Free Essay

Russian Foreign Policy in Central Asia Since 2001: Assessing the Successes and Failures

In: Other Topics

Submitted By analomtadze
Words 7007
Pages 29
Russian Foreign Policy in Central Asia since 2013: Assessing the successes and failures
Generally it is assumed that Russian foreign policy in Central Asia has been characterized by “neo-imperialism”. Yet this is statement is only partially true considering the fact that Moscow’s policies within its “sphere of influence” have not be static, and have been characterized by sweeping modifications. Since the breakup of Soviet Union, Russian policy in Central Asia has gone through drastic transformations and its influence in the region has varied over time. At present, Russian authority in Central Asia is weakening, yet the Kremlin continues to utilize number of political, institutional and economic strategies to prolong its presence there. Multilateral as well as Bilateral arrangements, and economic and energy leverages combined with cultural instructions are widely implemented in order to maintain Russian influence in Central Asia. Considering the fact that states in the region most importantly though not solely Kazakhstan, have begun to search for diversification and partnership with other great powers, they have gained a certain degree of independence from Moscow. Besides, in recent years China has emerged in Central Asia as an important rival to Russia in terms of influence, and has already established multiple agreements and investments with all of the states in the region. The degree of independence that Central Asian states have managed to gain due to their conviction to act separately from Moscow and to grab Western opportunities, as well as the Chinese presence in the region, suggest that Russian influence there is decreasing and will continue to do so in the near future.
Russia has not lost its ambition to remain the main player in Central Asia, which is seen as a priority for its regional security, and besides the opposition both from the regional states and the comparably new competition from China, it is understood that Moscow will not be able to implement policies that will stop the current developments, and that in the context of vanishing Russian strategic influence in the energy, economic and political spheres, they are unavoidable. Russia’s revived determination to pursue “post-imperial” objectives is still evident in the region, even though the “game” is at this point being played with more caution. The Kremlin’s position in the region continues to be imply that operates according to this logic, and is represented through various soft power instruments employed in Central Asia. This essay considers economic, political, institutional and cultural projects that Russia implements in the region, and assesses its successes and failures accordingly.

CENTRAL ASIA: overview of the region

Central Asia is comprised of five moderately similar states. They are ruled by totalitarian leaders, although the degree of autocracy differs from one another. All of them struggle with severe corruption, lack of democracy, drug-trafficking and politically weak society. It is also important to mention that all five states have distinct foreign policies which are reflected in their actions. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to some extent pursue isolationist policies, while Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan embrace multilateral and diversified foreign outlooks. Although the West has revealed its interest in the region on several occasions, none of the five states have displayed especially Western positioning, possibly due to erratic Western involvement, as well as Western states’ criticisms of the anti-democratic policies employed by the various Central Asian governments. In this context, China is seen as a better choice for partnership since it places minimal emphasis on the kinds of regimes established in the states. On the other hand, anti-Western sympathies in the region characterize both Chinese and Russian interests in Central Asia. This common ground has facilitated the establishment of various multilateral institutions where both leading players have worked diplomatically. Nevertheless, this has resulted in Moscow’s declining influence in the region.
After the break-up of the Soviet Union, the Russian position in Central Asia varied from total lack of interest to relative rhetorical involvement. As a result of Moscow’s absence during this critical period, faith in Moscow’s support was lost among the states, as was its influence. The terrorist attacks of 2001 in the USA have since revived US interest in the region. After “9/11”, the United States has sought military bases in the region, and this was mostly approved by the Central Asian states, as well as by Russia. For the US, dealing with the perceived Taliban threat became a priority for national security, and the Central Asian states, which are geographically situated “in the backyard” of the regions in which the Taliban were most active, were seen as necessary partners in combating such threats. The US therefore successfully gained access to the Manas base in Kyrgyzstan, and to an air base in Uzbekistan that was in close proximity to the Afghan border. Fearing that America would replace Russia as the sole major power in the region, Moscow then began to dedicate great effort to renewing its authority. Its policy of indifference, which was implemented soon after 1991 and which saw diminishing Russian importance in the region, was soon to be changed. Since 9/11, Russia has increased economic links with the Central Asian states, not only in terms of energy cooperation. It has also pushed to promote cultural and linguistic education that would re-establish the Russian-Central Asian connection. Moreover, it has played an important role as an external actor in the politics of the region, by supporting different authoritarian regimes through financial and military assistance. Therefore, since 2001, Russian policy towards Central Asia has been characterized by post-imperial goals, yet its efforts have not always met with positive outcomes due to the unavoidable overall waning of its power.
Russian interests in the region, besides the unrealistic dream of creating the Eurasian Union, in which Moscow would coordinate and manage its “little brother” states, are various. First of all, control over the Central Asia improves Russia’s geopolitical position and also brings vast economic benefits due to the region’s large energy reserves as well as the energy transport routes. Central Asia’s energy resources are critical instruments for Moscow’s trade partnership with Europe – the leading importer of Russian gas and oil. For instance, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan sell their gas to Russia at $100 per 1,000 m3 , which is then sold to European countries at the price of $250 per 1,000 m3. Thus, the favourable relationship with the region that enables Moscow to purchase resources below the market price directly reflects on the Russian economy and its position in the international arena. Moreover, influence in Central Asia will improve Russia’s position as a great international power, a status that it has lost. On the other hand, the region represents potential security threats for Russia itself, which it must regulate. Drug trafficking and the presence of Islamic extremism just across its borders pose a real threat to Russia’s security. However, this same reason is usually cited to justify unnecessary Kremlin policies, and in many cases such risks are over exaggerated and even virtual.
For Russia, the US is not the main competitor in the region, since Western ideas of democracy at this point are discordant with the governmental ideals of Central Asian states, and neither the US nor other Western states are inclined to get too involved with the region if democratic ideas are not at least pushed forward by their governments. Realizing this, states in the region remain separated from the West while simultaneously being more disposed toward Russia. Unlike the dismissed Western threat, which might be temporary but does not provide a case for total dismissal, China does pose a serious danger to Russian dominance, yet alignment with China is the only choice left to the Kremlin if it wants to counter Western authority globally. Besides, Moscow does not possess enough leverage to resist Chinese presence in Central Asia, neither with respect to China itself nor in light of the region’s willingness to engage with China. Therefore, the Kremlin cannot use forceful or military policies that might otherwise bring about a quick revival of its influence, but instead has to implement soft power strategies in order to retain its status in the region. Although each of the states have expressed their preparedness to cooperate with both the West and China on various projects, none of them have indicated a complete ignorance of Russia’s significance.

