Philosophical Analysis 1 The invisibility cloak has long held a place in the minds of people as an object to be desired in times of social anxiety. Recently, scientists have translated the concept from the pages of fantasy novels to play a part in a psychological experiment - one which provides a subject with virtual reality (VR) goggles that craft an illusion of one’s body being invisible. When asked to stand before a small crowd, those experiencing the mental illusion of invisibility reported “lower heart rates and stress levels” in comparison to when the VR system gave the subjects a physical body (Sample 2015). Further studies plan to examine whether this “sensation of invisibility” would influence one’s moral decisions (Sample 2015). The main philosophical perspectives, however, each predict their own evaluation of decision-making in the face of ethics. As Schafer-Landau details, from the viewpoint of a normative subjectivist, whether an invisible person chooses to act rightfully or not depends solely on the person’s approval of the action. In such a situation, if one were to commit a crime, whether the crime is ethically good or bad is simply at the mercy of the person’s judgement - which could vary once he or she attains invisibility. One may perceive robbing a bank as primarily morally bad, but once invisible, external factors such as reputation and punishment are erased, leading to a readjustment in moral assessment: “Robbing a bank isn’t wrong, it won’t put a dent in the bank’s financial well-being compared to robbing a corner store.” And this perspective would prove right, for it is right in the mind of the invisible person. When a meta-ethical subjectivist theorizes, the reevaluation of morals becomes not a judgement with truth or false to it, but rather, a simple, pleasurable expression of emotion: “I feel as though robbing a bank is not morally