stop, but chose not to do automatic truck stop, so as not to compete with its other stop. ∆ argues that patentee didn’t suffer any damages, because he’s not using patent for automatic truck stop a. Dissent: deny damages, policy should encourage people to bring products to market.

iii. Attorney’s Fee – As with TM and ©, only in exceptional circumstances, §285. Fees and prejudgment interest necessary to make Patentee whole, and to deter infringement. iv. Prejudgment interest ( value of money lost up until judgment is paid (lots of money because of longer litigation period. Patentee doesn’t get interest if he’s causing delay v. Trebble damages ( incentive not to infringe. Only when you can show willfulness 1. What counts as willful? What is the evidentiary standard? 2. Blackberry ( gets hundreds of C&D’s. How can they keep track of all of them and tell which are legit. c. Declaratory Relief -- “Genuine case” requirement i. D’s conduct must have produced a reasonable apprehension of suit ii. P must have produced or be prepared to product the device d. Exclusion Orders – can prevent importation of infringing articles, as long as industry exists or making reasonable efforts to establish i. Unlawful importation 19 USC 1337 (tariff Act provision) - Covers all IP – exception applies mostly in patents ii. Example: Burn beds to rotate victims were not being made in US, so court denies injunction. RU 486 not being sold in US e. Standing – Only those with exclusive right to practice the invention get standing

XIII. Design Patents – § 171 – Patents for new and original designs for an article of manufacture. A design patent protects ornamentation w/o protecting function.. a. A design patent is infringed if, from the vantage point of a typical purchaser, the infringing design seems substantially the same – similar to © protection. Only 14 year protection. b. Boat Hulls – Since 1998, boat hulls have had their own statutory scheme. Reason to believe that Congress is using this protection to test the waters for devising better protection for other functional designs. c. Criticisms of Design Patent Process – Often, design patent will issue after popularity of design has peaked. Non-obviousness is very subjective when it comes to ornamentation.

XIV. Federal Preemption -- State laws are preempted by the patent laws under the Supremacy Clause

a. Federal / State Preemption i. Field preemption ( when Congress so thoroughly occupies a legislative field that it is reasonable to assume that Congress left no room for the states to supplement it ii. Explicit Preemption ( Any legal or equitable rights under state law equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright iii. Conflict Preemption ( State laws are preempted by the Supremacy Clause if they stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress in enacting a patent statute

b. Sui Generis Legislation (like the FL statute in Bonito & the Semiconductor Chip Act) i. Advantages 1. Can combine copyright and patent to conform to industry needs 2. Better account of public access interests ii. Disadvantages 1. Difficult to design and implement 2. Tough to ensure global protection iii. Bonito Boats v. Thundercraft (boat hulls) – Boat hulls weren’t copyrightable b/c they were functional objects, and not patentable b/c didn’t meet non-obviousness standards! Therefore, should have been in public domain. FL law outlawed mold copying forever – in effect, scooping up boat hulls from the public domain and placing them under private control again. Supreme Court declared that federal IP laws preempted such state law. 1. Don’t want states favoring home industries. 2. Congress responded by passing boat hull law as part of DMCA iv. Sears Roebuck v. Stiffel (pole lamp) – Sears purchased unauthorized copies of the lamp and came in with a very competitive price. SC said that federal law had determined that the lamp was ineligible for patent protection, and thus in the public domain. State law could not interfere with that determination and alter the incentives to invent/compete as set forth by Congress. v. Cf. Kewanee Oil v. Bicron (state protection for trade secrets no preempted) 1. Unlike the items in Bonito and Sears, trade secrets were never in the public domain in the first place. 2. Trade Secret law provides weaker protection than patent law. 3. Trade secrets protect some non-economical interests outside of the patent sphere (e.g. privacy).

c. Federal / Federal Preemption i. the same innovation cannot be protected by more than one of the following (TM, © or Patent). ii. Application of Yardley (Spiro Agnew watch) – PTO said no patent because picture was already copyrighted, but CCPA saw no problem with using 2 modes of exclusive protection. iii. Singer Manufacturing v. June Manufacturing (sewing machine patents) – As the patent was about to expire, Singer put in for ® for the name/shape of their machines. They seem to have gotten the ®, but Supreme Court did not allow them to enforce it. The Court thought that ® protection for a formerly patented article would impermissibly extend the term, preventing the public from enjoying free access. NOT completely overruled by Traffix.
Part IV – Trade Secrets and Unfair Competition

I. Trade Secrets – any information that can be used in business that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an economic advantage over others. a. "Trade secret" UTSA§1(4): means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that: b. (1) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and c. (2) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.

d. Policy: i. encourage innovation/discovery ii. promote/maintain commercial ethics iii. avoid inefficiencies

e. cause of action against those who acquire a trade secret by ‘improper means’. This includes the use or disclosure of a secret obtained by (i) breach of confidence, (ii) abuse of a confidential relationship, or (iii) by accident or mistake f. Protection exists as long as the secret is kept from being known widely i. if the information becomes common knowledge in an industry, then it’s not protected. ii. Trade secrets “expire” when reverse engineered.