Political Influence

Kyrgyzstan:

The most apparent proclamation of political influence that Russia has exerted was seen in Kyrgyzstan during the events of 2010. The Kremlin was not impressed by President Kurmanbek Bakiev’s policies, and indirectly pushed for regime change in Kyrgyzstan. Firstly, it was dissatisfied by Bakiev’s stance regarding the US base at Manas; secondly, the president’s son was in charge of the economic process in the country, which at some points went contrary to Russian objectives. Russia has used both economic and political tactics to achieve its goals. It increased the fuel duty on petrol and cancelled various banking contracts, which directly affected the economy of the country and caused social discontent with regard to the government. Moreover, it has used several media sources to reveal corruption taking place in the country, which further intensified the turbulence within the population. When it was already apparent that pro-Russian leader, Roza Otunbaeva, was in charge of the provisional government, Moscow instantly supported her with financial assistance that amounted to 1.5 million tonnes of grain and offered $50 million aid to counter the unrest. As expected, after being appointed on her position, Roza Otunbaeva visited Moscow and expressed Kyrgyzstan’s loyalty to Russia. Although in the case of Kyrgyzstan, Moscow has had a certain degree of success due to its persistent policies, its success is not final. The fact that Kyrgyzstani businesses continued to supply visiting American forces irritated leaders in the Kremlin and eventually led to GazpromNeft to impede oil transfer to them. It was clear to Moscow that Russia was not accepted as the only great power in the country, and even though Kyrgyzstan remained Russia’s leading loyal partner in the region, it still pursued a multi-vector foreign policy that would consider US relationships in its calculations.

Turkmenistan:

For Turkmenistan Russia provides security with regard to confrontations with Iran and Uzbekistan, which automatically provides Moscow with some influence there. But this has not changed Ashgabad’s stance in relationship to Moscow significantly. Russia also tried to revive its influence in Turkmenistan in 2006, yet the outcome of its policies did not bring the latter country under its sphere of influence as it had hoped. For President Sparmurat Niyazov’s funeral, Russian high-ranking officials were sent to Turkmenistan, some of whom intended to sign long-term economic deals with leading businesses in the country. Gazprom CEO Alezei Miller was one of them, and was willing to pursue discussions of the arrangements for gas transfers with the new Turkmenistan government officials. Again, with Turkmenistan Moscow’s strategies have met with partial success. Although Turkmenistan adheres to an isolationist foreign policy, especially in relation to the US and other Western-oriented states, it has cooperated with them on various occasions, which went against Russian interests. President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow has proclaimed the country’s openness and reduced isolationism. It has negotiated with European Union to arrange gas export deals in 2011, and these negotiations were positively evaluated by both sides. Although for Turkmenistan the EU’s significance is limited, the fact that it welcomed a Western organization implies that Moscow’s role is also only partial in the country. Ashgabad understands that for the Kremlin, its energy reserves and transit routes are important and that the Russia will likely reassert its power in the country, yet President Berdimuhamedow is not willing to abandon its isolationist policy completely in regard with Russia. Besides Kyrgyzstan, and, to a lesser extent,Turkmenistan, the political leverage for Russia in Central Asia is reduced.

Kazakhstan:

Kazakhstan is the leading actor in the region. Since the collapse of the USSR, it has pursued policies that have aligned with, though not been limited to, Russian interests. It is apparent that Russia possess a significant degree of influence on the country, which is balanced by the country’s ambition to stay independent. President Nursultan Nazarbaev is approved by leaders in the Kremlin, even though he continues to cooperate with other non-Russian states as well. Astana has a full grasp of the Russian position, and understands that it should not be seen as a potential sole partner due to its unreliability. In this context, Kazakhstan remains independent of the Kremlin’s directives, but also embraces various strategies to satisfy the latter. The relationship between Astana and the Kremlin is thus a steady one, in which both play safe; Kazakhstan tries to remain considerate of Russian interests, while Russia controls its ambitions and does not impose its authority to an extent that would aggravate tension with officials in Astana.
A large number of ethnic Russians live in Kazakhstan, some even pursuing political careers in the country. Even one of the leading parties, Fair Kazakhstan, is seen as a pro-Russian party, but its loyalty remains more with the Kazakh government. This has given Moscow important power to affect the decisions of the government, yet the use of such leverage has remained restrained, since Russia would not want relationships to become strained between the two. Astana accepts that pro-Russian cultural and political movements are present in the country yet the fact that they remain moderate helps the relationship to remain peaceful. In the face of Kazakhstan’s multi-vectored foreign policy and independence, it is unrealistic that Russia will be able to reestablish its “great neighbour” influence in the country.

Uzbekistan:

Moscow’s relationship with Uzbekistan also suggests a decline in the Russian position. As the West critically assessed government’s use of force during the Andijon clash of 2005, Uzbek leaders sought support from their counterparts in Moscow. Expressing Russia’s willingness to cooperate, president Islam Karimov welcomed Russian forces onto Uzbek soil by giving them access to the military base within the framework of the Allied Relations Treaty. He also joined the Russian-initiated organization of the Eurasian Economic Community and the CSTO. Yet this relationship is questionable, as from 2006, Karimov had demonstrated that he wanted to collaborate with the West. Besides, on several occasions, Russo-Uzbek relations were strained by the irreconcilability of their views regarding security with those imposed by the CSTO. For Uzbekistan, Russia is not a reliable partner, but a strong neighbour that is willing to exert power in the country, something that independent Uzbekistan is not going to accept. Russian strategies are not dominant, neither among the officials nor among the population, who recognise Moscow’s diminished power and averted ambitions in the region.

Tajikistan:

Even though President Emomali Rakmon has tried to avoid Russian dominance in his country, Tajikistan’s weak financial position and security concerns over drug trafficking have increased its vulnerability. On the other hand, similarly to other Central Asian states, Tajikistan also began welcoming Western investments in the country in 2001, yet these proved inconsistent, which reduced Tajik faith in foreign cooperation. This suggests that many of the developments depend on the events that take inside the country and the extent to which the West will express its real interest in the country. In the case of substantial genuine interest, Tajikistan might be willing to reject Russian involvement and consequently diversify its connections.

