CONMETA Midterm Qs

This exam tests your knowledge of the topics we have covered so far. It also tests your ability to construct plausible arguments for or against a particular metaphysical view.
GOD
1. Suppose that you’re sympathetic to Anselm’s ontological argument. How would you reply to charge that the concept of the being that than which nothing greater can be conceived, like the concept of the largest natural number, is incoherent? 2. Some philosophers have raised problems for defenders of the cosmological argument. Particularly they have showed three ways to resist the premise that if the universe is contingent, it must have a cause. One option is to show that the universe is eternal. Another is to show that, given what our current science tells us, the universe might be contingent yet uncaused. And finally, show that the universe is indeed contingent and is caused, the causal chain involves a loop. Suppose that you’re a defender of the cosmological argument. Show that at least one of these options do not work to shoe that it is false that if the universe is contingent, it must have a cause.
WHAT ARE WE? 1. Suppose that you’re a constitutionalist. How would you address the issue of whether the animal that constitutes you is (self-)conscious? Recall that there is a dilemma her: if you were to deny that the animal that constitutes you is not conscious, you would then have to account for how mental states depend on the physical going-ons in the animal’s brain; if you were to accept that the animal is conscious, on the other hand, you would then have to admit that there could be two conscious beings in your shoes: viz., you and the animal. To answer this, you have to resist the dilemma. 2. Suppose that you’re a dualist. How would you reply to the charge of over-determination? Dualism implies that you are a non-physical substance whose non-physical mental states might sufficiently cause some physical effects (e.g. my desire to drink coffee is what caused me to buy coffee). But if we were to hold that our world is a causally closed system (i.e. all physical effects are sufficiently explained in term of physical causes) and, at the same time, admit that non-physical causes cause physical ones, then we would end up with two independent sufficient causes causing some given effect (i.e. a case of over-determination of causes). Your task is to make a consistent causal story for dualism without succumbing to a form of over-determination.

EXISTENCE 1. Suppose that you’re a property theorist. Is the belief that there are non-existent objects a natural consequence of your view? You have two options here. Either your view implies it or not. Your task is to justify your position. 2. True negative existentials, like “Sherlock Holmes does not exist”, is a problem for both the quantifier view and the property view of existence. Staying neutral on the matter, assess the solutions of both views. Show the positive traits of each solution; show also where each fails. Finally, decide which solution fares better.
MODALITY AND POSSIBLE WORLDS 1. Lewisian modal realism employs two general arguments to support its commitment to the existence of worlds. One is the argument from Quinean ontological commitment, and the other is the argument from the best possible explanation for modality. Suppose that you’re against the modal realism. Show that at least one of these arguments is problematic. 2. Consider the view that modal concepts are primitive: there is no nonmodal way to account for modal concepts (i.e. a reductive theory of modality is not possible). Call the view modalism. How would you argue for this view?