g. Two main factors determine trade secret status: i. Secrecy ( Courts will look at the measures taken to keep the information secret. The question is whether the measures takes were reasonable under the circumstances. Limitations to access are good indicators of secrecy. ii. Value – the information must be sufficiently valuable to afford an actual or potential economic advantage over others. Can be shown by 1. direct evidence 2. willingness of other to pay for the info 3. accused infringers decision to resort to bad faith methods to acquire it. a. CDI: The court reasoned that CDI did nothing show that any of the information in this case actually was a trade secret, i.e., information that has economic value by virtue of having been kept secret and that cannot be “ascertained by proper means. Further the potential customers for CDI and West River are in an area where they are easily identifiable, locally operating, oil filed companies. Information about these companies would be easily obtainable, if not already known, by relevant actors in the local oilfield service and equipment industry. Also, the record shows little effort by CDI to conceal data as trade secrets, and the defendants’ affidavits contest CDI’s assertions regarding those efforts.

h. Reverse engineering: is the process by which a completed process is systematically broken down into its component parts to discover the properties of the product with the goal of gaining the expertise to reproduce the product. i. Cemen Tech: This means that the defendants were able to look at and diagnosed each part of CTI’s machine in which enabled them to make their own machine. Despite this argument by the defendant the CTI, brought in an expert whom explained that even a trained and experienced engineer would not have been able to make and cement machine like CTI’s within 6 months unless one had access to CTI’s proprietary information of their machine. If this is taken as true CTI may still have a trade secret claim. (Argument Against)

II. Improper means of acquiring a trade secret include: theft, fraud, unauthorized interception of communications, inducement of or unauthorized participation in a breach of confidence, and other means wrongful in themselves or wrongful under the circumstances. (Independent research is OK, espionage is not.) The two main improprieties:

a. Breach of a confidential relationship – If ∆ owed a duty of confidentiality to owner (Π), and ∆ used or disclosed information, then there’s a cause of action. Such relationships arise through employment and other business relationships.

i. Reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy: 1. indicate value 2. institutional allocation – company can hide secrets better than courts (economic question) a. DuPont v. Christopher ( Dupont trade secret for making Methane. Built machinery, then walls, then roof. Somebody took arial photos before roof built roof. Court held process of covering machinery would be too expensive 3. secrecy procedures Provide notice to employees that certain stuff is not transportable

ii. PepsiCo v. Redmond (Quaker wants to hire away Redmond from Pepsi, but he’s signed a Confidentiality agreement that prevents him from making use of confidential information) – Redmond, a senior manager, had access to all kinds of confidential info. Court held disclosure was inevitable. Redmond could not help but rely on/disclose his old knowledge, and was enjoined from taking new job to prevent breach of K. Lower court did not abuse their discretion by considering Redmond’s lack of truthfulness w/ Pepsi and Uzzi’s unnatural affinity for hiring ex-Pepsi folks. iii. NOTE: Harder cases involve negative information: Somebody goes to anther company and does things different, and original employer says he learned negative information (things not to pursue)

b. Improper means of acquisition – any means that fall below the generally accepted standards of business morality and reasonable conduct. c. "Misappropriation" means: i. acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means; or ii. disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied consent by a person who 1. used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; or 2. at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that his knowledge of the trade secret was a. derived from or through a person who had utilized improper means to acquire it; b. acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or c. derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the person seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or 3. before a material change of his [or her] position, knew or had reason to know that it was a trade secret and that knowledge of it had been acquired by accident or mistake. a. See Dupont v. Christopher (Airplane taking pictures of ethanol plant) b. Proper means include: independent discovery, reverse engineering, observation of item in public use or display, or from published literature. c. Here the Christophers deliberately flew over the DuPont plant to get pictures of a process which DuPont had attempted to keep secret. The Christophers delivered their pictures to a third party who was certainly aware of the means by which they had been acquired and who may be planning to use the information contained therein to manufacture methanol by the DuPont process. The third party has a right to use this process only if he obtains this knowledge through his own research efforts, but thus far all information indicates that the third party has gained this knowledge solely by taking it from DuPont at a time when DuPont was making reasonable efforts to preserve its secrecy. d. In general, liability for trade secret misappropriation: in the employment context re- quires proof of both the existence of a trade secret as well as unauthorized disclosure or use of the secret in breach of a duty of confidence.