Multilateral Institutions: CSTO; EEC; CU

As mentioned above, Russia uses several multilateral organizations in order to extend its power in the region. Although at some points it proves successful, many of its outcomes are controversial and usually do not achieve the anticipated success. Russian-led institutions certainly add validity to the presence of Russia in the region as supervisor, but apart from that, progress is diminished.
The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan out of the Central Asian states, is one such organization. Joining the CSTO assumes that its members are prohibited from joining any other military organizations such as its Western equivalent, NATO: “ Russia regards the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) as one of the key elements of the modern security system in the post-Soviet space. The task of transforming the CSTO into a universal international organization capable of counteracting current challenges and threats under the growing pressure of diverse global and regional factors in the area of its responsibility and the adjoining regions remains relevant”. The CSTO has so far failed to fulfil its duties and its employment has been limited to a small number of joint military exercises and agreements. It even failed to mediate in the Osh clashes of 2010 in Kyrgyzstan, which strongly affected its legitimacy. The fact that the army assembled within the framework of the CSTO consists mostly of Russian military forces suggests that it is primarily a solely Russian-led project to which member states submit in order to please Moscow, and that its impact as a tool for regaining power for Russia remains low. In 2012, Uzbekistan even tried to withdraw from the CSTO, quoting divergent Afghan policies, yet the real reason for this attempt was seen as Uzbek’s desire to liberate itself from Kremlin control.
Moscow has also tried to expand economic dependence through institutions that were originaly intended to facilitate the creation of the Eurasian Economic Community, which only includes only Kazakhstan of the Central Asian states. It aimed to establish common tariffs and control of subsidies provided under political and economic requirements. Its dissolution was proposed as its members were concentrated on the development of the Eurasian Economic Union, which would be an offshoot of the Customs Union. The EEU project, unlike to EurAsEc, is seen to be more determined to achieve its goals. With stricter regulations and decrees attached to the project, it aims to establish strong policies for the regulation of foreign companies. Although the EEU might be well structured, it is unlikely to increase Russian influence in the region. For Kazakhstan, the Customs Union is not seen as an organization to which it aspires, but rather as one that it has to join in order to continue “balancing” its policies with those of Russia. For Kyrgyzstan, which is largely reliant on Chinese trade, Moscow decided tariffs might not prove compatible or alluring at all. Along with Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan is concerned with the extensive leverage exerted upon it by Russia, and would prefer to abstain from joining.
Moreover, joining the Customs Union would require the member states to satisfy certain economic conditions, and considering the fact that only Kazakhstan is strong enough in these terms, realization of the project will be difficult.
Another important multilateral organization in the region is Schangai Cooperation or SCO, which is a joint project of Moscow and Beijing. This organization aims to take control over terrorism, separatism, extremism and economy. Its members include Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan along with its major contributors, China and Russia. Although used as a counterweight to the influences of the US and the West, the emergence of the SCO has caused a great amount of power to be taken away from Russia. China managed to establish quick connection with the states in the region which are involved in extensive trading with the country. Its attempt to show the international arena that a Sino-Russian alliance could affect Western domination has backfired: “Chinese influence is growing and some say that soon Central Asia can become Central Eastern Asia, with final disintegration of post-Soviet space, total collapse of Russian power”. More facts regarding this development are discussed in the Economy section below.
Furthermore, the multi-vectored policy of the Central Asian states is also revealed by examining the institutional preferences of the organizations. While Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan cooperated with NATO within the agenda of The Partnership for Peace programme(PfP) they were also members of the CSTO. Both are military organizations, yet incorporate conflicting ideas and strategies. This again implies that although Russian-led institutions bring a certain degree of integration, they are unable to suppress the region’s interest in the West, and that at points, Western influence replaces that of Russia.
Each of the organizations is different in terms of its initiatives and structures, yet all display evidence of the same underlying Russian purpose. CSTO is seen as a counter-organization to NATO, emphasizing military cooperation, while EurAsEc resembled the EU, with an emphasis on economic regulations. It can be concluded that these organizations established by the Kremlin were aimed at the integration of Central Asian states under Russian control, while resisting Western dominance.

Economy: Energy sector

The Russian influence in terms of energy resources and transit routes in Central Asia has been significant since the break-up of the Soviet Union. But recent developments in the face of rising Chinese power have reduced Russian influence in the region. As the USSR collapsed, pipeline routes crossing Russian territories gave Moscow the ability to impact the energy policies of the other states, and, moreover, to acquire resources at low prices. The trend has changed since then, and the Central Asian states have managed to influence many of the decisions in this sector, on occasion contradicting the Kremlin’s preferences. The shift that is apparent suggests that Russia has lost its monopolistic possession of the region’s energy resources.
This trend is apparent if we look at the recent transit routes, which were adopted contrary with Russian preferences. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum and China-Turkmenistan pipelines have undermined Russian ambitions to preserve their gas and oil transit route hegemony. As separate projects, these three routes evade Russian territory and carry energy resources from Central Asia to the West independently.
Nevertheless, the long history of energy presence in the region suggests that even today Moscow retains a considerable influence over the energy in all of the states of Central Asia. The leading oil pipeline in Kazakhstan is controlled by Russia, and it has also managed to exploit a greater number of energy resources within the framework of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, which has been proposed by Moscow over the Kazakh-Caspian Transportation system, as well as the trans-Caspian oil pipeline that would be linked with Baku-Tbilisi Ceyhan, and would consequently decrease Russian influence. Kazakhstan and Russia came into conflict regarding the latter’s cooperation with foreign energy organizations in 2005; Moscow did not wait for the relationship to be extended, and cancelled its agreements with Kazakhstan’s energy company, KazMunaiGaz, claiming that Astana was acting against Russian interests while collaborating with its direct competitor in the market.
Kazakhstan, along with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, is a major energy-rich country of Central Asia, with which Moscow seeks to establishing lasting contracts. It is important for the Kremlin to have monopoly over the energy sector in Central Asia so that these countries will remain dependent on Russian investments, and so it will therefore be able to sell gas and oil to the West at higher prices with a considerable profit. To an extent, it has managed to buy valuable energy structures and has established contracts with regard to shared production. This accomplishment is only undermined by the fact that none of the states in question have placed their energy sector solely under Russian domination. In fact, all three of them have made effort to diversify their client bases and transit routes vastly. Moscow’s manipulations of foreign energy and resources over the years diminishes its appeal for the Central Asian states, and in the face of Chinese, as well as Indian, South Korean, Japanese and Western competition among others, the Central Asian states would prefer to cooperate with the latter group of investors. These energy-rich states can pursue the policy of their choice, provided they still consider the Russian factor, and therefore may find ways to act autonomously. For example, Kazakhstan has suggested that it plans to increase its oil exports to China through the Atasu-Alashankou pipeline by 2015, and that this should account for no less than 20% of its exports. It also proposed to export 25% of its oil to Europe through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. In the case of Turkmenistan, 30% of gas exports are planned to go to China and to utilize the Trans-Caspian as well as Trans-Afghan pipelines in the near future. In these states, Moscow also has more interests, and therefore cannot adopt extreme strategies that would eventually alienate it from regional cooperation.
Kyrgyzstan, on the other hand, along with Tajikistan, possesses less oil and gas reserves, and with poor economies internally these states are able to retain much less sovereignty in the energy sector. In their case, Moscow is ready to grab every opportunity and fill the investment void with Russian companies. Sariqamish gas resources, Kyrgyzgas and Kyrgyzneftgas are mainly operated by Moscow-dominated policies. Russia has also achieved success in signing a twenty-five year treaty with regard with the exploitation of Kyrgyzstan’s gas reserves.

Economy: Outside Energy Sector

Chinese competition, which has been named as the main factor contributing to declining Russian influence in Central Asia, is most apparent in the economic sector. It was the major trading partner in the region before yet for now this trend does not characterize Russo-Central Asian relations and instead has been replaced by China whose involvement in the region has been increasing over the last decade significantly. According to the WTO and Asian Investment Bank information for 2010, Russian trade within the region amounted to $22 billion while that of China extended to $24 billion.
On the other hand, Russia retains its dominion in the region due to its ability to seize control of the vast number of sectors that are not appealing for Western investors. Moreover, several states, including Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, are indebted to Russia since Soviet times, which gives Russia financial leverage in their agreements. Agriculture, food imports – specially of grain – and various state infrastructures are owned by Russian investors, yet all of these countries express resistance when the Kremlin tries to impose totalitarian dominance over the market. Confrontation with the Turkmenistan government regarding Moscow’s attempt to monopolise the media sphere with its telecom provider MTS confirms that argument.
Besides the Chinese trading partnership, another problem that Russia faces is that of the weak and corrupted political and economic atmosphere in the region, which is apparent in all states except Kazakhstan. This factor has proved to be an obstacle for Russian investments as it causes problems with the functionality, and hence profitability, of the businesses. Struggling with the feeble economic situation in these countries limits Russian financial cooperation with them, while the stronger market of Kazakhstan has its own leverage to resist Moscow’s domination.
Observation of the economic partnership between Russia and Central Asia suggests that the former still has a strong influence on the latter, but that this is diminishing each year. It also suggests that the influence gained over the energy sector derives solely from the economic security needs of the regions and, in some instances, from political games, which are usually halted as soon as the crisis passes by. Moreover, the diversification of customers and markets have enabled these states to act independently from Moscow’s directions, and realizing that none of the Central Asian states possess genuine inclination towards Russian dominance, they seize these opportunities eagerly.

Culture: Language

Besides politics and economy, Moscow has attempted to impose its cultural influence over the region. Similarly to the situation in other spheres, its success has been decreasing, despite the fact that Central Asian countries contain a large number of ethnic Russians. The Russian language has retained most of its influence, most strongly in Kazakhstan, where ethnic Russians comprise 23.7% of the population. For several years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian continued to be the only language spoken at the administrative level, but several attempts have been made to resist cultural leverage, and along with Kazakh language, Russian it is considered as the spoken language in the government, television and among the population. Moreover, English has gained increased credibility among Kazakhs, some of whom have managed to travel in the West and so have immersed themselves in Western culture. Similar opposition was revealed by the Uzbek and Turkmenistan governments, which adopted the Latin script instead of the Cyrillic in order to circumvent post-Soviet cultural dominance. Also, culturally speaking, Tajikistan is a lost cause for Russia, since it has deliberately decreased the importance of the Russian language in its educational and political systems.
Kyrgyzstan is possibly the only state, with 12.5 % of its population consisting of ethnic Russians, whose media is still is dominated by Russian channels.

Conclusion:

In 2011 the Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, in his article “A new Integration Project for Eurasia: A future that is Born Today” expressed the Kremlin’s willingness to re-establish a union that would resemble the Soviet Union in terms of its international relationships. A Post-Imperial understanding of the Kremlin’s foreign policy in Central Asia assumes that Russia is the sole major regional power. Besides conventional belief of domineering neighbour, common interests influence such logic to sustain. Yet, the fact the Moscow implements soft power and usually patient long-term strategies in the region suggests that it has felt its power there weakening, and that it needs to modulate its policies accordingly in order to preserve present authority. Putin has adopted flexible and strategic policies in the region in an effort to revive Russian importance but in the light of current developments his determination has not translated into an explicit success story. Moscow’s mechanisms for retain its position in Central Asia include, first and foremost, the establishment of cultural ties with the ethnic Russians in the region, and secondly, the setting up of multilateral organizations that would assure military, economic and political linkage. The Kremlin has also used its soft as well as (rarely) hard power to influence Central Asian domestic developments. This essay aimed to assess the successes and failures of Russian foreign policy in the region since 2001, within the context of international and regional developments, actors and decision-makers.
An examination of the economic, political and cultural ties between Central Asia and Russia suggests that all of the Central Asian states, act to further their domestic developments with different degrees of independence, while partnership with Russia is limited to tactical and financial interests, with internal, national interests dominating over them. Moreover, all five states have expressed their interest in cooperation with the West and other major powers, with China being the most successful in terms of establishing successful relationships. In spite of strong economic links and shared mutual interest globally as well as regionally, for the Kremlin, Beijing is a threat and a competitor in its geostrategic domain.
Chinese officials constantly emphasize the significance of Central Asia to the Chinese economy and especially to its energy security. For China, the region is considered as a vital resource to support the inexorable course of Chinese development – considering its geographic and economic position, a drift that it is not planning on altering. Despite Sino-Russian cooperation attempts, including that within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, it is unlikely that officials in Beijing will be willing to approve the Kremlin’s plans to establish a Eurasian Union, or enable the latter to pursue the kinds of policies in the region that would be determined by the “Central Asia as Russia’s sphere of influence” logic. Currently, China is a powerful force operating in the region, and it is expected that its established relationships will develop further in the near future, replacing the Russian dominance in Central Asia. Yet, in the face of Western initiatives to become more consistently involved in the region, the prospects for Russian influence might even get worse.
As for Russia itself, neither political and economic leverages nor mutual interests have proven to be effective in increasing its power in the region. Its strategies, whether institutional or financial, have at some junctures provided Russia with short-term influence, but not enough to halt the reduction of its impact in the region. Neither the international arena, comprised of multiple leading powers, nor the relatively liberated systems of Central Asia offer much hope as arenas in which Moscow can remain the key regional player. In 2013, the Russian Council for Foreign Affairs even published a report on Russia’s strategy for Central Asia which suggested that there was a “growing divergence of domestic situations in Central Asia and calls for the lack of regional unity to be addressed by designing Russian strategies on a country-by-country basis”, underlining the fact that Moscow has become one of the many players in the region “thereby admitting that the region is now multipolar in nature”.