III. Covenants not to Compete (not in CA!!) a. Courts will enforce to protect “commercial morality” and encourage invention b. balance against worker mobility. c. Generally, courts look to reasonableness of terms. i. Value of the employee’s wage “package” should compensate for lost job opportunities. ii. BUT did the employee have negotiating power? Did he even understand the clause? d. The modern, prevailing common law-standard of reasonableness for employee agreements not to compete applies a three-pronged test. A restraint is reasonable only if it: i. (1) is no greater than is required for the protection of the legitimate interest of the employer, ii. (2) does not impose undue hardship on the employee, and iii. (3) is not injurious to the public 1. BDO Seidman: Despite this part of the restrictive covenant the time constraint appears to represent a reasonably brief interlude to enable the firm to replace the client relationship and goodwill defendant was permitted to acquire with some of its clients. Defendant is free to compete immediately for new business in any market and, if the overbroad provisions of the covenant are struck, to retain his personal clients and those clients of BDO’s that he had not served to any significant extent while employed at the firm.

e. NOTE: CA doesn’t enforce covenants not to compete ( some say that’s why Silicon Valley is in CA (replaced Route 128 in Boston) i. Omega Optical: Here the plaintiff was found to have “no internal policies concerning confidentiality, nondisclosure or non- competition.” The trial court found that an open atmosphere prevailed in which employees were encouraged to share information about the development and production of filters. (Argument Against)

IV. Remedies –Damages are awarded as the greater of either the loss suffered by owner, or gain by thief. Injunctions and damage awards are to be decided equitably. a. Economic Espionage Act – criminalizes violations of trade secrecy law (harsher penalties for giving secrets to foreign countries. Liability may run not only to the individual misappropriating the trade secrets, but also to the organizations that employ them i. Enacted in lull between cold war and war on terror ii. Unemployed spies would move to private sector and look for industrial secrets iii. Extraterritorial effect – people can use information in their own country according to local law and still violate US law iv. Case of Japanese clients who use information they had learned at Cleveland clinic. b. Types of Money Damages: i. Actual damages ii. Disgorgement iii. Reasonable royalty iv. Attorney fees v. Exemplary damages

c. Right to Know Laws – compromise trade secrets in order to keep the environment and the workplace safe. OSHA, for example, requires disclosure of some secret information. Government not allowed to reuse data if reasonable expectations of confidentiality; otherwise it’s an unconstitutional taking. Monsanto.

d. Injunctive relief ( how long? i. permanent injunctions – never use secrets again. takes one competitor out ii. injunction until information becomes public ( people begin to worry that this is too long iii. Reasonable time; experiments ( How long would secrets have lasted? Inaccurate 1. (a) Actual or threatened misappropriation may be enjoined. Upon application to the court an injunction shall be terminated when the trade secret has ceased to exist, but the injunction may be continued for an 2. additional reasonable period of time in order to eliminate commercial advantage that otherwise would be derived from the misappropriation.

3. (b) In exceptional circumstances, an injunction may condition future use upon payment of a reasonable 4. royalty for no longer than the period of time for which use could have been prohibited. Exceptional 5. circumstances include, but are not limited to, a material and prejudicial change of position prior to acquiring knowledge or reason to know of misappropriation that renders a prohibitive injunction inequitable. a. It is a well settled tenet that in order to prevail on a motion for a preliminary injunction, the movant has the burden of demonstrating b. (1) a likelihood of ultimate success on the merits, c. (2) irreparable injury absent the granting of the preliminary injunction, and d. (3) that a balancing of equities favors the movant’s position. Viewed within this frame- work, we find that it was an abuse of discretion to grant the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction.

V. Three Problems with Trade Secrecy a. Monitoring – who knows when party is using it in secret b. ROI Time -- some products hard to invent but easy to reverse engineer c. Reluctance to enforce rights – don’t want to disclose secret information at trial

VI. Economic Costs of trade secrets vs. Other IP a. Can’t build on inventions. People waste resources reinventing the wheel b. Health and safety problems ( state doesn’t know what you’re doing c. Disrupts Employment market ( i. Restricts employment opportunities (can’t go to work for competitors) ii. End up misusing talents iii. Keeps salaries down (no competing offers) iv. Increased risks for those w/ seasoned employees 1. Computer Assoc v. Altai (406, n.6) ( arnie goes from CA to Altai and miraculously creates computer program that had taken CA long time to figure out. v. Slows technological development ( transferring information is slowed (employee movement is best way for information to travel, e.g. visiting professors)

VII. Reasons most states have trade secret law a. Otherwise people keep real secrets: tie employees more tightly b. Gives ability to share information with bankers regulators, etc. in order to secure loans/ivestors c. Guarantees legal recourse in case of leaks

VIII. Is trade secret law pre-empted? a. 102(g) ( very secret information can still prevent patents b. Court has retreated from stark position -. P. 906 (described in case on 918) i. Kiwani ( disloyal employee brings method for growing crystals to competitor 1. OH trade secrecy law was brought 2. Court says enforcement of trade secret isn’t pre-empted: anybody would could get a patent would get it c. Trade secrecy preemption is still viable notion i. notion that people get patents whenever they can is questionable. ii. only way to get benefit of public distribution is through disclosure and patent system iii. sui generis legislation aimed at particular information: CA sound recording law 1. BUT state boat hull laws struck down.