Post- US withdrawal from Afghanistan:

Another important factor to consider while analysing Russian foreign policy in Central Asia is the post-2014 US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Leaders in Moscow have already made statements to the effect that Russia’s role as a provider of security in the region should be increased since the US and Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) plan to reduce their military activities in Afghanistan. Security concerns regarding the post-2014 withdrawal have been emphasized by the leaders of Central Asian states as well, especially by the leaders of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, considering that those three states border Afghanistan directly. They fear that Central Asian Jihadists that fled to Pakistan after US intervention in Afghanistan, and, especially, members of Uzbekistan’s most vehement Islamic Movement, IMU, might look to the region as a potential area in which to exercise their own influence. Uzbek and Kazakh foreign ministers, along with Tajik president Emomali Rakmon, have characterized the issue as a “matter of deepest concern”. The threat of arms, human and narcotics trafficking as well as the spillover effects of Islamic radicalism are emphasized as the realistic threats that Moscow will aim to counter within the Central Asian states. In October 2012, Deputy Prime Minister of Russia, Dmitry Rogozin noted during his visit in India that: “Thousands of terrorists and fundamentalists will seek refuge in Afghanistan as well as the region around the country.” Moscow is prepared to refill the vacuum that will be created by the US withdrawal and to exploit this chance to extend its own influence in its backyard. In its Foreign Policy Concept of 2013, Russia indeed prioritized these very issues: “Russia will build up cooperation with the CIS Member States in ensuring mutual security, including joint efforts to combat common challenges and threats, primarily international terrorism, extremism, drug trafficking, transnational crime, and illegal migration. Priorities here are the neutralization of the above-mentioned threats coming from the territory of Afghanistan and the prevention of destabilization of the situation in Central Asia and Transcaucasia.” The document also emphasizes the importance of a Eurasian Economic Union. Along with political rhetoric, military base deals and bilateral training arrangements in which the CSTO’s utilities were widely utilized are some of the strategies that have already been implemented. Whether exaggerated or not for political purposes, the threats after US withdrawal from Afghanistan are real. Nevertheless much depends on the internal progress in Afghanistan itself, since there is a strong sense that the more stability that can be imposed there, the less severe the threat to Central Asia will be. Whatever happens in the region, whether Russia will benefit is still doubtful. The Kremlin has sought over the years to find ways to get American troops to leave bases in Central Asia, and US presence in Afghanistan was largely disapproved of in recent years.
Yet, the US withdrawal might be even more threatening and risky as they have previously expected. As Dr. Anar Valiyev, Dean of International Affairs at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy, stated “They [Russia] are happy that the Americans are leaving without understanding that the Americans leaving is bad for the Russians also…Sooner or later something will happen in Afghanistan and spill over, and Russia will not be able to contain it,” and that, “The enemy that comes after the Americans will be much worse than the Americans themselves.” It is largely questionable whether Russia, with its reduced resources and its domestic problems, can attain the status of the main security guarantor in the region. Weak and corrupted governments in most of the Central Asia, coupled with increased extremist spillover threat from Afghanistan cannot be countered solely by Russian military, political or economic resources. Furthermore, considering the fact that the same threats that Central Asia faces after US withdrawal will certainly affect Russian territory, at least in terms of increasing drug trafficking, for Moscow the most appropriate foreign policy is probably to seek the balance as a security provider, and again if not the Western than Chinese aid might prove to be necessary inconsiderate of what Central Asian state leaders wish for. The future will tell, and as mentioned above, several factors will affect the development of events. For now, it seems that Russia is losing its influence in the region, and that if it risks trying to reverse this trend by taking advantage of the power vacuum left after US withdrawal from Afghanistan, it may even be taking on an obligation that it will not be able to handle.

Bibliography:

Lapidus, Gail W. 2001. “Central Asia in Russian and American Foreign Policy after September 11, 2001.” Soviet Studies: the Caucasus and Central Asia Program; and the Institute of International Studies at UC Berkeley. IT: (Lapidus 2001)
Deyermond, Ruth. 2009. “Matrioshka hegemony? Multi-levelled hegemonic competition and security in post-Soviet Central Asia.” Review of International Studies, Vol. 35, No. 1: 151 - 173. IT: (Deyermond 2009)
Mankoff, Jeffrey. 2009. Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics. United States: Rowman & Littlefield Press. IT: (Mankoff 2009)
Mankoff, Jeffrey. 2007. “Russia and the West: Taking the Longer View,” Washington Quarterly 30, no. 2 : 123–35.
Mankoff, Jeffrey. 2008. “Russian Foreign Policy and the United States After Putin.” Council on Foreign Relations. IT (Mankoff 2008)
Kazantsev, Andrei. 2008. "Russian Policy in Central Asia and the Caspian Sea Region." Europe-Asia Studies 60, no. 6: 1073-1088. It( Kazantsev 2008) Kazantsev, Andrei. 2009. Russian Policy in Central Asia and the Caspian Region. In Power and Policy in Putin’s Russia. Edited by Richard Sakwa. Oxon: Routledge. It( Kazantsev 2009)
Donaldson, Robert , and Joseph L. Noggee.2009. The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing Systems, Enduring Interests. US: M.E. Sharpe Inc. it( Donaldson and Noggee 2009)
Aris, Stephen. 2009. Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO): Tackling the Three Evils. Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 61, Issue 3: 457–482.
Pawar, Monika. 2011. Russia’s Foreign Policy Towards Central Asia Under President Vladimir Putin. International Referred Research Journal Vol 3. 27: 41-42. Bohr, Annette. 2010. Central Asia: Responding to the Multi-Vectoring Game. In America and a Changed World: A Question of Leadership. London: Blackwell.
Balci, Bayaram. 2013. “The Myth of Rising Radical Islamism in Post-2014 Central Asia.” World Politics Review. http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/13459/the-myth-of-rising-radical-islamism-in-post-2014-central-asia It( Bayaram 2013)
Rashid, Ahmed. 2014. “Central Asian states must unite to halt the spread of jihadism.” Financial Times. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/457d3c1a-7eb0-11e3-8642-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2x5MNF05i it (Rashid 2014)

Centre for Policy Studies (CPS).2013. Russian and Central Asian perspectives on post- 2014 Afghanistan and Regional Stability. http://ww3.comsats.edu.pk/cps/proceedings/round_table_discussion.pdf it( CPS 2013)
15)Ipek, Pinar: 2008. “The role of oil and gas in Kazakhstan's foreign policy: Looking east or west?, Europe-Asia Studies, 59:7: 1179-1199. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09668130701607144 it( Pinar 2008)
O’Malley, William and Roger N. McDermott. 2003. “Kyrgyzstan’s Security Tightrope: Balancing its Relations With Moscow and Washington.” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 3:16. http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/Kyrgystan/Kyrgystan.htm it( O’Malley and McDermott 2003)
Peyrouse, Sebastian. 2007. “The Economic Aspects of the Chinese-Central-Asia Rapprochement,” Central Asia-Caucasus Institute. http://www.isdp.eu/images/stories/isdp-main-pdf/2007_peyrouse_economic-aspects-of-the-chinese-central-asia-rapprochement.pdf 18) Voloshin, Georgiy. 2012. “Russia’s Eurasian Union: A Bid for Hegemony?”. Geopolitical Monitor. http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/russias-eurasian-union-a-bid-for-hegemony-4730/ 19)Lo, Bobo. 2004. “The Long Sunset of Strategic Partnership: Russia's Evolving China Policy.” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) , Vol. 80, No. 2: 295-309. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3569243 it( Bobo Lo 2004)
20) Lo, Bobo. 2008. Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing, and the New Geopolitics. London: chatham House.
21) Ambrosio, Thomas. 2004. Challenging America's Global Preeminence: Russia's Quest For Multipolarity. US: Ashgate Publishing Company.
22) Kim, Younkyoo and Fabio Indeo. 2013. “The new great game in Central Asia post 2014: The US “New Silk Road” strategy and Sino-Russian rivalry.” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 46-2: 275–286. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0967067X13000147 23) Cooley, Alexander. 2012. "The New Great Game in Central Asia." Foreign Affairs. .
24) Overland, Indra., Heidi Kjaernet and Andrea kendall-Taylor, edit. 2009. Caspian Energy Politics Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. London: Routledge Press.
25) Laurelle, Marlene and Sebastien Peyrouse. 2012. “Regional Organisations in Central Asia: Patterns of Interaction, Dilemmas of Efficiency.” University of Central Asia’s Institute of Public Policy and Administration Working Paper No. 1. http://www.ucentralasia.org/downloads/UCA-IPPA-WP-10-RegionalOrganizations.pdf 26) Robert, John. 2011. Pipeline Politics: The Caspian and Global Energy Security.
27) Pfeifer, Sylvia. 2013. “Oil and gas: Pipeline politics debate hots up.” Financial Times. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2453b9ae-30f1-11e3-b991-00144feab7de.html#axzz2x5MNF05i 28) Achilov, Dilshod. 2012. “The New Central Asia: The Regional Impact of International Actors.” Europe-Asia Studies 64.7: 1331-1332. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09668136.2012.701384 29) Russian Foreign Policy Concept. 2013. http://www.mid.ru/ns-osndoc.nsf/1e5f0de28fe77fdcc32575d900298676/869c9d2b87ad8014c32575d9002b1c38?OpenDocument 30) Nixey, James. 2012. “The Long Goodbye: Waning Russian Influence in the South Caucasus and Central Asia.” Chatham House.
http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/184065

Similar Documents

Premium Essay

Financial Institutions

...used for managing various risk exposures, including foreign exchange, interest rate, and credit risks. By allowing investors to unbundle and transfer these risks, derivatives contribute to a more efficient allocation of capital, in many cases reduce market and portfolio volatility, facilitate cross-border capital flows, and create more opportunities for portfolio diversification. Despite rapid growth over the past several years, Emerging Market (EM) derivatives account for only about 10 percent of the total outstanding notional values in global derivatives markets. Compared to mature markets, the ratio of outstanding notional value of derivatives to market capitalization of the underlying asset markets is fairly small in most emerging economies and is mainly focused on sovereign risks. The most common issues that challenge the development of local derivatives markets are (i) relatively underdeveloped markets for the underlying assets; (ii) lack of adequate regulatory, legal and market infrastructure, and (iii) restrictions on the use of derivatives by local and foreign entities.2 The problem of misuse of derivatives is perceived to be more acute in emerging market countries where prudential regulation, credit information infrastructure, and risk management practices are not fully developed and maybe in conflict with reasonable economic, investment or portfolio objectives. This note provides a background for a discussion on policy measures to promote the benefits of derivative......

Words: 4021 - Pages: 17

Premium Essay

The European Union and Its Power over Opinion: What Can Belarus Tell Us About the European Identity?

...Page 30 Conclusion Page 49 Bibliography Page 52 Abstract Europe has embarked upon an unprecedented process of state integration witnessing the widespread deferral of policy making to intergovernmental institutions. The European Union’s institutionalism has facilitated an assimilation of values into an increasingly coherent, if complex regional identity. A normative self-conception has emerged that Brussels has sought to project onto its external relations through the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Brussels increasingly considers itself a transformative actor in global politics offering an alternative to great power realpolitik. This paper finds that while European multilateralism offers an environment conducive to a normative foreign policy, the extent to which it is able to exert any ideational influence is constrained by the level of engagement it is willing to pursue. Europe maintains a policy of isolating the Lukashenko regime and has failed to engage Belarusian civil society. As a result it has had a negligible impact on Belarusian political culture. Europe’s failure to adequately engage Belarus also suggests a contradiction within the European identity construction. Introduction Since the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Europe has sought to play an increasingly active role in global affairs. It has demonstrated a growing confidence in its unique political union that has, so far, resisted being......

Words: 13537 - Pages: 55

Premium Essay

World Investment Report 2013

...U N I T E D N AT I O N S C O N F E R E N C E O N T R A D E A N D D E V E L O P M E N T WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2013 GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS: INVESTMENT AND TRADE FOR DEVELOPMENT New York and Geneva, 2013 ii World Investment Report 2013: Global Value Chains: Investment and Trade for Development NOTE The Division on Investment and Enterprise of UNCTAD is a global centre of excellence, dealing with issues related to investment and enterprise development in the United Nations System. It builds on four decades of experience and international expertise in research and policy analysis, intergovernmental consensusbuilding, and provides technical assistance to over 150 countries. The terms country/economy as used in this Report also refer, as appropriate, to territories or areas; the designations employed and the presentation of the material do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. In addition, the designations of country groups are intended solely for statistical or analytical convenience and do not necessarily express a judgment about the stage of development reached by a particular country or area in the development process. The major country groupings used in this Report follow the classification of the United Nations Statistical Office. These......

Words: 156671 - Pages: 627

Premium Essay

World Investment Report

...U N I T E D N AT I O N S C O N F E R E N C E O N T R A D E A N D D E V E L O P M E N T WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2013 GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS: INVESTMENT AND TRADE FOR DEVELOPMENT New York and Geneva, 2013 ii World Investment Report 2013: Global Value Chains: Investment and Trade for Development NOTE The Division on Investment and Enterprise of UNCTAD is a global centre of excellence, dealing with issues related to investment and enterprise development in the United Nations System. It builds on four decades of experience and international expertise in research and policy analysis, intergovernmental consensusbuilding, and provides technical assistance to over 150 countries. The terms country/economy as used in this Report also refer, as appropriate, to territories or areas; the designations employed and the presentation of the material do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. In addition, the designations of country groups are intended solely for statistical or analytical convenience and do not necessarily express a judgment about the stage of development reached by a particular country or area in the development process. The major country groupings used in this Report follow the classification of the United Nations Statistical Office. These......

Words: 156671 - Pages: 627

Premium Essay

Globalization and Its Discontinents

...F u r t h e r Praise for Globalization and Its Discontents " Development and economics are not about statistics. Rather, they a re about lives and jobs. Stiglitz never forgets that there are people at t he end of these policies, and that the success of a policy should be d efined not by h o w fast international banks are repaid, but by h o w m u c h people have to eat, and by h o w much better it makes their lives." — Christian Science Monitor " [An] urgently important new book." — Boston Globe " Whatever your opinions, you will be engaged by Stiglitz's sharp i nsights for a provocative reform agenda to reshape globalization. A m ust read for those concerned about the future, w h o believe that a w orld of decent work is possible and want to avert a collision course b etween the haves and the have nots." —Juan Somavia, d irector-general of the International Labour Organization " [Stiglitz s] rare mix of academic achievement and policy experience m akes Globalization and Its Discontents w orth r e a d i n g . . . . His passion a nd directness are a breath of fresh air given the usual circumlocutions of economists." — BusinessWeek " T h i s smart, provocative study contributes significantly to the o n g o i n g globalization debate and provides a m o d e l of analytical r igor c o n c e r n i n g the process of assisting countries facing the challenges of e c o n o m i c development and transformation. . . . Impassioned, balanced and i n f...

Words: 144836 - Pages: 580

Premium Essay

Promises Not Kept

...India ' Penguin Group (NZ), Cnr Airborne and Rosedale Roads, Albany, Auckland 1310, NewZealand (a division of Pearson New Zealand Ltd) - Penguin Books (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd, 24 Sturdee Avenue, Rosebank, Johannesburg 2196, South Africa Penguin Books Ltd, Registered Offices: 80 Strand, London WC2R ORL, England First published in 2005 by The Penguin Press, a member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc. Copyright ©Jeffrey D. Sachs, 2005 All rights reserved Page 397 constitutes an extension of this copyright page, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING IN PUBLICATION DATA Sachs, Jeffrey. The e n d of poverty / Jeffrey Sachs. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-59420-045-9 1. Poverty—Developing countries. 2. Developing countries—Economic policy. 3. Developing countries—Economic conditions. 4. Economic assistance—Developing countries. I. title. HC59.72.P6S225 2005 339.4'6'091724—dc22 2004065942 This book is printed on acid-free paper. @ Printed in the United States of America 13 5 79 BY 10 MAUNA 8 6 4 2 EICHNER DESIGNED Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of this publication maybe...

Words: 154314 - Pages: 618

Free Essay

Impact of Industrial Policy

...ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMISSION FOR WESTERN ASIA (ESCWA) IMPACT OF INDUSTRIAL POLICIES ON THE COMPETITIVENESS OF SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES United Nations Distr. GENERAL E/ESCWA/SDPD/2007/7 11 December 2007 ORIGINAL: ENGLISH ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMISSION FOR WESTERN ASIA (ESCWA) IMPACT OF INDUSTRIAL POLICIES ON THE COMPETITIVENESS OF SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES United Nations New York, 2007 The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Mention of firm names and commercial products does not imply the endorsement of the United Nations. References have, wherever possible, been verified. Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document. 07-0488 Preface This study has been prepared by the secretariat of the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) as part of its regular programme of work for the 2006-2007 biennium. The study draws upon work that ESCWA is implementing within the framework of harnessing technology and enterprise development for the improved productivity of small and medium-sized enterprises, with a view......

Words: 41252 - Pages: 166

Free Essay

2004 Un Article Multiculturalism

...HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2004 Cultural Liberty in Today’s Diverse World Accommodating people’s growing demands for their inclusion in society, for respect of their ethnicity, religion, and language, takes more than democracy and equitable growth. Also needed are multicultural policies that recognize differences, champion diversity and promote cultural freedoms, so that all people can choose to speak their language, practice their religion, and participate in shaping their culture— so that all people can choose to be who they are. 65 108 166 55 34 82 3 14 91 51 40 138 29 62 6 99 161 134 114 66 128 72 33 56 175 173 130 141 4 105 169 167 43 94 73 136 144 168 45 163 48 52 30 32 Albania Algeria Angola Antigua and Barbuda Argentina Armenia Australia Austria Azerbaijan Bahamas Bahrain Bangladesh Barbados Belarus Belgium Belize Benin Bhutan Bolivia Bosnia and Herzegovina Botswana Brazil Brunei Darussalam Bulgaria Burkina Faso Burundi Cambodia Cameroon Canada Cape Verde Central African Republic Chad Chile China Colombia Comoros Congo Congo, Dem. Rep. of the Costa Rica Côte d'Ivoire Croatia Cuba Cyprus Czech Republic 17 154 95 98 100 120 103 109 156 36 170 81 13 16 122 155 97 19 131 24 93 121 160 172 104 153 115 23 38 7 127 111 101 10 22 21 79 9 90 78 148 28 44 110 135 50 80 Denmark Djibouti Dominica Dominican Republic Ecuador Egypt El Salvador Equatorial Guinea Eritrea Estonia Ethiopia Fiji Finland France Gabon Gambia Georgia Germany Ghana Greece Grenada Guatemala Guinea...

Words: 113315 - Pages: 454

Free Essay

One Significant Change That Has Occurred in the World Between 1900 and 2005. Explain the Impact This Change Has Made on Our Lives and Why It Is an Important Change.

...E SSAYS ON TWENTIETH-C ENTURY H ISTORY In the series Critical Perspectives on the Past, edited by Susan Porter Benson, Stephen Brier, and Roy Rosenzweig Also in this series: Paula Hamilton and Linda Shopes, eds., Oral History and Public Memories Tiffany Ruby Patterson, Zora Neale Hurston and a History of Southern Life Lisa M. Fine, The Story of Reo Joe: Work, Kin, and Community in Autotown, U.S.A. Van Gosse and Richard Moser, eds., The World the Sixties Made: Politics and Culture in Recent America Joanne Meyerowitz, ed., History and September 11th John McMillian and Paul Buhle, eds., The New Left Revisited David M. Scobey, Empire City: The Making and Meaning of the New York City Landscape Gerda Lerner, Fireweed: A Political Autobiography Allida M. Black, ed., Modern American Queer History Eric Sandweiss, St. Louis: The Evolution of an American Urban Landscape Sam Wineburg, Historical Thinking and Other Unnatural Acts: Charting the Future of Teaching the Past Sharon Hartman Strom, Political Woman: Florence Luscomb and the Legacy of Radical Reform Michael Adas, ed., Agricultural and Pastoral Societies in Ancient and Classical History Jack Metzgar, Striking Steel: Solidarity Remembered Janis Appier, Policing Women: The Sexual Politics of Law Enforcement and the LAPD Allen Hunter, ed., Rethinking the Cold War Eric Foner, ed., The New American History. Revised and Expanded Edition E SSAYS ON _ T WENTIETH- C ENTURY H ISTORY Edited......

Words: 163893 - Pages: 656

Premium Essay

Second Languages and Australian Schooling

...Australian Education Review Second Languages and Australian Schooling Joseph Lo Bianco with Yvette Slaughter Australian Council for Educational Research First published 2009 by ACER Press Australian Council for Educational Research 19 Prospect Hill Road, Camberwell, Victoria, 3124 Copyright © 2009 Australian Council for Educational Research All rights reserved. Except under the conditions described in the Copyright Act 1968 of Australia and subsequent amendments, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the written permission of the publishers. Edited by Carolyn Glascodine Cover illustration by ACER Project Publishing Typeset by ACER Project Publishing Printed by BPA Print Group National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry Author: Title: ISBN: Series: Notes: Subjects: Lo Bianco, Joseph. Second languages and Australian schooling / Joseph Lo Bianco ; Yvette Slaughter. 9780864318374 (pbk) Australian education review ; 54. Bibliography. Language and languages--Study and teaching--Australia. Language and languages--Study and teaching—Bilingual method. Education, Bilingual--Australia. Other Authors/Contributors: Slaughter, Yvette. Australian Council for Educational Research. Dewey Number: 370.11750994 Visit our website: www.acer.edu.au Acknowledgment The Author and Series Editor wish to acknowledge the......

Words: 42730 - Pages: 171

Free Essay

2009-Report to Congress of the Us-China E and S Review Commission

...2009 REPORT TO CONGRESS of the U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION NOVEMBER 2009 Printed for the use of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.uscc.gov dkrause on GSDDPC29 with K1 VerDate Nov 24 2008 08:23 Nov 10, 2009 Jkt 052771 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6012 Sfmt 6602 M:\USCC\2009\52771.XXX APPS06 PsN: 52771 M:\USCC\USChina.eps Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 2. REPORT TYPE 01 NOV 2009 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 00-00-2009 to......

Words: 185166 - Pages: 741

Premium Essay

Blah

...III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RICE UNIVERSITY PETRONAS: A NATIONAL OIL COMPANY WITH AN INTERNATIONAL VISION BY DR. FRED R. VON DER MEHDEN RICE UNIVERSITY WITH AL TRONER ASIA PACIFIC ENERGY CONSULTING PREPARED IN CONJUNCTION WITH AN ENERGY STUDY SPONSORED BY THE JAMES A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY AND JAPAN PETROLEUM ENERGY CENTER RICE UNIVERSITY – MARCH 2007 THIS PAPER WAS WRITTEN BY A RESEARCHER (OR RESEARCHERS) WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE JOINT BAKER INSTITUTE/JAPAN PETROLEUM ENERGY CENTER POLICY REPORT, THE CHANGING ROLE OF NATIONAL OIL COMPANIES IN INTERNATIONAL ENERGY MARKETS. WHEREVER FEASIBLE, THIS PAPER HAS BEEN REVIEWED BY OUTSIDE EXPERTS BEFORE RELEASE. HOWEVER, THE RESEARCH AND THE VIEWS EXPRESSED WITHIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL RESEARCHER(S) AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF THE JAMES A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY NOR THOSE OF THE JAPAN PETROLEUM ENERGY CENTER. © 2007 BY THE JAMES A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY OF RICE UNIVERSITY THIS MATERIAL MAY BE QUOTED OR REPRODUCED WITHOUT PRIOR PERMISSION, PROVIDED APPROPRIATE CREDIT IS GIVEN TO THE AUTHOR AND THE JAMES A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY ABOUT THE POLICY REPORT THE CHANGING ROLE OF NATIONAL OIL COMPANIES IN INTERNATIONAL ENERGY MARKETS Of world proven oil reserves of 1,148 billion barrels, approximately 77% of these resources are under the control of national oil companies (NOCs) with no equity participation by foreign, international oil......

Words: 12179 - Pages: 49

Free Essay

China Fragile Superpower

...China Fragile Superpower This page intentionally left blank Fragile Superpower Susan L. Shirk China 2007 Oxford University Press, Inc., publishes works that further Oxford University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education. Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offices in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Copyright © 2007 by Susan L. Shirk Published by Oxford University Press, Inc. 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016 www.oup.com Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of Oxford University Press. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Shirk, Susan L. China: fragile superpower / by Susan L. Shirk. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-19-530609-5 1. Nationalism—China. 2. China—Politics and government—2002– I. Title. JC311.S525 2007 320.951—dc22 2006027998 135798642 Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper For Sam, Lucy, and David Popkin This page intentionally......

Words: 135807 - Pages: 544

Premium Essay

Japan Economy

...MONETARY POLICY AND THE DEFLATION PROBLEM Takatoshi Ito Frederic S. Mishkin Working Paper 10878 http://www.nber.org/papers/w10878 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138 October 2004 This paper is written for the NBER 15th East Asian Seminar on Economics, June 25-27, 2004. The authors are grateful to Takeshi Kudo and Emilia Simeonova for their excellent research assistance. We also thank our discussants Ken Kuttner, and Kazuo Ueda, Kunio Okina and participants at seminars at the Bank of Japan, and the East Asian Seminar on Economics. Any views expressed in this paper are the views of the authors only and not the University of Tokyo, Columbia University or the National Bureau of Economic Research. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the National Bureau of Economic Research. © 2004 by Takatoshi Ito and Frederic S. Mishkin. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source. Two Decades of Japanese Monetary Policy and the Deflation Problem Takatoshi Ito and Frederic S. Mishkin NBER Working Paper No. 10878 October 2004 JEL No. E42, E52, E58 ABSTRACT This paper reviews Japanese monetary policy over the last two decades with an emphasis on the experience of deflation from the mid-1990s. The paper is quite critical of the conduct of monetary policy,......

Words: 31497 - Pages: 126

Free Essay

Cams

...Study Guide for the Certification Examination Fifth Edition ACAMS.org ACAMS.org/español ACAMSToday.org MoneyLaundering.com Study Guide for the Certification Examination Fifth Edition a publication of the association of certified anti-money laundering specialists Study Guide for the Certification Examination Fifth Edition Executive Vice President John J. Byrne, CAMS Editor Robert S. Pasley, CAMS Co-Editor Kevin M. Anderson, CAMS Contributors Joyce Broome, CAMS Heather Brown, CAMS Aub Chapman, CAMS Vasilios Chrisos, CAMS David Clark, CAMS Jurgen Egberink, CAMS Michael D. Kelsey, CAMS Saskia Rietbroek, CAMS Nancy J. Saur, CAMS Mansoor Siddiqi, CAMS Daniel Soto, CAMS Timothy White CAMS Production Assistant Catalina Martinez We would like acknowledge the following individuals for their contributions to the CAMS Exam, and the Online and Live Preparation Seminars: Kevin M. Anderson, CAMS Joyce Broome, CAMS Aub Chapman, CAMS David Clark, CAMS Josue Garcia, CAMS Hoi Luk, CAMS Ira Morales Mickunas, CAMS Robert S. Pasley, CAMS Karim Rajwani, CAMS Mansoor Siddiqi, CAMS Saskia Rietbroek, CAMS Ed Rodriguez, CAMS Nancy J. Saur, CAMS Wendy Steichen, CAMS Brian J. Stoeckert, CAMS Charles Taylor, CAMS Will Voorhees, CAMS Natalie Ware, CAMS Peter Warrack, CAMS Amy Wotapka, CAMS Crispin Yuen, CAMS Copyright © 2012 by the Association of Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialists (ACAMS). Miami, USA. All......

Words: 105184 - Pages: 421